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Abstract 
High anxiety may relate to the enhanced processing of threat-related stimuli, 
enhanced cognitive distraction, and/or altered conflict resolution. It was the purpose 
of this thesis to carry out a series of behavioural experiments designed to tap into 
these neuro-cognitive functions. Facial stimuli were used in computerised reaction 
time experiments. Personality traits were assessed using psychometric measures. The 
primary aim of this thesis was to determine how trait anxiety (and social anxiety) 
relates to the recognition of emotional facial expressions, how trait anxiety relates to 
distraction by other emotional faces (or emotional words) when identifying 
emotional facial expressions, how trait anxiety relates to differences in how 
emotional conflict resolution is achieved, and to determine how trait anxiety relates 
to other personality traits. Moreover this work aimed to develop a novel emotional 
face conflict resolution paradigm that is grounded in neuroscientific theory.  
Results showed that high trait and social anxiety are (differentially) related to the 
enhanced processing of threat-related faces, but provided no evidence that trait 
anxiety is related to distraction caused by peripheral emotional faces (threat-related 
or otherwise). However, we found a very specific distracting effect of happy words 
that was related to trait anxiety. We found that trait anxiety was somewhat related to 
conflict resolution but further work is required before this relationship can be 
properly understood. These results are discussed in detail, in relation to established 
theories of anxiety.  
 
My original contribution to knowledge is a detailed analysis of how sub-clinical 
levels of anxiety relate to emotional face discrimination, emotional distraction (when 
emotional face discrimination is required), and emotional conflict resolution (when 
emotional face discrimination is required). My original contribution to knowledge is 
also a detailed examination of how sub-clinical anxiety relates to other personality 
constructs, and the development of a novel but scientifically grounded emotional 
face flanker task. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The study of emotion and cognition 
 
The body contains complex integrated systems that interact to sustain life (LeDoux, 
2012). Darwin (1872) proposed that a limited set of basic emotions are present 
across species and across cultures that are critical for survival. Further biological 
theorising led to James (1884) proposing that emotions were simply the experiential 
component of felt bodily changes that occur in response to affective stimuli being 
present in one’s immediate environment. Lange (1885) proposed similar ideas at 
around the same time, and the two perspectives became known as the James-Lange 
theory of emotion. Despite some criticism from Cannon (1927, 1931), the James-
Lange theory has remained influential. Most contemporary neuroscience approaches 
to the study of emotion adopt a modified James-Lange perspective suggesting that 
feedback from bodily changes modulates how emotion is experienced (see Dalgleish, 
2004; for review). Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi and Damasio (2006) asked participants 
to recall and experience potent autobiographical emotional experiences relating to 
fear, anger, sadness and happiness. Each of these induced basic emotions were 
related to distinct recordings of cardiorespiratory activity relative to a neutral control 
condition. Although the study by Rainville et al. investigated biological activity and 
emotion, it also required participants to think, and thus required cognition.  
Cognition refers to functions such as attention, memory, problem solving, language, 
and planning (Pessoa, 2008). These functions often require controlled processes such 
as inhibiting interference during the pursuit of any goal. Pre-historic humans will 
have required ‘executive control’ processes such as planning and response inhibition 
for tool making and agriculture (Ardila, 2008), which are the foundations of modern 
human society. Planning, response inhibition and response activation processes in 
humans are complemented by other ‘executive control’ processes, such as 
performance monitoring (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004a), dual task performance, task 
switching, and selective attention (Baddeley, 1996). Some of these ‘executive 
control’ process are often further delineated and described as ‘cognitive control’ 
processes. Cognitive control processes generally refer to the ability to select aspects 
of any situation that are goal relevant, whilst ignoring goal irrelevant stimulation 
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(e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Thus, this may entail micro-
level adjustments in cognitive and behavioural responses in order to maintain any 
goal directed behaviour. 
Situations requiring executive control / cognitive control will often not be 
emotionally neutral in nature. Everyday visual stimuli often have emotional 
significance which affects perception and cognitive control (Pessoa, 2009). Ardila 
(2008) suggests that ‘executive functions’ can be dichotomised into meta-cognitive 
functions (eg. planning, attention, etc.), and emotional/motivational functions that 
co-ordinate emotion and cognition. This interaction of emotion and cognition also 
involves inhibitory processes. For example, social situations require inhibition of 
basic impulses that may be selfish or unacceptable (Ardila, 2008).  
Emotions are harder to define than cognition, as cognition and emotion interact (for 
review see Pessoa, 2008). Definitions of emotion often revolve around the concepts 
of drive and motivation leading to reward or punishment (e.g., Rolls, 2005), or 
conscious/unconscious evaluations or appraisals of events (e.g., Arnold, 1960). 
Some theoretical perspectives focus upon ‘basic’ emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1972; 
1992). The most well-known list of basic emotions contains the emotions referred to 
as fear, anger, happiness, sadness, disgust and surprise (Ekman, 1972). The term 
basic emotions refers to emotions that are discrete and have evolved through 
adaptation to the species’ surroundings (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). It is noteworthy 
that the list of proposed ‘basic’ emotions has also grown since the initial concept, 
and now includes surprise and contempt (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). Ekman and 
Cordaro also suggest that they expect to find evidence for several other rewarding 
emotions including amusement, relief, wonder, ecstasy, excitement, and sensory 
pleasure. Other perspectives upon emotion extend the emotions of interest to include 
those pertaining to morality such as envy and pride (e.g., Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-
Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Haidt, 2003).  Ekman and Cordaro suggest that 
any biological appraisal system and/or cognitive appraisal system for the basic 
emotions must function very quickly (as the stimulation to emotion onset interval 
can be very short). Thus, they suggest that these appraisal systems must often 
function either automatically, or very near automatically, although there will be 
exceptions when conscious appraisal and reasoning is required.  
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Izard (2007) suggests that the basic emotions can be considered ‘natural kinds’. Izard 
defines the term natural kinds as a category of related phenomena that have been 
provided by nature and have properties that are observably similar (i.e., they are 
significantly alike in some way). Izard suggests that the basic emotions of happiness, 
interest, sadness, disgust, anger, and fear all meet the relevant criteria for the 
classification of natural kinds. In contrast, Izard suggests that ‘emotional schemas’ 
are not natural kinds. Izard suggest that the basic emotions become entwined with 
their related cognitive components, and as such form emotional schemas. These 
schemas cannot be classed as natural kinds as they contain a person’s appraisals and 
higher level cognitions. Izard suggests that any emotional schemas that frequently 
occur could be construed as emotional traits, or at least the motivational constituents 
of personality traits. Izard continues by suggesting that there is never any such entity 
as an emotionless mind, as affect is always present. From this perspective all mental 
functions are in some way influenced by the always present emotion. From this 
perspective, research would focus upon how any ongoing emotional state is replaced 
by (or integrated with) a different emotional state, as opposed to focusing upon how 
any emotional state is activated.  
It has previously been proposed that at some point during information processing, 
emotion and cognition eventually equally and conjointly contribute to the way a 
person controls their thoughts and behaviour (Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002). 
Whereas the study by Gray et al. concerned memory performance and mood state, 
Pessoa (2008) suggests that this merging of emotion and cognition would occur in a 
vast selection of situations. Pessoa thus suggests that although emotions and 
cognitions are partly distinct, integration of the two processes often takes place 
which blurs distinguishing between them. Pessoa suggests that behaviour is 
produced via the orchestration of activity in several brain regions. From this 
perspective it is the aggregated functions of these brain regions that facilitate 
emotion and cognition.  
LeDoux (2012) adopts a different perspective on emotion from that of those who 
advocate the ‘basic emotions’ approach. LeDoux suggests that differentiating 
between the basic emotions is problematic, whereas evidence that they have 
separable neural mechanisms is also weak. LeDoux proposes that the study of 
emotion should move away from trying to understand the felt experience of emotion, 
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and focus upon studying what he terms the survival circuits in the brain. Brain 
functions that are life-sustaining facilitate behavioural responses to the environment. 
LeDoux distinguishes between the traditional idea of basic emotion circuits and 
survival circuits; basic emotion circuits are supposed to explain the feelings 
associated with whatever each circuit is responsible for. In contrast, survival circuits 
are not directly related to feelings, instead they modulate behaviour-environment 
interactions (which can indirectly influence felt experiences). The critical point here 
is the function of a survival circuit is to control behaviour when opportunities and 
challenges are present, not simply to create feelings. LeDoux continues by 
suggesting that survival circuits aid an organism’s survival by organising the 
functions of the brain. Once activated, specific categories of responses are inhibited 
whereas other categories of responses rise in priority. Moreover, brain and body 
arousal levels are increased, the focus of attention is directed to survival relevant 
stimuli (both external and internal), and motivational and learning systems will be 
activated. LeDoux summarises the function of these survival circuits as “sensory-
motor integrative devices that serve specific adaptive purposes” (p. 655). 
LeDoux (2012) also proposes that these survival circuits may be triggered by past 
experience, be innate, and genetically predetermined in early development. 
Therefore, although not discussed in any detail, this theoretical viewpoint does allow 
for individual differences in the reactivity of these survival circuits. The most 
common trigger of a survival circuit would be any stimuli that signal potential harm. 
This could also be a learned trigger and not be innate. Either learned or innate 
triggers would suffice to trigger a defence response. LeDoux draws attention to 
research showing that fearful and aggressive faces are a strong defence trigger (e.g., 
Adolphs, 2008). LeDoux also incorporates an information processing explanation, as 
humans are able to recognise some emotions by partial facial expression features 
such as the eyes (e.g., Whalen et al., 2004), which could be a learned trigger.  
One could attempt to amalgamate the perspective of LeDoux (2012) and the 
perspective of Izard (2007). For example, Izard suggests that the mind is never 
without emotion, and that emotional states are simply replaced with (or integrated 
with) other emotional states. From the perspective of LeDoux it would seem likely 
that any triggered survival circuit activity would replace (or be integrated with) the 
activity of any previously active circuit. The emotional schemas described by Izard 
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are likely to contain memories of past experiences, the cognitions preceding the 
onset of the triggered survival circuit response, and any felt emotions that relate to 
the emotional survival circuit being triggered. LeDoux suggests that more research is 
required concerning how external stimuli operate as triggers for the survival circuits. 
Anxiety is triggered by uncertainty and anticipation concerning possible future 
threat-related situations (e.g., Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). In healthy adults there is a 
lot of variability in the magnitude of a person’s responses to emotional stimulation, 
and how a person regulates those responses (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Moreover, 
many manifestations of psychopathology are also based upon deficits in the adaptive 
regulation of emotional responses. This can lead to personal distress and self-
destructive behaviours (e.g., Gross & Munoz, 1995; Davidson, 2000). Therefore it is 
important that researchers and clinicians begin to understand more fully how 
personality and individual differences affect the cognitive control of emotion. 
 
1.2. The study of personality - Eysenck’s trait theory  
 
Eysenck (1967) postulated two main personality super-traits. One of these super-
traits was a measure of sociability which placed extraversion and introversion at 
either end of a continuum. Extroverts were described as impulsive, carefree, 
sociable, excitement/sensation seeking people who are orientated to external 
stimulation. Conversely, introverts were described as introspective and quiet people 
who are orientated towards inner stimulation. The second super-trait was a measure 
of neuroticism. Those high in neuroticism were suggested to exhibit excessive 
anxiety, fear, depression and/or shyness, whereas those low in neuroticism would 
display less of these emotional behaviours. It is the contemporary study of the trait 
anxiety component of this super-trait of neuroticism that is the primary focus of this 
thesis. 
Eysenck’s (1967) proposed that a reticulo-cortical circuit regulates levels of cortical 
arousal caused by the perception of incoming stimuli. Moreover, Eysenck proposed 
that a reticulo-limbic circuit regulates arousal levels caused by emotional stimuli. 
Eysenck suggested that variations in neuroticism were related to levels of arousal in 
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the reticulo-limbic circuit. The reticulo-limbic circuit of those high in neuroticism 
was proposed to facilitate more arousal by emotionally relevant stimuli than that of 
those who fall in the low neuroticism part of the continuum. Thus, from Eysenck’s 
perspective, those high in trait anxiety would be more physiologically aroused upon 
perception of emotional stimuli. Despite its biological underpinnings Eysenck’s trait 
theory was based upon ‘top down’ methods that used statistics derived from 
personality assessments.  
 
1.3. Personality and anxiety: Reinforcement sensitivity theory 
 
Heavily influenced by Eysenck’s (1967) trait theory, Gray (1982) proposed a similar 
theory now known as reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST). Gray used a bottom up 
approach that was based primarily on rodent studies and some human 
pharmacological studies. Gray suggested that the extraversion and neuroticism 
continuums in Eysenck’s factor space should be rotated by around 30 degrees to 
reflect reward sensitivity/impulsivity and punishment sensitivity/anxiety, 
respectively (see Figure 1.1). Gray also provided a different and much more detailed 
neuropsychological basis for his theory.  
Gray (1982) proposed a behavioural inhibition system (BIS) as the basis for anxiety. 
The anatomical basis of the BIS was suggested to be the septo-hippocampal system, 
the Papez circuit, anterior thalamus, cingulate and pre-frontal cortices. In addition, 
Gray specified the involvement of neocortical inputs from the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) and entorhinal area, to the septo-hippocampal system. Clinical anxiety, 
phobias and obsessive compulsive disorders were therefore postulated to arise from 
too much activity of the BIS. Gray and McNaughton (2000) made some subtle 
revisions to RST, once again using mainly rodent studies combined with some 
human pharmacological evidence. It is this revised version that is the focus here.  
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between Eysenck’s (1967), Gray’s (1982) and Gray 
and McNaughton’s (2000) personality dimensions.  
            
The revised RST (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) is still primarily concerned with the 
BIS which is activated by goal conflict. As with the original version, this 
neurobiological system is complemented by two slave systems. The flight fight 
freeze system (FFFS) mediates responses to all aversive stimuli. Fear is therefore 
mediated by the FFFS whereas the BIS mediates anxiety. Gray and McNaughton 
reiterate that although these emotions may be linked, they are not seen as the same 
conceptually. The behavioural approach system (BAS) is suggested to mediate 
approach behaviours and reward based behaviour. The BAS is conceptualised as a 
reward system or feedback loop for positive information, and is active for all 
appetitive stimuli. The BIS is suggested to be activated when both the BAS and the 
FFFS are activated simultaneously.  This increases levels of anxiety, but only if the 
BAS and FFFS inputs are similarly weighted. If there is an imbalance, either slave 
system will dominate behavioural control. Thus, from this perspective the BIS is a 
conflict resolution system that resolves goal conflict arising from concurrent 
approach and avoidance behaviour/motivation. The BIS therefore inhibits behaviour 
and directs attention and physiological arousal towards any conflict inducing stimuli. 
This facilitates cautious defensive approach type behaviour and risk assessment.  
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To clarify, Gray and McNaughton (2000) suggest that in a situation of goal conflict 
where BIS activity is heightened, the BIS will either further activate the FFFS to 
initiate withdrawal type behaviour, or BAS related approach behaviour will continue. 
Thus, in a withdrawal situation, the FFFS would be activated by receiving enhanced 
negative emotional inputs from the BIS, and withdrawal would therefore decrease 
levels of anxiety. However, it is noteworthy here that in a situation where the FFFS 
becomes dominant, a fight response could also occur. In RST it is not really clear 
why this response is not dealt with by the BAS. It has been suggested that anger, 
which will often be present in a fight response, is in fact mediated by the BAS (e.g., 
Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).  
Gray and McNaughton (2000) suggest that the perception of task relevant but goal 
conflicting stimuli often inhibits much of the motor activity that is being carried out 
at the time. They suggest that the stimulus that is perceived as inducing this goal 
conflict, has its neural representation changed and ‘tagged’ as ‘faulty needs 
checking.’ Future experiences of these tagged stimuli are suggested to be dealt with 
in a more inhibited manor. From this perspective, behavioural inhibition and risk 
assessment are putatively mediated by the posterior cingulate and septo-hippocampal 
system, whereas avoidance behaviours may be mediated by the anterior cingulate 
and amygdala. 
Smillie, Pickering and Jackson (2006) draw attention to the fact that the strength of 
any effect upon behaviour that any stimulus may have, is dependent upon three 
things; the motivational strength of the stimulus itself, the level of activation of its 
mediating system; and the level of activation of the competing system(s). For 
example, BAS outputs are not only regulated by the BAS and by the strength of 
rewarding stimuli, but also by the level of inhibition facilitated by the BIS and FFFS. 
In short, whilst the FFFS controls simple escape or fight based defensive behaviours, 
the BIS mediates risk analysis, thus restraining BAS and FFFS outputs. Smillie et al. 
suggest that whilst RST is often referred to as a theory of anxiety and impulsivity, it 
is better described as a neuropsychological theory of motivation, emotion and 
learning.  
In summary, RST (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) comprises three systems. The 
functional outputs of a reward based approach motivation system, and a threat based 
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avoidance motivation system, are modulated by a conflict resolution system. All 
three systems can be said to be necessary for survival. RST therefore fits within the 
framework of emotional survival circuits proposed by LeDoux (2012). From this 
perspective, it would seem likely that Gray and McNaughton tapped into two basic 
survival circuit functions (i.e., FFFS and BAS), and a third more complex survival 
circuit (BIS) that mediates the balance of the two basic systems.  
  
1.4. Human reinforcement sensitivity theory research  
 
Corr (2004) reviewed RST research carried out with humans, with a particular focus 
upon laboratory experiments. The studies of emotion and RST reviewed by Corr do 
not seem to provide any conclusive evidence as to how emotion relates to the theory. 
Indeed Corr suggests that there is confusion about what the nature of reinforcement 
actually is. For example, Corr suggests that the distinction between motivational and 
emotional components can be confusing. Corr cites Mathews and Gilliland (1999) as 
suggesting that taking a strictly biological approach may be of limited utility as the 
literature is so confusing, and generalising from animal to human studies is difficult. 
Mathews and Gilliland suggested that cognitive approaches may prove to be more 
informative. Corr suggests that this is also difficult as making precise experimental 
predictions is hard. There have however been some later experimental studies that 
provide some insights into how RST relates to humans.  
Although the majority of the biological evidence in favour of RST comes from 
rodent studies, there has been some human RST biological research. Mathews, Yiend 
and Lawrence (2004) refer to the septo-hippocampal system described by Gray and 
McNaughton (2000) as a hierarchical defence system. Mathews et al. showed that 
threat related visual stimuli activated the entire septo-hippocampal system. 
Differential levels of brain activity in many of the areas of this system including the 
hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex and amygdala were positively correlated with 
individual differences in behavioural inhibition, which is a construct closely related 
to anxiety (as measured by the BIS scale, Carver & White, 1994).  
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Experimental behavioural RST research with human participants can be conducted 
using reaction time paradigms. For example, Eriksson, Jansson, Lisspers and Sundin 
(2016) used a modified stop-signal task to investigate the reactivity of the BIS. 
Eriksson et al. reported an interaction between levels of self-reported behavioural 
inhibition, stop-signal reaction times, and stop-signal accuracy levels. Participants 
with high BIS scores (as measured by the BIS scale; Carver & White, 1994) and also 
long stop-signal reaction times (indicating poorer levels of inhibitory control), 
showed poorer accuracy levels than those with low BIS scores (and long stop-signal 
reaction times). Accuracy levels did not differ between high and low BIS scorers 
with short stop-signal reaction times (which indicate good inhibitory control). 
However, it is noteworthy that the correlations present were also in the direction one 
would expect. The correlation between BIS and stop-signal reaction time was 
positive and moderate, but it did not reach significance. Furthermore, the correlation 
between BIS and stop-signal accuracy was negative but only weak in magnitude, and 
also did not reach significance.  
In the human neuroscience literature the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is 
suggested to be involved in monitoring environmental conflict (Botvinick, Braver, 
Carter, Barch, & Cohen, 2001). This functional description of the ACC resonates 
with Gray and McNaughton’s description of BIS function, and the ACC is part of 
their proposed septo-hippocampal system. Amodio, Master, Yee and Taylor (2008) 
used EEG and a response inhibition task to investigate individual differences in BIS 
activity. The focus here was on brain activity as evidenced by specific event related 
potentials (ERP), that are proposed to originate from the ACC. Dipole models 
suggest that the error-related negativity (ERN), which reflects error related brain 
activity,  and the N2, which reflects conflict related brain activity, are generated in 
the ACC (Mathalon, Whitfield, & Ford, 2003). The go/no-go task used by Amodio et 
al. showed that the frontocentral N2 ERP during no-go trials correlated with BIS 
scores measured by the BIS scale (Carver & White, 1994). The study by Amodio et 
al. therefore links variations in anxiety to variations in conflict monitoring. 
Moreover, in their study the ERN was related to lower error rates and lower BIS 
scores.  
Kanske and Kotz (2012) also investigated the relationship between individual 
differences in anxiety and goal conflict monitoring. They used a modified flanker 
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task in three experiments that used negative, positive and neutral words. Participants 
had to identify the ink colour of the central word that was either congruent or 
incongruent with the colour of the surrounding vertically flanked words.  Anxiety 
was selectively related to the reaction time interference effect (incongruent minus 
congruent) during trials with negative words, but not positive words. Moreover, their 
EEG analyses showed that a conflict related negativity ERP (observed at 190-250 
milliseconds) during negative trials was reduced in high anxious participants. 
Increases in activation of the ventral ACC during negative word incongruent trials 
were negatively correlated with anxiety. Moreover, amygdala activity during these 
trials was reportedly greater in high anxious participants. It is noteworthy that 
Kanske and Kotz’s findings in their flanker experiments were in alignment with their 
findings using a modified Simon task (that delineates high and low auditory response 
conflict, but still requires a motor response) presented in the same paper.  
There is also some evidence linking BIS/anxiety to conflict monitoring and 
inhibitory control that is derived from studies that used other goal conflict tasks, and 
focused upon the sequential effects of conflict processing. For example, Etkin and 
Schatzberg (2011) and Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, Menon and Schatzberg (2010) used an 
emotional goal conflict task to investigate how clinical anxiety is related to 
emotional conflict resolution. In these studies anxiety seemed to relate to an 
impairment in the control of emotional conflict. In a similar study Larson, Clawson, 
Clayson and Baldwin (2013) used a neutral goal conflict task to investigate the same 
question in a non-emotional situation. In this study anxiety seemed to relate to an 
enhanced conflict resolution ability. However, the evidence from these studies, and 
the type of paradigms used are discussed in detail in chapter two and thus will not be 
discussed further here.  
 
1.5. Anxiety and emotional face processing 
 
Emotional facial expressions aid communication in social situations (e.g., Darwin 
(1872). Recognising a person’s facial expression aids the observer to identify a 
person’s intentions and mood (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986). Accordingly, research 
concerning anxiety and the processing of emotion often focuses on emotional face 
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processing. For example, Perlman et al. (2009) reported an interesting result derived 
from using an eye-tracking methodology. Neuroticism (the basis for anxiety) 
correlated positively with the amount of time looking at the eyes of fearful faces (.6), 
sad faces (.4), and happy faces (.37). Further insights into the effect of anxiety upon 
emotional face processing comes from a study concerning emotional face detection 
sensitivity. Doty, Japee, Ingvar and Ungerleider (2013) showed that those high in 
trait anxiety had an increased ability to detect briefly presented (33 milliseconds) 
target fearful faces that were immediately masked by neutral faces. In this study the 
sensitivity of the detection of masked fearful faces also correlated positively with 
individual differences in neuroticism, harm avoidance, and social anxiety, in addition 
to trait anxiety.  
In real world settings emotional faces may appear infrequently amongst neutral 
faces. Rossignol, Philippot, Douilliez, Crommelinck and Campanella (2005) used an 
emotional face detection oddball paradigm where a stream of neutral faces were 
presented along with intermittently appearing fearful and happy faces. Detection of 
fearful faces was faster than happy faces by both high and low trait anxious 
participants. However, high trait anxious participants were faster than low trait 
anxious participants at detecting both fearful and happy faces. Rossignol et al. also 
recorded brain activity using EEG. Their ERP analyses revealed that high anxious 
participants showed an earlier P3b ERP for emotional faces relative to low anxious 
participants, and a decreased N300 ERP amplitude (in the right hemisphere) for 
emotional faces relative to low anxious participants. The authors suggest that the 
N300 is related to processing emotional features, and the P3b may reflect a 
conscious speeded decision based replacement for the diminished N300 based 
emotion evaluation function. Rossignol et al. suggest that high anxious participants 
may use less neural resources when initially evaluating the emotionality of the faces 
(as reflected in the reduced N300), but increase the use of explicit decision making 
resources (as reflected in the earlier P3b). This experiment suggests that anxiety may 
modulate the processing of facial emotion. However, other studies have provided 
inconsistent results.  
Holmes, Nielsen and Green (2008) used an emotional face processing task where 
high and low trait anxious participants were required to respond to immediate 
emotional facial expression repetitions. Two conditions were included. One 
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condition required participants to respond to repeated fearful faces or repeated 
neutral faces. The other condition required participants to respond to repeated happy 
faces or repeated neutral faces. Participants were divided into high and low trait 
anxiety groups using a median split. There were no effects of emotional face type 
nor trait anxiety in the RT data. However, Holmes et al. reported differences in brain 
activity that related to trait anxiety. In their low trait anxious group there was a trend 
towards an increased P1 ERP for fearful faces compared to neutral faces. This P1 
effect was located in the right occipital area and was not present in the left 
hemisphere. In their high trait anxious group this P1 effect was increased in 
magnitude relative to their low trait anxious group. Moreover, the P1 was present in 
the occipital area of both hemispheres. These effects were not present for happy 
faces compared to neutral faces. Holmes et al. suggest that the occipital P1 ERP 
represents an enhanced perception of threat, and fast attentional orienting towards 
this threat-related stimuli. 
In another experiment, Morel, George, Foucher, Chammat and Dubal (2014) 
required participants to decide if faces had any emotional significance or if they were 
neutral. Morel et al. reported that their high trait anxious group produced faster RTs 
in their fearful / neutral condition than their happy / neutral condition (for both 
emotional and neutral stimuli). Their low trait anxious group did not. They also 
reported that an occipital P1 ERP was larger for the emotional faces in the happy / 
neutral condition, but not the fearful / neutral condition. This seems somewhat in 
contrast to their RT findings, and opposite to the findings of Holmes et al. (2008). 
Moreover, this effect was specific to their high trait anxious participants, as it was 
not present in their low trait anxious group. Morel et al. proposed that this 
counterintuitive ERP effect may be due to condition effects as the entire fearful / 
neutral condition may have been processed as a threat related situation, whereas the 
entire happy / neutral condition may have been processed as a positive situation. 
Thus the neutral faces in the fearful / neutral condition may be processed as more 
threat relevant than those in the happy / neutral condition, which may have masked 
any possible trait anxiety related P1 ERP effects for fearful faces. Alternatively, 
Morel et al. suggest that the enhanced P1 ERP for happy faces in present in high trait 
anxious participants could reflect enhanced sensibility to the individual facial 
features, such as a smile. This effect suggesting that the entire fearful / neutral 
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condition was processed as a threat-related situation was not present in the study by 
Holmes et al. (2008), but the task instructions differed considerably between these 
studies.  
Task instructions differed even more in the study by Cooper, Rowe and Penton-Voak 
(2008). This task involved participants responding with a different key press to seven 
different facial expressions randomly presented in the same experiment (anger, 
sadness, happiness, fear, surprise, disgust and neutral). There were no effects of trait 
anxiety upon the RTs for any of these emotional faces. Cooper et al. suggest that 
anxiety does not affect RTs to fearful faces (or any of the other emotional faces). 
However, it is plausible that the seven emotional faces (and seven response keys) 
used in one experiment may have rendered any anxiety-related effect weaker and 
thus much harder to detect.  
A recent neuroimaging study provides further insights into these issues. Fonzo et al. 
(2015) used an emotional face-matching task to investigate emotional face 
processing in generalised anxiety, social anxiety, and panic disorder patients. In this 
task participants are shown a target face at the top of the computer screen. They are 
then required to match the emotional expression of this face to one of the expressions 
depicted by two faces that are presented below. Rapid responses were not a 
requirement of this task, and thus no reaction time (RT) differences between patient 
groups and normal controls were observed. Trait anxiety scores were analysed for 44 
of the 59 participants. In their happy face versus fearful face matching task there was 
a positive relationship between trait anxiety and the difference between right 
amygdala activation during happy face processing and right amygdala activation 
during fearful face processing. No trait anxiety related differences in amygdala 
activation related specifically to either happy face or fearful face processing versus 
oval control stimuli. In their happy face versus angry face matching task there was 
also a positive relationship between trait anxiety and the difference between anterior 
cingulate activity during happy face processing and anterior cingulate activity during 
angry face processing. Fonzo et al. report that this was due to a negative relationship 
between anterior cingulate activity to happy faces (versus oval control stimuli) and 
trait anxiety.  
Further neuroimaging data was provided by Ball et al. (2012), who also used the 
emotional face-matching task as used by Fonzo et al. (2015). Ball et al. reported that 
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trait anxiety was related to increased amygdala, insula and dorsal ACC activity to 
negative faces relative to positive faces. In a different type of experiment Etkin et al. 
(2004) used a backward masking paradigm. In this task participants had to identify 
the colour tint of fearful and neutral faces (red, yellow, or blue). Their non-masked 
condition involved a 200 millisecond presentation of either the fearful face or neutral 
face. Their backward masked condition involved a 33 millisecond presentation of 
either the fearful face or neutral face followed by a 167 millisecond presentation of a 
neutral face (of the same colour, but a different person). Etkin et al. found that trait 
anxiety correlated negatively with the speed of colour identification during masked 
fear trials but not unmasked fear trials. However, it is noteworthy that their sample 
was small, and as such the correlations should be treated with caution. Etkin et al. 
also found that masked fearful faces that were thus unconsciously perceived 
produced a strong positive correlation between basolateral amygdala activity (neutral 
minus fearful) and trait anxiety. However, in this study unmasked consciously 
perceived fearful faces produced only a very weak relationship.  
In summary, it seems as if the behavioural effects of anxiety upon facial emotion 
recognition and/or discrimination are inconsistent. However, it is noteworthy that 
several studies have provided some complementary neuroimaging evidence that 
suggests that anxiety may related to altered emotional face processing. It is possible 
that the behavioural results are being obscured by the different task instructions used 
in the paradigms. It would make intuitive sense that emotional faces would trigger a 
survival circuit similar to that described by LeDoux (2012), and that the effects of 
triggering this circuit (such as faster responses to fearful faces) would be increased in 
high anxiety. 
 
1.6. Social anxiety 
 
Social anxiety can be defined as a persistent fear of social interaction, or fear of 
being observed and evaluated by other people (Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Clark & 
Wells, 1995). Indeed, highly socially anxious people perceive other people as being 
threatening and/or critical (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Turk et al., 2001; Clark & 
wells, 1995). McNeil (2001) and Rapee, and Heimberg (1997) proposed that social 
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anxiety can be considered a continuum that ranges from people having no social fear 
at all, through to people experiencing subclinical levels of social anxiety, and in 
extreme cases manifesting as clinical social phobia. There are several cognitive 
theorists who propose that social anxiety is related to information processing biases 
(e.g., Clark et al., 2003; Foa, Franklin, & Kozak, 2001; Turk, Lerner, Heimberg, & 
Rapee, 2001; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Clark & Wells, 1995). It is also noteworthy 
here that those who score highly in social anxiety also tend to score highly on trait 
anxiety (e.g., Ball et al., 2012; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
Both positive and negative emotional facial expressions deliver social information 
(e.g., feelings and intentions) from one person to another (Keltner & Ekman, 2000). 
Emotional information processing biases, and the way they relate to social anxiety 
levels, have been researched in experimental settings. For example, Mogg and 
Bradley (2002) and Mogg, Philippot and Bradley (2004) showed that socially 
anxious participants display an attentional bias towards angry/threatening faces 
instead of happy or neutral faces. Moreover, Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa and Amir 
(1999) showed that socially anxious participants detect threatening faces faster than 
happy faces using a visual search paradigm.  
Bantin, Stevens, Gerlach and Hermann (2016) conducted a systematic review of 
social anxiety and facial dot-probe studies. In these experiments participants must 
respond quickly to a probe stimulus that is presented in the location of one of two 
previously presented faces. Those high in social anxiety seemed to preferentially 
direct attention towards faces that are threat-related, relative to non-socially anxious 
controls. Reeb-Sutherland et al. (2015) reported that behaviourally inhibited 
adolescents with lifetime histories of social anxiety disorder displayed a lower 
threshold for the identification of fearful facial expressions relative to angry facial 
expressions. Silvia, Allan, Beauchamp, Maschauer and Workman (2006) used a 
simple facial expression recognition paradigm which showed how social anxiety 
modulates emotional face recognition. Silvia et al. found that happy faces were 
responded to faster than sad faces. Silvia et al. found that those high in social anxiety 
were slower to recognise happy faces relative to those low in social anxiety. Silvia et 
al. also reported that overall happy faces were responded to faster than angry faces. 
They also showed that although those low in social anxiety responded to happy faces 
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faster than angry faces, those high in social anxiety showed only a borderline trend 
to respond to happy faces faster than angry faces.  
Further insights into social anxiety and any related emotional processing biases, are 
provided by complementary neuroimaging studies. For example, Ball et al. (2012) 
reported that social anxiety was related to variations in amygdala, insula and rostral 
and dorsal ACC activity when viewing emotional faces in general. Phan, Fitzgerald, 
Nathan and Tancer, (2006) reported that amygdala responses to fearful and angry 
faces were greater in patients with generalised social phobia relative to normal 
controls. The extent of these responses was positively related to their symptom 
severity. From the perspective of LeDoux (2012) the evidence discussed thus far 
does suggest that higher social anxiety might relate to a hyper-reactive survival 
circuit that is triggered by social situations and the processing of emotional faces. 
 
1.7. Anxiety and fear 
 
In the human and animal neuroscience literature the terms anxiety and fear are 
considered broad categories of survival responses (Mobbs & Kim, 2015). In the 
psychology literature fear is traditionally suggested to be aroused when a situation is 
perceived as being a threat to a person’s physiological or psychological self, and is 
out of the control of the person (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1984). 
Situations perceived as threat related can be either learned or innate. A person’s fear 
thresholds are determined by biological influences, sociocultural influences, 
individual differences, and previous experiences (Izard, 1997). From a psychological 
perspective, the desired activity when experiencing fear is to escape from any fear 
causing situation, as the desire for protection is high. Therefore, in any situations 
involving any perception of threat, avoidance behaviours are activated (Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994).  
From a biological perspective fear can also be described as an activated emotional 
state that is aversive, and motivates any organism to deal with any threatening 
occurrences. The resulting coping behaviours have been proposed to be focused 
upon defensive behaviours such as immobility, escaping or attacking (Ohman & 
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Weins, 2003). Ohman (2005) suggested that the data obtained from behavioural 
studies shows that fear stimuli automatically capture attentional resources and thus 
activate fear. Ohman suggested that this effect is mediated by a subcortical network 
of brain regions including the amygdala. The suggestions of Ohman, and Ohman and 
Weins are clearly in alignment with the propositions of Gray and McNaughton 
(2000), as their perspective on fear clearly resonates with description of the function 
of the FFFS. 
McNaughton and Corr (2004) suggested that fear and anxiety can be distinguished 
by a factor they term as defensive direction. From this perspective fear would be 
active when leaving a threatening situation and as such can be considered part of an 
active avoidance response. In contrast, anxiety would be activated when entering a 
potentially threat related situation or withholding the entry to a potentially threat 
related situation. These two scenarios were also described as reflecting cautious risk 
assessment approach behaviour, and passive avoidance behaviour, respectively. 
However, McNaughton and Corr also proposed that the functions that generate fear 
and anxiety would overlap substantially. For example, they suggested that anxiety 
involves the controlling of fears or frustrations that pre-exist any current situation. 
Perkins, Kemp and Corr (2007) tested Gray and McNaughton’s (2000), and 
McNaughton and Corr’s (2004) proposition that anxiety and fear are separate 
emotional constructs. Trait anxiety and trait neuroticism are suggested to be 
somewhat psychometrically interchangeable (e.g., Hagopian & Ollendick, 1996; 
Diaz & Pickering, 1993). Perkins et al. showed that the magnitude of the correlations 
between trait anxiety and fear as well as the correlations between trait neuroticism 
and fear were significantly smaller than the magnitude of the correlation between 
trait anxiety and self-reported neuroticism. Perkins et al. suggest their findings 
support Gray and McNaughton’s claim. A second study carried out by Perkins et al. 
showed that these self-reported levels of fear measured by the fear survey schedule 
(FSS; Wolpe & Lang, 1969) modulated variations in behavioural performance (in a 
military training setting) that was not additionally modulated by trait anxiety.  
The symptoms of anxiety and fear can be similar, but they can also differ. Anxiety 
has been described as a feeling of long lasting apprehension (or sustained fear) 
concerning unpredictable and possibly unspecific threat. In contrast, fear has been 
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described as an adaptive feeling of apprehension that dissipates quickly. This phasic 
type of fear would disappear as soon as any threat is removed (Davis, Walker, Miles, 
& Grillon, 2010).  
Perkins, Cooper, Abdelall, Smillie and Corr (2010) used a threat scenario paradigm 
to investigate how individual differences in anxiety (measured by the STAI; 
Spielberger et al., 1983) and fear (measured by the FSS; Wolpe & Lang, 1969) 
differentially modulate responses to different hypothetical threat situations. In their 
first study fear scores were positively correlated with the reported tendency of a 
participant to orient away from threat, whereas trait anxiety scores were not.  Their 
second study replicated the findings of their first study, and also extended the 
findings by modifying the threat scenario paradigm. Scores on the fear questionnaire 
positively correlated with self-reported intensity ratings of participants’ reported 
defensive responses, and participants’ self-reported intensity of the types of threat. 
Participants’ fear scores also negatively correlated with their perceived distance to 
the hypothetical threat, escapability of the hypothetical threat, and the availability of 
concealment from the hypothetical threat. Perkins et al. suggest that the direction of 
the correlations between participants’ fear scores and the ratings is consistent with 
the notion that those high in fear proneness perceive threats as being closer and more 
intense. In short, Perkins et al. suggest that those who score highly on fear 
questionnaires may have a magnified perception of threat. It is noteworthy that trait 
anxiety scores correlated negatively with self-reported perceived escapability of 
hypothetical threat. Scores on the neuroticism questionnaire were also positively 
correlated with self-reported perceived intensity of hypothetical threat. Perkins et al. 
reported that the lower magnitude of these other questionnaire correlations with the 
threat scenario ratings relative to the higher magnitude of the fear correlations with 
the threat scenario ratings suggests that the fear questionnaire may measure 
defensive responses more efficiently than the other questionnaires. Perkins et al.’s 
results supported Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) proposition that anxiety and fear 
responses should not be equally predicted at all distances from any perceived threat. 
In short, fear related escape responses should replace anxious approach related 
responses if any perceived threat is particularly close or intense. Moreover, the main 
impact of this study is that the fear and anxiety personality questionnaires measured 
separable constructs.  
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In alignment with the suggestions of Gray and McNaughton (2000), and 
McNaughton and Corr (2004), Rigoli, Ewbank, Dalgleish and Calder (2016) also 
suggested that evolution has resulted in two defensive responses that can be 
described as fear and anxiety. In order to investigate if fear and anxiety are mediated 
by distinct brain regions they used fMRI and a computerised task where a predator 
pursues an agent (the agent represents the participant). In a condition that was 
associated with fear the predator was visible, whereas in a condition that was 
associated with anxiety the predator was invisible. Rigoli et al. showed that the 
amount of visually perceived information pertaining to threat modulates activity in 
defensive brain circuits. More specifically they showed that a lack of information 
pertaining to threat, activated brain areas relating to anxiety, such as the 
hippocampus and ventral medial prefrontal cortex and amygdala. In contrast, the 
presence of information relating to threat, activated brain areas relating to fear, such 
as the periaqueductal grey. Participants high in trait anxiety showed anticipatory 
hippocampal activation when visual information was absent. These findings suggest 
that the two different defence related emotions may have different neural 
mechanisms, even if they both contribute to increased anxiety. 
Thus far it can be seen that in the psychological and neuroscientific literatures 
anxiety and fear are considered to be somewhat separate constructs. However, it is 
noteworthy that they are often somewhat entwined in evolutionary theories of 
emotion, as both behaviours aid escaping from threat. From an evolutionary 
perspective, both anxiety and fear are considered specialised states that have been 
designed by natural selection. In specific situations both anxiety and fear can 
increase Darwinian fitness. Fitness, from this perspective, means inclusive 
reproductive success. Survival and health relate to Darwinian fitness only in so far as 
they increase the likelihood of reproduction (Nesse, 1990). General anxiety has most 
likely evolved to help an individual cope with threats that are not clearly defined. 
Subtypes of anxiety and fear probably evolved to provide a more specific type of 
protection against a specific type of threat (Marks & Nesse, 1994).   
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1.8. Anxiety and anger 
 
In the psychology literature anger is traditionally suggested to be elicited in 
situations where obstacles are perceived to be interfering with goal directed 
behaviour, or when demeaning offenses are perceived to have occurred against 
oneself or loved ones (Averill, 1982; Hampton, 1978; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991). 
Anger is suggested to activate and sustain increased amounts of energy in order to 
aid defence of oneself, defence of loved ones, or to correct an appraised wrong doing 
(Averill, 1982; Izard, 1977, 1993). When a person experiences anger their attention 
is focused, and a desire to strike out, attack, or get back at the source of the goal 
obstruction is activated (Arnold, 1960; Averill, 1982; Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977; 
Lazarus, 1991; Roseman et al., 1994). The activation of these aggressive desires 
facilitate behaviours that aid the removal of any social or environmental barrier to a 
person’s goals (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Intense forms of anger are often related 
to aggression and/or impulsiveness, but less intense forms of anger can be 
reconceptualised as a form of problem solving. The latter form of anger can therefore 
result in beneficial consequences as opposed to harmful consequences (Averill, 
1982). Trait anger is proposed to be mediated by the BAS (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 
2009), and is therefore a behaviour closely related to approach motivation (Harmon-
Jones, 2003). Moreover, trait anger is also suggested to reliably predict reactive 
aggression (Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006). 
Shields, Moons, Tewell and Yonelinas (2016) showed that experimentally induced 
anxious mood but not experimentally induced angry mood impaired participants 
executive function. They additionally showed that individual differences in post 
induction anxiety ratings, but not post induction anger ratings, predicted these 
executive function deficits. The results of these studies provide some support for the 
suggestion that different negative affective states may differentially modulate 
cognition (Nabi, 1999), although this paper refers specifically to persuasion. Anger 
and anxiety are two different emotional states that have been suggested to be related 
to unique autonomic nervous system responses (Kreibig, 2010), and patterns of brain 
activity (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). Trait anger has been shown to 
relate to an enhanced attentional bias towards angry faces (van Honk, Tuiten, de 
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Haan, van den Hout, & Stam, 2001; Putman, Hermans, & van Honk, 2004). This 
makes logical sense as approach motivation has also been shown to modulate brain 
activity to angry faces (Beaver, Lawrence, Passamonti, & Calder, 2008). In short, 
using fMRI, Beaver et al. showed that increased BAS scores (as assessed with the 
BAS drive subscale of the BIS BAS scales; Carver & White, 1994) were related to 
increases in amygdala activity and decreased ventral anterior cingulate and ventral 
striatal activation to angry facial expressions, relative to neutral and sad facial 
expressions. However, it is noteworthy that their sample was very small (n=22), so 
these results should be treated with caution. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the 
activated areas (amygdala, anterior cingulate) have previously been suggested to be 
part of the BIS and/or FFFS brain circuitry (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). 
The study by Beaver et al. (2008) also showed that increased BIS scores were related 
to increases in dorsal anterior cingulate activity for angry facial expressions relative 
to neutral and sad facial expressions. The modulating effect of BIS upon brain 
activity is in alignment with research that suggests that this region is implicated in 
the anticipation of the occurrence of aversive events (Nitschke, Sarinopoulos, 
Mackiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006), fear conditioning (Phelps, Delgado, 
Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004), and urgent response inhibition (Garavan, Ross, Murphy, 
Roche, & Stein, 2002). Beaver et al. suggest that the differential effects of BAS and 
BIS upon brain activity are in accordance with the suggestion that threat related 
stimuli can be interpreted as either provocative which induces aggressive behaviour, 
or dangerous, which induces anxious behaviour. From this perspective this would 
depend upon a person’s temperament or an environmental context (Dimberg & 
Ohman, 1996; van Honk et al., 2001).  
Even though trait anger and trait anxiety are separable constructs, trait anger has 
been shown to correlate positively with trait anxiety (Carre, Fisher, Manuck, & 
Hariri, 2012; van Honk et al., 2001). Carre et al. also showed that trait anger 
positively correlated with amygdala activity to angry faces only in male participants 
who scored highly in trait anxiety. Oddly, these effects were not significant for 
female participants. Further evidence is provided by Coccaro, McCloskey, Fitzgerald 
and Phan (2007) who also showed that individuals who are prone to reactive 
aggression and excessive bursts of anger display enhanced amygdala reactivity to 
angry faces. 
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Veenstra, Schneider, Bushman and Koole (2016) used a computerised approach-
avoid task where participants were required to make approach and avoid movements 
with a joystick to angry and happy faces. The face stimuli had either a direct eye 
gaze or an averted eye gaze. Trait anger (as measured by the trait anger subscale of 
the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI, Spielberger, 1988) was related 
to faster approach joystick movements relative to avoid joystick movements to angry 
faces. Moreover, this effect was only present when the angry faces displayed a direct 
gaze as opposed to an averted gaze. No such effects were present for happy faces. 
The effects of trait anger upon task performance were therefore specific to hostile 
stimuli. Veenstra et al. suggest that people with elevated trait anger might approach 
hostile social interactions automatically. They propose that their results support an 
influential account of anger which suggests that high trait anger relates to a cognitive 
processing bias that leads people to interpret social interactions with increased 
hostility (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008). Veenstra et al. suggest that in their study 
the trait anger related enhanced approach motivated responses (relative to avoid 
responses) to angry faces may reflect this processing bias. Veenstra et al. also 
suggest that their findings are in alignment with the model of trait anger proposed by 
Koole and Veenstra (2015). This model suggests that trait anger is modulated by 
increases in approach motivation in situations that are anger relevant. Veenstra et al. 
suggest that this perspective is in contrast to previous motivation research that 
proposed that trait anger was linked to a general multi-situational increase in 
approach motivation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Veenstra et al. suggest that 
their data support the former explanation, and not the latter, as the effects of trait 
anger upon performance were only present with approach responses to stimuli with 
direct gaze. Veenstra et al. suggest that the latter explanation would predict these 
effects to be present with both approach and avoid responses. However, it is 
noteworthy that they did not administer trait anxiety measures which would have 
illustrated if just trait anger was implicated, or if trait anger plus trait anxiety was 
involved. 
Both anxiety and anger can be differentially explained from an evolutionary 
perspective. For example, anger may aid Darwinian fitness by protecting against 
exploitation. Moreover, anger may be adaptive by signalling that any undesirable 
change in a previously mutually beneficial relationship will not be tolerated (Nesse, 
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1990). The evolutionary benefit of anger is thus suggested to function in quite the 
opposite way to anxiety. For example, Nesse suggests that anxiety can motivate 
cooperation with others when it is inconvenient or perhaps somewhat undesirable, 
but also in a person’s best interests. Anger on the other hand, may be intended to 
stop a currently cooperative situation from ending.  
 
1.9. Cognitive perspectives on anxiety: Attentional control theory  
 
Whereas RST (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) was primarily derived from biological 
animal studies, attentional control theory (ACT, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007) was derived from the study of human cognitive psychology. ACT is 
also influenced by the work of Derryberry and Reed (2002) who report a negative 
correlation between self-reported attentional control and trait anxiety. A major 
assumption of ACT is that anxiety is manifested when one’s desired goal is under 
threat. Here it shares some common ground with RST, which also concerns the 
maintenance of goal directed behaviour. However, ACT makes more specific 
predictions about attentional processes and the effect of threat related stimuli in high 
anxiety. For example, unless the task being performed by a high anxious participant 
involves stimuli that are threat related, the perception of threatening peripheral goal 
irrelevant stimuli will reduce the focus of attention to the task in hand. Moreover, if 
the task being performed does involve goal relevant threat related stimuli, the threat 
related stimuli will enhance the goal directed behaviour of those high in anxiety.   
Eysenck et al. (2007) conceptualise attentional control as a function of the central 
executive, as described by Baddeley (1986). They also suggest that attentional 
control theory resonates with Easterbrook’s (1959) suggestion that anxiety narrows 
one’s scope of attention. Inhibition and attentional shifting are the main functions 
implicated in attentional control theory. Impairments of these functions are proposed 
to be due to the reduced effectiveness of attentional control processes in high 
anxiety. Of particular relevance to the current project and RST are the inhibitory 
functions. Inhibitory processes are usually described as those facilitating the 
withholding of automatic or habitual responses.  
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The notion that anxiety relates to variations in attentional control is integral to ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007).  Corbetta and Shulman (2002) suggested that a goal directed 
system modulated by knowledge, goals and expectation is distinct from a stimulus 
driven system that responds to stimuli that are salient and/or conspicuous. The goal 
directed system is postulated to regulate top down attention and be mediated by the 
PFC. This explanation resonates with the explanations of attention and cognitive 
control proposed by Posner and Petersen (1990) and Miller and Cohen (2001). The 
stimulus driven system is proposed to facilitate bottom up attentional control and 
detect relevant but possibly previously salient yet unattended sensory events. This 
system is suggested to be mediated by the ventral-frontal and temporo-parietal 
cortices. However, it is suggested that the two systems often functionally interact 
(Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthroff, 2001). ACT suggests that anxiety is disrupting to the 
balance between the goal directed attentional system and stimulus driven attentional 
system. Eysenck et al. propose that anxiety is linked to a magnified influence of the 
stimulus driven system coupled with a decrease in the influence of the goal directed 
system. Thus each system has reciprocal influences upon each other.  
 
1.10. Attention and Corbetta & Shulman 
 
To understand ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) it is necessary to understand the 
inspiration behind the theory of attention proposed by Corbetta and Shulman (2002). 
From their perspective, human visual attention is modulated by ‘top-down’ cognitive 
factors including goals, knowledge and expectations in addition to ‘bottom-up’ 
factors resulting from stimulation of the senses. Whereas top-down processing is 
influenced by previous experience, bottom-up processing is predicated upon 
perceptual analyses which lead to simple motor output. However, attention can be 
influenced by an interaction between these processing styles during situations where 
stimuli are novel or unexpected. This interactive process therefore modulates what is 
attended to in the environment and how it is attended to. Corbetta and Shulman 
propose that the human visual attention system is mediated by two partly distinct 
brain systems. A dorsal posterior parietal and frontal cortex is implicated during top-
down processing, whereas a temporoparietal and ventral frontal cortex (that is 
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mainly right hemisphere based) mediates bottom-up processing. This latter system is 
particularly implicated when stimuli are unattended and salient.  
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) suggest that top-down attentional control mechanisms 
allow humans to detect stimuli amongst a stimulus array or visual scene more 
efficiently as they are previously aware of perceptual information such as colour, 
motion or location. However, this process requires the ability to represent this 
‘perceptual set’ cognitively, and the ability to employ it when biasing the processing 
of incoming information. In addition, responses to stimuli are faster if the required 
motor response is previously known (i.e., a ‘motor set’). Corbetta and Shulman refer 
to the combination of perceptual and motor sets as the ‘attentional set’ which defines 
all neural representations implicated in selecting and responding to a goal-relevant 
stimulus.  
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) also suggest that attention to sensory information can 
be modulated by both bottom-up and top-down processing. For example, top-down 
expectations may modulate perceived salience of sensory stimuli. Sensory stimuli 
may attract attention if they have unexpected goal directed significance, which may 
increase the activity of bottom-up attentional processes. For example, when cycling 
an unexpected vehicle or environmental signal on the periphery may increase 
bottom-up attentional processing. Moreover, sensory stimuli may also attract 
bottom-up attentional resources if they share some perceptual characteristics with 
stimuli that are goal relevant. Accordingly stimulus driven attention is modulated by 
the interaction of these two attentional systems.  
From the perspective of Corbetta and Shulman (2002) the dorsal frontoparietal 
system that mediates top-down processing is also modulated by bottom-up stimulus 
salience in a stimuli array or visual scene. Neuroimaging studies suggest that this 
dorsal frontoparietal system is implicated during searching and detecting and thus 
mediates a stimulus ‘salience map’ that can help people direct behaviour. The ventral 
frontoparietal system is implicated in sensory bottom-up processing, which can 
disrupt goal directed top-down attention and behaviour (that is mediated by the 
dorsal system). Corbetta and Shulman refer to this attentional disrupting sub-
function as a ‘circuit breaker’ (that is mainly housed in the right hemisphere). The 
role of this system is to attract attention to goal-relevant sensory stimuli lying outside 
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the current focus of attention.  This system may reflect an orienting system involved 
in directing attention towards the location of distinct stimuli. Alternatively, this 
system may function interactively with the dorsal system when stimulus driven 
orienting is required.  
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) postulate two explanations for how the systems may 
interact. The ventral system may be an alerting system that mediates the detection of 
goal-relevant environmental stimuli but is unequipped to process high resolution 
spatial information. From this perspective, once a stimulus is attended to its exact 
localization is processed by the dorsal system. Alternatively, the circuit breaker 
function interrupts cognition when a goal-relevant stimulus is attended to. This 
involves abandoning the present attentional set, and adopting a new one, relevant to 
the new stimulus.  
Corbetta, Patel and Shulman (2008) suggest that reorienting responses in humans are 
necessary in survival situations (e.g., changing behaviour in response to threatening 
or appetitive stimuli). As proposed by Corbetta and Shulman (2002), they suggest 
that the reorienting response is reliant upon the right hemisphere dominant ventral 
system (interrupting and redirecting activity) and the dorsal system (selection and 
linkage of stimuli and responses). When they are resting the activity of these systems 
is at the same level yet they remain functionally distinct. However, when attentional 
focus is required, the ventral system is inhibited to avoid attending to distracting 
stimuli. Corbetta, Patel, and Shulman (2008) postulate that the differing types of 
attentional activity may be mediated by inputs to the ventral system from the locus 
coeruleus. Corbetta et al. (2008) proposed that this reorienting system has a general 
role in switching between dorsal and ventral systems, as opposed to the earlier 
suggestion by Corbetta and Shulman (2002) that it redirects attention between 
objects where necessary. Corbetta et al. (2008) suggest that this explains evidence of 
its role in social cognition. 
In summary, ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) is a cognitive account of anxiety that is 
predicated upon the imbalance of two attentional systems. The two attentional 
systems are based upon the neuroscientific account of attention proposed by Corbetta 
and Shulman (2002). High anxiety is proposed to relate to an increase in the 
reactivity of a stimulus driven attentional system, and/or a decrease in the reactivity 
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of a goal directed attentional system. This leads to increased cognitive interference 
and /or distraction. It is quite easy to see how a hyper-reactive stimulus driven 
attentional system (particularly in situations containing peripheral threat) could 
represent an (over-)enhanced survival circuit function (as described by LeDoux, 
2012).   
 
1.11. Anxiety and self-reported attentional control 
 
The attentional control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001, 2002) measures individual 
differences in the ability to focus one’s attention, shift one’s attention from one task 
to another, and flexibly control thought processes. Derryberry and Reed (2002) also 
suggest that self-reported attentional control modulated a threat-related attentional 
bias using a spatial orienting task. High trait anxious participants, who reported low 
attentional control scores, displayed an attentional bias towards threatening 
locations. However, high trait anxious participants, who reported high attentional 
control scores, were more efficient at shifting attention away from the threat-related 
location. Derryberry and Reed suggest that some anxious participants may be able to 
inhibit the impact of incoming threat-related stimuli by recruiting voluntary 
attentional control processes. Moreover, Mathews, Yiend and Lawrence (2004) 
employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and showed that 
behavioural inhibition (BIS scale) scores negatively correlated, and attentional 
control scores positively correlated, with rostral anterior cingulate cortex activity 
during the processing of fear-related pictures.  
Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2009) and Walsh, Balint, Smolira SJ, Fredericksen and 
Madsen (2009) also showed that scores on the attentional control scale correlated 
negatively with trait anxiety. Moreover, Walsh et al. showed that scores on both 
attentional control and trait anxiety scales correlated with individual differences in 
mindfulness. Attentional control positively predicted mindfulness whereas trait 
anxiety negatively predicted mindfulness.  Mindfulness is a state of increased 
awareness and attention to what is occurring in the present moment (Brown & Ryan, 
2003). Moreover, Teper, and Inzlicht (2013) showed that individual differences in a 
mindfulness sub-facet (referred to as mindful acceptance) were related to increased 
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performance during a task requiring goal conflict resolution. This was evidenced as 
increases in accuracy during a conventional word-colour Stroop goal conflict task. 
Therefore, individual differences in attentional control, as reflected in aspects of 
mindfulness, may also modulate goal conflict resolution.  
The attentional control scale was originally presented as two scales described as 
attentional focusing and attentional shifting (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988). 
Attentional focusing was described as the ability to intentionally maintain one’s 
attentional focus towards desired stimuli. In addition, this ability also involves 
resisting the unintentional shifting of one’s attentional focus towards distracting 
stimuli. Attentional shifting was described as the ability to intentionally shift ones 
attentional focus towards desired stimuli, whilst avoiding any unintentional 
focussing towards any other stimuli. Olafsson et al. (2011) investigated the factor 
structure of the attentional control scale and its relationship with anxiety and 
depression, using a sample of 728 students. An initial exploratory factor analysis 
using 361 participants revealed two factors they labelled focusing and shifting. A 
follow up confirmatory analysis using 367 participants indicated that the two factor 
model was a reasonable fit to the data. Unsurprisingly, Olafsson et al. reported that 
the two focussing and shifting factors correlated quite strongly (r=0.73). However, 
the two factors clearly do not explain all of the variance in each other.  Olafsson et 
al. showed that the predictive validity was different for the focussing and shifting sub 
scales. Focusing significantly predicted anxiety (after controlling for depression), 
whereas shifting significantly predicted depression (after controlling for anxiety).  
A later study by Judah, Grant, Mills and Lechner (2013) also supports the two factor 
structure of the attentional control scale, and that the focusing and shifting 
components have different predictive validity. They used a variety of psychometric 
and behavioural measures. Focusing and shifting shared only a small to medium 
correlation, which is somewhat in contrast to the larger correlation reported by 
Olafsson et al.  Judah et al. also reported that focusing was much more reliably 
negatively correlated with anxiety than depression, whereas shifting was much more 
reliably negatively correlated with depression than anxiety. However, it is 
noteworthy that the anxiety and depression scores were obtained using the STAI 
(Spielberger et al., 1983) subscales proposed by Bieling, Antony and Swinson 
(1998). This division of the STAI does not appear to have been widely adopted in 
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the anxiety literature. However, we return to this issue later in chapters 6 and 7. It is 
even more noteworthy that in the study by Judah et al. depression measured by the 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) did negatively 
correlate with focusing but not shifting. This contradicts their findings using the 
supposed subscales of the STAI.  Additionally, the BDI-II correlated positively at 
identical magnitudes with both the supposed anxiety and depression subscales of the 
STAI. However, Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg and Bradley (2013) also reported that 
lower focusing scores predicted increased anxiety, whereas lower shifting scores 
predicted increased depression (using the same subscales as Judah et al.). 
Judah et al. (2013) showed that attentional focusing (but not shifting) related to 
enhanced antisaccade performance in an eye tracking experiment. In contrast, 
attentional shifting but not focusing was related to enhanced switching ability in a 
letter-number sequencing experiment. Previously, overall scores on the attentional 
control scale have been shown to relate only weakly to behavioural measures of 
attentional control (e.g., Muris, van der Pennen, Sigmond & Mayer, 2008), or even 
be unrelated to behavioural measures of attentional control (e.g., Reinholdt-Dunne et 
al., 2009). Olafsson et al. suggest that this discrepancy may be due to self-report 
measures having a broader frame of reference relative to behavioural measures that 
focus upon specific stimuli. They suggested that more studies that assess the 
relationship between scores on the attentional control scale and behavioural 
measures of executive function are required. More specifically, they suggested that 
no studies using adult samples have been conducted that assess how the focusing and 
shifting sub-factors of attentional control relate to behavioural measures of executive 
function. 
 
1.12. Anxiety and attention to threat 
 
Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg and van Ijzendoorn (2007) 
conducted a large meta-analysis of computerised emotional Stroop, emotional dot-
probe, and emotional spatial cuing experiments. In the emotional Stroop task 
participants are required to name the ink colour of a word, but the words are either 
threat-related or neutral. If it takes participants longer to name a colour when the 
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word is threat-related as opposed to neutral, a threat-related bias in attention is 
inferred. The emotional dot-probe task requires participants to respond as fast as 
possible to a probe stimulus that is presented in the location of one of two previously 
(briefly) shown stimuli. The briefly shown stimuli are either threat-related or neutral. 
If participants are faster at responding to the probes in the threat location than the 
neutral location a threat-related attentional bias is again inferred.  The emotional 
spatial cuing task necessitates participants responding to stimuli whose locations are 
previously cued either validly in the majority of trials or invalidly in the minority of 
trials. As one would expect, participants are faster at responding to validly cued 
stimuli than the invalidly cued stimuli. A threat-related attentional bias can be 
inferred if participants display a larger reaction time difference between validly and 
invalidly cued stimuli for threat-related cues relative to neutral cues. The threat-
related attentional bias observed in these experiments was meta-analytically related 
to high anxious participants, and was not observable in low anxious participants.   
Bar-Haim et al. (2007) suggest that two separate operational definitions of 
attentional biases in anxious participants exist in the psychology literature. A within-
subjects bias refers to anxious participants attending preferentially to threat-related 
experimental stimuli relative to experimental stimuli that are neutral. A between-
subjects bias refers to increases in attention to threat-related stimuli by high anxious 
participants relative to low anxious participants. Bar-Haim et al. suggest that 
confusion can arise as studies sometimes report only one of these biases. For 
example, anxious participants may exhibit a within-subjects but no significant 
between-subjects bias. This may imply the bias is not anxiety related. In addition, 
anxious relative to non-participants may exhibit a between-subjects bias, but no 
within-subjects bias. To investigate this issue in detail Bar-Haim et al. included 172 
studies in their meta-analysis. Overall these studies included 2263 anxious and 1768 
non-anxious participants. Bar-Haim et al. reported that overall there was a robust 
threat-related bias in anxious participants that does not exist in non-anxious 
participants. They report that the effect size can be considered in the low to medium 
range (d = 0.45), and suggest that the meta-analytic result cannot be rendered 
insignificant by another 11,339 studies. Accordingly, the file drawer problem is of 
no concern in this area.  
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Bar-Haim et al. (2007) suggest that their finding of a lack of an overall threat-related 
attentional bias in low-anxious participants is inconsistent with the literature (e.g., 
LeDoux, 1995) that proposes that people in general automatically and preferentially 
attend to threat. However, Bar-Haim et al., state that when a study used strongly 
perceived threat it was evident. They draw attention to Mogg and Bradley’s (1996) 
and Wilson and MacLeod’s (2003) suggestions that anxious participants show a bias 
to mildly and highly threat-related stimuli, whereas low-anxious participants show 
the bias only to highly threat-related stimuli. Overall studies using pictures did not 
produce a larger effect than words. However, with subliminal stimuli pictures 
produced a much larger effect size than words. Bar-Haim et al. propose that this may 
be due to semantic processing requiring longer than sensory processing.  
 
1.13. Cognitive perspectives on anxiety and the threat-related attentional bias 
 
There have been several cognitive theories concerning anxiety and the threat-related 
attentional bias, but they all contain slightly different functional mechanisms. They 
are broadly in alignment with, and can as such broadly be accommodated within, the 
emotional survival circuit framework proposed by LeDoux (2012). These models 
and their differential mechanisms were reviewed concisely by Cisler and Koster 
(2010), but due to their theoretical relevance and for clarity they are each briefly 
described below.  
An early and influential cognitive model proposed by Williams, Watts, MacLeod 
and Mathews (1988) placed the bias at a preconscious level. From this perspective 
the level of threat pertaining to any incoming stimulus is ascertained by an affective 
decision mechanism. Although the term ‘decision mechanism’ sounds like a 
conscious function, Williams et al. conceptualise this function as an implicit 
function. The affective decision mechanism decides if the incoming stimulus 
represents high or low threat. If a stimulus is appraised as representing high threat, a 
resource allocation mechanism would be activated. In this situation the resource 
allocation mechanism would direct attentional resources towards threat-related 
stimuli. In contrast, if the incoming stimulus was appraised as representing low 
threat, attentional resources would be directed towards the task in hand, thus the new 
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stimulus would not be attended to. Williams et al. suggested that the resource 
allocation mechanism is modulated by trait anxiety. According to Williams et al. 
those high in trait anxiety will direct attention towards threat, whereas those low in 
trait anxiety ignore this threat. However, the suggestion concerning low trait anxiety 
has been suggested to be problematic (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Indeed, Wilson and 
MacLeod (2003) showed that those low in trait anxiety show a threat related 
attentional bias for severely threatening stimuli, but not moderately threatening 
stimuli. In contrast, those high in trait anxiety showed the bias towards both 
moderate and severe threat related stimuli.  
An alternative model also focuses upon preconscious processing of threat related 
stimuli.  Ohman (1996) conceptualises the threat-related attentional bias in anxiety as 
being evolutionarily adaptive. From this perspective, incoming stimuli are analysed 
by a feature detection system. The feature detection model proposes that biologically 
relevant stimuli directly modulate physiological arousal (via the feature detection 
system) without conscious awareness, resulting in increases in attention towards 
threat. Once information pertaining to any stimulus has passed the feature detection 
system it enters a significance evaluation system. Threat-related or relevant 
information is then suggested to enter a conscious perception system which mediates 
a slow cognitive appraisal of meaning influenced by emotional memories stored in 
an expectancy system. From this perspective the slow conscious processing system 
can also modulate the arousal system if information is appraised as being threat-
related. Feedback loops between the autonomic arousal system and the significance 
evaluation system enable arousal to increase the sensitivity of the significance 
evaluation system. The expectancy system may also increase the sensitivity of the 
significance evaluation system to specific stimuli that have been learnt about 
previously.  
Wells and Mathews (1994) proposed a very different explanation of the anxiety 
related attentional bias for threat-related stimuli. They view the bias as relating to top 
down self-regulatory executive control processes. Wells and Mathews suggest that 
self-knowledge, beliefs and voluntary goals direct an individual’s attention towards 
threat. They argue that those high in anxiety consciously perceive threat to self-
perseverance. They suggest that this type of motivational disposition would be 
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associated with threat monitoring, and that the bias observed in experimental settings 
is mediated by the belief that monitoring threat is important.    
The cognitive model proposed by Beck and Clark (1997), involves three stages of 
information processing. An initial attentional bias or orienting effect at the point of 
registration of any threatening stimulus was suggested to be predominantly stimulus 
driven. This was suggested to lead to the activation of a primal threat mode, which 
involves innate cognitive and affective psychophysiological and behavioural 
responses to any personally relevant threat related stimuli. The function of this 
primal threat response was proposed to be the reduction of environmental threat. The 
third and final stage was proposed to be based upon the secondary activation of 
slower reflective and elaborative cognitions that are schema based. 
Mogg and Bradley (1998) proposed a cognitive-motivational model of anxiety. From 
this perspective, attention towards threatening stimuli is conceptualised as a normal 
adaptive function. Mogg and Bradley were influenced heavily by the work of 
LeDoux (1996). LeDoux showed that threat related material can be processed via 
two neural routes. One neural route involves fast but crude analyses of features of 
any stimulus that relate to any previously encountered threat situation. The second 
neural route involves a slower and more detailed analysis of any incoming stimulus 
based upon memories and contextual information. Similarly, Mogg and Bradley 
suggested that attention involves two systems. A valence evaluation system was 
proposed to be responsible for preconscious initial appraisal of any incoming 
stimulus. Output from the valence evaluation system was proposed to be modulated 
by previous learning and contextual information. Trait anxiety was suggested to 
modulate the reactivity of the valence evaluation system’s response to threat. Thus, 
from this perspective, those high in trait anxiety would show an increased sensitivity 
to threat relative to those low in trait anxiety. Mogg and Bradley suggested that 
output from the valence evaluation system is then fed into a goal engagement system 
which determines how processing resources are allocated. If any incoming stimulus 
is tagged as being highly threat-related then any current behavioural activity will be 
interrupted as attentional resources will be reallocated to the incoming stimulus. In 
contrast, if the incoming stimulus was tagged as having a low level of threat 
relevance then current behavioural activity will not be interrupted as further 
processing of the incoming stimulus will be stopped. From this perspective stimuli 
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with mild levels of threat relevance would be more likely to be appraised as a high 
level of threat relevance by those high in trait anxiety relative to those low in trait 
anxiety. In short, Mogg and Bradley suggested that high trait anxious participants 
have an oversensitive valence evaluation system.  
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), and Mathews, Mackintosh and Fulcher (1997), 
developed another cognitive model that is somewhat similar to the cognitive-
motivational model proposed by Mogg and Bradley (1998). However, from this 
perspective the attentional bias would occur only when threat needs to compete with 
other task demands or other stimuli. A threat evaluation system was proposed to 
automatically evaluate any incoming stimulus. Output from this system was 
proposed to be fed into a distractor/threat representation system. Any 
interference/distraction was proposed to be countered by voluntary effort and goal 
directed behaviour. From this perspective the strength of any stimulus input would 
need to exceed a certain threshold before any output from the threat evaluation 
system can feed into the distractor/threat representation system. Those high in 
anxiety would have a reduced threshold level enabling increased output of the threat 
evaluation system into the distractor/threat representation system. From this 
perspective, strong threat cues would attract attention at all levels of anxiety, but 
weak threat cues would only attract attention in those high in anxiety. 
Bar-Haim et al. (2007) proposed an integrative model of attentional biases 
(incorporating components from the models of Williams et al., 1988, and Mogg and 
Bradley, 1998) that comprised four systems. Bar-Haim et al. (2007) suggested that a 
preattentive threat evaluation system evaluates any stimuli present in the 
environment. If threat is perceived as high, a resource allocation system is activated 
which results in increased physiological alertness. Any ongoing activities will be 
interrupted, and attention will be oriented towards the threat relevant stimulus. The 
output of this resource allocation system is also the input of a guided threat 
evaluation system. In this system the current stimulus is compared with previously 
learnt experiences and memories. At this point contextual information and possible 
coping mechanisms are evaluated. The output of this guided threat evaluation system 
is a conscious evaluation of the level of threat posed by any incoming stimulus. If 
the threat level of the stimulus is consciously appraised as high, then a goal 
engagement system would interrupt current goal directed behaviour. The goal of the 
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individual would then be to alleviate their current increase in anxiety. From this 
perspective the threat-related attentional bias is mediated by the resource allocation 
system. In short, Bar-Haim et al suggest that a hyper-sensitive resource allocation 
system will even direct attentional resources to stimuli that appraised as only mildly 
threatening by the preattentive threat evaluation system. They suggest that this is the 
cause of anxiety related problems.  
Cisler and Koster (2010) extensively reviewed the literature on anxiety and the 
threat-related attentional bias, and assessed the evidence for the aforementioned 
models of this effect that were proposed by Beck and Clark (1997); Williams et al. 
(1988); Ohman (1996, 2005); Wells and Mathews (1994); Mogg and Bradley, 
(1998); Mathews and Mackintosh, (1998); Eysenck et al. (2007); and Bar-Haim et al. 
(2007). Cisler and Koster drew attention to the fact that the only consistent feature 
across these models is a threat detection system that operates automatically, and 
mediates enhanced attention to threat-related stimuli. When reviewing the empirical 
evidence for these models they predominantly focused upon studies using spatial 
cueing tasks, visual search tasks and dot probe tasks. Cisler and Koster also drew 
attention to the fact that the attentional bias has three components. These 
components were defined as facilitated attention towards threat related stimuli; 
difficulty in disengaging attention away from threat related stimuli; and attentional 
avoidance of threat related stimuli. In summary of their findings, the evidence 
suggest that the threat related attentional bias consists of facilitated attention to threat 
when stimuli are presented for a short duration and have a high threat intensity, but 
also delayed disengagement and avoidance of threat at later stages of information 
processing. Cisler and Koster conclude that automatic threat detection is a feature of 
all the models reviewed except the model by Wells and Mathews (1994). Cisler and 
Koster suggest that both the behavioural evidence, and the neuroimaging evidence 
concerning the amygdala’s role in automatic threat detection, support this notion.  
Van Bockstaele et al. (2013) reviewed evidence for any causal effect of the threat 
related attentional bias upon fear and anxiety. They defined fear as a specific 
immediate affective response to a specific well defined type of stimuli or situations, 
whereas anxiety was defined as a general ongoing feeling of stressful unease. Thus, 
from their perspective, high fearfulness and high anxiousness would describe a 
person who scored highly on fear and anxiety questionnaires, respectively. They 
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focused their review upon research studies that used either the emotional Stroop task; 
dot probe task; spatial cueing task; visual search task; or attentional blink task. 
However, the review was limited to studies published between April 2005 and May 
2011. They also focused their review of theoretical accounts / models of anxiety and 
the attentional bias upon five perspectives. This included four of those reviewed by 
Cisler and Koster (2010). The perspectives of Beck and Clark (1997); Williams et al. 
(1988); Mogg and Bradley (1998); and Bar-Haim et al. (2007) were discussed along 
with the cognitive perspective of Eysenck (1992, 1997). Eysenck’s earlier 
perspective is broadly similar to that proposed by ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) as it 
revolves around distractibility and a hypervigilance to threat in high anxiety.  
Van Bockstaele et al. (2013) drew attention to the fact that these five accounts make 
different predictions concerning the attentional bias and the causality of fear and 
anxiety. Van Bockstaele et al. suggest that only the perspectives of Bar-Haim et al. 
and Beck and Clark suggest that the attentional bias would cause fear and/or anxiety 
in a unidirectional fashion. Moreover, the perspectives of Eysenck, Williams et al. 
and Bar-Haim all suggest that the attentional bias is a cognitive vulnerability factor 
concerning a person developing fear and/or anxiety, whereas the perspectives of 
Mogg and Bradley and Beck and Clark do not.  Furthermore, the perspectives of 
Eysenck, Mogg and Bradley, and Williams et al. suggest that the attentional bias is 
implicated in maintaining or exacerbating fear and/or anxiety. In contrast, the 
perspective of Bar-Haim et al. does not specify this, whereas the perspective of Beck 
and Clark suggests this is not the case. After reviewing the evidence Van Bockstaele 
et al. concluded that the theorising of Williams et al. and Eysenck fit the data best. 
Both of these perspectives proposed a mutually reinforcing relationship between the 
threat-related attentional bias and fear and/or anxiety, and considered the bias a 
cognitive vulnerability factor for the development of fear and/or anxiety. In short, 
Van Bockstaele et al. suggest that a causal unidirectional relationship between 
anxiety and this threat-related attentional bias is unlikely. Instead they propose that a 
reciprocal relationship would serve to maintain and reinforce levels of anxiety, and 
the magnitude of a person’s attentional bias. 
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1.14. The ABCDs of anxiety 
 
Wilt, Oehlberg and Revelle (2011) and Ortony, Norman and Revelle (2005) 
proposed that anxiety relates to four separate modes of functioning. They describe 
what they call an ABCD framework of anxiety. The ‘A’ component refers to affect. 
This component consists of internal and evaluative states such as mood patterns 
emotions, feelings and preferences. The ‘B’ component refers to behaviour. This 
component consists of physical activity, whether it be observable behaviour such as 
motor movement, talking and walking, or unobservable behaviour such as heart rate 
variability. The ‘C’ component refers to cognition. This component consists of 
processes that enable an individual to make sense of their environment. Thus, this 
component includes an individual’s thoughts, modes of thinking, beliefs, and 
problem solving abilities. The ‘D’ component refers to an individual’s desires. This 
component consists of goals, strivings, wants, and motivations, which all lead to a 
specific behavioural tendency. Wilt et al. suggest that personality can be seen as the 
integration of these ABCDs, and that one can view contemporary anxiety research as 
attempting to evaluate the links between the ABC and D components of an anxious 
personality.   
Wilt et al. (2011) suggest that even though there are the ABC and D components to 
an anxious personality, anxiety can be researched at three different levels of 
information processing. They suggest that anxiety differentially relates to reactive 
processing, routine processing, and reflective processing (Ortony et al., 2005). Wilt 
et al. suggest that many if not most of the situations an individual may find 
themselves in demand a rapid response that has followed a fast and efficient form of 
information processing. Wilt et al. suggest that this simple stimulus-response 
behaviour occurs at the reactive level of information processing. They suggest that at 
this level of information processing the A (affect), B (behaviour), and D (desire, i.e., 
motivation) components are almost indistinguishable from each other. Whereas at 
this level of information processing the C component (cognition) is only minimally 
active. This perspective would suggest that at a reactive level of information 
processing, each of the A, B, and D components simply provide a different 
perspective on the same unitary activity. In short, situations where a reactive 
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response has interrupted goal directed behaviour will have entailed a behaviour (B) 
being interrupted by emotional response (A) that then directs motivation (D) to 
approach or avoid the interrupting stimulus. From their perspective, anxiety at this 
level of information processing could therefore relate to goal conflict resolution.  
Wilt et al. (2011) describe the routine level of information processing as 
encompassing automatic processes that control well leaned everyday activities. They 
suggest that at this routine level emotion (A), behaviour (B) and desire: motivation 
(D) are distinguishable due to the influence of cognition (C). In short at this level of 
information processing cognition is involved in predicting expectancies about 
possible up and coming events (i.e., distinguishing between current states and future 
states). Thus, here anxiety is manifested when expectancies of negative events occur. 
Wilt et al. suggest that here motivation (D) will direct behaviour (B) to avoidance 
initiating behaviours, thus reducing the threat.  
The final level of information processing is described by Wilt et al. (2011) as the 
reflective level. They suggest that at this level self-awareness and meta-processing 
occur. They suggest that feelings that are emanated from the reactive and routine 
levels of information processing are elaborated upon cognitively. Thus here the 
experiential component of anxiety becomes enriched with explicit cognitions. 
Conscious processing such as planning, reasoning and thoughts will guide an 
individual’s behaviour towards or away from any potential goals. In summary, this 
perspective thus provides a framework for dividing up emotional (A), behavioural 
(B), cognitive (C) and motivational (D) functions that can be researched in anxiety, 
but also delineates the levels of information processing in which these functions can 
be researched (i.e., reactive, routine and reflective).  
 
1.15. The DSM 5 and the RDOC: Trait anxiety and clinical anxiety  
 
Clinical anxiety, phobias, and obsessive compulsive disorders have been suggested 
to arise from too much activity of the BIS (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). The 5th 
edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-5; 
American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2013) suggests that inclusion criteria for 
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the diagnosis of an anxiety disorder is predicated upon persons experiencing 
“excessive fear and anxiety and related behavioural disturbances” (p. 189). The 
magnitude of these experiences are determined by a clinician’s interview and 
subsequent evaluation. However, it has been proposed that a latent dimension sub-
serves the entire anxiety spectrum, which also overlaps with the mood disorders. 
Differing anxiety and mood disorders have substantial comorbidity and as such 
making diagnoses is difficult (Lang, McTeague, & Bradley, 2016).  
A recent initiative -- the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative -- questions the 
decision making utility of organising data around subjective symptoms. This 
initiative suggests that researchers develop new methods of classifying disorders 
using behavioural and neurobiological measures (Lang et al., 2016). Lang et al. 
suggest that the affective physiology of anxiety and the mood disorders is predicated 
upon motivational circuits that have evolved in the brains of mammals to aid 
survival. Lang et al. suggest that when activate these circuits produce the subjective 
experience of emotion. Their perspective clearly resonates with the ‘emotional 
survival circuit’ perspective of LeDoux (2012). Lang et al. thus advocate research 
that is designed to measure the defensive reactivity of these circuits in anxiety and 
mood disorders. Research suggests that underlying personality traits exist that range 
from healthy adaptive levels to pathological levels in clinical anxiety and mood 
disorders (e.g., Bienvenu et al., 2001). Thus, it should be possible to research the 
reactivity of any emotional or motivational survival circuits in this ‘anxiety 
spectrum’ by investigating how variations in trait anxiety affect performance. Trait 
anxiety research can thus serve to aid in the development of behavioural measures of 
the reactivity of survival circuits, which could also be used as future clinical 
diagnostic measures.  
 
1.16. Thesis rationale 
 
The perspective on anxiety offered by Gray and McNaughton (2000) is based upon 
three interacting brain systems. From their perspective anxiety relates to a defensive 
conflict resolution system. This system resolves conflicting approach and avoid 
motivations that are sub-served by a reward related behavioural approach system, 
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and a fear related behavioural avoidance system, respectively. Anxiety is said to 
relate to the enhanced reactivity of this conflict resolution system. Eysenck et al. 
(2007) offered a perspective on anxiety that is based upon two interacting brain 
systems. From their perspective on anxiety the activity of a goal directed attentional 
system is disrupted by the enhanced reactivity of a stimulus directed attentional 
system. Anxiety is said to relate to increased cognitive interference leading to 
increased distraction. The perspectives on anxiety offered by Beck and Clark (1997), 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), Mogg and Bradley (1998), Ohman (1996), 
Williams et al. (1988), and also Eysenck et al. (2007), all suggest that anxiety relates 
to the automatic and rapid detection of threat-related stimuli. Therefore, anxiety is 
said to relate to faster responses to visual stimuli depicting threatening information.  
This suggests that anxiety may relate to variability in the activity of three interrelated 
cognitive processes. High levels of trait anxiety may relate to altered conflict 
resolution, enhanced cognitive distraction, and enhanced processing of threat 
relevant visual stimuli. The threat-related attentional bias in high trait anxious people 
may also interact with the conflict resolution and/or distraction processes. Moreover, 
the evidence discussed thus far suggests that trait anxiety may also be interrelated 
with individual differences in social anxiety, trait anger, fear, and attentional control 
abilities. These other three personality factors may also be interrelated with the 
aforementioned conflict resolution, distraction and threat processing functions.  
If trait anxiety relates to a threat-related modification within any conflict resolution, 
distraction, and/or basic stimuli processing functions, it may reflect an anxiety 
related increase in the reactivity of the survival circuits discussed by LeDoux (2012). 
It is thus the purpose of this thesis to carry out a series of behavioural experiments 
designed to tap into these circuits, with particular emphasis upon conflict resolution, 
distraction and emotional face processing. Emotional manipulation in this thesis is 
solely carried out using visually emotional faces in computerised reaction time 
experiments. Personality traits are assessed using psychometric measures. This thesis 
adopts the perspective of LeDoux that suggests emotion can be researched using 
stimuli that represent survival circuit response triggers, as opposed to emotion circuit 
feeling triggers. Thus, it is the intent of this series of experiments to elicit manual 
responses to stimuli representing survival circuit triggers, not to elicit felt emotional 
responses.  
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The experiments described in this thesis will all use a methodology sometimes 
referred to as ‘mental chronometry’. Mental chronometry is the experimental study 
of response latencies, which are recorded as reaction times. Information processing 
accounts in psychology are based upon an important theoretical foundation. 
Processes that occur at a functionally early stage of information processing, such as 
the identification of stimuli, and the selection of appropriate responses, are accepted 
to be completed before the onset of a person’s overt response. A person’s response is 
proposed to be triggered when this processing is complete. Therefore, mental 
chronometry focuses upon the influence of factors on when a person responds, not 
how a person responds (Abrams & Balota, 1991). However, these response latencies 
(reaction times) can also be affected by processes that occur after the response has 
been selected and is on its way to becoming the overt response (e.g., Osman, 
Kornblum, & Meyer, 1986). In other words, factors can influence a person’s reaction 
time if they influence information processes after the selected responses’ point of no 
return. Mental chronometry (as a means of researching latent response triggers) is 
thus an ideal methodology to use when researching the existence of any survival 
circuit triggers such as those proposed by LeDoux (2012). 
The experiments described in this thesis will also use stimuli depicting facial 
emotion throughout. More specifically, the stimuli used will all be either happy 
faces, angry faces or fearful faces. The only positive emotional faces used will be 
happy faces. The only other positive emotional facial expression we are aware of is 
surprise. Surprised faces will not be used as certain methodological considerations 
need to be accounted for. Adolphs (2002a) suggests that surprised faces can be 
experienced as either happy or fearful. Elfenbein, Mandal, Ambady, Harizuka and 
Kumar (2002) also suggest that emotional faces displaying fear and surprise are 
often confused with each other. This confusion can arise within cultural groups, but 
also arise more frequently during cross-cultural facial emotion recognition. Jack, 
Blais, Scheepers, Schyns and Caldara (2009) used behavioural and eye-tracking 
methods in a within culture emotion recognition study; using happy, surprised, 
disgusted, fearful, angry, sad, and neutral faces as stimuli. Western participants were 
highly accurate at recognizing all emotions. East Asian participants consistently 
confused surprised faces with fearful faces and also consistently confused angry 
faces with disgusted faces. The eye-tracking data suggested that this cultural 
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difference in emotion perception was due to East Asian participants fixating on 
different face regions than western participants. It is expected that we obtain a 
culturally diverse sample so no surprised or disgusted faces will be used. No neutral 
faces will be used as in a two choice task consisting of neutral and fear faces, the 
entire situation could be processed as a threat situation. Moreover, in a two choice 
task consisting of neutral and happy faces, the entire situation could be processed as 
a positive situation. This would be a serious confound in our study designs. We 
suggest this based upon the results and interpretation of the study discussed earlier 
by Morel et al. (2014). 
The emotional faces will require behavioural responses. This thesis does not aim to 
record physiological or neural responses. However, there is plenty of evidence 
confirming that visual emotional stimuli (i.e., photographs) used in experimental 
settings elicit physiological and neural responses. Previous research shows that when 
appetitive, neutral, and aversive photographs are used experimentally, individual 
valence ratings correlate with physiological responses. Heart-rate decelerates whilst 
viewing unpleasant photographs, but accelerates when they are pleasant (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Moreover, arousal ratings have been shown to be 
positively correlated with skin-conductance responses, independent of valence (Lang 
et al., 1997). Furthermore, neuroimaging evidence suggests that increased occipital 
cortex activity is present during the processing of emotional (regardless of valence) 
relative to neutral pictures (Lang et al., 1998b). Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert (1998a) 
interpret this evidence as suggesting that emotional information is subject to 
increased neural processing at an early perceptual stage than neutral information. 
Indeed, Costafreda, Brammer, David and Fu (2008) conducted a large meta-analysis 
of PET and fMRI studies concerning amygdala activation to emotional stimuli. Their 
meta-analysis of 385 studies confirmed that the processing of emotional stimuli was 
related to an increased probability of amygdala activity than the processing of neutral 
stimuli. Costafreda et al. also showed that most negatively valenced and positively 
valenced emotional stimuli produced comparable effects. However, Costafreda et al. 
reported a higher probability of amygdala activation for stimuli depicting fear, 
relative to stimuli depicting happiness.  
The evidence provided by Lang et al. (1997; 1998a; 1998b) and Costafreda et al. 
(2008) suggests that the use of photographs of emotional faces from a standardised 
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facial emotion stimuli set will activate a biological response. The experiments 
described in this thesis will use visual emotional stimuli, combined with the use of 
mental chronometry. This will enable an investigation of how the reactivity of the 
survival circuits described by LeDoux (2012) are affected by sub-clinical levels of 
anxiety. 
 
1.17. Thesis questions 
 
This thesis aims to answer five questions. 
 
Question 1: How are sub-clinical levels of trait anxiety and social anxiety related to 
the recognition of happy, fearful and angry facial expressions?  
 
Question 2: How are sub-clinical levels of trait anxiety related to distraction by other 
emotional faces or emotional words when identifying these emotional facial 
expressions? 
 
Question 3: How are sub-clinical levels of trait anxiety related to any sequential 
differences in how conflict resolution is achieved in these situations of emotional 
distraction and emotional goal conflict? 
 
Question 4: How are sub-clinical levels of trait anxiety related to other personality 
variables such as trait anger, interpersonal fear, and attentional control, and how do 
these other traits relate to the cognitive processes described in questions 1-3?    
 
Question 5: Can we develop a novel emotional conflict resolution paradigm that is 
grounded in neuroscientific theory, and is practical for other researchers to use in 
future sub-clinical and clinical affective trait research?  
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1.18. Thesis predictions 
 
Prediction 1: Sub-clinical trait anxiety / social anxiety will be related to a reaction 
time bias when responding to threat-related emotional faces compared with non-
threat-related emotional faces. More specifically, this should be manifested as faster 
reaction times to fearful faces by those high in anxiety relative to those low in 
anxiety.   
 
Prediction 2: Sub-clinical trait anxiety will be related to increased distraction by 
emotional stimuli. More specifically, this should be manifested as slower reaction 
times (by those high in anxiety relative to those low in anxiety) to target stimuli in 
situations of emotional distraction / goal conflict. Alternatively, high anxiety may 
relate to the reaction time difference in responses to target stimuli when emotional 
distraction / goal conflict is present, relative to when no emotional distraction / goal 
conflict is present. 
 
Prediction 3: Sub-clinical trait anxiety will be related to altered conflict resolution. 
Conflict resolution will be measured as the reaction time advantage in resolving goal 
conflict that is present when goal conflict has been experienced immediately 
beforehand, relative to when it has not (the sequential effects of conflict resolution 
are explained in the following chapter). At the point of inception of this PhD we 
were unaware of any research on anxiety and this topic.  Initially we intuitively 
reasoned that anxiety would be related to enhanced conflict resolution. Once the PhD 
was underway we soon obtained two papers that suggested the opposite, followed by 
one paper that was in alignment with our original expectation. Accordingly, we 
necessarily adopted a non-directional prediction concerning this issue.  
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Chapter 2 
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2. Experiment 1 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The literature discussed thus far concerning anxiety and emotional facial expression 
recognition, discrimination, or categorisation has produced some very inconsistent 
results. This inconsistency is somewhat surprising as the processing of facial 
expressions of emotion serves key social functions: facilitating social 
communication (Darwin, 1872), and recognition of a facial expression aids 
identifying a person’s intentions and mood (Bruce & Young, 1986). Moreover, one 
would expect that the study of response latencies during emotional face processing 
would be ideal when researching the relationship between trait anxiety and any 
survival circuit triggers such as those proposed by LeDoux (2012). However, it is 
noteworthy that the anxiety and emotional face processing studies discussed thus far 
all use different task instructions and therefore assess emotional face processing (and 
any possible relationship with trait anxiety) in slightly different ways.  
Holmes, Nielsen and Green (2008) used a task where participants were required to 
respond to repeated emotional facial expressions, whereas Rossignol, Philippot, 
Douilliez, Crommelinck and Campanella (2005) used an oddball paradigm requiring 
the detection of infrequent emotional faces. Morel, George, Foucher, Chammat and 
Dubal (2014) used an emotional face categorisation task, Fonzo et al. (2015) used an 
emotional face matching task, and Doty, Japee, Ingvar and Ungerleider (2013) used 
a masked emotional face detection paradigm. Cooper, Rowe and Penton-Voak 
(2008) used a more simple facial emotion recognition paradigm. However, none of 
the studies discussed thus far required the detection of emotional faces amongst 
several other concurrently presented emotional faces. In a different type of 
experimental manipulation Byrne and Eysenck (1995) used a task requiring the 
detection of target faces amongst crowds of distractor faces. This has become known 
as the ‘face in the crowd’ paradigm.  
In the ‘face in the crowd’ study carried out by Byrne and Eysenck (1995) 
participants high in trait anxiety were able to detect angry target faces (amongst 
multiple neutral faces) faster than low trait anxious participants. The two groups did 
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not differ in the speed of detection of target happy faces presented amongst multiple 
neutral faces. Furthermore, happy target faces (presented amongst multiple angry 
faces) were detected slower by high trait anxious relative to low trait anxious 
participants. Reaction times (RTs) for those high in trait anxiety were the same for 
both angry and happy faces detected amongst crowds of neutral faces. The ‘face in 
the crowd task’ required participants to search for the target faces that were not 
always in the same location. In this task, all trials can be considered to contain a 
level of emotional incongruence, or conflict, as the surrounding emotional 
expressions were always different from the expressions of the target faces. 
Therefore, a direct comparison of the speed of identification of a target facial 
expression that is emotionally incongruent with the surrounding facial expressions 
(i.e., a high distraction / conflict situation), with one that is emotionally congruent 
with its surrounding facial expressions (i.e., a low distraction / non-conflict 
situation), was not possible. As the anxiety effects found in this study were search 
related, this still leaves open the question that anxiety may relate to differences in 
emotional cognitive interference experienced as emotional distraction, or emotional 
conflict resolution.  
The relationship between anxiety and emotional distraction and conflict resolution 
can however be assessed by using tasks that manipulate other emotional conflict 
scenarios. Etkin and Schatzberg (2011) and Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, Menon and 
Schatzberg (2010) investigated emotional conflict processing in patients with 
generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and normal controls. Etkin and colleagues used 
Stroop-like stimuli consisting of target fearful faces and happy faces. These faces 
were overlaid with words stating either ‘fear’ or ‘happy’ that were either emotionally 
congruent or emotionally incongruent with the facial expressions. Participants were 
required to respond to the emotional expression of the target face, but were also 
required to inhibit responding to the distractor words. Goal conflict would be high 
during incongruent trials as the distractor words also represent a possible conflicting 
response. Goal conflict would be low during congruent trials as the distractor words 
represent the same response as the target facial expression. As one would expect, 
low conflict / low distraction congruent trials consisting of target faces overlaid with 
words that were congruent with the facial emotion (e.g., happy face with the word 
happy overlaid) were responded to faster than high conflict / high distraction 
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incongruent trials (e.g., happy face with the word fear overlaid). However, the basic 
RT congruency effect (incongruent RT minus congruent RT) was not related to GAD 
symptoms (relative to normal controls), nor to the trait anxiety scores of the 
combined patients and normal controls.  
These findings are somewhat problematic for ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007), which 
proposes that anxiety relates to increased levels of distraction. In short, in this 
version of an emotional Stroop task an incongruent trial has a target face stimulus 
and a distractor word stimulus. From an ACT perspective, the goal directed 
attentional system would be maintaining attention to the target faces. However, if a 
high anxious participant completes the task their heightened stimulus driven 
attentional system should compromise the ability to inhibit the interference from the 
distractor word. ACT thus predicts a heightened RT congruency effect in the 
emotional face Stroop task for high trait anxious participants. Moreover, from an 
RST perspective (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), one might also expect anxiety to 
relate to differences in how this goal conflict is resolved.  
Stroop-like tasks are not the only conflict tasks suitable for researching distraction, 
conflict resolution, and their relationships with anxiety. Larson, Clawson, Clayson 
and Baldwin (2013) used the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) to 
investigate conflict processing of neutral stimuli in clinical anxiety patients (with 
GAD) and healthy controls. The Eriksen flanker task uses central target stimuli 
(usually letters or arrows) that are surrounded by either congruent or incongruent 
flankers. This task requires participants to respond quickly, but accurately, via left or 
right handed responses to the central target symbol. Congruent trials when the target 
and flankers are compatible do not generate response conflict (eg., <<<<< or 
>>>>>). Conversely, incongruent trials where the target is different from the 
flankers generate strong response conflict (eg., <<><< or >><>>). RTs for correct 
responses to incongruent trials are slower than RTs for correct responses to 
congruent trials. This effect is proposed to be produced by the flankers also 
activating an automatic motor response, which needs to be inhibited if accurate 
responses are to be achieved (Gratton et al., 1992). Larson et al. (2013) reported that 
the RT congruency effect (incongruent RT minus congruent RT) was uncorrelated 
with the trait anxiety scores of their whole sample.  
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The same ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) predictions can be made concerning responses 
to incongruent trials and/or the congruency effects in the flanker task, as with the 
Stroop tasks described already. In short, during incongruent trials the goal directed 
attentional system should be maintaining participants’ attention to the central target 
arrow. The flanker arrows should be easily ignored by those low in anxiety, who 
should have a good balance between the goal directed attentional system and 
stimulus driven attentional system. However, according to ACT, those high in 
anxiety would have an inefficient balance between these two attentional systems. 
Thus, in high anxiety the stimulus driven attentional system would be overactive and 
as such would lead to increased distraction by the flanker arrows. This should lead to 
an anxiety related slowing on incongruent trials, or an increased RT congruency 
effect. As described above, this was not found to be the case. This flanker study 
(Larson et al.) and the Stroop studies by Etkin and colleagues (2010; 2011) provide 
no support for the prediction of ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007), that anxiety is related to 
increased distraction. 
These conflict tasks do however also provide a means of researching the sequential 
effects of conflict processing, and thus individual differences in conflict resolution. 
The Stroop task and flanker task enable an analysis of congruency sequence effects 
(CSEs) present in the RTs. CSEs present in conflict tasks are often referred to as the 
Gratton effect. The Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1992) refers to slower 
RTs being elicited by congruent trials that follow incongruent trials (denoted iC), as 
opposed to congruent trials that follow congruent trials (denoted cC), and quicker 
RTs for incongruent trials that follow incongruent trials (denoted iI), as opposed to 
those that follow congruent trials (denoted cI). In short, there is a reliable RT 
advantage present in conflict tasks when the previous level of (in)congruency repeats 
(cC and iI trials) as opposed to when it alternates (iC and cI trials). This is often 
interpreted as evidence of top-down attentional adjustments that are triggered by the 
conflict experienced on the previous trial (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Carter, Barch, & 
Cohen, 2001), although alternative explanations of the effect have been offered (see 
Egner, 2007, for review). This issue is discussed in more detail later, but it suffices 
to say that the CSE might thus be a good phenomenon to study when conducting 
experimental research on anxiety and conflict resolution.  
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In the two experiments carried out by Etkin and colleagues (2011, 2010), anxious 
patients and non-anxious healthy controls displayed a similar CSE during congruent 
trials. Moreover, their healthy controls (who were lower in trait anxiety) also 
displayed the predicted CSE during correct responses to the target faces in 
emotionally incongruent trials. Therefore, for healthy controls incongruent trials that 
followed incongruent trials (iI) were responded to faster than incongruent trials that 
followed congruent trials (cI).  Clinical anxiety patients (who were higher in trait 
anxiety) did not display this effect. This finding was interpreted as evidence of 
defective emotion regulation processes in anxiety. In an editorial in the same journal 
edition that published Etkin et al’s (2010) paper, Ernst (2010) discussed the 
implications of this finding. Ernst drew attention to the value of this paradigm as a 
measure of emotion regulation that is not dependent upon patient self-report data. 
One can extend this argument by suggesting that this type of paradigm may prove to 
be equally useful when assessing personality implicitly (in contrast to explicit 
personality assessment by questionnaires), assuming there is a personality trait which 
is reliably associated with the size of the CSE.  
CSEs have also been found in a neutral gender word-face Stroop task. Osinksky, 
Alexander, Gebhardt and Hennig (2010) used a task where male and female faces 
had the words man or woman overlaid upon them. Participants responded to the 
gender of each face faster when the words were congruent with the face relative to 
when they were incongruent with the face. CSEs were present in the RTs but were 
not affected by trait anxiety. However, recordings of brain activity using EEG 
showed that an N400 ERP, thought to be related to conflict processing, was 
modulated by trait anxiety. As trait anxiety increased, the difference in the N400 
amplitude between iI and cI trials, and also between cC and iC trials, increased.   
Larson et al. (2013) reported in the flanker task experiment (which revealed no 
anxiety related interference effects) that when the data from their groups of clinical 
patients and normal controls were combined, trait anxiety correlated moderately, 
positively, and significantly with the overall magnitude of the CSE (aka the Gratton 
effect). This relationship is in contrast to that reported by Etkin and Schatzberg 
(2011) and Etkin et al. (2010) for the CSE during just incongruent trials, as in their 
studies high anxious participants did not display the effect during these trials. 
Nevertheless, these studies suggest that anxiety may be related to a difference in 
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conflict resolution processes, but further research is required before this can be 
understood. Yet again we see that the anxiety-behaviour correlations appear quite 
unreliable. 
Interpretations of how anxiety interacts with emotional face processing and the 
control of emotional conflict are hard to generalise across studies as paradigms 
differ. Moreover, the conflict elicited by the happy/fear Stroop task (Etkin & 
Schatzberg, 2011, Etkin et al., 2010) can be considered between-valence conflict. No 
within-valence conflict condition (e.g., anger/fear) was included. It is important that 
anxiety research delineates situations involving between-valence conflict and within-
valence conflict, when both emotional expression recognition and emotional conflict 
resolution is required1.  
In the real world visual emotional conflict is seldom experienced by concurrently 
reading words and seeing faces as in the Stroop tasks above. The study in this 
chapter uses a more ecologically valid emotional flanker paradigm using just faces 
that is inspired by the ‘face in the crowd’ paradigm used by Byrne and Eysenck 
(1995). We wanted to use a more ecologically valid level of conflict as traditional 
                                                          
1 Other categorisations of the emotional faces were considered (e.g., approach versus avoid) 
but evidence supporting this distinction is complex and surprising. In short, from Gray & 
McNaughtons’s (2000) RST perspective happy faces might signal potential reward and thus 
be related to the activity of a behavioural approach system (BAS). However, anger has also 
been suggested to be mediated by the BAS (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), and is therefore 
also a behaviour closely related to approach motivation (Harmon-Jones, 2003). Thus both 
happy and angry faces might represent an approach motivation. Fearful faces should signal 
fear, and generally fear leads to avoidance behaviours (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; 
McNaughton & Corr, 2004; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). However, this dichotomy 
would only be valid from the perspective of the person expressing the emotions. The person 
perceiving fear might initiate approach behaviour in order to help the fearful person (or 
resolve conflict). Moreover, although a person expressing anger might initiate approach 
behaviour, a person perceiving anger might initiate avoidance behaviour (Marsh, Ambady, 
& Kleck, 2005). Thus, one needs to be careful in applying the approach and avoid 
dichotomy to emotional face stimuli. As both fearful and angry faces would signal potential 
threat in the environment, the valence based dichotomy remains valid. 
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incongruent flanker task stimuli (e.g., <<><< or HHFHH) facilitate very strong 
interference but again do not seem to correspond to typical information processing 
demands in the real world.  We also included single face trials (i.e., no flanker trials) 
as a simple test of emotion recognition, and included both between-valence and 
within-valence conflict conditions, as we were interested in how anxiety affects the 
processing of fearful faces relative to both happy and angry faces. An emotional 
conflict situation consisting of happy and fearful faces can be considered a between-
valence conflict situation. Moreover, an emotional conflict situation consisting of 
angry and fearful faces can be considered a within-valence conflict situation. 
We aimed to generate a large data set to determine the utility of further anxiety 
research pertaining to three inter-related cognitive processes (i.e., emotion 
recognition, distraction, and conflict resolution).  
The use of computerised conflict tasks such as those described thus far is logical in 
anxiety research for several reasons. From Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) 
perspective cognitive control would be related to activity of the BIS, and would be 
partly mediated by the ACC. In the cognitive neuroscience literature the ACC is 
suggested to monitor environmental conflict and adjust the control of behaviour, in 
order to resolve this conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Carter, Barch, & Cohen, 2001). For 
example, ACC activation during fMRI increases during the Eriksen flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) when a response to a central target is not congruent with 
the flanking distracters (Botvinick et al., 2001). In addition, Carter and van Veen 
(2007) reviewed the literature concerning ACC and conflict tasks, and report that it 
is a consistent neuroimaging finding that ACC activity is greatest to incongruent 
trials following congruent trials. Moreover, Larson et al. (2013) reported that in their 
neutral arrow flanker task study, a conflict-related N2 ERP amplitude was less 
negative the higher the level of trait anxiety. Previous research using dipole models 
of the N2 ERP have located its source to the ACC (Mathalon, Whitfield, & Ford, 
2003). This evidence adds more weight to the suggestion that the ACC has some 
involvement in the cognitive control processes required by the flanker task. These 
findings, derived from the study of neuroscience and psychophysiology, indicate that 
a flanker type task would be an ideal paradigm to study how the cognitive control of 
conflict and emotion is affected by anxiety. Moreover, an emotional flanker task 
should be an ideal tool to use when exploring any possible survival circuit functions 
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(LeDoux, 2012) relating to the control of emotional goal conflict, that might also be 
affected by anxiety. 
 
2.2. Purpose of experiment 1 
 
A threat-related emotional expression recognition advantage, and an emotional 
conflict resolution advantage, can be easily accommodated within the emotional 
survival circuit framework theorised by LeDoux (2012). Moreover, if a threat-related 
stimulus appears in the periphery of attention it may be adaptive to be distracted by 
this stimulus, which might then become the target of attention and produce safety 
behaviours. In this initial study, we aimed to answer four research questions. Firstly, 
is trait anxiety related to increased distraction? Secondly, does trait anxiety relate to 
a bias for faster responses to fearful faces compared to happy faces? Thirdly, does 
trait anxiety relate to altered emotional conflict resolution as measured by the CSE? 
And fourthly, do other affective traits such as trait anger or levels of interpersonal 
fear relate to these three processes in addition to any effects found for trait anxiety?  
Concerning our first question, ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) proposes that anxiety is 
linked to magnified influences of a stimulus-driven attentional system (that attends 
and reacts to peripheral or distracting stimuli) coupled with a decrease in the 
influence of a goal-directed attentional system (that attends to one’s current goals).  
An ACT-based prediction would thus suggest that trait anxiety would be related to 
an increase in the slowing on incongruent trials (and/or an increased RT congruency 
effect), due to peripheral distracting stimuli engaging the stimulus-driven attentional 
system more strongly with increasing anxiety. Because Larson et al. (2013) reported 
that anxiety was unrelated to the RT congruency effects in their study, we were 
concerned to maximise the degree of flanker distraction within our task. Therefore, 
we reduced the frequency of incongruent trials relative to congruent trials, as this has 
been shown to increase congruency effects (e.g., Gratton et al., 1992; Mayr & Awh, 
2009). This was a final attempt to capture an anxiety related increase in distraction. 
Based upon ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) we can predict that the magnitude of 
distraction should be increased in high anxious participants if the distracting stimuli 
are threat-related relative to when they are not threat-related (e.g., fearful flankers 
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during incongruent trials with happy target faces should be more distracting for high 
anxious participants than happy flankers during incongruent trials with fearful target 
faces). If found this effect would also be consistent with the perspectives on anxiety 
that incorporate a threat-related processing bias (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews, Mackintosh & Fulcher, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Ohman, 1996; Wells & Mathews, 1994; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988).  
Concerning our second question, most of the task instructions in the studies 
discussed deviated from requiring simple rapid emotional facial expression 
recognition. In short, they either required participants to respond to repeated 
emotional expressions, categorise emotional expressions, match emotional 
expressions, detect infrequent emotional expressions, or the task included several 
emotional expressions. Based upon the design of these studies the effect of trait 
anxiety upon threat-related face processing still seems somewhat inconclusive. 
Based upon the accounts of anxiety that incorporate a threat-related processing bias 
(e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Ohman, 1996; Wells & Mathews, 1994; Williams et al., 
1988), the meta-analysis by Bar-Haim et al. (2007; showing that anxiety is related to 
a threat-related attentional bias), and the encouraging neuroimaging findings of 
Fonzo et al. (2015), we still predicted that trait anxiety would be related to a RT bias 
for fearful faces. This may be evidenced by trait anxious participants producing 
faster RTs to fearful faces in the between-valence condition (i.e., when 
discriminating fearful faces from happy faces), or by trait anxiety being related to the 
emotional face RT difference score (RT for fearful faces minus RT for happy faces). 
In this design it would not be likely that the alternative face from the fearful face 
(i.e., a happy face) could be processed as part of a threat-related situation, as 
proposed by Morel et al. (2014). In their task, neutral faces were the other face. The 
within-valence condition in the present study includes two threat-related face 
expressions as both angry and fearful expressions were used. This allows an analysis 
of whether any anxiety related speeding in RTs to fearful faces is also present when 
anger is the alternative facial expression, or if an anxiety related speeding to both 
threatening expressions occurs in the same task.  
72 
 
Concerning our third question, we predicted that anxiety would be related to conflict 
resolution (as evidenced by a relationship between anxiety and the magnitude of the 
CSE). It is not possible to make a confident directional prediction here. As discussed 
above, Etkin and Schatzberg (2011), and Etkin et al. (2010) showed that a CSE in an 
emotional face-word Stroop task was selectively abolished in high anxiety 
participants, but Larson et al. (2013) showed that a CSE was increased in high trait 
anxiety when using a neutral Eriksen flanker task.   
The present study aims to extend the flanker paradigm by including within-valence 
emotional conflict using angry and fearful faces, in addition to between-valence 
conflict using happy and fearful faces. If an anxiety effect is driven by emotional 
conflict in general, the relationship between trait anxiety and the emotional CSE 
should be similar across valence contrast conditions. However, it is possible that 
anxiety relates to the emotional CSE only when between-valence conflict is present.  
If this is the case then within-valence CSEs elicited in a task requiring the 
discrimination of angry and fearful faces should not be modulated by trait anxiety.  
It is also noteworthy that Etkin and Schatzberg (2011), Etkin et al. (2010), and 
Larson et al. (2013) all adopt the conflict adaptation explanation of the CSE 
proposed by Botvinick, Braver et al. (2001). Botvinik et al. suggest that response 
conflict monitored during any current trial modulates cognitive control during the 
following trial. However, the theoretical cognitive mechanisms that mediate the CSE 
during conflict tasks are fiercely debated. In short, the CSE has also been explained 
by episodic memory priming effects and the feature integration theory developed by 
Hommel (1998, 2004, 2007) and Hommel, Proctor & Vu (2004). In fact, a recent 
paper suggests that it is possible that conflict adaptation processes and episodic 
memory processes may interact when producing the CSE (Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler & Notebaert, 2014). However, whatever mechanism drives the 
effect, it is interesting that those high in anxiety could be advantageously (or 
disadvantageously) affected by (in)congruency repetition when dealing with 
emotional conflict. The finding of an anxiety-related increase or decrease in the CSE 
in the emotional flanker task may well have real world implications. In real life 
settings an (in)congruency repetition advantage may manifest as the increased speed 
of detection of repeated conflicting (or non-conflicting) facial emotions in the social 
environment. In contrast, an (in)congruency repetition disadvantage may manifest as 
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a reduced speed of detection of repeated conflicting (or non-conflicting) facial 
emotions in the social environment. It is thus easy to see how an emotional CSE 
might represent the activity of a possible neural survival circuit as theorised by 
LeDoux (2012). 
It was not the original purpose of this present study to prove nor disprove any of the 
mechanistic accounts of the CSE. In this chapter we adopt a neutral stance on this 
issue and analyse the CSE in a relatively atheoretical way. We want, in the first 
instance, to ascertain if anxiety is reliably related to the CSE in a task designed so 
that it can also address the other questions listed above.  If a reliable relationship 
between anxiety and the CSE is found then it could be well worth designing a series 
of finer-grained paradigms that can explain how the mechanism(s) driving the CSE 
in emotional scenarios may relate to trait anxiety. Here we simply want to determine 
if trait anxiety is robustly related to any RT advantage (or disadvantage) when 
emotional conflict repeats (i.e., cC and iI trials), as opposed to alternates (i.e., iC and 
cI trials).  
Concerning our fourth question, RST (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) suggests that 
anxiety and fear are distinct emotions, with fear being mediated by a 
fight/flight/freeze system in contrast to the behavioural inhibition system mediating 
anxiety. Approach behaviours are proposed to be mediated by a behavioural 
approach system. Whereas approach behaviours are often related to positive 
emotions, they can be related to aversive emotions as well, as in the case of anger 
(Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). In social situations anxiety, fear and anger may all 
interact and require the cognitive control of responses to conflicting emotional 
signals. From Gray and McNaughton’s RST perspective this cognitive control would 
be related to activity of a behavioural inhibition system, which mediates levels of 
trait anxiety. Accordingly, we intend to establish whether other affective traits such 
as fear and anger modulate emotional expression recognition and/or emotional 
conflict resolution, or determine if these cognitive processes are solely modulated by 
trait anxiety.  
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2.3. Method 
 
2.3.1. Participants 
Participants with no reported history of neurological condition (N = 81, 57 female) 
were recruited from Goldsmiths, University of London, and had a mean age of 22.6 
years (SD = 7). 74 were right handed, 4 were left handed, and 2 claimed to be 
ambidextrous (with 1 response omission regarding handedness). 56 were psychology 
1st year undergraduates recruited via a research participation scheme who took part 
in return for course credit. The rest were paid £10 and recruited via advertisements 
placed around the campus, and were therefore students and staff from other 
departments. All gave informed written consent in accordance with standard ethical 
guidelines. This study was approved by the Goldsmiths psychology departments’ 
ethics committee (approval received 24/10/2012). Data for one participant was 
excluded as the data for one experiment failed to save.  
We base our power calculations on correlations because, as the data analysis sections 
below make clear, all the key effects involving anxiety that we are testing are tests of 
correlations. Based upon the 0.4 correlation between anxiety and the CSE reported in 
the study by Larson et al. (2013), 46 participants should allow 80% power for a two-
tailed test at p=0.05, for a correlation of 0.4. Based upon the 0.65 correlation 
between anxiety and fearful face detection sensitivity reported in the study by Doty 
et al. (2013), 16 participants should allow 80% power for a two-tailed test at p=0.05, 
for a correlation of 0.65. However, as these correlations are quite strong we ran some 
extra participants to be sure of having enough power to detect an anxiety correlation 
of 0.3 in our analyses.  
 
2.3.2. Psychometric measures. 
Trait anxiety was assessed with the trait anxiety scale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 1983). Trait anger was assessed using the trait 
anger 10 item subscale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI, 
Spielberger, 1988). Individual differences in the experiencing of interpersonal fear 
were assessed using the 23 item subscale of the Fear Survey Schedule (Wolpe & 
Lang, 1969). 
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2.3.3. Stimuli 
The emotional faces used to create the flanker stimuli were obtained from a 
standardised face stimuli set developed for research (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 
2009). The individual face pictures were scaled so that they appeared (on the 
computer screen) as 20mm high x 16 mm wide and were formed into 3x3 grids of 9 
faces; thus the overall grid dimensions were 60mm high and 48 mm wide. They were 
presented using MATLAB version R2006a on a 15.5 inch laptop screen. The laptop 
was running Windows XP, and we used the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 for 
precision RT measurement. Four face stimulus sets were created using either one 
Caucasian male, or one black male, or one Caucasian female, or one black female in 
the set. This was an attempt to control for possible gender and race effects. The four 
stimulus sets were used to create two happy face/fearful face flanker task conditions, 
and two angry face/fearful face flanker task conditions. Examples of the stimuli used 
are shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Examples of one of the sets of stimuli used in the happy face / fearful 
face between-valence flanker task (top row, and angry face / fearful face within 
valence flanker task (bottom row). Top row left to right: single happy, congruent 
happy, incongruent happy, single fear, congruent fear, and incongruent fear. 
Bottom row left to right: incongruent fear, congruent fear, single fear, 
incongruent anger, congruent anger, and single anger.   
 
 
 
76 
 
2.3.4. Procedure   
 
 
Participants were told that they would be presented with four short face emotion 
recognition tasks with a short rest in between each task. Participants were asked to 
sit as close to the screen as was comfortable for their eyes (typical viewing distance 
was approximately 70 cm). The task instructions were presented on the screen. To 
start each task the first screen instructed participants that they would have to judge 
the emotional expression showing on photos of faces (happy and fear in the between-
valence condition; and anger and fear in the within-valence condition). Participants 
were then shown examples of the various stimulus combinations they might see and 
reminded to concentrate on the central face in the grid of faces and ignore any others. 
They were told to rest their index fingers over the responses keys (z and /) and to 
respond as fast as possible while maintaining high accuracy levels. They were 
verbally told that a high pitched tone following a response indicates a correct 
response, whereas a low pitched tone following a response indicates an incorrect 
response.  
 
The experimental stimuli were displayed until a response key was pressed. 
Unbeknown to the participants, at the beginning of each task, there were two of each 
single and incongruent trial, and 8 of each congruent trial included as practice trials; 
these 24 trials were discarded and not analysed. The main experimental stimuli that 
followed consisted of 40 single trials, 40 incongruent trials and 160 congruent trials 
(in each of the four tasks). The modified flanker task was designed primarily to elicit 
RT effects as opposed to effects reflected in error rates. The trial type sequence was 
created using a random number generator function in Matlab, and was the same for 
all participants. We kept the sequence the same for all participants as this is an 
individual differences study, and we wanted as few uncontrolled variables as 
possible to vary across participants. We also used the same trial type sequence for 
each of the tasks (with happy target single, congruent and incongruent trial types 
being substituted for angry target single, congruent and congruent trials as 
appropriate). There were 240 non-practice trials in total in each task so we felt that 
there was no chance that using the same sequence in each task would cause any 
learning of the sequence of trial types and, as noted below, we counterbalanced the 
order of the 4 tasks across participants. Each task lasted for approximately ten 
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minutes. The four tasks were created using a 2 X 2 combination of happy/fearful 
versus angry/fearful decisions, with either a male or a female face used (four 
different individuals across the four tasks). The two happy/fearful face 
discrimination tasks formed the between-valence condition of the current study, and 
the two angry/fearful face discrimination tasks formed the within-valence condition 
of the current study. There were equal proportions of happy and fearful faces in the 
between-valence condition, and equal proportions of angry and fearful faces in the 
within-valence condition. The sequence of the four tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants. The left/right finger response key mappings were also counterbalanced. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates example trial sequences used to manipulate emotional CSE 
scenarios.   
 
 
Figure 2.2: Incongruency repetition and alternation differences between iI trials 
and cI trials (left hand schematic). Congruency repetition and alternation 
differences between cC trials and iC trials (right hand schematic). The scoring 
method did not differentiate between central emotional face types (i.e., congruent 
trials with a target happy face and congruent trials with a target fearful face are 
aggregated, as are incongruent trials with a target happy face and incongruent 
trials with a target fearful face). 
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2.3.5: Data analysis  
In our primary analysis, RTs will be analysed using ANCOVA with factors of 
emotion, valence contrast, and trial type, with standardised trait anxiety included as 
the covariate.  
In this analysis ANCOVA is not used as a statistical control device, which is 
commonly but often erroneously employed in psychology (Miller & Chapman, 
2001). Rather, ANCOVA is used as an efficient way to test the significance of 
correlations of interest, within a repeated-measures (factorial) design. The overall 
effect of the covariate, in these analyses, tests whether the overall DV values 
(averaged across all effects in the ANCOVA) correlates significantly with the 
covariate. Any interaction of other effects, with the covariate, tests whether the 
correlation between the contrast and covariate is significant. For 2-level factors, as in 
the studies in this thesis, and taking RT as an example DV, this means that a 
covariate by main effect 2-way interaction tests the correlation between the RT 
difference and the covariate. For any  factor by factor by covariate 3-way interaction 
effect this tests the correlation between the RT difference of differences and the 
covariate etc. This statistuical approach is adopted throughout the thesis as the 
deisgns and hypotheses of interest all share these same features. 
In this analysis the effect of emotion will therefore reveal whether RTs to fearful 
faces differ from RTs averaged across happy and angry faces, and the covariate 
interaction with the emotion effect will test whether trait anxiety modulates this 
effect (see above). The effect of valence contrast upon the effect of emotion will 
allow us to test whether the RT difference between fearful and happy faces differs 
from the RT difference from fearful and angry faces. The effect of the covariate, 
upon the valence by emotion interaction, specifically tests whether anxiety correlates 
with the RT difference between fearful and happy faces minus the RT difference 
between fearful and angry faces2.  
If a significant anxiety by valence by emotion interaction is found is found we 
planned further comparisons to separately verify that anxiety relates to the RT 
difference for happy and fearful faces (which was a key hypothesis), but also to test 
                                                          
2 In the computations of the ANCOVA, the direction of these differences and differences of 
differences, is determined by the coding of levels used 
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whether anxiety relates to the RT difference for angry and fearful faces (which was 
an exploratory interest). Thus, these emotion effects test our hypotheses concerning 
anxiety and emotion recognition.  
The effect of trial type will allow us to test how the peripheral distracting faces affect 
the discrimination of the central target faces. The covariate by trial type interaction 
here will show if anxiety modulates (correlates with) the overall distraction effect. 
The effect of valence contrast on the effect of trial type will allow us to test whether 
the distraction effects when happy and fearful faces are discriminated, differ 
significantly from those when angry and fearful faces are discriminated. The 3-way 
interaction of covariate by emotion by trial type will allow us to test whether anxiety 
modulates (correlates with) the emotion by trial type interaction just described. If a 
significant anxiety by emotion by trial type effect is found we planned further 
comparisons to separate out the effects of distraction in the two tasks (i.e., the 
happy/fear task and the anger/fear task). Thus, these trial type effects test our 
hypotheses concerning anxiety and distraction.  
We then conducted a planned further RT analysis to investigate the congruency 
sequence effects (CSE). The RT data were analysed using ANCOVA with factors of 
current trial type, previous trial type: (in)congruency repetition/alternation, and 
valence contrast, with standardised trait anxiety included as the covariate.  
The key effects of interest in this sequential analysis are the (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect (which tests the RT difference between trials when the 
level of (in)congruency repeats relative to when it alternates; i.e., the CSE), and the 
effect of valence contrast upon the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect 
(which tests if the CSE differs between the happy/fear task and the anger/fear task). 
The critical effects here are the covariate interactions with the above which will 
reveal if anxiety modulates (correlates with) the CSE overall or to the difference in 
CSE between the emotion discrimination tasks. These effects therefore test our 
hypotheses that anxiety will relate to a difference in how conflict resolution is 
achieved (as indexed by the CSE).  
We also planned to conduct further analyses concerning how trait anxiety relates to 
trait anger and interpersonal fear, and how these other traits relate to any RT effects 
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that relate to trait anxiety. For completeness most of the main analyses were then 
repeated with the accuracy data 
 
2.4. Results 
 
2.4.1. Psychometric assessments 
In this sample participants’ trait anxiety questionnaire scores as measured by the 
STAI ranged from 20 to 66 (mean: 43, SD: 11), their interpersonal fear questionnaire 
scores as measured by the FSS subscale ranged from 3 to 113 (mean: 38, SD: 23), 
and their trait anger questionnaire scores as measured by the STAXI subscale ranged 
from 10 to 34 (mean: 19, SD: 5).  
 
2.4.2. Primary RT analysis: Emotion recognition and emotional distraction 
 
There was no outlier removal conducted here to maximise the amount of correct 
responses used to compute mean RTs in the conditions with relatively small numbers 
of trials. The summary RT data for all 12 conditions of the experiment are shown in 
Table 2.1. These data were first subjected to a repeated measures 2 x 2 x 3 
ANCOVA with factors of emotion (fear versus other); valence contrast (between-
valence versus within-valence; i.e., fear versus happy and fear versus anger) and trial 
type (single versus congruent versus incongruent); with standardised trait anxiety as 
the covariate. The mean RTs, 95% confidence intervals and standard errors for each 
of the 12 stimulus types are shown in Table 2.1. Figure 2.3 shows the mean RTs for 
each of the 12 stimulus types, expressed as a function of emotion and valence 
contrast condition relative to trial type. The test of between-subjects effects was not 
significant (F[1,76]=0.32, p=0.858, η2<0.001), indicating that trait anxiety was 
unrelated to mean RTs across the whole paradigm.  
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Table 2.1: Mean RTs, 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs), and standard errors 
(SE) for each of the 12 stimulus types (listed by target emotion versus trial type). 
All values are in msecs. 
 Between-valence condition  Within-valence condition 
        
Trial type Mean 95% CI SE Trial type Mean 95% CI SE 
        
Single  
fear 
582 559-605 12 Single  
fear 
585 566-604 9 
Congruent 
fear 
562 540-586 11 Congruent 
fear 
562 544-580 10 
Incongruent 
fear 
566 542-590 12 Incongruent 
fear 
574 552-596 11 
Single 
happy 
565 545-586 10 Single 
anger 
579 560-599 10 
Congruent 
happy 
551 531-572 11 Congruent 
anger 
566 547-584 9 
Incongruent 
happy 
563 540-585 11 Incongruent 
anger 
577 556-597 10 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean RTs for each of the 12 stimulus types, expressed as a function of 
emotion and valence contrast condition relative to trial type. All values are in 
msecs. 
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The main effect of emotion was significant (F[1,76]=4.6, p=0.035, η2=0.057), as 
averaged other faces (happy, angry) were responded to faster (mean  567 msecs; 
95% CI 548-586; SE 9) than averaged fearful faces (mean  572 msecs; 95% CI 552-
592; SE 10). The critical finding here was that trait anxiety robustly interacted with 
the effect of emotion (F[1,76]=7.4, p=0.008, η2=0.089). This interaction tests the 
correlation between trait anxiety and the RT difference between averaged other 
emotional faces and averaged fearful faces (RT for fearful faces minus RT for other 
faces), which is illustrated by Figure 2.4. The correlation value was r= -0.30. As trait 
anxiety increased, the RT advantage for averaged other emotional faces decreased. 
This effect relates to our main hypothesis that trait anxiety will modulate emotion 
recognition, but later statistical comparisons will reveal if it is more specific. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The negative correlation (r= -0.30, p=0.008) between standardised trait 
anxiety and the RT difference between averaged fearful faces and averaged other 
faces (RT fearful faces minus RT other faces). 
 
The main effect of valence contrast was not significant (F[1,76]=2.4, p=0.129, 
η2=0.030), and did not interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=1.2, p=0.270, η2=0.016). 
Therefore mean RTs were similar in each of the valence contrast conditions, and the 
valence effect was similar across levels of trait anxiety. The main effect of trial type 
was highly significant (F[2,152]=23.4, p<0.001, η2=0.235) as RT congruent (mean 
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560 msecs; 95% CI 542-579; SE 9) < RT incongruent (mean 570 msecs; 95% CI 
549-590; SE 10) < RT single (mean 578 msecs; 95% CI 559-597; SE 9). The 
relationship between these trial types is illustrated by Figure 2.5. However, the main 
effect of trial type did not interact with trait anxiety (F[2,152]=0.7, p=0.936, 
η2=0.001). Thus, critically trait anxiety was unrelated to any flanker distraction 
effects reflected in the trial type effect.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Mean RTs for congruent, incongruent and single trials. 
 
The effect of emotion interacted with the effect of valence contrast (F[1,76]=4.7, 
p=0.034, η2=0.058), indicating that the effect of emotion may be robustly present in 
only one of the valence contrast conditions. This interaction is illustrated by Figure 
2.6, and the mean RTs, 95% CIs and SEs are contained in Table 2.2. We return to 
this issue later.  
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Figure 2.6: Mean RTs to each emotional facial expression expressed as a function 
of valence contrast and emotion category.  
 
Table 2.2: Mean RTs, 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs), and standard errors 
(SE) for each emotional facial expression expressed as a function of valence 
contrast and emotional category. All values are in msecs. 
 Between-valence condition  Within-valence condition 
        
Trial type Mean 95% CI SE Trial type Mean 95% CI SE 
        
Happy 560 539-581 10 Angry  574 555-593 9 
Fear 570 548-592 11 Fear 574 555-593 9 
        
 
This interaction did not significantly further interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=0.9, 
p=0.343, η2=0.012). The effect of emotion also interacted with the effect of trial type 
(F[2,152]=5.0, p=0.008, η2=0.061), indicating that the trial type effect may show a 
different pattern for one of the emotion categories (this is illustrated by Figure 2.7). 
Critically, the emotion versus trial type interaction did not further interact with 
anxiety (F[2,152]=1.1, p=0.325, η2=0.015). This 3-way interaction relates to our 
main hypothesis that anxiety would be related to distraction that is further increaesd 
when the emotion depicted by the distracting faces is fearful.   
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Figure 2.7: Mean RTs for each of the trials types as a function of emotion 
category. 
Valence contrast did not significantly interact with trial type (F[2,152]=0.4, p=0.658, 
η2=0.006). This is illustrated in Figure 2.8. Moreover, this interaction did not interact 
with anxiety (F[2,152]=0.4, p=0.676, η2=0.005). The 3-way interaction between 
emotion, valence contrast and trial type was not significant (F[2,152]=0.7, p=0.497, 
η2=0.009), nor was the 4-way interaction between emotion, valence contrast, trial 
type and anxiety (F[2,152]=0.5, p=0.601, η2=0.007). 
 
Figure 2.8: Mean RTs for each trial type as a function of valence contrast. 
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We then carried out further planned comparisons to explore the previously reported 
emotion versus valence contrast interaction by conducting two one-way ANCOVAS. 
Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.05/2. The first ANCOVA 
concerned the between-valence contrast condition. The main effect of emotion was 
significant as happy faces were responded to faster than fearful faces (F[1,76]=12.4, 
p=0.001, η2=0.141), and critically this effect further interacted with trait anxiety 
(F[1,76]=8.4, p=0.005, η2=0.099).This robust interaction tests the correlation 
between trait anxiety and the RT difference between responses to happy and fearful 
faces. The correlation value was r = -0.32. As anxiety increased the happy face RT 
advantage over fearful face RT decreased. This effect is depicted in Figure 2.9, and 
relates to our main hypothesis that anxiety would modulate emotion discrimination 
in the happy/fear task.  
 
 
Figure 2.9: The negative correlation (r=-0.32, p=0.005) between standardised trait 
anxiety and the happy face recognition advantage in the between valence 
condition (for congruent, incongruent and single trials combined).   
 
The second ANCOVA concerned the within-valence contrast condition. The main 
effect of emotion was not significant as angry faces were not responded to faster than 
fearful faces (F[1,76]=0.06, p=0.812, η2=0.001), and critically this effect did not 
significantly further interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=0.8, p=0.364, η2=0.011).This 
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interaction tests the correlation between trait anxiety and the RT difference (RT 
fearful faces minus RT angry faces). The correlation value was r = -0.10.  This effect 
relates to our exploratory interest in whether anxiety modulates emotion 
discrimination in the anger/fear task.  
In summary thus far, we find no evidence that anxiety is related to increased flanker 
distraction. However, overall averaged other emotional facial expressions were 
responded to faster than averaged fearful facial expressions. Moreover, trait anxiety 
was related to a reduced RT advantage for averaged other facial expressions. Our 
planned comparisons showed that both of these effects were driven by the between-
valence contrast condition (happy versus fearful faces), and were not present in the 
within-valence contrast condition (angry versus fearful faces). However, exploratory 
correlations showed that trait anxiety was not correlated with RTs to either happy 
faces (r= -0.01, p=0.905), or fearful faces (r= -0.09, p=0.437) in the between-valence 
condition.  
We also verified that mean RTs to fearful faces were similar in the between-valence 
contrast condition (mean RT 570 msecs; 95% CI 548-592; SE 11) and the within-
valence contrast condition (mean RT 574 msecs; 95% CI 555-593; SE 9). A one-way 
ANCOVA with a factor of valence contrast (fearful faces from the between-valence 
contrast condition versus fearful faces from the within-valence contrast condition), 
with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate showed that there was no significant 
effect of valence contrast upon RTs to fearful faces (F[1,76]=0.42, p=0.52, η2=0.01). 
Trait anxiety did not interact significantly with the non-significant valence contrast 
difference in fearful face RTs (F[1,76]=1.95, p=0.17, η2=0.03). 
We suspected that the correlations between trait anxiety and the specific RT effects 
in any single condition were likely to have been suppressed by general sources of RT 
variance unrelated to trait anxiety and shared across all conditions. Thus, we 
calculated a general RT factor. Exploratory factor analyses clearly revealed a strong 
general RT factor across all conditions for both valence contrasts, and a second much 
smaller factor. To estimate the general RT factor we used a maximum likelihood 
extraction of two factors using mean RTs from each participant for each of the 12 
stimulus types from both valence contrasts (single/congruent/incongruent x fearful 
face/other face x valence contrast). Factor 1 was clearly the general RT factor (all 
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loadings > 0.86), which accounted for 83% of the variance). Factor 2 was much less 
important, and accounted for 7% of the variance. Factor 2 was clearly a valence 
contrast factor: stimuli from the between-valence contrast all loaded negatively on 
factor 2, whereas stimuli from the within-valence contrast all loaded positively on 
factor 2.  
When controlling for the general RT factor score using partial correlation, trait 
anxiety negatively correlated with RTs to fearful faces (r= -0.25, p=0.03), but not 
happy faces (r=0.01, p=0.94) in the between-valence contrast condition. Therefore, 
as a person’s level of trait anxiety increased, their RTs to fearful faces decreased, 
when discriminating them from happy faces, although this effect should strictly be 
considered only a trend at an adjusted significance level (0.025/2). This effect relates 
to our main hypothesis that anxiety would relate to an RT bias for fearful faces. In 
sum, there is evidence for an anxiety-related speeding to fearful faces when the 
fearful stimuli must be discriminated from positively valenced stimuli (happy faces), 
but not when the fearful faces must be discriminated from negatively valenced 
stimuli (angry faces).  
 
2.4.3. Emotional distraction effects confirmatory analysis 
 
We wished to confirm that trait anxiety was unrelated to any distraction effects that 
were specific to any target emotional facial expression type. Thus, we carried out a 
series of confirmatory one-way ANCOVAS, including standardised trait anxiety as 
the covariate, which were designed to address this confirmation. These confirmatory 
comparisons have not been adjusted for multiple testing. These analyses focus upon 
the RT comparisons between congruent and incongruent trials divided up by target 
emotion type. As discussed previously, Table 2.1 shows that for each of the four 
target emotion conditions, mean RTs for congruent trials were faster than mean RTs 
for incongruent trials. These confirmatory analyses relate to our main hypotheses 
that anxiety would relate to distraction, and that this distraction be further modulated 
by the type of emotion depicted by the distracting face.  
The first one-way ANCOVA showed that the RT congruency effect for between-
valence contrast trials with happy target faces was significant (F[1,76]=13.1, 
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p=0.001, η2=0.147), but did not significantly interact with anxiety (F[1,76]=0.02, 
p=0.894, η2<0.001). This shows that trait anxiety was unrelated to the RT 
congruency effect (incongruent RT minus congruent RT) for happy face trials in the 
between-valence condition. The correlation value was r= 0.02. The second one-way 
ANCOVA showed that the RT congruency effect for between-valence contrast trials 
with fearful faces was not significant (F[1,76]=0.1, p=0.724, η2=0.002), and did not 
significantly interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=0.1, p=0.719, η2=0.002). This shows 
that trait anxiety was unrelated to the RT congruency effect (incongruent RT minus 
congruent RT) for fearful face trials in the between-valence condition. The 
correlation value was r= -0.04 
The third one-way ANCOVA showed that the RT congruency effect for within-
valence contrast trials with angry faces was significant (F[1,76]=10.9, p=0.001, 
η2=0.126), and did not significantly interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=0.3, p=0.593, 
η2=0.004). This shows that trait anxiety was unrelated to the RT congruency effect 
(incongruent RT minus congruent RT) for angry face trials in the within-valence 
condition. The correlation value was r= -0.06. The fourth one-way ANCOVA 
showed that the RT congruency effect for within-valence contrast trials with fearful 
faces was significant (F[1,76]=5.5, p=0.021, η2=0.068), and did not significantly 
interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=0.2, p=0.690, η2=0.002). This shows that trait 
anxiety was unrelated to the RT congruency effect (incongruent RT minus congruent 
RT) for fearful face trials in the within-valence condition. The correlation value was 
r= 0.05.  
In summary, in the between-valence contrast condition fearful flanker faces slowed 
RTs to happy target faces (i.e., happy incongruent trials) relative to happy flanker 
faces during congruent happy trials. In contrast, happy flanker faces did not slow 
RTs to fearful target faces during incongruent fearful trials relative to fearful flanker 
faces during congruent fearful trials. Critically, trait anxiety was not related to this 
effect of fearful face distraction. In the within-valence contrast condition both 
emotional flanker face types (fearful and angry) slowed RTs to the target faces 
during incongruent trials relative to their congruent equivalent trial. Critically, trait 
anxiety was also unrelated to this effect of emotional distraction. We can conclude 
from this that although the predicted distraction effects were present in our sample 
trait anxiety did not affect the magnitude of distraction. 
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2.4.4. Further RT analysis: Congruency sequence effects 
 
The RT data were first subjected to a 2 (current trial type; congruent versus 
incongruent) x 2 (previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus 
(in)congruency alternation) x 2 (valence contrast; between-valence versus within-
valence) repeated-measures ANCOVA with standardised trait anxiety as the 
covariate. We will denote 4 key types of trials within this analysis thus: incongruent 
trials preceded by incongruent trials (iI); incongruent trials preceded by congruent 
trials (cI); congruent trials preceded by congruent trials (cC); and congruent trials 
preceded by incongruent trials (iC). Each of these trial types are averaged across 
target emotion (e.g., happy incongruent trials and fearful incongruent trials are 
averaged, as are the congruent trials). However, each of these averaged 4 trial types 
is separated by valence contrast. To remain consistent with the traditional CSE 
analyses conducted in flanker experiments that average across the 2-choice 
responses, each of these trial types were averaged across target emotion in each 
valence contrast condition. For example, happy cI trials and fearful cI trials were 
averaged in the between-valence condition, as were angry cI trials and fearful ci 
trials in the within-valence condition). Thus, each averaged trial type was separated 
by valence contrast condition. The effects of the previous trial’s congruence upon the 
RT congruence effect on the subsequent trial, often referred to as CSEs, thus appear 
in the analyses as the effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation.  
The main effect of current trial type was significant (F[1,76]=5.8, p=0.019, η2=0.07), 
but this did not interact with anxiety (F[1,76]=0.7, p=0.798, η2=0.001). In the 
sequential analysis congruent trials (mean RT 561 msecs; 95% CI 542-579; SE 9) 
were not responded to faster than incongruent trials (mean RT 553 msecs; 95% CI 
534-573; SE 10; although they were when averaged across all trial types in the non-
sequential analysis reported above (this inconsistency seems counterintuitive but we 
verified this to be correct). The main effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
effect was also significant (F[1,76]=51.6, p<0.001, η2=0.41), but this did not interact 
with anxiety (F[1,76]=0.54, p=0.465, η2=0.007). As Figure 2.10 shows, repetition 
trials were responded to faster than alternation trials. These effects relate to one of 
our main interests concerning how trait anxiety relates to conflict resolution and the 
CSE. 
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Figure 2.10: The congruency sequence effects present across the whole 
experiment. (In)congruency repetition trials were responded to faster than 
(In)congruency alternation trials. This effect was driven by faster RTs for cC trials 
(mean RT 552 msecs; 95% CI 533-571; SE 9) than for iC trials (mean RT 569 
msecs; 95% CI 550-588; SE 10), and faster RTs for iI trials (mean RT 542 msecs; 
95% CI 523-562; SE 10) than for cI trials (mean RT 565 msecs; 95% CI 545-585; 
SE 10).  
 
The current trial type by (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was also 
not significant (F[1,76]=1.75, p=0.19, η2=0.22) and did not significantly interact 
with anxiety (F[1,76]=0.19, p=0.661, η2=0.003). This shows that the effect of 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation was very similar during currently congruent 
and currently incongruent trials. The non-significant current trial type by 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was not further modulated by 
valence contrast (F[1,76=0.47, p=0.497, η2<0.006). 
The main effect of valence contrast was not significant (F[1,76]=2.25, p=0.138, 
η2=0.029), although the between-valence mean RT was 553 msecs (95% CIs 532-
574; SE 10) and the within-valence mean RT was 562 msecs (95% CIs 543-580; SE 
9). This comparison did not interact with anxiety (F[1,76]=1.23, p=0.264, η2=0.016). 
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Thus there were no significant overall RT differences between the two valence 
contrast conditions.  
The main effect of current trial type did not significantly interact with valence 
contrast condition (F[1,76]=1.65, p=0.203, η2=0.021), and this potential interaction 
did not interact with anxiety (F[1,76]=1.85, p=0.178, η2=0.024). Therefore, there 
were no differences in RTs to any trial type that were driven by the different valence 
contrast conditions.  
Importantly, the main effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation did not interact 
with valence contrast (F[1,76]<0.001, p=0.984, η2<0.001). This shows that the 
differential effects of congruency repetition and alternation upon RTs to either 
congruent or incongruent trials did not differ between the two valence contrast 
conditions. Furthermore, the key finding in this analysis was a 3-way interaction of 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation by valence contrast condition by anxiety 
(F[1,76]=4.7, p=0.033, η2=0.06). This shows that anxiety relates significantly more 
strongly to the main effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation in one of the two 
valence contrast conditions more than the other. We analyse this interaction in more 
detail below, as it relates to one of our main interests concerning how trait anxiety 
relates to conflict resolution and the CSE. The 4-way interaction of current trial type 
by (in)congruency repetition/alternation by valence contrast condition by anxiety 
was not significant (F[1,76]=1.60, p=0.209, η2=0.021).  
In summary thus far, the CSE analysis suggests that trait anxiety relates to the effect 
of (in)congruency repetition/alternation in one of the two valence contrast 
conditions. As planned we then analysed the CSE (and its relationship with anxiety) 
in each valence contrast condition separately.  In the between-valence condition the 
effect of current trial type was significant (F[1,76]=8.6, p=0.004, η2=0.1). The 
critical (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect was significant (F[1,76]=26.6, 
p<0.001, η2=0.26), as repetition trials (mean RT 543 msecs; 95% CI 522-564; SE 11) 
were responded to faster than alternation trials (mean RT 562; 95% CI 541-584; SE 
11). The key finding here was an interaction between this (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect and anxiety (F[1,76]=4.6, p=0.036, η2=0.06).   
To understand this significant interaction between (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation and anxiety in the between-valence condition, we used an 
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overall CSE index which can be written in terms of mean RTs (iC + cI)/2 - (cC + 
iI)/2. The previously reported interaction between (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation and anxiety tests the correlation between this index and trait 
anxiety: the correlation is r = 0.24 (p=0.036, as previously reported). The sign of this 
correlation (depicted in Figure 2.11) shows that, as participants are more trait 
anxious, they show an increased CSE; in effect an increased (in)congruency 
repetition advantage in RTs. These effects relate to one of our main interests 
concerning how trait anxiety relates to conflict resolution and the CSE. 
 
Figure 2.11: The positive correlation (r = 0.24, p=0.036) between standardised 
trait anxiety and the overall CSE in the between-valence condition. 
 
The current trial by (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was again not 
significant (F[1,76]=2.23, p=0.135, η2=0.03). Importantly, this shows that the effect 
of (in)congruency repetition/alternation did not differ significantly between 
congruent and incongruent trials. Similarly, there was no 3-way interaction between 
current trial, (in)congruency repetition/alternation, and trait anxiety (F[1,76]=1.5, 
p=0.222, η2=0.02). This shows that there were no significant anxiety related effects 
on the difference between the effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation for 
congruent vs. incongruent trials. 
In the within-valence condition the effect of current trial type was non-significant 
(F[1,76]=.61, p = 0.437, η2=0.008). However, the critical effect of (in)congruency 
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repetition/alternation was again significant (F[1,76]=23.74, p<0.001, η2=0.238), as 
repetition trials (mean RT 551 msecs; 95% CI 532-571; SE 10) were responded to 
faster than alternation trials (mean RT 572 msecs; 95% CI 552-591; SE 10). The key 
finding here was that, in contrast to the between-valence condition, this effect was 
not significantly modulated by anxiety (F[1,76]=1.03, p=0.314, η2=0.13). Thus 
anxiety was not significantly correlated with the RT difference between repetition 
trials and alternation trials. The correlation value is r= -0.12 (p=0.314 as previously 
reported). These effects relate to one of our main interests concerning how trait 
anxiety relates to conflict resolution and the CSE.  Once again, the current trial by 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,76]=0.25, 
p=0.616, η2=0.003), nor was the current trial by (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
by anxiety interaction (F[1,76]=0.25, p=0.621, η2=0.003). 
Exploratory correlations showed that trait anxiety was not correlated with either 
(in)congruency repetition trials (r= -0.1, p=0.400) nor alternation trials (r= -0.01, 
p=0.913)  in the between-valence condition. When controlling for the general RT 
factor, trait anxiety showed a negative correlation with RTs to (in)congruency 
repetition trials (r= -0.23, p=0.047), but was still uncorrelated with RTs to 
alternation trials (r= 0.01, p=0.921). However, it should be noted that these results 
were not adjusted for multiple comparisons. In summary, the sequential analysis 
shows that trait anxiety is related to an increased RT advantage when the level of 
emotional (in)congruency repeats, but only in the between-valence condition. The 
exploratory correlations suggest that this effect might be primarily driven by an 
anxiety related speeding on (in)congruency repetition trials, as opposed to a slowing 
on alternation trials.  
 
2.4.5. Trait anger and interpersonal fear: relationships with RT effects 
We first explored the relationship between trait anxiety, trait anger and interpersonal 
fear. Standardised trait anxiety and standardised trait anger were modestly and 
significantly positively correlated (r = 0.31, p = 0.007). Standardised trait anxiety 
scores and standardised interpersonal fear scores were also positively correlated (r= 
0.23, p = 0.041); as were standardised trait anger and standardised interpersonal fear 
scores (r= 0.33, p = 0.003). The correlations between trait anxiety and trait anger, 
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and between trait anger and interpersonal fear stand up to a strict Bonferroni 
significance adjustment for multiple testing (adjusted alpha = 0.05/3 = 0.017), but 
the correlation between trait anxiety and interpersonal fear should be interpreted as a 
trend. Exploratory analyses showed that trait anger and interpersonal fear were not 
correlated with the RT difference between happy and fearful faces in the between-
valence contrast condition, nor any RT difference between angry and fearful faces in 
the within-valence condition (all  rs < 0.11, ps >0.3).   
We then explored the relationship between trait anger, standardised interpersonal 
fear and the CSEs. The p-values in these exploratory analyses have not been adjusted 
for multiple testing, and should therefore be treated with caution. Trait anger 
correlated at the borders of unadjusted statistical significance with the difference 
between (in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation trials in the 
between-valence contrast condition (r = 0.22, p = 0.052), whereas interpersonal fear 
did not (r = 0.13, p = 0.242). The relationship between trait anger and the difference 
between (in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation trials in the 
between-valence contrast condition is shown in Figure 2.12.  Neither trait anger, nor 
interpersonal fear, correlated with the difference between (in)congruency repetition 
and (in)congruency alternation trials in the within-valence contrast condition (both rs 
< 0.01, both ps > 0.9).  
 
Figure 2.12: The positive correlation (r = 0.22, p = 0.052) between standardised 
trait anger and the overall CSE in the between-valence condition. 
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When trait anger was partialled out, the correlation between trait anxiety and the 
difference between (in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation trials in 
the between-valence contrast condition was not significant (r = 0.19, p = 0.11). 
Similarly, when trait anxiety was partialled out, the correlation between trait anger 
and the difference between (in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation 
trials in the between-valence contrast condition was also non-significant (r = 0.16, p 
= 0.169). These partial correlations tentatively suggest that it may be the shared 
components of trait anxiety and trait anger that correlate with the CSE. Multiple 
regression showed that trait anger and trait anxiety combined were only a slightly 
better predictor than either trait alone, of the CSE (R = .29; F[2, 74] = 3.26, p = 
0.044). Moreover, we also verified that similarly to trait anxiety, trait anger and 
interpersonal fear were uncorrelated with the CSE in the within-valence condition 
(both rs < 0.01, both ps > 0.9). 
 
2.4.6. Accuracy analyses 
 
The proportion of correct responses for each of the trial types were first subjected to 
a repeated measures ANCOVA with factors of emotion (fear versus other); valence 
contrast (between-valence versus within-valence; i.e., fear versus happy and fear 
versus anger) and trial type (single versus congruent versus incongruent); with 
standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. Mean proportion correct, 95% confidence 
intervals and standard errors for each of the 12 stimulus types are shown in Table 
2.3. Figure 2.13 shows the mean proportion correct for each of the 12 stimulus types, 
expressed as a function of emotion and valence contrast condition relative to trial 
type The test of between-subjects effects was not significant (F[1,76]=1.0, p=0.332, 
η2=0.013), indicating that trait anxiety was unrelated to the proportion correct across 
the whole paradigm.  
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Table 2.3: Mean proportion correct, 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs), and 
standard errors (SE) for each of the 12 stimulus types (listed by target emotion 
versus trial type). All values are in msecs. 
 Between-valence condition  Within-valence condition 
        
Trial type Prop/C 95% CI SE Trial type Prop/C 95% CI SE 
        
Single  
fear 
0.95 0.94-
0.96 
0.005 Single  
fear 
0.95 0.94-
0.96 
0.005 
Congruent 
fear 
0.96 0.95-
0.96 
0.003 Congruent 
fear 
0.96 0.95-
0.97 
0.004 
Incongruent 
fear 
0.95 0.93-
0.96 
0.006 Incongruent 
fear 
0.94 0.93-
0.95 
0.005 
Single 
happy 
0.94 0.93-
0.95 
0.005 Single 
anger 
0.93 0.91-
0.94 
0.007 
Congruent 
happy 
0.97 0.96-
0.97 
0.003 Congruent 
anger 
0.96 0.95-
0.96 
0.003 
Incongruent 
happy 
0.96 0.95-
0.97 
0.004 Incongruent 
anger 
0.95 0.94-
0.96 
0.005 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Mean proportion correct for each of the 12 stimulus types, expressed 
as a function of emotion and valence contrast condition relative to trial type.  
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The main effect of emotion was not significant (F[1,76]=0.002, p=0.965, η2,0.001), 
as averaged other faces (happy, angry) were not responded to more accurately than 
averaged fearful faces (other faces proportion correct 0.95; 95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 
0.003; fearful faces  proportion correct 0.95; 95% CI 0.95-0.96; SE 0.003). Trait 
anxiety did not interact with the effect of emotion (F[1,76]=1.4, p=0.236, η2=0.018). 
The main effect of valence contrast was significant as accuracy levels were slightly 
higher in the between-valence condition (F[1,76]=5.3, p=0.024, η2=0.065; between 
valence proportion correct 0.953; 95% CI 0.95-0.96; SE 0.003, within valence 
proportion correct 0.948; 95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 0.004, but this effect did not interact 
with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=0.2, p=0.693, η2=0.002). The correlation value was 
r=0.06 (p=0.693, as reported earlier). 
The main effect of trial type was also highly significant (F[2,152]=23.9, p<0.001, 
η2=0.240) as proportion correct congruent (mean 0.96; 95% CI 0.95-0.97; SE 0.003) 
> proportion correct incongruent (mean 0.95; 95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 0.004) > 
proportion correct single (mean 0.94; 95% CI 0.93-0.95; SE 0.004). The 
relationships between these variables are also illustrated in Figure 2.14. The main 
effect of trial type did not interact with trait anxiety (F[2,152]=1.9, p=0.150, 
η2=0.025).  
 
 
Figure 2.14: Mean proportion correct for congruent, incongruent and single face 
trials. 
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The effect of emotion interacted with the effect of valence contrast (F[1,76]=7.5, 
p=0.008, η2=0.090), as illustrated by Figure 2.15. We return to this issue later. This 
interaction did not further interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=0.2, p=0.659, 
η2=0.003). The effect of emotion also interacted with the effect of trial type 
(F[2,152]=15.4, p<0.001, η2=0.169), indicating that the trial type effect differs 
between the two emotion categories. This is illustrated in Figure 2.16. This 
interaction did not further interact with trait anxiety (F[2,152]=0.7, p=0.498, 
η2=0.009).  
 
 
Figure 2.15: Mean proportion correct for each emotional facial expression 
expressed as a function of valence contrast and emotion category.  
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Figure 2.16: Mean proportion correct for each trial type as a function of emotion 
category.  
 
The effect of valence contrast did not significantly interact with trial type 
(F[2,152]=0.2, p=0.853, η2=0.002), and this potential interaction did not interact 
with anxiety (F[2,152]=0.2, p=0.816, η2=0.003). The 3-way interaction between 
emotion, valence contrast, and trial type was also not significant (F[2,152]=0.8, 
p=0.454, η2=0.010). The 4-way interaction between emotion, valence contrast, trial 
type and anxiety was also not significant (F[2,152]=0.2, p=0.818, η2=0.003).  
We followed up the emotion and valence contrast interaction using one-way 
ANCOVAS. Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.05/2. The first one-
way ANCOVA showed that there was a trend towards happy faces being responded 
to more accurately than fearful faces (F[1,76]=4.2, p=0.043, η2=0.053), but this 
effect did not interact with trait anxiety (F[1,76]=1.2, p=0.270, η2=0.016). This 
interaction shows that trait anxiety was not significantly correlated with the accuracy 
difference between these trials. The correlation value was r= -0.13, p=0.270 as 
reported above. The second one-way ANCOVA showed that there was a trend 
towards fearful faces being responded to more accurately than angry faces 
(F[1,76]=4.2, p=0.045, η2=0.052), but this effect did not interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,76]=0.2, p=0.643, η2=0.003). This interaction shows that trait anxiety was not 
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significantly correlated with the accuracy difference between these trials. The 
correlation value was r= 0.05, p=0.643 as reported above.  Thus, the proportion 
correct analysis shows that there was a trend towards the effect of emotion being 
reversed in the within-valence condition, relative to the between-valence condition. 
Critically, the proportion correct analysis also shows that that trait anxiety did not 
reliably affect the accuracy of emotional face discrimination.  
 
2.4.7. Further accuracy analysis: Congruency sequence effects 
 
In order to analyse the CSEs and proportion correct, the data were subjected to a 2 
(current trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 (previous trial type; 
(in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) repeated-measures 
ANCOVA with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical findings in 
this analysis were that the main effect of  (in)congruency repetition versus 
(in)congruency alternation was highly significant  (F[1,76]=37.6, p<0.001, η2=0.33), 
as repetition trials (mean proportion correct 0.97; 95% CI 0.96-0.97; SE 0.002) were 
responded to more accurately than alternation trials (mean proportion correct 0.95; 
95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 0.004), but this effect did not interact with anxiety 
(F[1,76]=0.02, p=0.893, η2<0.001). Thus, anxiety was not significantly correlated 
with the difference in accuracy between these trials. The correlation value was r= 
0.02. The effect of current trial type approached significance (F[1,76]=3.7, p=0.058, 
η2 =0.047), but there were no other significant effects/interactions (all Fs < 1.6, all Ps 
> 0.2).  
 
2.5. Discussion 
 
In experiment 1 we used a novel emotional ‘face in the crowd’ flanker task with both 
between-valence and within-valence (fearful face versus other face) discrimination 
conditions. Averaged happy and angry faces were responded to faster than averaged 
fearful faces. The critical finding here was that trait anxiety was robustly negatively 
correlated with the RT difference between averaged happy and angry faces and 
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averaged fearful faces. We then wished to determine if these effects were due to a 
general difference in the processing of fearful faces and other faces, or whether the 
effects were specific to one of the valence contrast situations. In the between-valence 
condition happy faces were responded to faster than fearful faces, which is consistent 
with the findings of Cooper et al. (2008). However, we found that high trait anxiety 
was related to a decreased happy face RT advantage. Trait anxiety was uncorrelated 
with RTs to either happy or fearful faces. This RT finding is somewhat in alignment 
with the neuroimaging study of Fonzo et al. (2015). Fonzo et al. reported the 
difference in right amygdala activation during happy face processing vs. fearful face 
processing was related to levels of trait anxiety. Similarly to our RT findings, right 
amygdala activation in their study did not relate to either happy or fearful face 
processing. In the present study, analysis of the within-valence condition showed 
that RTs to angry and fearful faces did not differ and were unrelated to trait anxiety, 
which is also consistent with the findings of Cooper et al. We can conclude from this 
that the trait anxiety effects upon emotional face discrimination were not due to a 
general difference in the processing of fearful faces and other faces. The anxiety 
effect was specific to making between-valence (happy vs fear) discriminations, as 
opposed to within-valence (anger vs. fear) discriminations.   
A standard RT congruency effect was present as incongruent trials were responded 
to slower than congruent trials. This effect was unaffected by the type of valence 
conflict. Trait anxiety was unrelated to the RT congruency effect which is consistent 
with the findings of Larson et al. (2013), who used neutral arrow stimuli. Thus, the 
ACT-based prediction that trait anxiety would be related to increased distraction was 
not supported. However, it is noteworthy that Eysenck et al. (2007) also postulate 
that high anxious participants can adopt compensatory processing strategies, which 
although inefficient, render behavioural effects unobservable. However, this 
argument does tend to make ACT rather unfalsifiable. We suggest that further 
anxiety research concerning congruency effects in flanker tasks is unlikely to be 
fruitful unless the magnitude of emotional distraction/conflict can be increased in a 
different way.  
We next considered that general sources of RT variation would act to obscure the 
specific RT correlations with trait anxiety in particular emotional face conditions. 
When controlling for these ‘general RT effects’ using partial correlations, trait 
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anxiety was related to faster mean RTs to fearful faces in the between-valence 
condition. This suggests that the correlation between trait anxiety and the RT 
difference between happy and fearful faces is driven by high anxious participants 
responding to fearful faces faster than their low anxious counterparts. Controlling for 
general RT effects confirmed that trait anxiety was not related to mean RTs to happy 
faces in the between-valence condition, nor fearful faces or angry faces in the within-
valence condition.  
The faster responses to fearful faces (presented amongst happy faces) in high trait 
anxiety might represent the enhanced reactivity of a neural survival circuit as 
theorised by LeDoux (2012). Indeed, this finding is also in alignment with the 
theories of anxiety that incorporate an enhanced threat processing system, as 
described by Beck and Clark (1997), Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), Mogg and 
Bradley (1998), Ohman (1996), and Williams et al. (1988). Our results also show 
that those low in trait anxiety showed a happy face recognition advantage relative to 
those high in trait anxiety, which was driven by slower responses to fearful faces. It 
is possible that the happy faces would activate the same neural circuits that would be 
active in situations of adaptive reward. For example, LeDoux (2012) suggests that 
behaviours such as happiness, pleasure and joyfulness are products of the biological 
circuits that are also implicated in nutrition, energy, fluid balance, thermoregulation 
and procreation. It seems possible that those high in trait anxiety have a more 
reactive survival circuit response to threat-related stimulation relative to adaptive 
reward stimulation, whereas those low in trait anxiety may have a more reactive 
survival circuit response to adaptive reward stimulation relative to threat-related 
stimulation, although the correlation with happy face RTs is not directly related to 
anxiety.  
The correlations in the present study show that trait anxiety directly affects the speed 
of processing and responding to fearful faces, but not happy faces. This is somewhat 
inconsistent with the findings of Rossignol et al. (2005). They showed that high 
anxious participants were faster than low anxious participants at detecting both 
fearful and happy faces. This may reflect anxiety-related speeding in RTs to 
infrequent emotional faces, as opposed to discriminating between the actual 
emotional facial expressions per se. Rossignol et al. suggested that anxiety is related 
to an enhanced vigilance towards general emotion processing. An alternative 
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explanation of their results could be that trait anxiety modulates RTs to happy faces 
but this depends upon the context provided by other task relevant emotional faces. In 
their study happy faces were predominantly discriminated from neutral faces, and 
some infrequent fearful faces. In contrast, in the present study fearful and happy 
faces were equal in frequency, and the task was to discriminate happy faces from 
fearful faces, not neutral faces. This argument can also be accommodated within the 
perspective of LeDoux (2012) and the existence of emotional survival circuits in the 
brain. For example, in a situation where fearful faces must be discriminated from 
happy faces this might consistently trigger a threat-related survival circuit in high 
anxious participants. In contrast in a situation where intermittent fearful and happy 
faces are discriminated from neutral faces, the intermittent emotional faces might 
trigger phasic responses from both threat-related and adaptive reward related 
survival circuits in high anxiety. Thus, the different anxiety effects found in the 
present study and that of Rossignol et al. can possibly be reconciled.  
In the present study, RTs to fearful faces were similar in both valence contrast 
conditions. Trait anxiety did not modulate the RT difference between fearful faces 
that were discriminated from happy faces and fearful faces discriminated from angry 
faces. Trait anxiety selectively correlated with RTs to fearful faces only in the 
between-valence condition (after controlling for general RT effects). One could 
suggest that there were no anxiety-related differences in RTs to the emotional faces 
in the within-valence condition, by arguing that both emotions were threat-related. 
However, we suspect this explanation is unlikely as we would expect anxiety to 
correlate with overall mean RTs in the within-valence condition, and this was not the 
case. Instead, we offer an explanation based upon theories of face processing.  
Calder, Young, Keane and Dean (2000) suggest that the perception of emotional 
faces can require configural processing. Configural and featural processing may play 
different roles when processing different emotional facial expressions (Adolphs, 
2002a). Indeed, Calvo and Nummenmaa (2008) showed that an increase in featural 
processing is used during the visual search for happy faces compared to fearful and 
angry faces, whereas the visual search for fearful and angry faces is more reliant 
upon configural processing. In the present study distinguishing between and happy 
and fearful faces may have only required a basic featural processing style, but 
distinguishing between angry and fearful faces may have required additional 
105 
 
configural processes. The finding that anxiety modulated RTs to fearful faces in the 
fear / happy discrimination condition, but not the fear / anger discrimination 
condition, is consistent with the idea that different types of processes are required to 
distinguish fearful faces from happy faces than are required to distinguish fearful 
faces from angry faces. In short, the anxiety-modulated RT advantage for fearful 
faces may have been lost when discriminating the fearful faces from angry faces, due 
to increased configural processing demands in the within-valence condition. This 
explanation supposes that the configural processing operations of the within-valance 
condition are not dependent on, or affected by, anxiety-related mechanisms, whereas 
the featural processing operations of the between-valence conditions are. This post 
hoc suggestion needs to be tested appropriately. 
In sum, in answer to our second question, trait anxiety did relate to a RT bias for 
fearful faces. But this occurred only when happy faces were the alternative face 
being discriminated, and not when the alternative was an angry face. We suggest that 
clarifying the boundaries of this bias is a valuable line of further research.  
In summary, our analyses thus far showed that trait anxiety modulated emotional 
facial expression recognition, as opposed to the magnitude of emotional face flanker 
interference. Our next analyses focused upon how anxiety relates to conflict 
resolution and the CSE. CSEs in the RTs were analysed using the standard cC, iI, iC 
and cI trial sequences. The critical (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency 
alternation effect was robustly significant and was not further modulated by valence 
contrast condition. In short, (in)congruency repetition trials were responded to faster 
than (in)congruency alternation trials in both valence contrast conditions. This 
(in)congruency repetition RT advantage did not differ in magnitude for either 
congruent or incongruent trials. However, the key finding in this analysis was a 3-
way (in)congruency repetition/alternation by valence contrast by anxiety interaction. 
Anxiety modulated the magnitude of the CSE, but only in the between-valence 
condition, not the within-valence condition. As a participant’s level of trait anxiety 
increased so did their overall CSE in the between-valence condition. This effect did 
not further interact with trial type. This suggests that the anxiety-related CSE did not 
significantly differ between congruent and incongruent trials.  
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The finding that anxiety relates to an increased CSE is in alignment with the findings 
of Larson et al. (2013) who used a non-emotional flanker task.  The results of the 
present study therefore appear to lend some support to Gray and McNaughton’s 
(2000) suggestion that anxiety is related to the reactivity of a conflict resolution 
system, assuming that the CSE depends upon processing within the conflict 
resolution system. However, it is noteworthy that they proposed that the perception 
of task-relevant goal conflict often inhibits much of the motor activity that is being 
carried out at the time. They suggested that when conflict-inducing stimuli are re-
experienced, they are dealt with in a more inhibited manner. By contrast, the RT 
effects of repeated incongruent trials that contribute to the CSE occur when iI trials 
are responded to faster than cI trials (e.g., Gratton et al., 1992). It therefore seems 
probable that the methods employed in the original rodent paradigms produced 
results that are not activating the same systems that are responsible for generating the 
CSE, or are doing so in a different way. An increased (in)congruency repetition 
advantage in high anxiety could still be explained as evidence of the reactivity of a 
neural survival circuit, from the perspective of LeDoux (2012). The speeded 
resolution of emotional conflict, or even the speeded detection of emotional 
congruence by those high in anxiety, could well be adaptive.  
It is noteworthy that the current CSE results are in contrast to the results of the 
emotional Stroop studies carried out by Etkin and Schatzberg (2011), and Etkin et al. 
(2010). These authors found that the CSE during incongruent trials was abolished in 
GAD patients, who were higher in trait anxiety than normal controls. It is possible 
that this was due to differences in how emotional Stroop conflict and emotional 
flanker conflict is processed. Alternatively, anxiety may affect the CSE differently in 
clinical patients compared to the sub clinical levels of anxiety present in our sample.  
It is also noteworthy in the present study that anxiety modulated the CSE only in the 
between-valence condition. The reason for this difference seems unlikely to be to do 
with the emotional content of the judgements per se; we have already noted that 
Larson et al. (2013) found anxiety effects in a similar direction to those observed in 
current study when they were using entirely neutral stimulus displays. This is also 
consistent with our prior suggestion that differences in processing requirements in 
the between-valence discrimination condition, relative to the within-valence 
discrimination condition (e.g. such as within-valence discriminations requiring more 
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configural processing) abolish any anxiety-related effects. In short, in the present 
study, both the anxiety-related RT effects on expression recognition and conflict 
resolution were present only in the between-valence condition.  
We suggest that further anxiety research concerning conflict resolution will be 
fruitful. However, we suggest that it would be advantageous to design a finer-grained 
emotional flanker paradigm that enables one to determine the precise mechanism 
that underlies the anxiety effects upon the CSE. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2006) and Mayr, 
Awh and Laurey (2003) reported that the CSE was present only with both target and 
response repetition. Nieuwenhuis et al. suggested that response priming drives the 
effect. In contrast, Clayson and Larson (2012, 2011a, & 2011b) found robust CSEs 
after removing stimulus and response repetitions. Recently it has been shown, using 
a much modified conflict paradigm, that a CSE can occur when precluding any target 
and response repetitions in the design (Duthoo et al., 2014). However, from the 
perspective of anxiety research it would be interesting to compare pairs of trials 
where just conflict is implicated, with trials where conflict plus response priming is 
implicated. This could allow researchers to determine whether the present CSE 
correlations with trait anxiety may be present only when there is target response 
repetition, or whether target response repetition modifies the CSE and its dependence 
on anxiety. It would be useful not to preclude these trials if one wishes to determine 
whether conflict adaptation or episodic memory processes are responsible for the 
anxiety-related modulation of the CSE. It is entirely plausible that there may be 
mechanisms responsible for the CSE, which are independent of anxiety, and these 
may be distinct from other mechanisms that facilitate the anxiety-related 
enhancement of the CSE. Future studies should focus upon this issue.  
We administered additional individual difference measures as trait anxiety is not the 
only variable that is likely to be implicated in emotional distraction, expression 
recognition or conflict resolution. Trait anxiety and trait anger were positively 
correlated, and both correlated positively with interpersonal fear. Neither trait anger 
nor interpersonal fear modulated RTs to any of the emotional face types, nor the 
difference in RTs to either pair of conflicting emotional face types. This is somewhat 
in contrast to the finding that trait anger (but not trait anxiety) has been related to an 
attentional bias for angry faces, relative to neutral faces (van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, 
van den Hout & Stam, 2001). The task used by van Honk et al. required participants 
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to respond to the colour of the tinted photographs (red, yellow, blue or green), not 
the facial emotion. Thus the emotion expression was not task relevant, which is in 
contrast to the task used in the present chapter.  
In the present study, trait anger was positively correlated with the overall CSE in the 
between-valence condition. In contrast, interpersonal fear scores were not. When 
trait anger was partialled out the correlation between trait anxiety and the CSE was 
non-significant. Similarly, when trait anxiety was partialled out the correlation 
between trait anger and the CSE was non-significant. These partial correlations 
tentatively suggest that it may be some shared components of trait anxiety and trait 
anger that modulate the CSE. Moreover, we also verified that, similarly to trait 
anxiety, trait anger and interpersonal fear did not modulate the CSE in the within-
valence condition.  
Anger is considered an approach-related behaviour (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), 
whereas anxiety is described as related to cautious, defensive approach behaviour 
that arises in conflict situations (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Shared resources 
related to approach behaviour may explain why the traits are both implicated in the 
CSE, whereas fear (an avoidance behaviour, Gray & McNaughton) appears much 
less implicated. Alternatively, anger has previously been shown to be 
psychometrically related to anxiety, but after controlling for general negative affect 
the correlation disappeared (Harmon-Jones, 2003).  Therefore, shared negative 
affectivity could explain the present findings, although the absence of a relationship 
with fearfulness (which also concerns a negative affect) does not fit this explanation. 
The relationship between trait anxiety and trait anger (and their combined 
relationship with the CSE) in the present study also resonates with the findings 
reported in a recent clinical paper. Lang, McTeague and Bradley (2016) 
administered 14 different individual difference questionnaires that measure 
depression, anhedonia, trait anxiety, trait anger, and life stressors, to 425 patients 
seeking treatment for a spectrum of DSM-IV anxiety diagnoses. A principal 
components analysis of the responses to all of the questionnaires isolated three 
components. Lang et al. defined these as negative affectivity, anxious arousal, and 
cumulative life stress. Trait anxiety measured by the STAI and trait anger measured 
by the STAXI both loaded on the negative affectivity component, whereas the total 
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scores of the fear survey schedule (FSS) did not load on any of the three 
components. In the present study the interpersonal fear subscale of the FSS was 
unrelated to the CSE, whereas both trait anxiety and trait anger were. In answer to 
our fourth and final research question, we suggest it is likely that there will be some 
shared components of interrelated affective traits that can influence emotion and 
cognition, across several domains of information processing. We suggest that it will 
be beneficial for future studies concerning trait anxiety and cognition to also 
administer trait anger measures at the very least.  
The current study has investigated how affective traits are related to variations in 
cognitive control in an emotional goal conflict situation. We suggest that a 
replication of this study should also assess whether any neural differences exist, 
between the three affective traits. For example, cognitive control processes require 
ongoing performance evaluation. A proposed neural basis of this evaluative function 
(illustrated by EEG recordings of ERPs) has been termed the error-related negativity 
(ERN). ERP recordings derived from fronto-central electrodes contain a large 
negative deflection in the response-locked ERPs that peak at 100 milliseconds 
following error commission. The ERN is possibly the neural basis of error-detection, 
or a general action plan evaluation, originating from an executive control system 
(Gehring, Coles, Meyer & Donchin, 1995). Alternatively the ERN may represent a 
neural estimate of any current events motivational worth, as illustrated in financially 
incentivised paradigms where higher value trials illicit a larger ERN (Pailing & 
Segalowitz, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2005). Research using dipole modelling techniques 
suggests that the ERN originates from the ACC (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994). 
The ACC is a neural component of the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC). 
fMRI evidence shows that increased activity in this area is present during erroneous 
responses compared to correct responses. This pMFC activity is also present 
following response conflict and unfavourable outcomes (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, 
Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004b). 
These theories of the ERN resonate substantially with the theoretical function of the 
septo-hippocampal defence system proposed by Gray and McNaughton (2000). 
From an RST perspective the neurobiology and neurochemistry, of the proposed 
explanations of the ERN, resonate with the proposed basis of BIS and BAS activity. 
For example, Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman and Lorist (2006) draw attention to 
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the fact that Holroyd & Coles (2002) postulate that dopaminergic neurotransmission 
is critical if the ERN is to occur. However, Boksem et al. point out that in Gray and 
McNaughton’s theory punishment and prediction error responses are controlled by 
the BIS which is based upon cholinergic neurotransmission. Boksem et al. continue 
by explaining that the BIS inhibits the BAS which is dopamine based, therefore the 
two theories are compatible with each other. Accordingly, these authors suggest that 
this leaves open an interesting area for research as the non-dopamine based BIS 
(response monitoring) system has not featured greatly in theoretical accounts of the 
ERN. In a study using the traditional Eriksen flanker task Boksem et al. found that 
BIS scores (as measured with the BIS scale; Carver and White, 1994) correlated 
positively and moderately with the ERN amplitudes. However their sample was 
quite small (N=24). We suggest that the current study is replicated using EEG. The 
recordings of the ERN may help to further differentiate how trait anxiety, trait anger 
and interpersonal fear are implicated in the cognitive control of emotion. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, trait anxiety does seem to be selectively related to a RT bias for fearful 
faces, but it is dependent upon the context provided by the other task relevant faces. 
Trait anxiety was not related to distraction caused by emotional flankers, even 
though the predicted effects were detected in the whole sample. However, trait 
anxiety was related to the sequential effects of emotional conflict processing. This 
was evidenced by an enhanced CSE. However, this effect was dependent upon the 
type of emotional conflict present. Moreover, trait anger was positively related to 
trait anxiety. It seemed to be the shared variance of trait anxiety and trait anger that 
accounted for the trait effects upon the CSE. In contrast, trait anger was unrelated to 
RTs to fearful faces. Future studies should focus upon how both trait anxiety and 
trait anger modulate sequential effects present during emotional conflict processing, 
and how trait anxiety modulates emotional face processing. Moreover, it would also 
be beneficial to include a social anxiety measure in future emotional face processing 
experiments. The use of these RT paradigms that tap into emotional face recognition, 
and emotional conflict resolution processes, should be a fruitful means of 
111 
 
researching how the suggested survival circuits described by LeDoux (2012) might 
be triggered.  
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Chapter 3 
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3. Experiment 2 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Experiment 1 showed that our new emotional face flanker task was a useful measure 
of emotional distraction, emotional expression recognition, and emotional conflict 
resolution that can be used in personality and individual differences research. Our 
novel flanker paradigm was partially inspired by the ‘face in the crowd task’ (Byrne 
& Eysenck, 1995), but some of the inspiration for creating this new emotional 
conflict paradigm came from studies using another conflict task, referred to as the 
Stroop task. This chapter reports experiment 2 which focuses upon this type of 
emotional conflict paradigm.  Emotional variants of the Stroop task have been used 
in anxiety research for many years (see Phaf & Kan, 2007). This present experiment 
(experiment 2) has now been published (du Rocher & Pickering, 2017). This paper 
can be sourced at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886917300855 
In the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) performance when naming the font colour 
in which single words are written is affected by the meaning of the words: especially 
if the word names a colour that is incongruent with the font colour. For example if 
the word blue is presented in green font (i.e., an incongruent trial), participants will 
be slower or less accurate when responding to the green font colour than if the word 
green was presented in green (i.e., a congruent trial). These Stroop effects were 
traditionally explained as an automatic effect of participants reading written words.  
Performance on this task reflects two different types of conflict. Informational 
conflict exists between the font colour and word, during incongruent trials. Task 
conflict exists between the necessary colour naming task, and the irrelevant 
automatic word reading effect (Kalanthroff, Avnit, Henik, Davelaar, & Usher, 2015). 
Stroop effects consist of facilitative effects and interference effects. Facilitative 
effects are the improvement in performance for congruent relative to neutral trials, 
whereas interference effects are the reduction in performance for incongruent 
relative to neutral trials (Goldfarb & Henik, 2007). However, it is noteworthy that 
most Stroop studies do not include these neutral trials. In these cases the relative 
contributions of facilitation effects, and/or interference effects, to the overall Stroop 
effect cannot be quantified.  
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Basten, Stelzel and Fiebach, (2011) used a traditional colour word Stroop task where 
the words red, yellow, blue or green were presented in font colours that were either 
congruent or incongruent with the words. Congruent and incongruent trials were 
presented in equal proportions. Congruent trials were responded to faster and more 
accurately than incongruent trials. Trait anxiety was not significantly related to any 
reaction time (RT) trial type effects. However, high anxiety was related to faster RTs 
averaged across all trial types at a trend level. Using a median split, high and low 
trait anxiety groups differed significantly in trial type accuracy rates. For high 
anxious relative to low anxious participants the error rate for incongruent trials 
relative to congruent trials was increased. To confirm this effect the anxiety groups 
were combined and the correlation between the Stroop effect in errors (proportion 
correct congruent minus proportion correct incongruent) and trait anxiety was 
positive and moderate in magnitude (the correlation value was r=0.32, p=0.031). 
Basten et al. also reported fMRI analyses that showed increased conflict-related 
brain activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in high anxious 
participants relative to their low anxious counterparts. Basten et al. suggest that this 
activity represents a processing efficiency impairment in high anxious participants 
that is in alignment with the predictions of attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck 
et al., 2007). Basten et al. also suggested that the trend towards an anxiety related 
speeding in RTs across conditions, and the trend towards a reduction in accuracy for 
incongruent trials may reflect a speed-accuracy trade-off (this is discussed in detail 
in the discussion but see Meyer, Irwin, Osman, & Kounios, 1988; Wickelgren, 
1977). This strategy would prioritise faster responses but produce reduced accuracy 
rates.  
Kalanthroff, Henik, Derakshan and Usher (2015) investigated the effects of emotion 
upon anxiety during Stroop performance using a traditional colour word Stroop task. 
The words red, yellow, blue or green or the character string XXXX (all in Hebrew) 
were presented in font colours that were either congruent or incongruent with the 
words. However, in this study negative and neutral pictorial distractors were briefly 
presented (100 milliseconds) before the Stroop stimuli, with a 50 millisecond 
interval included between the distractor and Stroop stimuli. The use of the neutral 
XXXX stimuli allowed for a calculation of both RT facilitation and RT interference 
contributions to the Stroop effect. RT facilitation is the RT difference between 
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congruent trials and neutral trials, whereas RT interference is the RT difference 
between incongruent trials and neutral trials. Low trait anxious participants were 
unaffected by either pictorial distractor valence. However, high trait anxious 
participants showed increased interference effects and decreased facilitation effects 
for trials following negative distractors, relative to trials following neutral 
distractors. Kalanthroff et al. suggest that the high anxiety related slowdown in RTs 
for both congruent and incongruent trials (that followed negative distractors relative 
to neutral distractors) reflects disrupted pro-active control processes. Pro-active 
control relies upon active maintenance of task context as preparation for conflict or 
task difficulty. In contrast, a reactive strategy involves control that is initiated 
precisely when needed, and is thus less goal focused (Braver, 2012). Kalanthroff et 
al. suggest that their results support the ACT suggestion that anxiety relates to a bias 
in bottom-up processing over top-down processing (Eysenck et al., 2007). In this 
case, the emotional impact of the negative emotional distractors was suggested to 
impair the executive control processes necessary in the Stroop task, but only in high 
anxious participants. Thus, it is the combination of the pressure on these executive 
control mechanisms by negative distractors and high anxiety that causes the effect. 
The anxiety related slowing in RTs following negative distractors was not evident 
for neutral (XXXX) trials. Kalanthroff et al. note this and suggest that the slowing 
effect was not an overall slowing in RTs. They suggest it is more likely a specific 
modulation of reactions to both response conflict and task conflict during 
incongruent trials, and just task conflict during congruent trials.  
It is noteworthy here that the results of the study by Kalanthroff et al. (2015) do 
allow for an alternative explanation (of ours). In short, the presence of negative 
distractors could have activated the BIS, which from an RST perspective mediates 
anxiety (Gray & McNaughton, 2000).  The BIS could thus have slowed responses to 
incongruent trials (conflict trials) and congruent trials (potential conflict trials), but 
not neutral trials (no conflict trials), as processing the conflict trials and potential 
conflict trials needed the BIS, whereas the neutral trials did not.  
The effect of emotion upon cognitive control during the Stroop task has traditionally 
been researched in a different way. The colour naming Stroop task itself is often 
modified to include threat-related emotional words and neutral words. Stroop effects 
during font colour naming in traditional Stroop tasks (using colour words) and 
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modified emotional Stroop tasks (using emotional and neutral words) have been 
found to correlate. However, blood pressure tests show that the colour task is more 
arousing, possibly due to increased conflict between colours and colour words as 
opposed to colours and emotion words (Cothran & Larsen, 2008). This can be 
explained easily as emotional Stroop colour naming tasks will still elicit task conflict 
between the necessary colour naming task, and the irrelevant automatic word reading 
effect. However, no informational conflict will exist between the font colour and 
word during emotional word trials. The only conflict present in the task would be 
task conflict. The emotional Stroop task thus requires a different explanation than the 
colour naming Stroop task, as emotional word meanings and font colours do not 
occupy the same semantic dimension (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004).  
Performance during emotional Stroop tasks has been shown to be modulated by 
levels of anxiety. For example, Taake, Jaspers-Fayer and Liotti (2009) used an 
emotional Stroop task with words that were either neutral, positive or threat related 
presented in either red, yellow, blue or green font. Two types of blocks of stimuli 
were presented. In one block type threat and neutral words were presented equally 
often in each of the four colours, whereas in the other block type positive and neutral 
words were presented. High anxious participants showed significant slowing in RTs 
when naming the font colour in the threat/neutral block, but not the positive/neutral 
block. Low anxious participants did not exhibit this effect. Moreover, EEG 
recordings showed that for high anxious participants only, words from the 
threat/neutral block type elicited an increased negative amplitude (at 350-450 
milliseconds) at frontocentral brain regions, relative to words from the 
positive/neutral block type. In their RT analyses, the effect of trial type versus block 
type was insignificant. Critically, there was no RT slowing for threat words relative 
to neutral words in the same block. However, EEG recordings showed for threat 
words versus neutral words in the same block a positive enhancement of an ERP 
(200-300 milliseconds) was present at anterior frontal brain regions. This effect did 
not differ between high and low anxious participants. However, Taake et al. report 
that in high anxious participants only, this effect was preceded by a very early 
response (30-70 milliseconds) to threat words relative to neutral words in the same 
block in the left frontomedial brain region. They propose that this early emotional 
processing may represent a hyper-vigilance towards threat in high anxious 
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participants. In emotional Stroop studies anxiety is often suggested to modulate 
processing priorities towards threat-related stimuli which leads to interference when 
naming the colours of the words (Fox, 1996; Mathews & Mackintosh; 1998, 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). The slower RTs when naming 
the colour of fear words in high anxiety was traditionally explained as an automatic 
attentional bias towards the emotional meaning of the fear words (Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).  
Designs where emotion words are blocked together can produce larger Stroop effects 
than designs where emotion and neutral words are mixed in the same block 
(Richards, French, Johnson, Naparstek, & Williams, 1992; Waters, Sayette, & 
Wertz, 2003). McKenna and Sharma (2004) found that interference occurred in a 
neutral trial following a fear trial, not in the actual fear trial. They interpreted this as 
a slow emotional Stroop effect with the effect of the fear words carrying over to the 
following trial. However, Bailey, Paret, Battista and Xue (2012) showed that 
attachment anxiety was related to increased immediate interference, as well as 
delayed interference, by threat related words. They suggest that the effect was 
primarily due to a subset of participants with reduced top-down attentional control 
ability. Frings, Englert, Wentura and Bermeitinger (2010) investigated the issue of 
whether the emotional Stroop effect is due to fast or slow effects. They controlled 
the stimuli order so that fast and slow effects could be assessed separately. They 
found that both fast and slow effects were present. Frings et al. suggest that the 
results reported by McKenna and Sharma (2004) were the result of contingency 
learning confounds as the sequences McKenna and Sharma used were somewhat 
predictable.  
Phaf and Kan (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 70 emotional Stroop studies that 
used words as stimuli. Phaf and Kan distinguished between slow Stroop effects 
(subsequent neutral trial) and fast Stroop effects (current fear trial) when designing 
their meta-analysis. Stroop effects were reportedly the largest for anxious patients 
when emotional stimuli were blocked together and neutral stimuli were blocked 
together. The second largest Stroop effect was more modest, was again for blocked 
designs, but with non-clinical high anxious participants.  When designs used mixed 
presentation methods where emotional and neutral stimuli appeared in the same 
block the effects were half the magnitude of those found with blocked presentation 
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designs. For clinically anxious patients the Stroop effect was still significant. 
However, for non-clinically anxious participants the effect was not significant, as 
there were approximately as many facilitation effects as interference effects. Phaf 
and Kan suggest that emotional Stroop interference is reduced considerably by using 
mixed presentation relative to blocked presentation designs. It is also noteworthy 
here that all these findings were in fully conscious presentation conditions. They did 
not find significant Stroop effects in less conscious presentation conditions (e.g., 
masked conditions). Phaf and Kan suggested that the emotional Stroop effect is 
primarily due a slow attentional disengagement from the emotional words, as 
opposed to a fast automatic attentional bias towards the emotional words. They 
suggest that anxiety may relate more to a difficulty in disengaging from fear stimuli 
than to an automatic engagement with the fear stimuli.  
Van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, van den Hout and Stam (2001) used a further modified 
emotional Stroop task where pictures of neutral and angry faces were tinted with the 
colours red, yellow, blue or green. Trait anxiety was not related to an attentional bias 
to angry faces relative to neutral faces when naming the colours. Reinholdt-Dunne, 
Mogg and Bradley (2009) used a similar design but included happy and fearful faces 
in addition to the angry and neutral faces. High trait anxiety was related to an 
increased emotional Stroop effect for the emotional faces (happy, fearful and angry 
combined). In contrast, their word version of the emotional Stroop task elicited no 
anxiety-related modulation of the emotional Stroop effect. This may have been due 
to fatigue effects as the word task was always administered after the face task. The 
anxiety-related increase in the emotional Stroop effect during the face task was 
further modulated by a behavioural measure of attentional control; the attention 
network task. Participants high in trait anxiety, whose performance was poor at the 
attention network task, showed greater emotional Stroop effects than other 
participants. In the face version of the emotional Stroop task, as with the word 
version, there is task conflict present but no informational conflict present.  
Emotional processing during Stroop tasks has recently been investigated using a 
further modification of the task. Zhu, Zhang, Wu, Luo and Luo (2010) showed that 
during an emotional face-word Stroop task that emotional congruency and 
incongruencey was differentiated at an early perceptual stage. Emotional words (fear 
and happy in Chinese) were presented over fearful and happy emotional faces. The 
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words were either congruent or incongruent with the emotions depicted by the faces. 
When participants were required to respond via a key press to either emotional facial 
expression incongruent trials elicited a more negative N170 ERP over posterior 
lateral brain regions than congruent trials. Moreover, when participants were 
required to respond to the emotional word incongruent trials elicited a less negative 
N170 ERP than congruent trials. This word-face emotional Stroop design re-
introduces the informational conflict back into the task, which is not present in the 
word colour naming emotional Stroop task, or the face-colour naming emotional 
Stroop task.  
As discussed in chapter 2, Etkin and Schatzberg (2011) and Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, 
Menon and Schatzberg (2010) also used a word-face emotional Stroop task. To 
briefly reiterate, the Stroop effect was not related to anxiety. However, general 
anxiety disorder patients and normal controls displayed a similar CSE during 
congruent trials. Moreover, their normal controls (who were lower in trait anxiety) 
also displayed the predicted CSE during correct responses to the target faces in 
emotionally incongruent trials. Therefore, for normal controls incongruent trials that 
followed incongruent trials were responded to faster than incongruent trials that 
followed congruent trials.  Clinical anxiety patients (who were higher in trait 
anxiety) did not display this effect.  
Krug and Carter (2010) used two word-face Stroop tasks; a non-emotional gender 
Stroop task; and an emotional expression Stroop task using fearful and neutral faces 
overlaid with the words fear or neutral. In both tasks there were 70% congruent trials 
and 30% incongruent trials. There were slower RTs overall in the emotional task 
than the non-emotional task, but no differences in the magnitude of Stroop effects in 
the RTs, but there was a larger Stroop effect in the emotional task in the accuracy 
data. Trait anxiety did not modulate the Stroop effects in RTs or accuracy in either 
task. However, trait anxiety was positively correlated with the RT difference 
between incongruent trials in the emotional task. High trait anxious participants were 
slower to respond to neutral faces overlaid with the word fear, than fearful faces 
overlaid with the word neutral. However, low trait anxious participants were faster to 
respond to the latter stimuli type. It is noteworthy here that this comparison 
compares RTs during threat-related distraction with RTs during neutral distraction, 
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and thus differs from comparing distraction (incongruent trials) to no distraction 
(congruent trials; i.e., the Stroop effect).  
Krug and Carter (2012) used the emotional word-face Stroop task again, but this 
time two versions were used. In a high conflict expectancy task 65% of trials were 
incongruent, whereas in a low conflict expectancy task 35% of trials were 
incongruent. The Stroop effects in RTs and accuracy were reliably present in both 
tasks. Moreover, these effects were larger in the low conflict expectancy task (35% 
incongruent trials) than in the high conflict expectancy task (65% incongruent trials). 
Neither the Stroop effects, nor performance during incongruent trials (in either RTs 
or accuracy) were correlated with trait anxiety in either task.  
Osinksky, Alexander, Gebhardt and Hennig (2010) used an emotionally neutral 
version of the word-face Stroop task. In this task male and female faces had the 
words man or woman overlaid upon them. The words were either congruent or 
incongruent with the gender of the faces. In this task two thirds of trials were 
congruent. As expected, target faces for congruent trials were responded to faster and 
more accurately than incongruent trials. This Stroop effect was uncorrelated with 
trait anxiety. Osinksky, Geghardt, Alexander and Hennig (2012) also used a word-
face gender Stroop task, but with equal amounts of congruent and incongruent trials, 
and a smaller amount of face only and word only trials. Once again trait anxiety was 
uncorrelated with the Stroop effect. 
The studies discussed thus far suggest that trait anxiety modulates the processing of 
indirect emotional distraction during colour naming Stroop tasks, but the effects of 
anxiety upon direct emotional conflict during word-face emotional Stroop tasks are 
very inconsistent. The study by Krug and Carter (2010) produced an encouraging 
behavioural effect that related to trait anxiety, when using a reduced proportion of 
incongruent trials relative to congruent trials. In contrast, the studies by Etkin and 
Schatzberg (2011) and Etkin et al. (2010) did not show any current trial Stroop 
effects that related to trait anxiety using equal amounts of incongruent and congruent 
trials. It is noteworthy here that the other difference between these studies is that 
Etkin and colleagues used happy and fearful stimuli, whereas Krug and Carter used 
neutral and fearful stimuli. This leaves open the question as to whether using happy 
and fearful stimuli, coupled with a reduced amount of incongruent trials (relative to 
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congruent trials), would produce more robust effects than those reported by Krug 
and Carter. A noticeable similarity between all of these word-face Stroop studies is 
that none of them used neutral control trials to differentiate the effects of facilitation 
and interference upon the Stroop effect. This would have been particularly 
interesting in the studies that featured unequal proportions of congruent and 
incongruent trials (Krug & Carter, 2010, 2012; Osinksky et al., 2010).  
In Stroop tasks increasing the proportion of congruent trials relative to incongruent 
trials results in an increased Stroop effect (i.e., the RT difference between congruent 
and incongruent trials). The traditional explanation of this ‘proportion congruency 
effect’ has been that the detection of the proportions leads to participants modulating 
their attention towards the word in word/colour tasks (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; 
Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). This attentional based account is referred to as the 
modulation account, but cannot explain some results. For example, a proportion 
congruent effect has been reported when high and low proportion congruent stimuli 
were randomly mixed in the same block. Blocks of trials contained words presented 
mostly in their congruent colour and also critically other words were also presented 
mostly in a specific incongruent colour (Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003). The 
proportion congruent effect in this study cannot be explained by participants simply 
attending to the words, as participants would have to have been modulating their 
attention to the words (i.e., attending or ignoring) in a trial by trial fashion 
(depending upon the word). This is not a viable explanation as it means that 
participants would have to decide if they attend to the word or not, after they have 
already read the word (Schmidt & Besner, 2008).   
An alternative account was proposed by Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman and Besner 
(2007) which suggests that contingency learning accounts for the increase in the 
Stroop effect. The contingency learning account proposes that participants implicitly 
learn the correlations (contingencies) between the words and responses. Thus, they 
learn to predict the response required based upon the distracting word. Schmidt and 
Besner (2008) conducted several reanalyses and new experiments that supported the 
contingency learning account of the proportion congruency effect. They suggest that 
participants make speeded responses to high contingency trials based upon response 
predictions. They continue by proposing that participants lower a response threshold 
for any expected response, but not any other possible response. Thus facilitation in 
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RTs is evident for high contingency trials relative to medium contingency trials 
(which would be chance level contingency trials), but no interference in RTs is 
evident in low contingency trials relative to medium contingency trials (chance level 
contingency trials). The contingency learning account also predicts increased 
facilitation in accuracy for high contingency trials. Critically, this account also 
predicts increased interference resulting in reduced accuracy for low contingency 
trials. This is due to the response threshold being lowered for the word when it was 
predictive.  
Levin and Tzelgov (2016) recently showed that contingency learning is not a 
function recruited by the cognitive control system in order to overcome conflict, but 
is an independent function that can operate in parallel with the cognitive control 
processes. This suggests that trait anxiety related conflict effects may be present with 
or without significant anxiety-related contingency learning effects, or vice-versa. 
Moreover, response conflict and contingency learning are not the only variables that 
can affect information processing in situations of goal conflict. 
It is well known that people slow their responses following the commission of an 
error (Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Post-error slowing during RT tasks has been 
explained as a strategic adaptation in control that enhances task performance 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). In contrast, it has been reported 
that post-error slowing does not always facilitate enhanced task performance 
(Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011). An alternative account proposed by Notebaert et 
al. (2009) suggests that errors are salient but infrequent occurrences. From this 
perspective, when an error occurs this activates an orienting response that directs 
attention away from the current task.  This orienting response therefore hinders 
subsequent stimuli processing. This account therefore offers a non-functional 
explanation. Another non-functional account of post-error slowing, referred to as the 
bottleneck account, suggests that error detection occupies time and resources and 
thus interferes with goal directed behaviour (Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009; Jentzsch & 
Dudschig, 2009). Houtman and Notebaert (2013) designed an experiment that 
dissociates between the two accounts which suggested that the bottleneck account 
was a better explanation. However, they also suggested that it is possible that both 
attentional orienting, and performance monitoring, are part of a combined 
mechanism that mediates post-error slowing. Whatever the mechanism behind the 
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effect, committing an error is suggested to be an aversive experience (Hajcak & Foti, 
2008). It is easy to see how any neural or cognitive response that facilitates the 
slowing down of responses after an ‘aversive’ error, could reflect the activity of a 
survival circuit as proposed by LeDoux (2012).  
Research suggests that error commission increases activity of the autonomic nervous 
system and thus increases arousal, which primes reflexive defence mechanisms 
(Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003b; Wessel, Danielmeier & 
Ullsperger, 2011). Therefore, intuitively one might expect anxiety to modulate post-
error slowing. However, several studies show this not to be the case (e.g., Hajcak 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003a; Weinberg, Olvet, & Hajcak, 2010). Van der Borght, 
Braeme, Stevens and Notebaert (2016) predicted that trait anxiety should modulate 
post-error behaviour during a Simon task. Trait anxiety was unrelated to post-error 
slowing, but did modulate post error accuracy. There was a negative correlation 
between the post-error accuracy increase and trait anxiety, but only with a long inter-
trial interval (ITI), but not with a short or medium length ITI. We suggest that further 
research is required to determine whether emotional goal conflict activates the post-
error slowing mechanisms in high anxiety.  
 
3.2. Purpose of experiment 2  
 
This chapter aims to answer three questions concerning individual differences in the 
cognitive control of emotional conflict during a word-face emotional Stroop task. 
Firstly, we wished to clarify how trait anxiety affects performance at this task. 
Secondly, considering the relationships discussed in chapter 1, we wished to clarify 
how both trait anxiety and Stroop task performance are affected by individual 
differences in self-reported attentional control. Thirdly, we wished to clarify how 
trait anxiety and self-reported attentional control affect behaviour following a 
performance error.   
The first question this experiment addresses is how trait anxiety (measured by the 
STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) relates to the processing of emotional conflict in an 
emotional word-face Stroop task. Krug and Carter (2010) showed that trait anxiety 
affected the processing of infrequent incongruent trials, whereas their (2012) study 
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did not replicate this finding. Etkin and colleagues (2010, 2011) did not report any 
current trial Stroop effects that related to anxiety using equal proportions of 
incongruent and congruent trials. The stimuli used by Etkin and colleagues 
represented two different emotions (i.e., happy versus fear words/faces), whereas the 
stimuli used by Krug and Carter consisted of one neutral stimulus type, and one 
emotional stimulus type (i.e., neutral versus fear words/faces). In short, none of these 
designs combined two conflicting emotional stimulus types with infrequent 
incongruent trials.  
We used a two emotion (happy versus fear) word-face Stroop task, with a 
contingency biased design with infrequent emotional conflict trials (i.e., 17% 
incongruent trials). We included neutral word trials to help elucidate the contribution 
of both facilitation effects and interference effects, to the Stroop effect. Thus, we 
could determine whether trait anxiety differentially modulated any interference 
effects or facilitation effects. We predicted that trait anxiety would impair cognitive 
performance during rare incongruent trials, resulting in either slower RTs or reduced 
accuracy, or even an increased Stroop effect. This prediction is based upon the 
suggestion that that high anxiety is related to increased cognitive interference which 
can be experienced as distraction (Eysenck et al., 2007). We predicted that this effect 
would be magnified for incongruent trials consisting of happy faces overlaid with the 
word “fear” as, according to Eysenck et al., distraction would be increased in high 
anxious individuals, when distracting stimuli are threat-related. Indeed, as discussed 
in detail in the introduction of this thesis, several other cognitive perspectives on 
anxiety have proposed that anxiety relates to the automatic detection of threat-related 
stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Ohman, 1996; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1988).  
The design of this Stroop task is identical to our flanker task used in experiment 1 
(chapter 2). The script that ran the experiment was exactly the same, except the 
stimuli were changed. Thus, we can ascertain if the two tasks are in any way similar, 
as far as the detection of anxiety effects goes. In short, in the Stroop task a happy or 
fearful face is the equivalent of the central happy or fearful face in the flanker task. 
In the Stroop task the word is the distractor, which is the equivalent of the flanker 
faces in the outer eight squares in the grid of faces that we used in the flanker task. 
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Thus, in both tasks the distractors can be incongruent or congruent with the target 
face stimulus. The neutral word trials in the Stroop task are broadly equivalent to the 
single face trials used in the flanker task as there is no emotional distraction present. 
However, the neutral word trials do differ from the single face trials used in the 
flanker task as they contain a neutral distractor, and serve a slightly different purpose 
as described above. 
The second question this experiment addresses is how do individual differences in 
self-reported attentional control relate to trait anxiety and Stroop performance. Here 
we mainly focus upon the sub-factors of the attentional control scale as opposed to 
the total scores. We aimed to clarify if either of the two sub-factors discussed in 
chapter 1 (i.e., attentional focusing and attentional shifting) is a better predictor of 
trait anxiety than the other. We aimed to clarify if either of them mediates the 
relationship between trait anxiety and behavioural performance. We aimed to 
elucidate whether either sub-factor modulates any of the key behavioural effects 
independently of trait anxiety.  
The third question this experiment addresses is whether post-error slowing is 
affected by trait anxiety in an emotional conflict situation, and whether self-reported 
attentional control is related to post-error slowing.   
 
3.3. Method 
 
3.3.1. Participants 
 
Participants (20 of whom also completed experiment 1) with no reported history of 
neurological disorder (N = 77, 62 female) were recruited from Goldsmiths, 
University of London, and had a mean age of 23.4 (SD = 7). Of these, 68 were right 
handed and 35 were psychology 1st year undergraduates recruited via an online 
research participation scheme who took part in return for course credit. The rest were 
paid £5, and were recruited via advertisements placed around the campus; they were 
therefore students or staff from other departments. All gave informed written consent 
in accordance with standard ethical guidelines. This study was approved by the 
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Goldsmiths psychology departments’ ethics committee (approval received 
24/10/2012).  
Here we can make a sample size and power calculation based upon the word/face 
Stroop task study by Krug and Carter (2010). They reported that anxiety correlated at 
0.4 with the RT difference between incongruent fearful and incongruent neutral 
trials. Thus, 46 participants should allow 80% power for a two-tailed test at p=0.05, 
for a correlation of 0.4. They also reported effects of anxiety on the sequential cI 
trials. Thus, we can make a sample size and power prediction based upon these 0.3 
correlations between anxiety and responses to the cI trials. 82 participants should 
allow 80% power for a two-tailed test at p=0.05, for a correlation of 0.3. We thus 
aimed for approximately 80 participants in this study. 
 
3.3.2. Psychometric measures 
 
Trait anxiety was assessed with the trait anxiety subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983). Attentional control was assessed with the 
Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001, 2002). We also used 
attentional focusing and attentional shifting sub-scales which were predicated on the 
sub-factors identified by Olafsson et al. (2011). Olafsson et al. reported that nine 
items loaded on factor 1, whereas ten items loaded on factor 2. One item (question 9) 
did not load on either factor. The attentional focusing sub-scale thus consisted of 9 
items (items 1-8 and item 12). The attentional shifting sub-scale consisted of 10 
items (items 10, 11, and 13-20).  
 
3.3.3. Stimuli 
 
The emotional faces used to create the Stroop stimuli were obtained from a 
standardised face stimuli set developed for research (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 
2009). The overall picture dimensions were 65mm high and 53 mm wide (when 
presented using MATLAB version R2006a on a 15.5 inch laptop screen). The laptop 
was running Windows XP, and we used the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 for 
precision RT measurement. Two face stimulus sets were created using one male, and 
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one female in each set. This was an attempt to control for the effects of the gender of 
the face. Congruent stimuli were created by placing the word “fear” or “happy” 
across the nose of the fearful or happy faces, so that the mouths and eyes were not 
obscured.  Incongruent stimuli were created in the same way except the emotion 
words were placed over the opposite emotional face. Neutral stimuli were created by 
placing neutral words (bowl or cellar) over both emotional face types. Figure 3.1 
shows one of the sets of emotional face/word Stroop stimuli. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: An example of one of the sets of emotional face/word Stroop stimuli 
(the emotion of the face is the target and the word is the distractor). Clockwise 
from top left: congruent fear; incongruent fear; neutral fear; congruent happy; 
incongruent happy; neutral happy.  
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3.3.4. Procedure   
 
 
Participants were told that they would be presented with two short facial emotion 
recognition tasks with a short rest in-between (i.e., one task with a male face and one 
task with a female face, as described above). Participants were asked to sit as close 
to the screen as was comfortable for their eyes (typical viewing distance was 
approximately 70 cm). The task instructions were presented on the screen. To start 
each task the first screen instructed participants that they would have to judge the 
emotional expression showing on photos of happy or fearful faces. Participants were 
then shown examples of the various stimulus combinations they might see and 
reminded to concentrate on the face and ignore the words. They were told to rest 
their index fingers over the responses keys (z and /) and to respond as fast as possible 
while maintaining high accuracy levels. They were verbally told that a high pitched 
tone following a response indicates a correct response, whereas a low pitched tone 
following a response indicates an incorrect response.  
The experimental stimuli were displayed until a response key was pressed. 
Unbeknown to the participants, at the beginning of each task, there were two of each 
neutral and incongruent trials, and 8 of each congruent trial included as practice 
trials; these 24 trials were discarded and not analysed. The main experimental stimuli 
that followed consisted of 40 neutral trials, 40 incongruent trials and 160 congruent 
trials (in each of the two tasks). The modified Stroop task was designed primarily to 
elicit RT effects as opposed to errors. The trial type sequence was created using a 
random number generator function in Matlab, and was the same for all participants. 
We kept the sequence the same for all participants as this is an individual differences 
study, and we wanted as few uncontrolled variables as possible to vary across 
participants. We also used the same trial type sequence for each of the tasks. There 
were 240 non-practice trials in total in each task so we felt that there was no chance 
that using the same sequence in each task would cause any learning of the sequence 
of trial types and, as noted below, we counterbalanced the order of the 2 tasks across 
participants. Each task lasted for approximately ten minutes. The sequence of the 2 
tasks was counterbalanced across participants. The left/right finger response key 
mappings were also counterbalanced. 
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3.3.5: Data analysis  
 
RTs will be analysed using ANCOVA with factors of trial type and emotion, with 
standardised trait anxiety included as the covariate.  
The effect of trial type will allow us to test how the differing types of distracting 
words affect the discrimination of the target faces. The effect of the covariate here 
will show if anxiety modulates (correlates with) the overall distraction effect. The 
effect of emotion on the effect of trial type will allow us to test whether the 
distraction effects differ when happy vs. fearful faces are used as targets. The effect 
of the covariate here will allow us to test whether anxiety modulates (correlates with) 
the difference in distraction effects across these 2 emotion conditions. We also 
planned to repeat the main analyses with the accuracy data.  
We then conducted a planned further RT analysis to investigate the congruency 
sequence effects (CSE). The RT data were analysed using ANCOVA with factors of 
current trial type and previous trial type: (in)congruency repetition/alternation, with 
standardised trait anxiety included as the covariate. The key effect of interest in this 
sequential analysis is the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect (which tests the 
RT difference between trials when the level of (in)congruency repeats relative to 
when it alternates; i.e., the CSE). The critical effect here is the covariate interaction 
with the CSE which will reveal if anxiety modulates (correlates with) the size of the 
CSE. These effects therefore test our hypothesis that anxiety will relate to a 
difference in how conflict resolution is achieved (as indexed by the CSE).  
We also planned to conduct further analyses concerning how trait anxiety relates to 
attentional shifting and attentional focusing, and how these attentional traits relate to 
any RT effects that relate to trait anxiety. We also planned an analysis of post error 
behaviour.  
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3.4. Results 
 
3.4.1. Psychometric assessments 
 
In this sample participants’ trait anxiety scores, as measured by the STAI trait 
version, ranged from 20 to 70 (mean: 42, SD: 10). Participants’ attentional control 
scale scores ranged from 33 to 71 (mean: 50, SD: 8). When the attentional control 
subscales were analysed separately, attentional focusing scores ranged from 13 to 36 
(mean: 22, SD: 5). Attentional shifting scores ranged from 17 to 36 (mean 26, SD: 
4).  
 
3.4.2. Reaction times 
 
Including all participants the experiment contained 36000 responses in total. 34732 
of these were correct responses. Correct responses ranged from 79 msecs to 6085 
msecs. RT outliers for correct responses were removed if RTs < 250 msecs and RTs 
> 1000 msecs. Of these 793 were where RT > 1000msecs, and 70 were where RT < 
0.250 msecs. Thus, 863 correct responses were removed. Thus, 2.48 % of correct 
response trials were excluded.  
863 / 34732 * 100 
 
The RT data for correct trials (excluding trials with RTs < 250 msecs and RTs > 
1000 msecs) were first subjected to a repeated measures 3 x 2 ANCOVA with 
factors of trial type (congruent versus neutral versus incongruent) and emotion 
(fearful face versus happy face) with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. RTs 
for all trial types are shown in Figure 3.2. The mean RTs, 95% confidence intervals 
and standard errors for each of the 6 stimulus types are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.2: Mean RTs  for each of the stimulus types. 
 
Table 3.1: Mean reaction times, 95% confidence intervals (95%CI) and standard 
errors of the mean (SE) for each stimulus type. All are given in milliseconds. 
 
 Happy target faces  Fearful target faces 
        
Trial type Mean 
RT 
95% CI SE Trial type Mean 
RT 
95% CI SE 
        
Congruent 486 472-499 7 Congruent 
 
488 574-502 6 
Neutral 496 481-511 7 Neutral  
 
496 583-512 7 
Incongruent  495 479-511 8 Incongruent  500 484-516 8 
 
The test of between-subjects effects was significant (F[1,72]=6.45 p=0.01, 
η2=0.082), indicating that anxiety was significantly correlated with RTs across the 
whole experiment (the corresponding correlation value was r = -0.3). This negative 
relationship is shown in Figure 3.3. This finding was unexpected therefore we 
confirmed that this negative correlation was present for both target fearful faces 
(r= -0.29, p=0.012), and with target happy faces (r= -0.31, p=0.007) considered 
separately. These correlations are significant at an adjusted significance level of 
0.025.   
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Figure 3.3: The negative correlation (r= -0.3) between standardised trait anxiety 
and mean RTs. 
 
The test of within-subjects effects showed that the main effect of trial type was 
significant (F[2,144]=15.1, p<0.001, η2=0.17) as RT congruent (mean 487 msecs; 
95% CI 474-500; SE 7) < RT incongruent (mean 497 msecs; 95% CI 482-513; SE 8) 
= RT neutral (mean 497 msecs; 95% CI 482-511; SE 7). The critical finding here 
was that trait anxiety did not modulate the main effect of trial type (F[2,144]=1.6, 
p=0.21, η2=0.022). This effect is critical to our main hypothesis that anxiety would 
relate to increased distraction.  
The effect of emotion was also non-significant (F[1,72]=1.23, p=0.27, η2=0.017; 
mean RT for happy faces 489 msecs; 95% CI 475-503; SE 7; mean RT for fearful 
faces 491 msecs; 95% CI 477-505; SE 7). Critically the effect of emotion did not 
interact with anxiety (F[1,72]=0.13, p=0.72, η2=0.002). The effect of trial type did 
not further interact with emotion (F[2,144]=0.46, p=0.63, η2=0.006; see Figure 3.2), 
and there was no significant three way interaction between trial type, emotion and 
anxiety (F[2,144]=0.29, p=0.75, η2=0.004).  
We conducted three planned comparisons to clarify the main effect of trial type 
using an adjusted significance level of 0.05/3. A one-way ANCOVA with 
standardised trait anxiety as the covariate showed that congruent trials were 
responded to significantly faster than incongruent trials (F[1,72]=22.1, p<0.001, 
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η2=0.235). This effect was unrelated to anxiety (F[1,72]=0.09, p=0.76, η2=0.001). 
This confirms that anxiety was uncorrelated with the Stroop effect (incongruent RT 
minus congruent RT), which relates to one of our main hypotheses. Our next one-
way ANCOVA with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate showed that 
congruent trials were responded to significantly faster than neutral trials 
(F[1,72]=25.9, p<0.001, η2=0.265). This effect was unrelated to anxiety 
(F[1,72]=2.3, p=0.13, η2=0.031). This confirms that anxiety was uncorrelated with 
the facilitation effect (neutral RT minus congruent RT). Our final one-way 
ANCOVA with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate showed that incongruent 
trials were not responded to significantly slower than neutral trials (F[1,72]=1.4, 
p<0.711, η2=0.002). This comparison was unrelated to anxiety (F[1,72]=2.6, 
p=0.112, η2=0.035). This confirms that anxiety was uncorrelated with the 
interference effect (incongruent RT minus neutral RT).  
 
3.4.3. Further RT analysis: Congruency sequence effects 
 
In order to analyse the CSEs the RT data were subjected to a 2 (current trial type; 
congruent versus incongruent) x 2 (previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition 
versus (in)congruency alternation) repeated-measures ANCOVA with standardised 
trait anxiety as the covariate. We will denote 4 key types of trials within this analysis 
thus: incongruent trials preceded by incongruent trials (iI); incongruent trials 
preceded by congruent trials (cI); congruent trials preceded by congruent trials (cC); 
and congruent trials preceded by incongruent trials (iC). Each of these trial types are 
averaged across target emotion (e.g., happy incongruent trials and fearful 
incongruent trials are averaged, and the same for the congruent trials). The effects of 
the previous trial’s congruence upon the RT congruence effect on the subsequent 
trial, often referred to as CSEs, thus appear in the analyses as the effect of 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation.  
The critical findings in this analysis were that the main effect of  (in)congruency 
repetition versus (in)congruency alternation was highly significant  (F[1,72]=28.2, 
p<0.001, η2=0.28), as repetition trials (mean RT 479 msecs; 95% CI 464-493; SE 7) 
were responded to faster than alternation trials (mean RT 492 msecs; 95% CI 477-
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507; SE 7). This effect did not interact with anxiety (F[1,72]=0.21, p=0.646, 
η2=0.003).  This interaction tests the correlation between anxiety and the RT 
difference between alternation trials and repetition trials. The correlation value was 
r=0.05. This comparison relates directly to our main interest in how anxiety relates 
to conflict resolution and the CSE. There was, however, a near significant 3-way 
interaction between trial type, (in)congruency repetition/alternation, and trait anxiety 
(F[1,72]=3.71, p=0.058, η2=0.049). There were no other significant 
effects/interactions (all Fs < 1.3, all ps >0.2). As the aforementioned 3-way 
interaction approached significance, we explored it by running correlations between 
trait anxiety and the CSE for congruent trials (i.e., the RT difference iC – cC), and 
incongruent trials (i.e., the RT difference cI – iI), separately. Trait anxiety was not 
significantly correlated with the CSE during congruent trials (r= -0.19, p=0.098), or 
incongruent trials (r= 0.15, p=0.2), at an adjusted significance level (0.05/2). In 
summary, trait anxiety was not significantly related to the CSE in the RT data. 
However, it is noteworthy here that the near significant 3-way interaction reported 
above shows that the relationship between anxiety and the CSE was near-
significantly different for congruent compared to incongruent trials, even though it 
was not significant for either trial type considered separately.  
 
3.4.4. Accuracy analysis 
 
We then analysed the proportion correct for each of the trial types (excluding trials 
with RTs < 250 msecs and RTs > 1000 msecs) using a 3 x 2 ANCOVA with factors 
of trial type (congruent versus neutral versus incongruent) and emotion (fearful face 
versus happy face) with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. Proportion correct 
for all trial types are shown in Figure 3.4. The mean proportion correct, 95% 
confidence intervals and standard errors for each of the 6 stimulus types are shown in 
Table 3.2.   
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Figure 3.4: Mean proportion correct for each of the stimulus types. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Mean proportion correct (Prop/C), 95% confidence intervals (95%CI) 
and standard errors of the mean (SE) for each stimulus type. 
 Happy target faces  Fearful target faces 
        
Trial type Prop/C 95% CI SE Trial type Prop/C 95% CI SE 
        
Congruent 0.97 0.97-
0.98 
0.003 Congruent 
 
0.97 0.96-
0.97 
0.004 
Neutral 0.97 0.96-
0.97 
0.004 Neutral  
 
0.97 0.97-
0.98 
0.004 
Incongruent  0.95 0.93-
0.96 
0.007 Incongruent  0.94 0.92-
0.95 
0.007 
 
As with the RT analysis, the test of between-subjects effects was significant 
(F[1,72]=4.79 p=0.032, η2=0.062), indicating that anxiety was significantly 
correlated with proportion correct across the whole experiment (the correlation value 
was r = -0.25). Thus, the overall speeding in RTs by high anxious participants also 
seemed to result in an overall reduction in accuracy. This negative relationship is 
shown in Figure 3.5. This finding was unexpected therefore we followed up this test 
0.925
0.93
0.935
0.94
0.945
0.95
0.955
0.96
0.965
0.97
0.975
Congruent Neutral Incongruent
M
ea
n
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 c
o
rr
ec
t
Trial type
  Happy faces
  fearful faces
136 
 
by verifying whether average proportion correct for fear targets and for happy targets 
were each implicated in this anxiety-related reduction in accuracy. Here, we adopt an 
adjusted significance level of 0.025. Correlational analysis showed that anxiety 
negatively and significantly correlated with proportion correct for fear trials overall 
(r= -0.29, p=0.013), but did not significantly correlate with proportion correct for 
happy trials overall (r= -0.16, p=0.185). We wished to determine which of the fear 
trials were driving the anxiety and overall fear trial correlation. We ran three separate 
exploratory correlations between anxiety and the proportion correct for the three 
fearful face trial types (i.e., incongruent, neutral and congruent), using a further 
adjusted significance level (0.025/3). Anxiety correlated with the proportion correct 
for incongruent fear trials (r= -0.28, p=0.017; see Figure 3.6), although this was 
above the further adjusted criterion for statistical significance. The anxiety 
relationship with the proportion correct was not anywhere near significant for neutral 
fear trials (r= -0.170, p=0.149), or congruent fear trials (r= -0.174, p=0.138).  
 
 
Figure 3.5: The negative correlation (r= -0.25) between standardised trait anxiety 
and overall accuracy. 
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Figure 3.6: The negative correlation (r= -0.28) between standardised trait anxiety 
and accuracy for incongruent fear trials. 
 
The test of within-subjects effects showed that the main effect of trial type was 
significant (F[2,144]=24.6, p<0.001, η2=0.255), as mean proportion correct 
incongruent (0.94; 95% CI 0.93-0.95; SE 0.006) < mean proportion correct 
congruent (0.97; 95% CI 0.96-0.98; SE 0.003) = mean proportion correct neutral 
(0.97; 95% CI 0.96-0.98; SE 0.003). The critical finding here was that trait anxiety 
modulated the trial type effect (F[2,144]=3.0, p=0.054, η2=0.040) at a near 
significant level. This suggests that anxiety is related to the difference in accuracy 
between two or more of the trial types. This effect relates to our hypothesis that 
anxiety would relate to increased distraction (although we initially predicted the 
effect would be reflected in RTs not accuracy). However, there was no significant 
main effect of emotion (F[1,72]=1.06, p=0.307, η2=0.014; mean proportion correct 
for happy faces 0.96; 95% CI 0.96-0.97; SE 0.004; mean proportion correct for 
fearful faces 0.96; 95% CI 0.95-0.97; SE 0.004). Thus, accuracy levels did not differ 
between happy target trials and fearful target trials. Critically the effect of emotion 
did not interact with anxiety (F[1,72]=1.70, p=0.194, η2=0.023). This non-significant 
emotion versus anxiety interaction shows that anxiety did not correlate with any 
difference in accuracy between happy and fearful target trials. The effect of trial type 
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significantly interacted with emotion (F[2,144]=4.74, p=0.010, η2=0.062), but there 
was no significant three way interaction between trial type, emotion and anxiety 
(F[2,144]=0.30, p=0.74, η2=0.004).  
We followed up the trial type effect using three one-way ANCOVAs with 
standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. Here we adopt an adjusted significance 
level of 0.05/3. A traditional Stroop effect (congruency effect) was evident as 
congruent trials were responded to more accurately than incongruent trials 
(F[1,72]=27.2 p<0.001, η2=0.274). Trait anxiety was related to this difference in 
accuracy but only at a weak trend level (F[1,72]=3.67 p=0.059, η2=0.048). The sign 
and value of the Stroop effect versus anxiety correlation was r=+0.22. Thus, as 
anxiety increased so did the Stroop effect. Again, this effect relates to our hypothesis 
that anxiety would modulate distraction. Congruent trials were not responded to 
significantly more accurately than neutral trials (F[1,72]=0.10 p=0.749, η2=0.001), 
and this comparison did not interact with anxiety (F[1,72]=0.37 p=0.543, η2=0.005). 
Therefore, there were no facilitation effects in the accuracy data. However, responses 
to neutral trials were more accurate than responses to incongruent trials, indicating 
the presence of an interference effect (F[1,72]=27.56 p<0.001, η2=0.277). This 
interference effect was not significantly related to anxiety (F[1,72]=2.85 p=0.096, 
η2=0.038).   
As the anxiety and trial type analyses focus upon the difference between trial types 
we wished to determine if anxiety correlated with accuracy during each of the 3 trial 
types separately. Trait anxiety was related to reduced accuracy for incongruent trials 
(r= -0.26, p=0.024). This effect relates to our hypothesis that anxiety would 
modulate distraction. However, this result should be judged against an adjusted 
significance level of 0.025/3.  Anxiety was not significantly correlated with accuracy 
to congruent trials (r= -0.12, p=0.307) or neutral trials (r= -0.17, p=0.144). Clearly 
the effect of anxiety is weak, but numerically the strongest action is upon 
incongruent trials in this analysis, in keeping with the previous exploratory 
correlations which showed the relationship is driven mostly by the incongruent 
fearful trials. 
We followed up the trial type versus emotion interaction using six one-way 
ANCOVAS with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate and the adjusted 
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significance level of 0.05/6. Congruent fear trials were responded to more accurately 
than incongruent fear trials (F[1,72]=22.34 p<0.001, η2=0.237). This comparison 
was not significantly related to anxiety (F[1,72]=2.81 p=0.098, η2=0.038). Accuracy 
during congruent fear trials was similar to neutral fear trials (F[1,72]=2.73 p=0.103, 
η2=0.037). This comparison was not significantly related to anxiety (F[1,72]=0.015 
p=0.903, η2<0.001). Neutral fear trials were responded to more accurately than 
neutral incongruent trials (F[1,72]=32.08 p<0.001, η2=0.308). However, this 
comparison was not significantly related to anxiety (F[1,72]=2.92 p=0.092, η2=0.39).  
Congruent happy trials were responded to more accurately than incongruent happy 
trials (F[1,72]=17.23 p<0.001, η2=0.193). This comparison was not significantly 
related to anxiety (F[1,72]=2.50 p=0.118, η2=0.034). Congruent happy trials were 
responded to more accurately that neutral happy trials (F[1,72]=6.24 p=0.015, 
η2=0.80) at a trend level. This effect was unrelated to anxiety (F[1,72]=1.11 
p=0.296, η2=0.015). Neutral happy trials were also responded to more accurately 
than incongruent happy trials (F[1,72]=8.51 p=0.005, η2=0.106), but this effect was 
unrelated to anxiety (F[1,72]=1.114 p=0.295, η2=0.015). 
 
3.4.5. Further accuracy analysis: Congruency sequence effects 
 
In order to analyse the CSEs and proportion correct, the data were subjected to a 2 
(current trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 (previous trial type; 
(in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) repeated-measures 
ANCOVA with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. Only trials where current 
trial and previous trial were correct are included here (i.e., excluding trials with RTs 
< 250 msecs and RTs > 1000 msecs). The critical findings in this analysis were that 
the main effect of  (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation was 
highly significant  (F[1,72]=31.97, p<0.001, η2=0.31), as repetition trials (mean 
proportion correct 0.97; 95% CI 0.97-0.98; SE 0.004) were responded to more 
accurately than alternation trials (mean proportion correct 0.95; 95% CI 0.94-0.96; 
SE 0.004), but this effect did not interact with anxiety (F[1,72]=2.21, p=0.141, 
η2=0.03). Thus, anxiety was not significantly correlated with the difference in 
accuracy between these trials. The correlation value was r= -0.17. There was a 
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significant trial type versus (in)congruency repetition/(in)congruency alternation 
interaction (F[1,72]=9.51, p=0.003, η2=0.12), as the congruency repetition advantage 
in accuracy was larger for incongruent trials than congruent trials. However, there 
were no other significant effects/interactions (all Fs < 2.4, all Ps > 0.1).  
 
3.4.6. Attentional control 
We also ran further planned analyses concerning how trait anxiety relates to 
attentional shifting and attentional focusing, and how these attentional traits relate to 
any RT effects that relate to trait anxiety. The overall attentional control score 
negatively correlated with trait anxiety (r= -0.35, p=0.002). Attentional shifting and 
attentional focusing were positively correlated (r= 0.54, p<0.001). When controlling 
for attentional shifting, trait anxiety was not significantly correlated with attentional 
focusing (r= -0.131, p=0.267). The zero-order correlation value was r= -0.29, 
p=0.012. When controlling for attentional focusing, trait anxiety was not 
significantly correlated with attentional shifting (r= -0.23, p=0.045) using an 
adjusted (0.05/2) significance level. However, the zero-order correlation value was 
r= -0.344, p=0.003. This suggests that it is the shared variance of attentional 
focusing and shifting that drive the bulk of the attentional control correlation with 
trait anxiety.  
We therefore determined whether the overall scores on the attentional control scale 
showed any sign of a relationship with the key effects that related to trait anxiety. 
Conversely to trait anxiety, overall attentional control was unrelated to the overall 
RTs (r= 0.162, p=0.17) and also proportion correct (r= 0.116, p=0.329). We 
confirmed that the key trait anxiety correlations remained stable after controlling for 
overall scores on the attentional control questionnaire. When controlling for 
variations in overall attentional control, trait anxiety still significantly correlated with 
overall RTs (r= -0.312, p=0.008), overall proportion correct (r(69)= -0.282, 
p=0.017), and proportion correct for incongruent fear trials (r= -0.353, p=0.003). 
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3.4.7. Speed-accuracy trade-off 
A reliable speed accuracy trade-off was present, as overall RTs correlated positively 
with overall proportion correct (r= 0.39, p=0.001). As trait anxiety was significantly 
correlated with both an overall decrease in RTs, and an overall decrease in accuracy, 
we considered that this was likely to reflect an anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-
off. To verify this we correlated trait anxiety with the overall proportion correct 
across the experiment whilst controlling for overall RTs. When partialling out the 
effects of RTs, trait anxiety was no longer significantly correlated with proportion 
correct (r= -0.15, p=0.20). Moreover, the correlation between trait anxiety and RTs 
was no longer reliable when controlling for accuracy (r= -0.22, p=0.06). We suggest 
that these partial correlations indicate a speed-accuracy trade-off that is partly 
mediated by anxiety.  
 
3.4.8. Post-error behaviour 
We also ran a planned analysis of post error behaviour. It is noteworthy here that the 
traditional method of calculating the post-error slowing index has recently been 
shown to contain subtle confounds that could render the index inaccurate (Dutilh et 
al., 2012). Dutilh et al. showed that fluctuations in performance across the duration 
of RT tasks can lead to the illusion of spurious post-error slowing effects (or the lack 
of them), when using the traditional measure (post-error RT minus post-correct RT). 
They showed that using their robust measure (post-error RT minus pre-error RT) 
alleviates this confound. 
We used the robust post-error slowing index proposed by Dutilh et al. (2012; post-
error RTs minus pre-error RTs). This index is the difference between mean RTs for 
trials immediately after an error, and mean RTs for trials immediately before an 
error. We examined these effects for correct responses only, but without imposing 
any minimum or maximum RT constraints. A one-way ANCOVA (averaged pre-
error RTs versus averaged post-error RTs) with standardised trait anxiety as the 
covariate was highly significant (F[1,67]=101.4 p<0.001, η2=0.602). Thus, averaged 
post-error trials were responded to significantly slower (mean RT 730 msecs; 95% 
CI 723-734; SE 2) than averaged pre-error trials (mean RT 500 msecs; 95% CI 498-
502; SE 1). Trait anxiety did not significantly interact with this effect (F[1,67]=0.3 
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p=0.58, η2=0.005). This interaction shows that trait anxiety was not correlated with 
the robust post-error slowing index (the correlation value was -0.07). Out of 
theoretical interest, and for comparison with other published work we also computed 
the traditional post-error slowing index (averaged correct RT following error – 
averaged correct RT following correct response), in order to confirm that trait 
anxiety was not correlated with this effect either (the correlation value was also -
0.07).  
When controlling for attentional focusing, robust post-error slowing was not 
correlated with attentional shifting (r= -0.154, p=0.211). The zero-order correlation 
value was r= 0.004, p=0.973. However, when controlling for attentional shifting, 
robust post-error slowing was positively correlated with attentional focusing (r= 
0.276, p=0.023). The zero-order correlation value was r= 0.233, p=0.055. We also 
confirmed that the overall attentional control questionnaire scores would not have 
correlated with post-error slowing, had we chosen to use the total instead (r= 0.147, 
p=0.228).  
We were also interested in the differences in the proportion correct for trials that 
followed correct responses relative to trials that followed incorrect responses. We 
also wished to determine if trait anxiety was related to any differences between these 
proportions correct. A one-way ANCOVA (averaged proportion correct following 
correct responses versus averaged proportion correct following incorrect responses) 
with standardised trait anxiety as the covariate was not significant (F[1,68]=3.4 
p=0.071, η2=0.047). Post-error proportion correct was 0.97, whereas post correct 
response proportion correct was 0.96. Trait anxiety did not interact with this null 
effect (F[1,68]=0.001 p=0.98, η2<0.001). Therefore there were no anxiety 
modulation of differences in response accuracy based on whether the previous trials 
response was an error or not.  
 
3.5. Discussion 
 
We used a word-face emotional Stroop task which produced a robust RT congruency 
effect and RT facilitation effect, but no RT interference effect. Our accuracy analysis 
showed a robust congruency effect, robust interference effect, but no facilitation 
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effect. Our RT data lends some support to the contingency learning theory proposed 
by Schmidt et al. (2007) and Schmidt and Besner (2008), which predicts that the RT 
Stroop effect (congruency effect) in contingency biased designs (i.e., those including 
predominantly congruent trials) will be driven mainly by facilitation not interference. 
Our accuracy data only partially supports the contingency learning account, as 
although the expected interference effects were found, the expected facilitation 
effects were not found. In other words, we found reduced accuracy for incongruent 
trials relative to neutral trials, but no increase in accuracy for congruent trials relative 
to neutral trials.  However, Schmidt and Besner used equiprobable contingency trials 
(50% Incongruent and 50% congruent) to compare to high and low contingency 
trials (and thus separate facilitation and interference effects differently). In contrast, 
we used neutral word trials (in the same proportion as incongruent trials) that were 
not predictive or emotionally conflicting.   
In the present study, the effect of trait anxiety predicted overall for incongruent 
trials, was not found for RTs, but was marginally present for accuracy. The critical 
finding here was that trait anxiety did not modulate the overall Stroop effect (i.e., the 
RT difference between congruent and incongruent trials). Moreover, trait anxiety did 
not modulate the overall RT facilitation effect, or the overall RT interference effect. 
Trait anxiety was related to the overall Stroop effect present in the accuracy data, but 
at a weak trend level. As trait anxiety increased so did the Stroop effect.  However, 
neither the overall facilitation effect in accuracy nor the overall interference effect in 
accuracy were significantly related to anxiety. Thus, our initial analyses suggested 
that trait anxiety was not reliably related to increased cognitive 
interference/distraction, which is somewhat inconsistent with ACT (Eysenck et al., 
2007). Moreover, we found no evidence of an anxiety-related attentional bias 
towards threat-related stimuli, which is inconsistent with several theoretical 
perspectives on anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Ohman, 1996; Williams et al., 1988). In 
contrast to the above, the present study found that trait anxiety was related to faster 
RTs across the whole paradigm, which was related to an overall reduction in 
accuracy (i.e., a speed accuracy trade-off). However, further analyses suggested that 
there was actually a more specific effect of anxiety upon cognitive 
interference/distraction and emotion processing. Anxiety was related to reduced 
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accuracy for fearful trials, which seemed primarily due to the incongruent fearful 
trials (a fearful target face overlaid with the word happy). We now offer a novel 
explanation of the effects of anxiety upon the speed accuracy trade-off, and the 
resulting decrement in accuracy for incongruent fearful trials.  
The finding of an anxiety-related speed-accuracy trade-off is in alignment with the 
results reported by Basten, Stelzel & Fiebach (2011). They found that high anxiety 
was related to a trend towards an overall speeding in RTs, and increased errors in a 
neutral Stroop task. It is possible that both the present study, and the study carried 
out by Basten et al., may have tapped into an anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-
off mechanism. The speed-accuracy trade-off is considered to be a strategic 
adjustment in decision processes that enables an organism to adapt to changes in 
environmental demands (Heitz & Schall, 2012). This behaviour has been reported in 
humans (Wickelgren, 1977; Bogacz et al., 2010), but also in animals such as rats 
(Kaneko, Tamura, Kawashima, & Suzuki, 2006), ants (Stroeymeyt, Giurfa, & 
Franks, 2010) and bees (Chittka, Dyer, Bock, & Dornhaus, 2003). It is easy to see 
how this adaptive behaviour could be accommodated within any theory that 
conceptualises anxiety in humans as an adaptive trait. For example, anxiety is 
considered to be adaptive, as it increases fitness during potentially threatening 
situations (Marks & Nesse, 1994). The question remains open as to what triggered 
the speed-accuracy trade-off, in high anxious participants in the present study.  
Van Veen, Krug and Carter (2008) proposed that when a stimulus is perceived, 
evidence is processed that relates to each possible response. They suggest that neural 
activity relevant to making a possible response will start from baseline and gradually 
increase until a response threshold is reached. Schmidt and Besner (2008) suggest 
that in Stroop tasks participants make speeded responses to high contingency trials 
based upon response predictions. They suggest that participants lower a response 
threshold for expected responses, but not for any alternative possible responses. 
They also suggest that increased interference during low contingency trials will 
produce more errors, as the response threshold was reduced for the word because it 
was previously predictive. 
In the present study anxiety did not modulate any RT facilitation effects for 
congruent trials. Thus we suggest that the contingency learning effect was of the 
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same magnitude at all levels of anxiety. However, we suggest that contingency 
learning may still have been the trigger for the speed-accuracy trade-off, and its 
increase in high anxious participants. The anxiety-related speed-accuracy trade-off 
was much stronger in the present study than the trend in the study by Basten et al. 
(2011). In their study their results may have reflected an underlying response 
tendency that was not yet fully triggered. Indeed, in their study no contingency 
learning would have been present as congruent and incongruent trials were equal in 
proportions.  
It is also noteworthy here to compare with the findings for experiment 1 (chapter 2), 
an emotional face flanker study using the same proportions of trial types. In 
experiment 1, we did not find an anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-off.  We 
suggest that effects of contingency learning of the association between target face 
and flanker faces in experiment 1 would either not be present, or be only weakly 
present, as the target and flanker stimuli received very different amounts of attention. 
In contrast, in the word-face Stroop task the target stimuli are visual and are overlaid 
with very salient verbal distractor stimuli, so that the distractors in the Stroop task 
receive much more attention.   
It is plausible that the speed-accuracy trade-off in high anxiety can be accommodated 
within the emotional survival circuit framework proposed by LeDoux (2012). It 
seems possible that contingency learning of the relationship between distractor word 
and target and response could have triggered an emotional survival circuit function 
that facilitated the speed-accuracy trade-off. During most responses this strategy 
would have been advantageous. However, this trade-off obviously caused some 
detrimental effects. The main detrimental effects of the anxiety-related speed-
accuracy trade-off seemed to be an anxiety-related reduction in accuracy during 
incongruent trials requiring responses to target fearful faces, overlaid with the 
distractor word happy. These results are in contrast to the predictions of ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007), which predicts that distraction in high anxious participants 
will be magnified by threat-related distractor stimuli, and in contrast to the finding 
that anxiety is related to a threat-related attentional bias (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
However, the meta- analysis carried out by Bar-Haim and colleagues only included 
studies that compared threat-related stimuli to neutral stimuli, but the present study 
included combinations of fearful and happy stimuli. The question is why in the 
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present study was it harder for high anxious participants to suppress responses to 
happy words than fear words during incongruent trials? 
Pool, Brosch, Delplanque and Sander (2016) conducted a large meta-analysis 
concerning attentional biases towards positively valenced stimuli relative to neutral 
stimuli. Pool et al. reported that the magnitude of the attentional bias is increased 
when measured at the initial orienting stage as opposed to the later disengagement 
stage. Their findings contradict the notion that attention is exclusively biased 
towards any stimuli that are threat-related (e.g., Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Ohman 
and Mineka suggested that this perceptual threat bias would be predicated upon 
organisms being biologically prepared. However, Pool et al. have shown that 
attention towards positive stimuli is also rapid and involuntary. Moreover, some 
theorists suggest that those high in anxiety have difficulty disengaging their attention 
from threat (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
Phaf and Kan (2007) suggested that, in word versions of the emotional Stroop, task 
anxiety may relate more to a difficulty in disengaging from fear stimuli than to an 
automatic engagement with the fear stimuli. 
We offer an explanation of the anxiety modulations of accuracy in the present study, 
based upon the following two suggestions. The magnitude of the attentional bias to 
positive stimuli may be increased at the initial orienting stage as opposed to the later 
disengagement stage (Pool et al., 2016), whereas anxiety may relate to the difficulty 
in disengaging attention from threat (Fox et al., 2001; Phaf & Kan, 2007;  Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001).  
According to these two perspectives, in the present study all participants’ attention to 
the target happy faces and happy distractor words would have been affected at an 
early orienting stage of information processing.  However, a delayed attentional 
disengagement from target fearful faces and fearful distractor words, by high anxious 
participants, would occur at a slightly later stage of information processing. In the 
present study the initial orienting to happy words, their learned contingencies, and 
the anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-off could have made it particularly hard for 
those high in anxiety, to inhibit responding to the happy words. This may explain the 
anxiety related decrement in accuracy for incongruent fearful trials. In short, the 
target fearful faces may not have had the chance to affect attention (and thus the 
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responses) of those high in anxiety, if the responses to happy words were prepared 
exceptionally quickly.  
In the present study anxiety did not relate to reduced accuracy during incongruent 
trials consisting of target happy faces overlaid with fearful words. We suggest that 
the fearful words should have affected the attention of high anxious participants at 
the later disengagement stage. However, in all participants the happy target faces 
would have affected attention at the initial orienting stage. Thus, even though 
responses to the fearful words would have been contingency learned, it may have 
been slightly easier for high anxious participants to respond to the target happy face 
by inhibiting responding to the fearful word (during incongruent happy trials), than it 
would be for them to respond to the target fearful face by inhibiting responding to 
the happy word (during incongruent fear trials).  In short, we suggest that the 
different effects of the two types of incongruent trials, upon those high in anxiety, 
was due to differences in when and how their attention was affected by the 
differentially valenced emotional stimuli. However, we suggest that this account 
should be treated with some caution as when adjusting the significance levels for 
multiple testing the effects involved were marginal ones at best. 
It is noteworthy here that we have previously found in experiment 1 that when 
participants are required to discriminate between happy and fearful faces, anxiety 
was related to a reduced happy face recognition advantage relative to fearful faces. 
However, in this previous study there were no words printed over the faces that 
would compete strongly for attentional resources. Moreover, Krug and Carter (2010) 
showed that high anxious participants were slower (whereas low anxious participants 
were faster) to respond to incongruent trials with neutral faces overlaid with the 
word “fear” than fearful faces overlaid with the word “neutral”. We suggest that the 
accuracy effects in the present study produced results inconsistent with the RT 
results of Krug and Carter, because the neutral stimuli were replaced with happy 
stimuli in our study.  
An alternative explanation of the anxiety-related distracting effects of the positive 
words (during incongruent fear trials) may well be possible. Kuchinke et al. (2005) 
found that that positive words facilitated enhanced anterior cingulate cortex and 
hippocampal activity relative to negative words. Ashby, Isen and Turken (1999) 
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suggested that positive verbal stimuli initiate a processing advantage as they are 
better elaborated upon and interconnected within the cognitive-emotional system 
than negative verbal stimuli. However, it should be noted that this alternative 
explanation does seem to be much less clear than the previous explanation that was 
based upon the differential effects of positive and negative stimuli upon information 
processing and attention.  
It should also be noted that trait anxiety may not be the only individual difference 
variable that is implicated in situations requiring the cognitive control of conflict or 
distraction, or even the processing of an error. When proposing ACT Eysenck et al. 
(2007) drew attention to the fact that individual differences in self-reported 
attentional control negatively correlate with trait anxiety (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 
2002). We are unaware of any studies that have been carried out investigating 
whether attentional control modulates how trait anxiety affects Stroop performance.  
Moreover, we are unaware of any studies investigating whether the attentional 
focusing and attentional shifting subscales used by Olafsson et al. (2011), 
differentially modulate goal conflict.  
Overall, attentional control scores in the present experiment were negatively 
correlated with trait anxiety scores. This correlation is consistent with the studies 
carried out by Derryberry & Reed (2002), Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2009), and Walsh 
et al. (2009). We also investigated the construct validity of the two subscales used by 
Olafsson et al. (2011).  The attentional shifting and attentional focusing sub-scales 
were positively correlated at a moderate level (0.5), but were less strongly correlated 
than in the study by Olafsson et al. (0.7). This suggests that they measure two at least 
partially separate constructs. However, when controlling for attentional shifting, trait 
anxiety was not significantly correlated with attentional focusing. When controlling 
for attentional focusing, trait anxiety was not significantly correlated with attentional 
shifting. This analysis suggested that it is the shared variance of attentional focusing 
and attentional shifting that drives the bulk of the attentional control correlation with 
trait anxiety. We therefore determined whether the overall scores on the attentional 
control scale showed any sign of a relationship with the key effects that related to 
trait anxiety. Conversely to trait anxiety, overall attentional control was not related to 
the overall RTs or proportion correct. When controlling for variations in overall 
attentional control, trait anxiety still significantly correlated with overall RTs, overall 
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proportion correct, and the strength of the relationship between anxiety and 
proportion correct for incongruent fear trials was unchagned. So, whatever the 
relationships between behaviour and anxiety in the current study signify, they are not 
related to variance captured by scores on the attentional control scale.  
We were also interested in how trait anxiety affects cognitive performance following 
the commission of an error. Individuals’ responses are reportedly slower following 
the commission of an error (Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977), which was true in the present 
study. However, in the present study anxiety was not related to the robust measure of 
post-error slowing (the measure advocated by Dutilh et al., 2012). This finding is 
consistent with the null results reported in previous studies (e.g., Hajcak McDonald, 
& Simons, 2003a; Van der Borght et al., 2016; Weinberg, Olvet, & Hajcak, 2010). 
When controlling for attentional focusing, post-error slowing was uncorrelated with 
attentional shifting. When controlling for attentional shifting, post-error slowing was 
positively correlated with attentional focusing. In short, attentional focusing and 
attentional shifting have different predictive validity. Attentional focusing predicted 
post error slowing whereas attentional shifting did not. We suggest that the 
attentional control questionnaire should be used as two subscales. Our main interest 
concerned how trait anxiety and self-reported attentional control affected the slowing 
down of responses after error commission. However, we did verify that there were 
no differences in accuracy relative to whether the previous response was an error or 
not, and verified that trait anxiety did not modulate this null effect in any way.  
Behavioural adjustments following errors were not the only sequential effect we 
were interested in. We analysed the CSEs in both the RT data and in the proportion 
correct data. The critical finding in the RT data was that, as predicted, 
(in)congruency repetition trials were responded to faster than (in)congruency 
alternation trials. The effects were of a similar magnitude to those found in our 
flanker study (experiment 1).  However, in the present Stroop study the CSE was not 
modulated by trait anxiety in contrast to our earlier finding for the flanker task. Trait 
anxiety was not significantly correlated with the CSE during congruent trials, or 
incongruent trials.  The CSE analysis of the proportion correct data showed that 
repetition trials were responded to more accurately than alternation trials, but again 
this effect was not modulated by anxiety. The anxiety-related CSE effects in the 
studies by Etkin et al. (2010) and Etkin and Schatzberg (2011) were not replicated in 
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the present study. Critically, the anxiety-related CSE effects in experiment 1 were 
also not replicated in the present study (experiment 2), even though the structure of 
the task was the same except for the stimulus changes (flanker to Stroop). Moreover, 
in experiment 2 the relationship between anxiety and the CSE was near-significantly 
different for congruent compared to incongruent trials. This is further evidence that 
CSE here behaves differently from on the flanker task (where there was no hint of an 
effect of trial type congruency on the relationship between anxiety and the CSE). It 
seems likely that emotional Stroop conflict tasks and emotional flanker conflict tasks 
may tap into slightly different brain functions and thus elicit information processing 
that differs with respect to its involvement of trait anxiety. It also seems likely that 
trait anxiety in sub-clinical participants may affect Stroop task performance 
differently from the way trait anxiety affects behaviour in clinical patients (as used in 
the studies by Etkin and colleagues).  
Tillman and Wiens (2011) compared participants’ congruency effects from both a 
neutral Stroop task and a neutral flanker task. When the tasks contained 20% 
incongruent trials relative to 80% congruent trials, participants RT congruency 
effects were correlated between the two tasks (but only at an r=0.4 magnitude). 
However, the proportion correct for these two tasks was uncorrelated. In addition, 
when the tasks contained 80% incongruent trials relative to 20% congruent trials 
there was no RT congruency effect correlation between tasks. Tillman and Wiens 
suggest that the behavioural indices of these tasks reflect similar cognitive control 
processes such as goal conflict detection and goal conflict resolution. However, we 
suggest that the correlations between the tasks were not really that strong for the 
RTs, and non-existent for the accuracy levels. Under the best conditions the tasks 
correlated at only 0.4, thus just 16% of the variance was shared. It is not really 
possible to argue that this shows that they reflect similar processes. Rather it shows 
that they share relatively few processes. The Stroop and flanker tasks may in fact 
produce some considerable differences in behaviour.  
To summarise, there is inconsistency between the anxiety effects in our emotional 
flanker task and our emotional Stroop task. There is also inconsistency between 
anxiety effects in our emotional Stroop task and those of Etkin et al. (2010) and also 
Etkin & Schatzberg (2011).  There is inconsistency between the anxiety effects in the 
Stroop study by Etkin and colleagues and the anxiety effects in the flanker study by 
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Larson, Clawson, Clayson and Baldwin (2013). We have suggested that the 
differences between the anxiety effects in the present study, and in the studies by 
Etkin and colleagues, may be due to differences in how levels of trait anxiety in 
clinical and sub-clinical participants may differentially modulate cognition. 
However, both the Stroop studies of Etkin and colleagues and the flanker study of 
Larson et al. were carried out with clinical patients with GAD (and normal controls). 
Moreover, the anxiety effects upon the CSE in our flanker study were in the same 
direction to those reported by Larson et al. with clinical patients included in the 
sample. Therefore we suggest that the two tasks may involve differences in the 
cognitive control processes elicited.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, we used a contingency biased emotional word-face Stroop task that 
resulted in an anxiety-related speed-accuracy trade-off. This resulted in an anxiety-
related reduction in accuracy which was numerically largest for incongruent trials 
(particularly those with positive distracting words). Future studies should seek to 
ascertain if the anxiety related speed-accuracy trade-off is replicable, and further 
explain how this mechanism is triggered. Moreover, we suggest that the present 
study should be replicated using EEG with a view to determining if any relationship 
exists between the ERN (as described in chapter 2) and the anxiety related speed-
accuracy trade-off. It would also be useful to explore whether and how the ERN 
relates to the interaction between post-error slowing and self-reported attentional 
focusing scores. The differential effects of anxiety upon the CSE in this experiment 
compared to experiment 1 show that the Stroop and flanker tasks are not 
interchangeable when researching cognitive goal conflict and anxiety. We suggest 
that a further CSE study using equal proportions of congruent and incongruent trials 
should be conducted using our emotional flanker task. Equal proportions of 
congruent and incongruent trials would enable a more detailed analysis that includes 
dividing the sequential trial types by emotional target type (e.g., happy cI trial versus 
fear cI trial). Thus, we would be able to determine how emotion type effects the 
CSE, in addition to delineating trials where target and response repeat, relative to 
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trials where target and response do not repeat. This may be important when assessing 
anxiety effects. As discussed briefly in chapter 2, Nieuwenhuis et al. (2006) and 
Mayr, Awh, and Laurey (2003) reported that the CSE occurred only when target and 
response repeated, but Clayson and Larson (2012, 2011a, & 2011b) found robust 
CSEs without target and response repetitions. In short, anxiety may relate 
differentially to these two stimulus and response situations.   
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Chapter 4 
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4. Experiment 3 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Experiment 1 showed that mean RTs for happy faces were faster than for fearful 
faces. However, those high in trait anxiety displayed a negative relationship with this 
effect. Those high in anxiety showed a reduced happy face recognition advantage 
that was driven by faster responses to fearful faces (although this effect of the fearful 
faces was initially supressed by general sources of RT variance). Experiment 1 also 
showed that RTs to angry and fearful faces were similar, and were not affected by 
trait anxiety. The finding that trait anxiety affects how fearful faces are discriminated 
from happy faces is not surprising from an RST perspective. There is considerable 
overlap between brain regions implicated in the septo-hippocampal system proposed 
to mediate the BIS and thus trait anxiety (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), and the facial 
emotion recognition system proposed by Adolphs (2002b). For example, the 
amygdala and extended hippocampal formation are critical in both of these 
neurobiological systems.  
In accordance with the original suggestions of Lissauer (1890), Adolphs (2002a) 
suggests that perception and recognition are distinct processes. Visual perception 
refers to the early sensory processing of the features of stimuli and their 
configuration. This process would aid discriminating between faces that are 
concurrently in one’s visual field. However, Adolphs suggests recognition requires 
extra information about the perceived stimulus that aids identification. Recognizing 
facial emotion would require memories of the relationship between the expression 
and instances when it has been previously experienced.  This information would 
often be complemented with information concerning how one felt when the 
expression was experienced. It is easy to see how these memories and feelings might 
be magnified by anxiety. The theoretical account of face recognition proposed by 
Bruce and Young (1986) focused upon discrete cognitive processes that facilitate 
both expression identification, and person identification. This account suggests that 
analyses of facial speech and facial expression, in addition to the identification of a 
person, are mediated by discrete processes.  However, Calder and Young (2005) 
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suggest that expression identification and person identification processes may 
interact more than was originally thought. 
Recognizing facial emotion employs multiple brain regions including the occipito-
temporal cortex, orbito-frontal cortex, right fronto-parietal cortices and amygdala 
(Adolphs, 2002b). Adophs proposes that sensory information pertaining to a face 
appearing in one’s visual field would proceed through occipito-temporal cortices. 
Adolphs suggests that after approximately 100 milliseconds, perceptual information 
aids the coarse categorisation of whether the stimulus has emotional significance or 
not. This would be based upon the structural properties of the face. Adolphs 
proposes that orbito-frontal cortices and amygdala may then contribute to emotional 
face recognition in three separate ways. Firstly, Adolphs suggests that these brain 
regions might control perceptual representations by providing feedback, thus 
directing attention to specific features and aiding expression categorization. 
Secondly, Adolphs postulates that these regions may mediate the retrieval of 
conceptual knowledge related to the facial emotion via neural projections to the 
hippocampal formation as well as other areas of the neocortex. Thirdly, the orbito-
frontal cortices and amygdala may mediate the response to the face via neural 
projections to motor regions, brainstem nuclei and hypothalamus. Adolphs proposes 
that these latter regions would mediate a person’s response to the emotional face.  
 
Evidence suggesting neutral and emotional faces are processed differently can be 
gained from studies using EEG. Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa and Matsumura 
(2000) recorded event related potentials (ERPs) obtained whilst participants 
categorised the gender of fearful, happy and neutral faces. Fearful and happy faces 
compared to neutral faces boosted the N270 ERP as shown by greater negativity 
recorded at posterior temporal electrodes. The distribution of this activity covered a 
large area of visual cortex. The authors propose that this increased activity may 
reflect amygdala re-entrant projections to visual areas that represents early emotional 
processing, that is independent of task instructions.  A review by Eimer and Holmes 
(2007) provides ERP evidence supporting the view that perceptual structural 
encoding processes, and the detection and subsequent analysis of the expressions of 
emotional faces are functionally independent processes that work in parallel.  
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The theoretical account of face recognition presented by Bruce and Young (1986) 
suggests that a structural encoding stage provides information about features and 
their global configuration. Bruce & Young suggest that the configuration of observed 
facial features results in facial expression categorisation. Facial speech (movement 
of facial components), and facial expression analyses may operate independently of 
the face recognition units. From this perspective, these different components of the 
face recognition system supply information to the rest of a person’s cognitive 
system. Bruce and Young suggest that the rest of a person’s cognitive system can 
also influence the activity of components of the face recognition system, and is also 
responsible for decision making processes. Face expression analysis is an important 
feature of this account of face recognition. From this perspective it is possible that 
high trait anxious participants demonstrate enhanced reactivity of the face expression 
analysis component of the system represented by this model. More specifically, in 
experiment 1 this enhanced reactivity seemed to occur only when processing 
intermingled happy and fearful faces, or possibly just the fearful faces in the 
between-valence condition. As already discussed, it is possible that increased 
configural processing demands present in the within-valence condition 
(discriminating angry faces versus fearful faces) reduced a trait anxiety related 
advantage in the reactivity of the expression analysis component of this system 
during the processing of fearful faces.  
 
The structural encoding and expression analysis components of Bruce and Young’s 
(1986) account of face processing are in alignment with the suggested neural stages 
of emotional face processing proposed by Adolphs (2002b). Following a structural 
encoding phase, Adolphs (2002b) suggests that the orbito-frontal cortices and 
amygdala might direct attention to specific features of a face thus aiding expression 
categorization. Adolphs also suggests that these regions possibly mediate the 
retrieval of information relating to the facial emotion via neural projections to the 
hippocampal formation and neocortex. Bruce & Young’s account of face processing 
and Adolph’s proposed neural system together provide further insights into how trait 
anxiety may relate to facial emotion identification. The orbito-frontal cortices and 
amygdala of those high in trait anxiety might retrieve certain kinds of information 
from the hippocampal formation differently and/or more efficiently than those low in 
trait anxiety. This may aid an enhanced fearful facial expression analysis in high trait 
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anxiety, which results in faster RTs to fearful faces relative to happy faces. 
Moreover, this may reflect the enhanced activity of a neural survival circuit, as 
proposed by LeDoux (2012).  
Calvo and Nummenmaa (2008) showed that the role of featural processing is highly 
important when detecting target emotional expressions in a visual search situation. 
They showed that the mouths of facial stimuli played a major role, whereas eyes 
played only a minor role in predicting participants’ visual search performance. 
Moreover, Neath-Tavares and Itier (2016) showed that the mouth region and eye 
region play a major role in the processing of fearful facial expressions. They also 
showed that the mouth region was important when processing happy facial 
expressions. Their results are also consistent with another study that suggests that the 
mouth region, may be important when processing fearful facial expressions (Blais, 
Roy, Fiset, Arguin, & Gosselin, 2012). Messinger, Mattson, Mahoor, and Cohn 
(2012) showed that both the magnitude of eye constriction, and the magnitude of 
mouth opening, were related to the intensity of both negatively valenced and 
positively valenced facial expressions of 6 month old infants.  Another study with 
adult participants showed that the display of teeth (relative to no display of teeth) 
increased both valence ratings and arousal ratings for happy faces and grimacing 
faces. In addition, this study also showed that the presence of teeth also enhanced 
ERP recorded brain responses to the mouth expressions (daSilva et al., 2016).   
It is possible that in emotional face discrimination situations that a more salient 
feature that belongs to any specific target face could enhance expression recognition. 
For example, a happy expression or fearful expression with an open mouth should be 
more emotionally salient (and/or represent a more enhanced version of the emotion) 
than a happy expression or fearful expression with a closed mouth. It is possible that 
open mouths relative to closed mouths may aid discriminating between happy and 
fearful facial expressions. One would expect happy and fearful facial expressions 
with open mouths (depicting a more enhanced version of the emotion), to be more 
arousing than the same emotional expressions with closed mouths. Variations in 
arousal levels of different emotional facial stimuli have been previously shown to 
relate to the perceived intensity of the facial expression (Lundqvist, Juth, & Ohman, 
2014). Based upon these studies it seems possible that more intense emotional facial 
expressions (with open mouths) might facilitate an information processing advantage 
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relative to those that are less intense (with closed mouths). This makes initiative 
sense from the emotional survival circuit perspective of LeDoux (2012), as the 
detection of subtle differences in facial signals of potential threat, or potential 
reward, would both be adaptive. 
Further insights into these issues can be obtained from studies using eye tracking 
methods.  Mogg, Garner, and Bradley (2007) showed using eye tracking techniques 
together with a dot-probe task, that moderate intensity or high intensity angry and 
fearful faces (which had very salient open mouths) elicited an increased tendency for 
participants to orient their gaze towards them, relative to neutral control faces. This 
effect was not elicited by mild intensity angry and fearful faces (which had mouths 
that were slightly open, but were less salient than the moderate or high intensity 
faces). Intense emotional facial expressions were also discriminated more accurately. 
High trait anxiety, relative to low trait anxiety, was related to an increased tendency 
to gaze at the most intense angry and fearful faces, and an increased dot probe 
attentional bias score in RTs caused by the high intensity threat-related faces. Mogg 
et al. showed that there were no trait anxiety related effects that related to faces with 
weaker low intensity emotional expressions. Moreover, trait anxiety levels did not 
affect participants’ face expression intensity ratings. It is noteworthy here that these 
findings are somewhat inconsistent with the theory that stimuli indicating a mild 
level of threat will be appraised as being more threat-relevant by those high in 
anxiety relative to those low in anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). However, 
inconsistencies in behavioural effects of anxiety on emotion processing may occur 
due to varying types of paradigms being used in research (i.e., the task instructions 
may vary between paradigms).   
The study by Mogg et al. (2007) showed how anxiety is affected by emotional 
expression salience, but the study was limited for two reasons. Firstly, they only 
included threat-related and neutral faces, as happy faces were not included. It is thus 
unknown whether high intensity happy faces would have facilitated any increase or 
decrease in anxiety related gazing behaviours. Secondly, they measured only trait 
anxiety, which is a closely related construct, in psychometric terms, to social anxiety 
(e.g., Mattick & Clarke, 1998). However, as discussed previously, Silvia, Allan, 
Beauchamp, Maschauer and Workman (2006) showed that those high in social 
anxiety are slower to recognise happy face expressions relative to those low in social 
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anxiety. It is possible that the effects of expression intensity may affect social 
anxiety differently than the broader construct of trait anxiety.  
Several studies, other than those discussed in detail in this thesis, reported a happy 
face recognition advantage relative to negatively-valenced faces (e.g., Leppanen & 
Hietanen, 2003; Kirita & Endo, 1995; Feyereisen, Malet, & Martin, 1996). This 
advantage has been found to be present when stimuli are schematic, and thus control 
for complexity of features (Leppanen & Hietanen, 2004; Kirita & Endo, 1995). 
Leppanen and Hietanen (2004) also found this effect and proposed that this positivity 
bias results from participants’ tendencies to form positively biased judgments about 
people. Silvia et al. (2006) suggested that positive information concerning other 
people may be less readily available or retrievable in high social anxiety, even 
though generally people are suggested to perceive others as a source of rewarding 
interaction (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002). Silvia 
et al suggested that a lack of availability of positive information about other people 
in high socially anxious individuals may slow down applying conceptual information 
to the percept of a face.  
The results in the study by Silvia et al. (2006) differ from the results of experiment 1 
in this thesis as in their study social anxiety was related to slower RTs to happy faces 
but in experiment 1 in this thesis trait anxiety was primarily related to faster RTs to 
fearful faces, rather than slower RTs to happy faces. It is possible that trait anxiety 
and social anxiety affect emotional information processing slightly differently. 
Mansell, Ehlers, Clark, and Chen (2002) used a dot-probe paradigm to investigate 
whether social anxiety is related to attention to socially evaluative words that are 
negative (e.g., pathetic, stupid) or positive (e.g., attractive, friendly). Social anxiety 
was unrelated to attention to socially evaluative words of either valence. However, 
trait anxiety was related to an attentional bias for negative words relative to positive 
words. These effects were present in both an experimentally induced socially 
evaluative condition, and a non-socially evaluative condition.  
In an earlier study Mansell, Clark, Ehlers and Chen (1999) used a similar task using 
emotional faces as opposed to words, in addition to the social evaluation versus non-
social evaluation manipulation. In this study socially anxious participants avoided 
positive and negative emotional faces in the social evaluative condition. In contrast, 
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trait anxious participants showed a bias towards negative faces in the non-social 
evaluative condition. These studies, together with the differential effects observed in 
the study by Silvia et al. (2006) and experiment 1 of this thesis, suggest that 
participants high in trait anxiety and participants high in social anxiety may process 
emotional stimuli in slightly different ways.   
Experiment 1 in this thesis measured participants’ levels of trait anxiety but did not 
measure participants’ levels of social anxiety. It is possible that the anxiety effects in 
the experiment 1 of this thesis would have differed if the trait anxiety measure was 
replaced with a social anxiety measure. Alternatively, it is possible that the anxiety 
effect upon fearful and happy face discrimination in experiment 1 of this thesis was 
driven by social anxiety accounting for some of the variance in trait anxiety, as 
previously found by Mattick and Clarke (1998). In which case, trait anxiety and 
social anxiety may have affected the results similarly. In short, it is possible that both 
trait anxiety and social anxiety may be related to increased reactivity of the 
emotional survival circuits theorised by LeDoux (2012). However, these emotional 
survival circuits may be triggered in a different way or by slightly different stimuli, 
by the two types of anxiety. 
It is also not clear if the anxiety effect upon between-valence face discrimination 
found in experiment 1 is specific to fearful faces versus happy faces, or if this 
anxiety effect would occur for angry faces versus happy faces. A discrimination task 
including angry and happy faces would clarify if the effects during the happy/fear 
discrimination task is emotion specific or related to a more general between-valence 
effect. Moreover, it may be that the effects of trait anxiety and/or social anxiety are 
completely different concerning the presence of fearful faces or angry faces.  
 
4.2. Purpose of experiment 3 
 
This next experiment uses two emotional face discrimination tasks with just single 
faces (this time with no flankers present). The issues discussed above are accounted 
for by including a happy versus fear task and a happy versus anger task. To 
counteract any possible effects of participants adopting an increased featural 
processing strategy specific to any specific component of a single person’s identity, 
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six distinct people pose the stimuli for each emotional expression. Moreover, facial 
expressions with open and closed mouths were included to ascertain any effect of 
mouth salience upon emotional expression recognition and/or the effect of anxiety 
upon this.  
This time a specific social anxiety measure was administered as well as the trait 
anxiety measure. Silvia et al. (2006) measured social anxiety using the Social Phobia 
Scale (SPS) and Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
Based upon the method used in previous research by Kashdan (2002) and Kashdan 
and Roberts (2004), Silvia et al. calculated social anxiety scores by standardising and 
then averaging together the scores of the SPS and SIAS. We adopt this method of 
measuring social anxiety as one of two primary anxiety measures in the present 
study. We also use the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983) as the other primary measure. 
However, we also note some controversy concerning the construct validity of the 
STAI.  
Bieling, Antony and Swinson (1998) suggested that, although the STAI is a popular 
and widely used measure of trait anxiety, it may measure more than one underlying 
factor. Bieling et al. suggested that the scale does not measure ‘pure’ anxiety, but in 
also includes items that measure depression and also a general form of negative 
affect. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses supported the notion of a 
hierarchical model with an umbrella factor of negative affect, and two lower order 
more specific affective factors. Bieling et al. suggest that one of these factors 
contains items relating to worry, rumination and disturbing thoughts, and reflects the 
construct of anxiety. The other factor, they suggest, contains items that relate to 
negative self-appraisal and dysphoric mood, and thus measure depression. Bieling et 
al. confirmed the convergent and discriminant validity of the resulting subscales by 
conducting correlational analyses with other measures of anxiety and depression. As 
predicted, the two scales correlated with the other measures in a way that was 
consistent with the items they contain. The construct validities of the STAI and the 
subscales proposed by Bieling et al. were further investigated by Bados, Gomez-
Benito and Balaguer (2010). Bados et al. suggested that the discriminant validity of 
the anxiety subscale of the STAI may be questionable, as the correlation between the 
anxiety subscale and other measures of anxiety was of a similar magnitude to the 
correlation between the anxiety subscale and other measures of depression. The 
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anxiety subscale also had lower convergent validity than the depression subscale 
which was also the case in the study by Bieling et al.  
As discussed previously, Judah, Grant, Mills and Lechner (2013) reported that scores 
on the attentional focusing subscale of the attentional control scale (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002) were much more reliably negatively correlated with the STAI measured 
anxiety subscale than the STAI measured depression subscale, whereas scores on the 
attentional shifting subscale of the attentional control scale was much more reliably 
negatively correlated with STAI measured depression than STAI measured anxiety. 
Moreover, Judah et al. reported that depression measured by the BDI-II (Beck, Steer 
& Brown, 1996) correlated positively and at identical magnitudes with both the 
supposed anxiety and depression subscales of the STAI. However, Reinholdt-Dunne, 
Mogg and Bradley (2013) also reported that lower attentional focusing scores 
predicted increased STAI measured anxiety, whereas lower attentional shifting 
scores predicted increased STAI measured depression. These studies do lend support 
to the notion that the discrete STAI subscales proposed by Bieling et al. (1998) have 
some discriminant validity, concerning other individual difference measures, but 
their discriminant validity concerning other affective trait measures is somewhat 
uncertain. In the present study we also aimed to carry out exploratory analyses using 
behavioural measures of emotional expression recognition, and self-reported 
attentional focusing and shifting measures, to investigate the discriminant validity of 
the proposed STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression subscales.  
We predicted that both trait anxiety and social anxiety would relate to a reduced 
happy face recognition advantage relative to fearful faces. Based upon experiment 1 
we predicted that trait anxiety would relate to faster RTs for fearful faces (but this 
may be suppressed by general RT effects, until we adopt statistical procedures to de-
suppress them). Based upon the paper by Silvia et al. (2006) we predicted that social 
anxiety will relate to slower RTs for happy faces. As discussed, the anger versus 
happy contrast condition is included to determine if angry faces elicit the same 
anxiety effects as the fearful faces, and if any social anxiety effects for happy faces 
can be observed across two different types of emotion discrimination. The open 
versus closed mouth contrast will determine how enhanced feature saliency affects 
the overall happy face recognition advantage and any observed anxiety effects.  
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4.3. Method 
 
4.3.1. Participants 
 
Participants with no reported history of neurological disorder (N = 90, 64 female) 
were recruited from Goldsmiths, University of London, and had a mean age of 24.6 
(SD = 6). 76 of these participants were right handed. 22 participants were 
psychology 1st year undergraduates recruited via a research participation scheme 
who took part in return for course credit. The rest were paid £10 and recruited via 
advertisements placed around the campus, and were therefore students and staff from 
other departments. All gave informed written consent in accordance with standard 
ethical guidelines. 8 participants were excluded from the analyses due to data saving 
problems. This study was approved by the Goldsmiths psychology departments’ 
ethics committee (approval received 24/10/2012).  
Based upon the 0.48 correlation between social anxiety and fearful face detection 
sensitivity reported in the study by Doty et al. (2013), 31 participants should allow 
80% power for a two-tailed test at p=0.05, for a correlations of 0.48 in this 
experiment. However, based upon the 0.32 correlation between trait anxiety and the 
RT difference between responses to happy and fearful faces in experiment 1 of this 
thesis, 74 participants should allow 80% power for a two-tailed test at p=0.05, for a 
correlation of 0.32 in this experiment. We thus aimed for 75 participants 
approximately (in the end we tested a few more participants than this). 
 
4.3.2. Psychometric measures 
 
Social anxiety was assessed using the Social Phobia Scale (SPS) and the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) developed by Mattick and Clarke (1998). Based 
upon previous research (Silvia et al., 2006; Kashdan, 2002; Kashdan & Roberts, 
2004) we standardised and averaged the total scores of the SPS and total scores of 
the SIAS to obtain a unitary social anxiety score. Trait anxiety was initially assessed 
with the trait anxiety scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et 
al., 1983). However, we refer to this as the STAI-trait scale hereafter, as we also use 
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the previously proposed anxiety and depression subscales of the STAI, as described 
by Bieling, Antony and Swinson (1998). The STAI-anxiety subscale consists of 
STAI-trait items 22, 28, 29, 31, 37, 38, & 40. The STAI-depression subscale consists 
of STAI-trait items 21, 23-27, 30, 32-36, & 39. Attentional control was assessed 
with the Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001, 2002). We also used 
the attentional control scale subscales as used by Olafsson et al. (2011). The 
attentional focusing sub-scale thus consisted of 9 items (items 1-8 and item 12). The 
attentional shifting sub-scale thus consisted of 10 items (items 10, 11, and 13-20).  
 
4.3.3. Stimuli 
 
The emotional faces used were obtained from a standardised face stimuli set 
developed for research (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 2009). The individual face 
pictures were were 60mm high and 48 mm wide (when presented using MATLAB 
version R2006a on a 15.5 inch laptop screen). The laptop was running Windows XP, 
and we used the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 for precision RT measurement. 
Three face stimulus sets containing different people’s faces in each were created for 
use in two tasks, one task consisted of happy and fearful faces and one task consisted 
of happy and angry faces. Each of the three face sets included happy, fearful and 
angry facial expressions (with versions of each expression included that had both 
open mouths and closed mouths) posed by six different models from the NimStim. 
Thus in each task (happy face and fearful face or happy face and angry face) 
photographs each of the six models were used, with both closed and open mouths 
(for both facial expressions). Thus, in each task, 24 unique stimuli were presented 
(two emotions x 2 mouth types x six people). Figure 4.1 shows an example of one of 
the sets of emotional faces used. 
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Figure 4.1: Example of one of the sets of emotional faces used. Clockwise from 
top left: fear open mouth; fear closed mouth; happy open mouth; happy closed 
mouth; anger closed mouth; anger open mouth.  
 
4.3.4. Procedure 
 
Participants were told that they would be presented with two short emotional facial 
expression recognition tasks (i.e., conditions) with a short rest in between. 
Participants were asked to sit as close to the screen as was comfortable for their eyes 
(typical viewing distance was approximately 70 cm). The task instructions were 
presented on the screen. To start each task the first screen instructed participants that 
they would have to judge the emotional expression showing on photos of faces 
(happy and fear in the one task; and happy and anger in the other task). Participants 
were then shown examples of the various faces they might see. They were told to 
rest their index fingers over the responses keys (z and /) and to respond as fast as 
possible while maintaining high accuracy levels. They were verbally told that a high 
pitched tone following a response indicates a correct response, whereas a low 
pitched tone following a response indicates an incorrect response.  
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The experimental stimuli were displayed until a response key was pressed. 
Unbeknown to the participants, at the beginning of each task, there were 24 trials 
included as practice trials; these were discarded and not analysed. The main 
experimental stimuli that followed consisted of 120 happy face trials and 120 threat-
related face trials (in each of the two tasks). The emotional facial expression 
discrimination paradigm was designed primarily to elicit RT effects as opposed to 
errors. The trial type sequence was created using a random number generator 
function in Matlab, and was the same for all participants. We kept the sequence the 
same for all participants as this is an individual differences study, and we wanted as 
few uncontrolled variables as possible to vary across participants. We also used the 
same trial type sequence for each of the tasks (with fearful faces being substituted 
with angry faces where appropriate). There were 240 non-practice trials in total in 
each task so we felt that there was no chance that using the same sequence in each 
task would cause any learning of the sequence of trial types and, as noted below, we 
counterbalanced the order of the 2 tasks across participants. Each task lasted for 
approximately ten minutes. The experiment was thus created using a 2 X 2 X 2 
combination of valence (happy face versus threat-related face) x mouth salience 
(closed mouth versus open mouth) x discrimination task (happy/fear discrimination 
versus happy/anger discrimination). We included equal proportions of male and 
female faces, with different facial identities used across the two tasks. The left/right 
finger response key mappings were also counterbalanced. Each participant was 
tested using one of the three face identity sets for each of the two tasks (i.e., a 
different face set was used per condition for each participant, and the mapping of the 
face-set  was counterbalanced using an incomplete Latin square). 
 
 
4.3.5: Data analysis  
Our RT data will be analysed using ANCOVA with factors of valence, mouth 
salience, and discrimination task, with standardised social anxiety as the covariate. 
The effect of valence will reveal whether RTs to threat-related faces differ from RTs 
to happy faces, and the covariate interaction with valence will test our key 
hypothesis that social anxiety modulates (correlates with) this valence effect.  
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The effect of mouth salience upon the effect of valence will allow us to test whether 
the RT difference between threat-related and happy faces differs significantly as a 
function of mouth salience (i.e., open vs. closed mouths). The 3-way interaction 
between the covariate, the effect of mouth salience, and the effect of valence, 
specifically tests whether social anxiety modulates (correlates with) the difference in 
the RT differences between threat-related faces and happy faces for open vs. closed 
mouth trials.  
The effect of discrimination task on the effect of valence will allow us to determine 
if the RT difference between threat-related faces and happy faces differs 
significantly when fearful faces are the threat-related emotion, relative to when angry 
faces are the threat-related emotion. The effect of the social anxiety covariate upon 
this interaction will allow us to test whether social anxiety modulates (correlates 
with) the RT difference between happy and fearful faces minus the RT difference 
between happy and angry faces. The effect of mouth salience here will allow us to 
tease apart whether these effects differ significantly between faces with open vs. 
closed mouths.  
We also planned to repeat the analyses including STAI-trait scores as the covariate. 
To follow we planned to investigate whether the STAI-subscales, discussed above, 
differentially affect any of the key RT correlations. We also planned to conduct some 
exploratory correlations using the attentional control scale. For completeness most of 
the main analyses above were then repeated with the accuracy data. 
 
4.4. Results 
 
4.4.1. Psychometric test scores 
 
In this sample, participants’ STAI-trait scores ranged from 23 to 69 (mean: 43, SD: 
9), whereas their social anxiety scores (calculated as [SIAS + SPS]/2) ranged from 2 
to 65 (mean: 19, SD: 11). Participants’ total attentional control scale scores ranged 
from 23 to 71 (mean: 49, SD: 9). Participants’ attentional focusing scale scores 
ranged from 9 to 36 (mean: 22, SD: 5), whereas their attentional shifting scale scores 
ranged from 13 to 38 (mean: 26, SD: 5). The STAI-anxiety scale scores in this 
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sample ranged from 8 to 27 (mean: 15, SD: 4), whereas the STAI-depression scale 
scores ranged from 15 to 43 (mean: 28, SD: 6).  
 
4.4.2. Reaction time analyses 
 
Including all participants the experiment contained 41280 responses in total. 39134 
of these were correct responses. Correct responses ranged from 1 msec to 8682 
msecs. RT outliers for correct responses were removed if RTs < 200 msecs and RTs 
> 1250 msecs. Of these 1675 were where RT > 1250msecs, and 4 were where RT < 
0.200 msecs. Thus, 1679 correct responses were removed. Thus, 4.29 % of correct 
trials were excluded.  
1679 / 39134 * 100 
 
The correct RT data were first subjected to a 2 (valence; happy face versus threat-
related face) x 2 (mouth salience; closed mouth versus open mouth) x 2 
(discrimination task; happy/fear discrimination versus happy/anger discrimination) 
repeated-measures ANCOVA with standardised social anxiety as the covariate. We 
also repeated the same analysis but included standardised STAI-trait scores as the 
covariate. To account for multiple testing of 2 separate covariates we adopt an 
adjusted significance level of 0.05/2 for all of the covariate interactions. The 
descriptive statistics for the RTs for each of the eight trial types are shown in Table 
4.1. Figure 4.2 shows the mean RTs for each of the 8 stimulus types. 
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Table 4.1: Mean RTs, 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs), and standard errors 
(SE) for each of the 8 stimulus types (listed by target emotion versus mouth versus 
discrimination task). All values are in msecs. 
 Happy/fear task  Happy/anger task 
        
Trial type Mean 95% CI SE Trial type Mean 95% CI SE 
        
Happy 
closed 
660 638-681 11 Happy 
closed 
658 636-679 11 
Happy  
open 
632 609-654 11 Happy  
open 
633 612-654 11 
Fear  
closed 
658 637-680 11 Anger  
closed 
656 634-678 11 
Fear  
open 
649 628-670 11 Anger  
open 
643 621-666 11 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Mean RTs, for each of the 8 stimulus types (listed by target emotion 
versus mouth versus discrimination task). All values are in msecs. 
 
4.4.3. Social anxiety RT analysis 
 
The test of between-subjects effects showed that social anxiety was not significantly 
related to RTs averaged across the whole experiment (F[1,80]=0.3, p=0.605, 
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η2=0.003). The key findings of the test of within-subjects effects were that the main 
effect of valence was significant (F[1,80]=7.5, p=0.008, η2=0.086), and this also 
significantly interacted with social anxiety (F[1,80]=6.4, p=0.013, η2=0.074). 
Therefore, there was a small but significant difference between RTs for averaged 
happy faces from both discrimination tasks (mean RT 645 msecs; 95% CI 625-666; 
SE 10), and RTs for averaged threat-related faces from both discrimination tasks 
(mean RT 652 msecs; 95% CI 631-672; SE 10). However, even though this effect 
was quite small the interaction shows that social anxiety correlated with the RT 
difference (RT threat-related faces minus RT happy faces). The correlation value 
was r= -0.27. This correlation is depicted in Figure 4.3, which shows that higher 
social anxiety was related to a reduced happy face recognition advantage. This effect 
relates to our key hypothesis suggesting that social anxiety will modulate emotion 
discrimination.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: The negative correlation between social anxiety and the happy face 
recognition advantage. The correlation value is r = -0.27, p = 0.013.  
 
The main effect of mouth salience was also significant (F[1,80]=91.9, p<0.001, 
η2=0.535), but this did not significantly interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=1.3, 
p=0.254, η2=0.016). This shows that facial expressions with open mouths were on 
average responded to significantly faster (mean RT 639 msecs; 95% CI 618-660; SE 
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10) than facial expressions with closed mouths (mean RT 658 msecs; 95% CI 637-
678; SE 10), but social anxiety was not significantly related to this RT difference 
(the correlation value was r= -0.13). Moreover, the main effect of discrimination task 
was not significant (F[1,80]=0.1, p=0.722, η2=0.002), and did not significantly 
interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.4, p=0.534, η2=0.005). This shows that there 
were no RT differences between discrimination task (mean RT for the happy/fear 
task was 650 msecs; 95% CI 629-671; SE 11; and mean RT for the happy/angry task 
was 648 msecs; 95% CI 626-669; SE 11), and no differential RT effects of social 
anxiety between the two discrimination tasks.  
The interaction between valence and mouth type was significant (F[1,80]=13.1, 
p=0.001, η2=0.141), but this interaction did not significantly further interact with 
social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.3, p=0.587, η2=0.004). Mean RTs for the happy faces and 
threat-related faces, relative to mouth type, are illustrated in Figure 4.4. This graph, 
coupled with the significant interaction, show that the RT advantage for the more 
salient open mouths, relative to closed mouths, was reduced when processing threat-
related faces relative to happy faces. This relates to our key interest in how mouth 
salience affects emotional face discrimination. We return to explore this effect 
further below.  
 
Figure 4.4: The RT interaction between the valence of the emotional faces (happy 
versus threat-related) and the salience of the mouths of the faces (open versus 
closed). 
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The interaction between valence and task was not significant (F[1,80]=0.7, p=0.412, 
η2=0.008), and did not significantly interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.2, 
p=0.653, η2=0.003). Therefore RTs for happy faces were similar in both 
discrimination tasks (the mean RT for happy faces in the happy/fear task was  646 
msecs; 95% CI 624-667; SE 11; the mean RT for happy faces in the happy/anger 
task was 645 msecs; 95% CI 624-667; SE 11), and RTs for threat-related faces in 
both discrimination tasks were similar (the mean RT for fearful faces in the 
happy/fear task was 654 msecs; 95% CI 632-675; SE 11; the mean RT for angry 
faces in the happy/anger task was 650 msecs; 95% CI 628-671; SE 11). These task 
similarities were true at all levels of social anxiety.  
The interaction between mouth type and discrimination task was also not significant 
(F[1,80]=0.006, p=0.939, η2<0.001), and did not significantly interact with social 
anxiety (F[1,80]=0.1, p=0.779, η2=0.001). The 3-way interaction between valence, 
mouth type and discrimination task was also not significant (F[1,80]=1.1, p=0.301, 
η2=0.013), and did not significantly interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]<0.001, 
p=0.983, η2<0.001).  
We now return to the aforementioned interaction between social anxiety and valence, 
and the interaction between valence and mouth type. As planned we explored the 
social anxiety by valence interaction using correlational analysis, in order to 
elucidate if any specific valence type was driving the interaction. In short, to explore 
our key hypotheses further we wished to determine whether RTs to just the happy 
faces, just the threat-related faces, or both types of faces were correlated with social 
anxiety. However, these analyses showed that social anxiety was not correlated with 
average RTs to happy faces (r= -0.03, p=0.826), nor average RTs to threat-related 
faces (r= -0.09, p=0.424).  
We further explored the interaction between valence and mouth type using four one-
way ANCOVAS, including standardised social anxiety as the covariate. Here we 
adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.025/4 (thus our accepted covariate 
significance level was p=0.006). The first one-way ANCOVA showed that happy 
faces with open mouths were responded to faster (mean RT 632 msecs; 95% CI 611-
653; SE 11) than happy faces with closed mouths (mean RT 659 msecs; 95% CI 
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638-679; SE 10). This RT advantage was highly significant (F[1,80]=100.9, 
p<0.001, η2=0.558), but did not further interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.2, 
p=0.695, η2=0.002). Thus, social anxiety was not significantly related to this RT 
difference. The correlation value was r = -0.04. The second one-way ANCOVA 
showed that threat-related faces with open mouths were responded to faster (mean 
RT 646 msecs; 96% CI 625-667; SE 11) than threat-related faces with closed mouths 
(mean RT 657 msecs; 95% CI 636-678; SE 10). This RT advantage was significant 
(F[1,80]=11.3, p=0.001, η2=0.124), and again did not further interact with social 
anxiety (F[1,80]=1.2, p=0.285, η2=0.014). Thus, social anxiety was not significantly 
related to this RT difference. The correlation value was r = -0.12. 
Next, we considered the RT differences between responses to threat-related faces 
with salient open mouths and responses to happy faces with open mouths. The third 
one-way ANCOVA showed that threat-related faces with open mouths were 
responded to slower than happy faces with salient open mouths. This RT effect was 
significant (F[1,80]=14.9, p<0.001, η2=0.157). Once again, this comparison did not 
significantly interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=1.7, p=0.193, η2=0.021). This 
interaction tests the correlation between social anxiety and the RT difference 
between responses to threat-related faces with open mouths and happy faces with 
open mouths. The correlation value was r= -0.15. Our fourth and final one-way 
ANCOVA showed that RTs for threat-related faces with closed mouths were not 
significantly different from RTs for happy faces with closed mouths (F[1,80]=0.2, 
p=0.643, η2=0.003). However, critically for our key area of interest this non-
significant comparison interacted with social anxiety at a very near significant level, 
judged against the adjusted p=0.006 significance level (F[1,80]=7.6, p=0.007, 
η2=0.087). This interaction tests the correlation between social anxiety and the RT 
difference between responses to threat-related faces with closed mouths and happy 
faces with closed mouths (threat-related face RTs minus happy face RTs). The 
correlation value was r= -0.3. The last two one-way ANCOVAS illustrate how the 
reduced happy face recognition advantage in social anxiety may be driven more by 
the closed mouth trials, than the open mouth trials. In making this comment, one 
must bear in mind that the social anxiety by valence by mouth type interaction was 
not significant, as noted above. This interaction is the formal test that the social 
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anxiety dependent RT disadvantage for happy faces (cf negative faces) is 
significantly greater for closed mouth rather than open mouth expressions. 
Exploratory correlations (with unadjusted p-values) showed that social anxiety was 
not significantly correlated with average RTs for happy faces with closed mouths (r= 
-0.03, p=0.788), or average RTs for threat-related faces with closed mouths (r= -
0.12, p=0.336).  However, the sign of the correlations is in the direction that social 
anxiety relates to faster RTs for threat-related faces with closed mouths.  
 
4.4.4. STAI-trait RT analysis 
 
As planned, we repeated the main ANCOVA including STAI-trait scores as the 
covariate, as this was also a key area of interest for us. The test of between-subjects 
effects showed that STAI-trait scores did not correlate with RTs averaged across the 
whole experiment (F[1,80]=0.6, p=0.435, η2=0.008). STAI-trait scores shared no 
significant covariate interactions with any of the within-subjects comparisons. The 
only effect worthy of reporting was a valence by discrimination task by STAI-trait 
score interaction (F[1,80]=4.5, p=0.036, η2=0.053), but this was not quite formally 
significant at our adjusted initial covariate significance level of p=0.025. All other 
covariate interactions were even weaker (all Fs <0.9, all ps > 0.3). Given the large 
number of comparisons we do not analyse the trend towards a valence by 
discrimination task by STAI-trait score interaction any further.   
 
4.4.5. Exploratory STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression RT analyses 
 
We carried out our planned exploratory correlations using the STAI-anxiety and 
STAI-depression subscales of the STAI-trait measure, as this was another key 
interest of ours. The non-significant trend towards a valence by discrimination task 
by STAI-trait score interaction provided us with a clue as to where any STAI-anxiety 
effects may lie. We therefore analysed the effect of STAI-anxiety and STAI-
depression upon each discrimination task separately. The zero-order correlation 
between STAI-anxiety and the RT difference score in the happy/fear condition was 
(r= -0.23, p=0.037), whereas the zero-order correlation between STAI-depression 
175 
 
and this RT difference score was (r= -0.12, p=0.284).  When controlling for 
depression the partial correlation between STAI-anxiety and the RT difference score 
in the happy/fear condition was weakened (r= -0.2, p=0.069). When controlling for 
STAI-anxiety the partial correlation between STAI-depression and this RT 
difference score was (r= 0.04, p=0.707). The zero-order correlation between STAI-
anxiety and the RT difference score in the happy/anger condition was (r= 0.06, 
p=0.587), whereas the zero-order correlation between STAI-depression and this RT 
difference score was (r= 0.09, p=0.405). When controlling for STAI-depression the 
partial correlation between STAI-anxiety and the RT difference score in the 
happy/anger condition was (r<0.001, p=0.999). When controlling for STAI-anxiety 
the partial correlation between STAI-depression and the RT difference score in the 
happy/anger condition was (r=0.07, p=0.531).  
 
4.4.6. Correlational RT analyses controlling for general RT 
 
As with experiment 1, we suspected that the correlations between social anxiety and 
the specific RT effects in any single condition were likely to have been suppressed 
by general sources of RT variance shared across all conditions. Thus we calculated a 
general RT factor. Exploratory factor analyses clearly revealed a strong general RT 
factor across all conditions for both discrimination tasks. To estimate the general RT 
factor we used a maximum likelihood extraction of two factors using mean RTs from 
each participant for each of the 8 stimulus types. Factor 1 was clearly the general RT 
factor (all loadings > 0.91), which accounted for 86% of the variance). Factor 2 was 
small and accounted for 6% of the variance. The pattern of the loadings appeared to 
support the view that factor 2 was a discrimination task factor. In short, stimuli from 
the happy/fear discrimination task all loaded positively on factor 2, whereas stimuli 
from the happy/anger discrimination task all loaded negatively on factor 2. We used 
the general RT factor in a series of exploratory partial correlations to determine if 
social anxiety shared any suppressed RT correlations with any specific emotional 
facial expression. These correlations have not been adjusted for multiple testing and 
should therefore be treated with caution.  
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When controlling for the general RT factor, exploratory partial correlation showed 
that social anxiety shared a negative correlation with RTs to threat-related faces 
(averaged across discrimination task; r= -0.25, p=0.025). Therefore, as a person’s 
level of social anxiety increased, their RTs to threat-related faces decreased. When 
controlling for the general RT factor, exploratory partial correlation showed that 
social anxiety shared a positive correlation with RTs to happy faces (averaged across 
discrimination task; r= 0.28, p=0.012). Therefore, as a person’s level of social 
anxiety increased, their RTs to happy faces increased. In summary, participants who 
were higher in social anxiety responded faster to threat-related faces, and responded 
slower to happy faces, relative to participants lower in social anxiety. These 
correlations directly reflect our key hypotheses concerning how social anxiety will 
affect emotional face processing.  
Further exploratory partial correlations showed that when controlling for the general 
RT effects social anxiety was correlated with RTs to threat-related faces with closed 
mouths (r= -0.3, p=0.008), but not open mouths (r= -0.07, p=0.525). Moreover, 
social anxiety was correlated with RTs to happy faces with closed mouths (r= 0.22, 
p=0.048), and similarly, although slightly less strongly, with RTs to happy faces 
with open mouths (r= 0.18, p=0.107).  
Our final exploratory partial correlations showed that when controlling for the 
general RT factor STAI-anxiety was correlated with RTs to fearful faces (r= -0.23, 
p=0.035), but not happy faces (r= -0.02, p=0.897), in the happy/fear discrimination 
task. In addition, when controlling for the general RT factor STAI-depression was 
uncorrelated with RTs to fearful faces (r= -0.12, p=0.291), and happy faces (r< 
0.001, p=0.999).  
 
4.4.7. Exploratory attentional control analyses 
 
We conducted further planned analyses concerning self-reported attentional control. 
Table 4.2 contains the correlations between the primary social anxiety and STAI-trait 
measures, the exploratory STAI-trait subscale measures, and the additional 
attentional control measures. These correlations are exploratory in nature, are 
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intended to aid further hypothesis generation; and should be treated with caution as 
the p-values have not been adjusted for multiple testing.  
Table 4.2: The correlations between social anxiety, STAI-trait, STAI-anxiety, 
STAI-depression, ACS-total, ACS-focusing and ACS-shifting. 
 1 2 3 4  5        6 7 
1: Social anxiety   0.55*** 0.50*** 0.51*** -0.20 -0.16 -0.18 
2: STAI-trait   0.87*** 0.95*** -0.40*** -0.35*** -0.34*** 
3: STAI-anxiety    0.65*** -0.31** -0.31** -0.22* 
4: STAI-depression     -0.40*** -0.32** -0.37*** 
5: ACS-total      0.87*** 0.83*** 
6: ACS-focusing       0.46*** 
7: ACS-shifting        
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).   
We carried out further planned exploratory correlations between the attentional 
control subscales and the emotional face RT difference scores. Once again these 
correlations have not been adjusted for multiple testing and should be treated with 
caution. Attentional focusing was positively correlated with the average RT 
difference between happy faces and threat-related faces (r= 0.24, p=0.030). This 
correlation was driven primarily by a positive correlation with the RT difference 
between happy and fearful faces (r= 0.28, p=0.010), but not happy and angry faces 
(r= 0.09, p=0.406). In contrast, attentional shifting was not correlated with any of 
these RT difference scores (all rs < 0.13, all ps > 0.23). As both STAI-anxiety and 
attentional focusing were correlated with the RT difference between happy and 
fearful faces, in addition to being correlated with each other, we further probed these 
associations using regression models. Table 4.3 shows that the attentional focusing 
and STAI-anxiety correlations with the RT difference between happy and fearful 
faces was due to substantial shared components of attentional focusing and trait 
anxiety (as measured by the STAI-anxiety subscale). The attentional focusing 
regressions in step 2 of our analyses show that attentional focusing was not a reliable 
predictor of the happy/fear RT difference scores, when controlling for STAI-trait 
scores (the correlation value would be r=0.21, p=0.054 as shown in Table 4.3). 
Moreover, STAI-trait scores did not predict the happy/fear RT difference scores 
when controlling for attentional focusing (the correlation value would be r= -0.14, 
p=0.192 as also shown in Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Regression analyses showing how attentional focusing and STAI-
anxiety predict the RT difference between responses to happy and fearful faces.  
 B SE B beta 
    
Dependant variable: happy/fear RT diff    
    
Step 1 (R²= 0.08**)  0.008 0.003 0.277** 
         ACS-focusing    
    
Step 2 (R²= 0.10*)    
         ACS-focusing 0.006 0.003 0.221 
         STAI-anxiety -0.004 0.003 -0.149 
    
Dependant variable: happy/fear RT diff    
    
Step 1 (R²= 0.05*)    
         STAI-anxiety -0.006 0.003 -0.231* 
    
Step 2 (R²=0.10*)    
         STAI-anxiety -0.004 0.003 -0.149 
         ACS- focusing 0.006 0.003 0.221 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01; please note that the attentional focusing regressions in step 2 of our 
regression analyses could be considered borderline significant at p=0.054).  
 
We carried out further exploratory correlations to verify whether attentional focusing 
predicted RTs for either happy faces or fearful faces in the happy/fear condition. 
When controlling for attentional shifting and general RT effects, attentional focusing 
was not significantly correlated with RTs to either the happy faces or fearful faces 
from the happy/fear discrimination condition (both rs < 0.13, ps>0.26).  
We also wished to determine whether STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression share any 
unique relationships with attentional focusing and attentional shifting, with a view to 
clarifying the discriminant validity of the STAI-subscales. Table 4.4 illustrates our 
regression analyses showing the differential relationships between both attentional 
focusing and attentional shifting and the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression 
subscales. We present this data in the same way as other recently published papers to 
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aid a direct comparison. Table 4.4 shows that attentional shifting independently (and 
negatively) predicted depression (after controlling for anxiety) and not anxiety (after 
controlling for depression). In contrast, attentional focusing did not independently 
predict depression (after controlling for anxiety), nor did it significantly 
independently predict anxiety (after controlling for depression), although it is 
noteworthy that the sign of the latter partial correlation was negative.   
 
Table 4.4: Regression analyses using the attentional focusing and attentional 
shifting subscales of the attentional control scale to predict STAI-anxiety and 
STAI-depression.  
 B SE B beta 
    
Dependant variable: STAI-anxiety    
    
Step 1 (R²= 0.42***)     
         STAI-depression 0.43 0.05 0.65*** 
    
Step 2 (R²= 0.45***)    
         STAI-depression 0.42 0.06 0.64*** 
         ACS-focusing -0.10 0.08 -0.14 
         ACS-shifting 0.06 0.07 0.08 
    
Dependant variable: STAI-depression    
    
Step 1 (R²= 0.42***)    
         STAI-anxiety 1.00 0.13 0.65*** 
    
Step 2 (R²=0.49***)    
         STAI-anxiety 0.91 0.13 0.60*** 
         ACS-focusing -0.04 0.10 -0.04 
         ACS-shifting -0.26 0.10 -0.22* 
Note: This table follows the same format as Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2013) and Judah et 
al. (2013) to facilitate a direct comparison with their regression analyses (*p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001).   
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4.4.8. Accuracy analyses 
The proportion correct data were first subjected to a 2 (valence; happy face versus 
threat-related face) x 2 (mouth salience; closed mouth versus open mouth) x 2 
(discrimination task; happy/fear discrimination versus happy/anger discrimination) 
repeated-measures ANCOVA with standardised social anxiety as the covariate. Once 
again we also repeated the same analysis but included standardised STAI-trait scores 
as the covariate. To account for multiple testing of a covariate we again adopt an 
adjusted significance level of 0.05/2 for all of the covariate interactions. The 
descriptive statistics for the proportion correct for each of the eight trial types are 
shown in Table 4.5. Figure 4.5 shows the mean proportion correct, for each of the 8 
stimulus types. 
 
Table 4.5: Mean proportion correct (Prop/c), 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs), 
and standard errors (SE) for each of the 8 stimulus types (listed by target emotion 
versus mouth versus discrimination task). 
 Happy/fear task  Happy/anger task 
        
Trial type Prop/c 95% CI SE Trial type Prop/c 95% CI SE 
        
Happy 
closed 
0.94 0.92-
0.95 
0.007 Happy 
Closed 
0.95 0.94-
0.96 
0.005 
Happy  
open 
0.96 0.95-
0.97 
0.005 Happy  
Open 
0.96 0.95-
0.97 
0.005 
Fear  
closed 
0.94 0.93-
0.95 
0.006 Anger  
Closed 
0.95 0.94-
0.96 
0.006 
Fear  
open 
0.94 0.93-
0.95 
0.006 Anger  
Open 
0.94 0.93-
0.95 
0.005 
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Figure 4.5: Mean proportion correct, for each of the 8 stimulus types (listed by 
target emotion versus mouth versus discrimination task).  
 
4.4.9. Social anxiety accuracy analysis 
The test of between-subjects effects showed that social anxiety was not significantly 
related to accuracy averaged across the whole experiment (F[1,80]=0.7, p=0.789, 
η2=0.001). The key findings of the test of within-subjects effects were that the main 
effect of valence was significant (F[1,80]=9.0, p=0.004, η2=0.101), but this did not 
significantly interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.01, p=0.912, η2<0.001). 
Therefore there was a small but significant difference between the proportion correct 
for happy faces averaged across the experiment (mean proportion correct 0.95; 95% 
CI 0.94-0.96; SE 0.004), and proportion correct for threat-related faces averaged 
across the experiment (mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% CI 0.93-0.95; SE 0.004), 
but social anxiety did not affect this difference in accuracy.  
The main effect of mouth salience was also significant (F[1,80]=4.4, p=0.038, 
η2=0.053), and this also did not significantly interact with social anxiety 
(F[1,80]=0.1, p=0.794, η2=0.001). This shows that the proportion correct for facial 
expressions with open mouths (mean proportion correct 0.95; 95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 
0.004) was greater than the proportion correct for facial expressions with closed 
mouths (mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% CI 0.94-0.95; SE 0.004), but social 
anxiety did not affect this difference in accuracy.  
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Moreover, the main effect of discrimination task just reached significance 
(F[1,80]=4.1, p=0.045, η2=0.049), and this effect also did not significantly interact 
with social anxiety (F[1,80]=2.6, p=0.114, η2=0.031). This shows that there was a 
small accuracy difference between discrimination task, but no social anxiety related 
differences in accuracy between the two discrimination tasks. The proportion correct 
in the anger/happy task (mean proportion correct 0.95; 95% CI 0.95-0.96; SE 0.004) 
was greater than in the fear/happy task (mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% CI 0.94-
0.96; SE 0.005).  
The interaction between valence and mouth type was significant (F[1,80]=7.2, 
p=0.009, η2=0.083), but this interaction did not significantly further interact with 
social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.3, p=0.586, η2=0.004). The mean proportions correct for 
the happy faces and threat-related faces, subdivided according to mouth type, are 
illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
 
Figure 4.6: The accuracy interaction between the valence of the emotional faces 
(happy versus threat-related) and the salience of the mouths of the faces (open 
versus closed). 
 
The interaction between valence and task was not significant (F[1,80]=0.3, p=0.855, 
η2<0.001), and did not significantly interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.01, 
p=0.923, η2<0.001). Therefore accuracy levels for happy faces were similar in both 
discrimination tasks (the mean proportion correct in the happy/fear task was 0.95; 
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95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 0.005; the mean proportion correct in the happy/anger task 
was 0.96; 95% CI 0.95-0.96; SE 0.004), and accuracy levels for threat-related faces 
in both discrimination tasks were similar (the mean proportion correct in the 
happy/fear task was 0.94; 95% CI 0.93-0.95; SE 0.005; the mean proportion correct 
in the happy/anger task was 0.95; 95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 0.005). These similarities 
were true at all levels of social anxiety.  
The interaction between mouth type and discrimination task was not quite significant 
(F[1,80]=3.0, p=0.085, η2=0.037), and did not significantly further interact with 
social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.8, p=0.372, η2=0.010). The 3-way interaction between 
valence, mouth type and discrimination task was also not significant (F[1,80]=4.8, 
p=0.031, η2=0.057), and did not significantly interact with social anxiety 
(F[1,80]=0.2, p=0.620, η2=0.003).  
We further explored the previously reported accuracy interaction between valence 
and mouth type using four one-way ANCOVAS, including standardised social 
anxiety as the covariate. Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.025/4 
(thus our accepted covariate significance level was p=0.006). The first one-way 
ANCOVA showed that the proportion correct for happy faces with open mouths was 
greater (mean proportion correct 0.96; 95% CI 0.95-0.97; SE 0.004) than happy 
faces with closed mouths (mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% CI 0.93-0.95; SE 
0.005). This open mouth accuracy advantage was highly significant (F[1,80]=14.3, 
p<0.001, η2=0.152), but did not further interact with social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.1, 
p=0.739, η2=0.001).The second one-way ANCOVA showed that the proportion 
correct for threat-related faces with open mouths (mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% 
CI 0.93-0.95; SE 0.005) was not significantly different than threat-related faces with 
closed mouths (mean proportion correct 0.95; 95% CI 0.94-0.96; SE 0.005; 
F[1,80]=0.9, p=0.356, η2=0.011). This effect also did not interact with social anxiety 
(F[1,80]=0.3, p=0.584, η2=0.004).  
The third one-way ANCOVA showed that the proportion correct for happy faces 
with open mouths was greater than threat-related faces with open mouths. This open 
mouth accuracy advantage for happy faces relative to threat-related faces was highly 
significant (F[1,80]=17.1, p<0.001, η2=0.176), and did not further interact with 
social anxiety (F[1,80]=0.1, p=0.717, η2=0.002). The fourth one-way ANCOVA 
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showed that the proportion correct for happy faces with closed mouths was less than 
threat-related faces with closed mouths. However, this accuracy difference was not 
significant (F[1,80]=0.2, p=0.879, η2<0.001), and did not interact with social anxiety 
(F[1,80]=0.2, p=0.636, η2=0.003). 
 
4.4.10. STAI-trait accuracy analysis 
As planned we repeated the main ANCOVA including STAI-trait scores as the 
covariate. The test of between-subjects effects showed that STAI-trait scores were 
not significantly related to accuracy levels averaged across the whole experiment 
(F[1,81]=0.01, p=0.925, η2<0.001). The test of within-subjects effects showed that 
STAI-trait scores were not significantly related to any trial type and/or task 
interactions (all Fs <1.8, all Ps > 0.19). Accordingly, we did not conduct any further 
accuracy analyses concerning STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression.  
 
4.5. Discussion 
 
The key findings in this experiment were that overall RTs to the happy faces were 
faster than RTs to the threat-related faces. This finding is consistent with the results 
of experiment 1 and the general finding of a happy face recognition advantage, 
relative to negatively-valenced faces in the studies by Silvia et al. (2006), Cooper, 
Rowe and Penton-Voak (2008), Leppanen and Hietanen (2003), Leppanen and 
Hietanen (2004), Kirita and Endo (1995), and Feyereisen, Malet and Martin (1996), 
Werheid, Alpay, Jentzsch and Sommer (2005). Even though in the present study the 
happy face versus threat-related face RT difference was quite small, social anxiety 
was clearly related to a reduced difference in RTs between happy faces and threat-
related faces. However, social anxiety did not appear to be correlated with average 
RTs to happy faces, nor average RT for threat-related faces. The finding that social 
anxiety relates to a reduced happy face recognition advantage is in alignment with 
the study by Silvia et al. (2006). In the present study happy faces were also 
responded to more accurately than threat-related faces but this happy face detection 
accuracy advantage was unaffected by social anxiety. 
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In the present study, facial expressions with salient open mouths were responded to 
faster and more accurately than facial expressions with less salient closed mouths. 
Social anxiety did not affect either the RT advantage, or the accuracy advantage for 
averaged facial expressions with open mouths. The RT advantage for the more 
salient open mouths, relative to closed mouths, was reduced when processing threat-
related faces relative to happy faces. These analyses suggest that the salience of 
individual features enhances emotional expression recognition more during the 
processing of happy faces. These findings also lend some support the suggestions of 
Calvo and Nummenmaa (2008), who showed that observed facial mouth regions are 
important during situations requiring facial emotion detection. It is however 
interesting that in the present study this mouth salience effect was not further 
increased in social anxiety.  
As planned we also explored the RT differences between responses to threat-related 
faces with salient open mouths and responses to happy faces with salient open 
mouths. Threat-related faces with open mouths were responded to slower than happy 
faces with open mouths. This RT effect was not significantly correlated with social 
anxiety, however the relationship was negative. RTs for threat-related faces with 
closed mouths were similar to RTs for happy faces with closed mouths. However, 
here we found an effect of social anxiety. Social anxiety was negatively related to 
the RT difference: threat-related face RT minus happy face RT. These analyses 
tentatively suggest that the reduced happy face recognition advantage in social 
anxiety was driven primarily by responses to faces with closed mouths, not 
responses to faces with open mouths. However, exploratory correlations suggested 
that in the present study, social anxiety was not significantly correlated with RTs to 
happy faces with closed mouths or threat-related faces with closed mouths, thus the 
social anxiety effect appeared to be manifested only in the RT difference 
computation. As discussed below general RT effects are subtracted out in the RT 
difference measures, but are present in the single condition RTs. Thus, if general 
RTs are a major source of variance in every condition, and are not related to social 
anxiety, then this will suppress the study’s ability to detect trait relationships with 
RTs in specific conditions. 
The present results suggest that the processing of highly intense emotional faces with 
salient open mouths was similar at all levels of social anxiety. In contrast, the 
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processing of moderately intense emotional faces with low-salient closed mouths 
was affected by social anxiety levels. This finding lends some support to the 
cognitive account of anxiety proposed by Mogg and Bradley (1998). Mogg and 
Bradley suggest that stimuli indicating a mild level of threat will be appraised as 
being more threat-relevant by those high in anxiety relative to those low in anxiety, 
as high anxiety is related to an oversensitive valence evaluation system. Similarly, 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) also proposed that strong threat cues will affect 
attention regardless of anxiety levels, but weak threat cues will only affect attention 
of those high in anxiety. In the present study the salient open mouths of the fearful 
and angry faces may have been processed as the same level of threat at all levels of 
social anxiety. In contrast, the non-salient closed mouths of the fearful and angry 
faces may have been processed as being more threat-related, by those high in social 
anxiety, relative to those low in social anxiety. The current study’s findings, and 
these cognitive accounts of anxiety can also be accommodated with the emotional 
survival circuits framework theorised by LeDoux (2012). A hyper-sensitive threat 
evaluation system, and the resulting threat-related RT bias for less salient threat-
related facial expressions, would likely reflect an increased sensitivity in the 
triggering of the emotional survival circuit. However, it is noteworthy that the study 
by Mogg et al. (2007) showed the opposite, as the effects of anxiety only appeared 
with high intensity fearful and angry faces not low intensity fearful and angry faces. 
As with experiment 1, we suspected that the correlations between social anxiety and 
any specific RT effects were likely to have been suppressed by general sources of 
RT variance. We calculated a general RT factor using factor analysis. When 
controlling for this general RT factor, social anxiety shared a significant negative 
correlation with RTs to threat-related faces. Therefore, those higher in social anxiety 
responded faster to threat-related faces than those lower in social anxiety. Similarly, 
when controlling for this general RT factor, social anxiety shared a significant 
positive correlation with RTs to happy faces. Therefore, those higher in social 
anxiety responded to happy faces slower than those lower in social anxiety. 
Moreover, when controlling for these general RT effects, social anxiety was related 
to faster RTs to threat-related faces with closed mouths, but not open mouths. 
However, social anxiety was also related to slower RTs to happy faces with closed 
mouths, but not significantly with RTs to happy faces with open mouths. These 
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correlations add further weight to our suggestion that the threat-related but low-
salient closed mouths were processed as more threatening by those high in social 
anxiety, relative to those low in social anxiety.  
It is noteworthy here that social anxiety was related to both faster RTs to threat-
related faces and slower RTs to happy faces. This observation supports our 
explanation of the trait anxiety results in experiment 1. To reiterate, based upon the 
notion of emotional survival circuits in the brain (LeDoux, 2012), we suggested that 
those high in trait anxiety may have a more reactive survival circuit response to 
threat-related stimulation relative to adaptive reward stimulation, whereas those low 
in trait anxiety may have a more reactive survival circuit response to adaptive reward 
stimulation relative to threat-related stimulation. In experiment 1 trait anxiety was 
related to faster RTs to fearful faces, but the happy face RTs did not correlate with 
trait anxiety. The present study shows that this happy face correlation is indeed 
present (but with social anxiety), which increases the validity of our explanation.  
As planned we repeated the main RT analysis, this time we included STAI-trait 
scores as the covariate instead of social anxiety scores. We found no reliable effects 
of the STAI-trait scores in this analysis. This shows that the STAI-trait scale is a 
much less reliable as a predictor of emotional face processing than the social anxiety 
scale. However, we anticipated that we may detect the effects of anxiety and 
emotional face processing by using the STAI-anxiety subscale.  
We carried out planned exploratory correlations using the STAI-trait subscales. 
STAI-anxiety scores were related to a reduced RT difference score in the happy 
versus fear discrimination task, whereas STAI-depression scores were not. This 
lends some support for the discriminant validity of the STAI subscales proposed by 
Bieling et al. (1998). However, when controlling for STAI-depression scores the 
correlation between STAI-anxiety scores and this RT difference score was 
unreliable. Neither STAI-anxiety scores nor STAI-depression scores were related to 
the RT difference score in the happy versus anger discrimination task. When 
controlling for the general RT factor STAI-anxiety was related to faster RTs to 
fearful faces, but not happy faces, in the happy versus fear discrimination task. This 
finding is consistent with the results of experiment 1. In addition, STAI-depression 
was uncorrelated with RTs to fearful faces, and happy faces in this task. As planned 
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we repeated the accuracy analyses using STAI-trait scores.  STAI-trait scores were 
not significantly related to any trial type and/or task interactions. Accordingly, we 
did not conduct any further accuracy analyses concerning STAI-anxiety scores and 
STAI-depression scores. 
The exploratory analyses using the STAI-anxiety scale do suggest that trait anxiety 
may be selectively related to the processing of fearful faces, whereas social anxiety 
seems related to the processing of both fearful and angry faces. It is noteworthy here 
that social anxiety, STAI-anxiety, and STAI-depression were all only moderately 
correlated with each other.  
We also administered the attentional control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001, 2002) 
partly in order to further clarify the discriminant validity of the STAI-trait subscales, 
and partly to explore any possible behavioural effects relative to attentional control. 
Social anxiety was not significantly correlated with self-reported attentional control 
total scores, nor with attentional focusing scores, and nor with the attentional shifting 
scores. In contrast, STAI-trait, STAI-anxiety, and STAI-depression were all 
correlated with the attentional control total scores, the attentional focusing scores, 
and the attentional shifting scores. The finding that STAI-trait score correlated with 
the total attentional control scores is consistent with the studies by Reinholdt-Dunne 
et al. (2009) and Walsh, Balint, Smolira SJ, Fredericksen and Madsen (2009). 
However, we were primarily interested in the attentional control subscales. 
Exploratory correlations showed that attentional focusing was positively correlated 
with the RT difference between happy faces and threat-related faces. This correlation 
was due to a positive correlation between attentional focusing and the RT difference 
between happy and fearful faces, as opposed to the happy and angry faces. Thus as 
self-reported attentional focusing increased, so did the happy face recognition 
advantage. In contrast, attentional shifting was not correlated with any of these RT 
difference scores. Exploratory correlations showed that when controlling for both 
attentional shifting scores and general RT effects, attentional focusing was not 
related to RTs for either happy faces or fearful faces from the happy versus fear 
discrimination task.  
STAI-anxiety and attentional focusing were inversely related, but both predicted the 
happy face recognition advantage. It therefore comes as no surprise that STAI-
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anxiety predicted a reduced happy face recognition advantage, whereas attentional 
focusing predicted an increased happy face recognition advantage. The attentional 
focusing and STAI-anxiety correlations with the RT difference between happy and 
fearful faces seemed to be due to some substantial shared cognitive resources 
between attentional focusing and trait anxiety (as measured by the STAI-anxiety 
subscale). Attentional focusing was not a reliable predictor of the happy/fear RT 
difference scores, when controlling for STAI-trait scores. Moreover, STAI-trait 
scores did not predict the happy/fear RT difference scores when controlling for 
attentional focusing.  
Attentional shifting independently predicted STAI-depression but not STAI-anxiety. 
Attentional focusing did not independently predict STAI-depression, nor did it 
independently predict STAI-anxiety. This analysis shows that the discriminant 
validity of the depression subscale was much more reliable than the anxiety subscale. 
This finding is consistent with the suggestions that the discriminant validity of the 
anxiety subscale may be questionable (Bados et al., 2010). As discussed, the anxiety 
subscale was previously found to have lower convergent validity than the depression 
subscale (Bieling et al., 1998). In short, the present analysis only partially supports 
the findings of Judah et al. (2013) and Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2013), who reported 
that attentional focusing much more reliably predicted STAI-anxiety than STAI-
depression, and attentional shifting much more reliably predicted STAI-depression 
than STAI-anxiety. 
The present study used photographs of real people posing emotional faces, as an 
ecologically valid test of emotion recognition. However in the real world the context 
provided by the events immediately preceding any experience of an emotional face 
may affect information processing. Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert (1998) propose that 
the evolutionary basis of emotion has a dual-factor motivationally-based 
organisation. Lang et al. propose that there are two brain systems that mediate 
adaptive responses to appetitive or aversive stimuli. Lang et al. propose that 
activation or arousal levels of each system can vary. Lang et al. conceptualise 
arousal as the intensity of activation (neural and/or metabolic) of each (or both) of 
the systems when activated. Accordingly, in this view arousal is not considered to 
have an independent substrate. This view is perhaps unsurprisingly highly 
compatible with RST (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), and its notion that the two slave 
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systems; BAS and FFFS, predominantly processing appetitive and aversive stimuli. 
Lang et al. suggest that the brain’s memory associations, representations and actions, 
which are associated with either active motivational system, are “primed” for 
activation. In other words, they have an increased likelihood of being used relative to 
other stored information or responses, and their potential strength of output is 
increased.  Accordingly, memory associations, representations and actions that are 
associated with the inactive system have a lower likelihood of use. This emotional 
priming model suggests that any defensive reflex occurring to potential threat should 
be magnified if the organism is already processing an aversive stimulus as the 
defensive system is already active. This same reflex should be reduced if the 
organism is already reacting to an appetitive stimulus. This emotional priming 
account is also compatible with the theory of emotional survival circuits proposed by 
LeDoux (2012). In short, the survival circuit triggers could become more sensitive, if 
their activation was primed.  
We suggest that a future study involving a partial replication of the present study, but 
also including the priming propositions of Lang et al. (1998), would usefully extend 
knowledge of this area.  Hietanen and Astikainen (2013) used a priming paradigm to 
investigate how emotional facial expression recognition is affected by the context 
provided by prior emotional visual stimuli. Primes were either negatively-valenced 
or positively-valenced pictures whereas the target faces depicted either happy or sad 
faces. Four affective trial types were included in this paradigm; a happy face 
preceded by a positive prime; a happy face preceded by a negative prime; a sad face 
preceded by a positive prime; and a sad face preceded by a negative prime. Thus, 
there were two emotionally congruent pairs of targets and primes, and two 
emotionally incongruent pairs of targets and primes.  
Hietanen and Astikainen (2013) found that happy faces were recognised more 
accurately and were responded to faster than sad faces. Happy faces were recognised 
more accurately when they followed positive primes as opposed to negative primes. 
Sad faces were recognised more accurately when they followed negative primes as 
opposed to positive primes. The priming effect for accuracy was stronger for sad 
faces than for happy faces. RTs for happy faces following positive primes were 
faster than for happy faces following negative primes. However, RTs for sad faces 
following negative primes only showed a trend towards being faster than RTs for sad 
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faces following positive primes.  The RT priming effect was stronger for happy faces 
than for sad faces. These findings lend some support to the emotional priming model 
proposed by Lang et al. (1998), and may be important when trying to understand 
how anxiety affects emotional face discrimination. We suggest that a further trait 
anxiety or social anxiety study (but including happy versus threat-related faces) 
should be conducted using this priming paradigm as anxiety may be affected by 
emotional priming effects. Moreover, a design such as this may provide evidence of 
how the survival circuits proposed by LeDoux (2012) are primed for activation, and 
also how this affects trait or social anxiety. 
In a similar priming study, Werheid, Alpay, Jentzsch and Sommer (2005) used an 
emotional facial expression recognition task consisting of sequences of angry and 
happy faces. Half of the target stimuli were primed as the previous expression 
depicted the same emotion. The other half of the target stimuli were un-primed as the 
previous expression depicted the alternative expression to the target stimuli. RTs for 
target happy facial expressions were faster than RTs for target angry facial 
expressions. Moreover, overall RTs for target facial expressions were faster when 
they were primed relative to when they were un-primed. However, the critical 
finding of this study was that there was an interaction between this priming effect 
and the valence of the target facial expression. The priming effect was only present 
for happy facial expressions. Thus, happy faces were responded to faster when they 
were primed by a happy face, than when they were primed by an angry face. In 
contrast, RTs for angry facial expressions were not faster when they were primed (by 
a previous angry face) relative to when they were un-primed (by a previous happy 
face). It is possible that this happy face priming effect would be reduced in social 
anxiety. We suggest that future studies should try to test this.  
We also suggest that a further study should be conducted to ascertain the neural basis 
of the social anxiety effects upon emotional face recognition. We suggest that the 
priming paradigms discussed could be ideal for this. For example, Hietanen and 
Astikainen (2013) showed using EEG recordings that the N170 ERP amplitude was 
greater during the processing of happy faces than sad faces, and larger over the right 
hemisphere than the left hemisphere. In a future study concerning social anxiety, it 
seems likely that this effect would be reduced. Moreover, the N170 amplitude in 
response to facial expressions was modulated by the affective congruency between 
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the target emotional facial expression and the preceding affective picture prime. The 
N170 amplitude was greater for happy faces following positive primes, than for 
happy faces following negative primes. Furthermore, the N170 amplitude was also 
greater for sad faces following negative primes than for sad faces following positive 
primes. The priming effect for the N170 amplitude was the same for happy and sad 
faces. The latency of the N170 was shorter for happy faces than sad faces. The 
latency was shorter for positively primed happy faces than for negatively primed 
happy faces. There was no effect of prime type upon latency for sad faces. A future 
study that measures social anxiety may show that these neural priming effects for 
happy faces are reduced. Moreover, the addition of threat-related faces as opposed to 
sad faces might show that the neural priming effects are increased in social anxiety.  
Werheid et al. (2005) also reported that priming related ERP effects were present 
independent of the valence of the facial expressions. An early priming effect present 
in the ERP data was expressed as attenuated amplitudes (present at 100-200 
milliseconds) in frontal and occipital regions in response to target facial expressions 
that were primed. Werheid et al. reported that their dipole model located the 
probable sources of this effect as the inferior occipitotemporal cortex, and insular 
cortex. Werheid et al. suggest that the inferior occipitotemporal cortex activity may 
have been related to the detection of facial configurations that are specific to 
expressions, whereas the insular cortex activity may reflect affective processing. It is 
noteworthy that these early ERP effects appeared before the N170 ERP time 
window. These early ERPs did not show the same pattern as the N170. The N170 
(post prime) was clearly present for all of the conditions, and was most clearly 
present at parieto-occipital regions. The peak N170 amplitude did not differ relative 
to the valance of the primes. We suggest that a further ERP study may show how this 
early but valence-unspecific priming effect is also modulated by social anxiety. 
Werheid et al. (2005) also reported a late priming effect in the ERP data. The late 
positive potential (LPP) amplitudes (present at 500-600 milliseconds) were enhanced 
following target facial expressions that were unprimed. They also suggest that this 
LPP amplitude enhancement may reflect an attribution of greater relevance to 
changing emotional facial expressions. It is also possible that this neural activity 
would be further modulated by social anxiety. Werheid et al. interpreted these ERP 
findings together as suggesting that configurations of facial information related to 
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emotion can be detected particularly early during the perception of a face, and that 
the LPP reflects the processing of the level of emotional arousal of the faces as 
opposed to the actual valence of the expression (i.e., happiness or anger in this case). 
Werheid et al. suggest that in the real world a change of a person’s emotional 
expression (and thus their probable state of mind) may be more relevant to a viewer 
(and thus more arousing) than a repeated expression. The present study should be 
replicated (using primes) whilst recording EEG activity. This may further illustrate 
how social anxiety is related to differences in emotional facial expression 
discrimination, and explore whether it is also related to level of emotional arousal.  
Further insights into this issue come from a different type of experiment. Li, 
Zinbarg, Boehm and Paller (2008) used an emotional valence judging task (using a 
Likert scale) that required participants to rate how negative or positive a face 
expression was. Target stimuli were preceded by subliminally presented fearful or 
happy primes. The primes influenced the valence ratings in the following face 
expression rating task. Li et al. reported that those high in trait anxiety showed 
enhanced subliminal priming effects from fearful primes (compared to happy 
primes) than those low in trait anxiety. High anxious participants also displayed an 
enhanced occipital P1 ERP during fearful trials as compared to happy trials, which 
was sourced to the bilateral extrastriate cortex. In summary, the studies carried out 
by Hietanen and Astikainen (2013), and Werheid et al. (2005), all showed that 
emotional priming affects information processing, whereas Li et al. (2008) showed 
that emotional priming affects those high in anxiety. Future research should examine 
this issue in more detail and in the context of discriminating threat related faces from 
happy faces.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study has shown that social anxiety is reliably related to faster 
responses to threat-related faces, and slower responses to happy faces. However, this 
effect is only reliable when the facial expressions are shown with less salient closed 
mouths. Trait anxiety (measured by the anxiety subscale of the STAI) seems to be 
related specifically to the discrimination of fearful faces from happy faces, whereas 
social anxiety is related to the discrimination of both fearful and angry faces from 
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happy faces. The interpretability of the overall scores of the STAI is made difficult 
as it might assess both anxiety and depression, and as such may measure general 
negative affect. However, the discriminant validity of the anxiety and depression 
STAI subscales is also something that requires further research. We suggest that 
future emotional face processing studies should use the social anxiety measure used 
in the present study as well as trait anxiety measures. Future goal conflict studies 
may benefit from using the anxiety subscale of the STAI.  
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Chapter 5 
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5. Experiment 4 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Experiment 1 showed that trait anxiety might relate to the reactivity of a conflict 
resolution system, and that this might be able to be assessed by using goal conflict 
tasks, that account for the sequential differences in performance referred to as 
congruency sequence effects (CSEs). Experiment 1 showed that the flanker task 
might be a useful tool to assess how trait anxiety relates to the CSE. In contrast, 
experiment 2 showed that trait anxiety did not relate to the CSE in the Stroop task. 
As discussed briefly in chapter 2, there are different mechanistic accounts that seek 
to explain the cognitive / information processing basis of the CSE. Before continuing 
with any discussion concerning any possible new design for a further experiment it is 
necessary to explain the key mechanistic accounts of the CSE. These are discussed in 
turn below.  
 
5.1.1. The conflict monitoring account 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the CSE has been predominantly explained in the 
literature by what has become known as conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick, 
Braver, Carter, Barch, & Cohen; 2001). To reiterate, this account proposes that the 
stream of information being processed is being constantly monitored for any 
occurring conflict. Botvinick et al. in their conflict monitoring account of the CSE 
suggest that response conflict monitored during any current trial modulates cognitive 
control during the following trial. In tasks used to evaluate the CSE, trials are 
designated as either congruent (C) or incongruent (I); but the congruency of the 
preceding trial is indicated with lower case letters (so the set of possible trials can be 
denoted cC, iI, cI, iI). Performance during iI trials is improved relative to cI trials as 
cognitive control applied during the current incongruent trial is improved by the 
previously experienced conflict on the preceding incongruent trial. However, during 
cI trials performance is poorer than iI trials as cognitive control is not increased 
because the preceding trial was congruent and so the prior level of conflict was low.  
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As briefly discussed in chapter 2, this account has been questioned by Nieuwenhuis 
et al. (2006), who included 892 participants ranging from children to both younger 
and older adults in their study. The CSE was present only when the target stimulus 
(and the correct response) was repeated (a detailed description of how target and 
response repetition is implicated in these paradigms will be given below). This study 
suggested that basic response repetition priming effects drive the CSE. Moreover, 
Mayr, Awh, and Laurey (2003) also reported a CSE that was present only with target 
and response repetition. The findings obtained by Nieuwenhuis et al. and Mayr et al. 
are more in alignment with Hommels’ (1998, 2004, 2007) event file theory. 
Hommel, Proctor & Vu (2004) have used event file theory to account for the 
sequential effects found in another conflict task referred to as the Simon task. This 
theoretical explanation of the CSE is referred to as the feature integration account.  
 
5.1.2. The feature integration account  
 
Hommel (2007) proposes that goal directed behaviour relies upon selectively 
attending to and recognising any goal relevant stimulus and then responding 
physically towards it in order to achieve the goal. This behaviour is facilitated by 
cells in the visual cortex coding colour, shape, motion, form and orientation of 
relevant stimuli, in addition to coding action features that are under a person’s 
intentional control. Hommel (1998, 2004, 2007) postulates that information 
pertaining to any behavioural responses, along with their preceding stimuli, is 
integrated in episodic memory. Hommel refers to these neural based mnemonic 
representations as event files. Hommel proposes that these event files facilitate 
stimulus-response priming effects. Accordingly, these priming effects are able to 
cause impairments in goal directed behaviour in addition to improving goal directed 
behaviour, during tasks that rely upon motor responses to visually presented stimuli.  
In a typical forced choice arrow flanker paradigm with two stimuli types and 
responses, trials involve either exact stimulus repetitions (e.g., <<<<< then <<<<< 
for cC trials; and >><>> then >><>> for iI trials), or exact alternations (e.g., <<<<< 
then >>>>> for cC trials; and <<><< then >><>> for iI trials).  However, cI and iC 
trials involve partial stimulus repetitions (e.g., >>>>> then >><>> for cI trials; and 
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>><>> then <<<<< for iC trials). For clarity, the sequences of stimuli that occur in 
flanker tasks are also depicted in Table 5.1 
 
Table 5.1: The sequences of stimuli that occur in a typical two choice arrow 
flanker task.  
Trial type Repetition type Previous trial Current trial 
    
cC Exact stimulus repetition <<<<< <<<<< 
cC Exact stimulus repetition >>>>> >>>>> 
iI Exact stimulus repetition <<><< <<><< 
iI Exact stimulus repetition >><>> >><>> 
cC Exact stimulus alternation <<<<< >>>>> 
cC Exact stimulus alternation >>>>> <<<<< 
iI Exact stimulus alternation <<><< >><>> 
iI Exact stimulus alternation >><>> <<><< 
iC Partial stimulus repetition <<><< <<<<< 
iC Partial stimulus repetition >><>> >>>>> 
iC Partial stimulus repetition <<><< >>>>> 
iC Partial stimulus repetition >><>> <<<<< 
cI Partial stimulus repetition <<<<< <<><< 
cI Partial stimulus repetition >>>>> >><>> 
cI Partial stimulus repetition >>>>> >><>> 
cI Partial stimulus repetition <<<<< >><>> 
 
 
The feature integration account (Hommel et al., 2004) relies upon the assumption 
that the stimulus and response features of any previously experienced trial will have 
been temporarily bound together to form a common episodic memory trace. 
Therefore, the presence of any of these features during the following trial will 
automatically co-activate the remaining features of the bound memory trace. Thus, 
from this perspective, the reason that trials with complete stimulus repetitions and 
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complete stimulus alternations are responded to faster is because no previous feature 
binding needs to be undone. In other words, a complete stimulus and response 
repetition will require effortless repeated co-activation of features in the event file. 
This situation would reflect the target and response repetition priming effect 
discussed above. A complete stimulus and response alternation would also be 
processed relatively effortlessly, as no feature binding needs to be undone. In 
contrast, trials with partial repetitions require the feature binding to be undone before 
any (correct) response can be made. In iC and cI transitions, one feature changes in 
the second trial, whilst the other features remain the same as in the first trial. The 
undoing of previously bound features in the event file, thus slows responses to the 
following trial. In other words, the feature integration perspective suggests that the 
partial stimulus repetitions will facilitate the retrieval of episodic memory traces of 
the previous trial’s stimulus and response representations. These representations 
would partially conflict with the stimuli present in the current trial. According to the 
feature integration account this would slow RTs to cI and iC trials relative to iI and 
cC trials, thus producing the CSE. In contrast to conflict monitoring theory, the 
feature integration account does not involve cognitive control mechanisms, it 
involves memory mechanisms.  
 
5.1.3. Delineating cognitive control and episodic memory effects upon the CSE 
 
The feature integration account has provoked a multitude of attempts to dissociate 
the different contributions to the CSE made by higher level cognitions that mediate 
cognitive control, and lower level cognitions that rely upon episodic memory. 
Several goal conflict studies show that the CSE is abolished when feature repetitions 
are not present (e.g., Chen & Melara, 2009; Mayr et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2006; Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 2008). In contrast, several other studies have 
found that a CSE is present when there is no feature repetition (e.g., Kerns et al., 
2004; Kunde & Wuhr, 2006; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005; Clayson & 
Larson, 2012, 2011a, 2011b). Paradigms using a design that does not include any 
feature integration to start with have also been used. For example, Duthoo and 
Notebaert (2012) used an eight colour vocal Stroop task where feature repetition was 
not possible and found that the CSE was still present. Feature repetition is not 
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possible in a Stroop design that uses eight colours because feature repetitions can be 
completely excluded at the design stage.  
The finding of a CSE when there are no feature repetitions present does not suggest 
that the feature integration account should be abandoned. It is possible that both 
feature integration and conflict monitoring may contribute to the CSE (Duthoo, 
Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014; Davelaar and Stevens, 2009; 
Egner, 2007). Indeed, Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, and Liefooghe (2006) 
illustrated this by varying the response to stimulus interval (RSI) in a Stroop task. 
Bottom-up priming effects that can be explained as feature integration effects were 
detected at a very short RSI (50 milliseconds), whereas top-down conflict monitoring 
effects required longer to affect behaviour (at an RSI of 200 milliseconds). However, 
it is noteworthy that the feature integration account and the conflict monitoring 
account explain the CSE during iI trials rather differently. The feature integration 
account explains the effect as a facilitatory effect driven by stimuli repetitions or 
alternations, whereas the conflict monitoring account explains the effect as resulting 
from conflict resolution.  
In an extensive review of the CSE, Duthoo et al. (2014) drew attention to the fact 
that the available neuroimaging evidence seems to support the conflict monitoring 
account as opposed to the feature integration account. For example, Botvinick et al 
(2001) suggest that the anterior cingulate (ACC) is specifically implicated in conflict 
detection (Jones, Cho, Nystrom, Cohen, & Braver, 2002), whereas any subsequent 
adjustments in the control of behaviour are mediated by the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC; Egner & Hirsch, 2005). Duthoo et al. also suggested that fMRI 
evidence showing strong DLPFC activation during iI trials supports the conflict 
monitoring account, and that the feature integration account cannot explain why the 
CSE is not found when the DLPFC cannot function. For example, transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the DLPFC abolishes the CSE (Sturmer, Redlich, 
Irlbacher, & Brandt, 2007). Moreover, surgical removal of the DLPFC (in patients 
undergoing stereotactic cingulotomy for treatment-refractory obsessive-compulsive 
disorder) also abolishes the CSE (Sheth et al., 2012).  
Davelaar and Stevens (2009) suggest that Hommel’s (1998, 2004, 2007) theory of 
episodic memory event files explains the observed priming effects caused by feature 
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repetitions in the flanker task. However, they postulate that conflict monitored in any 
previous trial will modulate the size of the priming effect in any current trial. 
Davelaar and Stevens therefore propose that both priming and conflict monitoring 
affect the CSE.  This suggestion is based upon the finding that the effect is larger for 
iI trials (when the full stimuli array repeats), than it is for cC trials (when the full 
stimuli array repeats). In short, the observed response conflict in a current 
incongruent trial increases the priming effect for the following incongruent trial, 
more than low conflict congruent trials preceding low conflict congruent trials are 
able to do. In other words, currently congruent trials cannot increase cognitive 
control for following congruent trials as they have no attention-increasing conflict. 
Davelaar and Stevens postulate that the observed level of response conflict in trials 
therefore modulates the strength of the association between any stimulus and 
response.  Observed correct motor responses increase the association between the 
stimulus and motor response, whilst observed incorrect responses will decrease this 
stimulus/response association. This stimulus/response association increasing effect is 
therefore greater for high conflict incongruent trials than it is for low conflict 
congruent trials. However, in a later study Davelaar (2013) showed that the 
repetition of flankers alone is sufficient to produce a CSE. Davelaar illustrated that it 
is not necessary for participants to make a response or even perceive a target 
stimulus on a preceding trial to obtain a CSE in a current trial.    
 
5.1.4. The negative priming account 
 
Another account of the CSE suggests that negative priming is implicated (Ullsperger 
et al., 2005; Bugg, 2008). Negative priming refers to the idea that an iI trial with a 
complete non-repetition transition will slow responses (e.g., <<><< followed by 
>><>>). This would be due to the target in a previous trial becoming the distractor in 
the following trial. However, whereas Bugg found slower RTs for the complete non-
repetition transition trials relative to a neutral baseline condition, Davelaar and 
Stevens (2009) did not. In addition, Bugg also found slower RTs for the iC partial 
repetition transition where flankers repeat but target and response do not (e.g., 
>><>> followed by >>>>>). Davelaar (2013) suggested that if negative priming 
were implicated in the iI trials with a complete non-repetition transition, then the iC 
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partial repetition transition (where flankers repeat but target and response do not 
transition) should produce positive priming. Davelaar suggested that this pattern is 
not observable in the literature that focuses upon two-choice flanker tasks, and that 
there is no evidence for the existence of negative priming in flanker tasks that 
include both congruent and incongruent trials. It is also interesting to note that Mayr 
and Awh (2009) showed using a six colour-word Stroop task that distractor to target 
transitions for iI trials did not produce slower RTs than non-repetition iI trials; thus, 
again, there was no evidence of negative priming. In contrast, target to distractor 
repetitions for iI trials produced faster RTs and were more accurate than non-
repetition iI trials. So, from this evidence, one can conclude that negative priming 
should not be an issue in a two-choice emotional flanker task of the kind we used in 
experiment 1. 
 
5.1.5. The contingency learning account in proportion congruent designs 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman and Besner (2007) and 
Schmidt and Besner (2008) propose that participants implicitly learn the correlations 
(contingencies) between the words and responses in Stroop tasks using proportion 
congruent manipulations (e.g., when there are more congruent trials than incongruent 
trials participants learn that the word in red ink is more often the word “red” than an 
incongruent word). This contingency learning account has been applied to CSE 
research when the proportions of congruent and incongruent trials are unequal. 
Schmidt (2013) claimed that contingency biases when congruent trials are 
predominant can artificially enhance the magnitude of the CSE. One could suggest 
that this was possible in experiment 1 of the present thesis. However, it is 
noteworthy that in experiment 1 (where congruent trials outnumbered incongruent 
trials) RTs for iI trials were similar to RTs for cC trials. Thus we suggest that 
contingency learning did not enhance the CSE in our emotional face flanker task in 
experiment 1.  
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5.1.6. Precluding contingency learning and feature integration 
 
Several studies have used designs that precluded the possibility of both contingency 
learning and feature integration.  For example, Schmidt and Weissman (2014) 
showed that a CSE can occur without the presence of any feature integration or the 
possibility of any contingency learning effects when using prime probe tasks. 
Larson, Clayson, Kirwan and Weissman (2016) also used a prime probe task and 
found a robust CSE. These prime probe tasks use stimuli that are similar to those 
used in flanker tasks. In these tasks distractor arrays of arrows or words are shown 
initially (i.e., a prime stimulus that does not require a response). Unlike flanker tasks 
these distractors then disappear before the lone target arrow or word is presented, 
where a response is required from the participant. The prime probe tasks are thus 
quite different from the conflict tasks usually used to study the CSE. However, it is 
noteworthy here that Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler and Notebaert (2014) 
created versions of the picture-word Stroop task, and colour-word Stroop task, in 
addition to the flanker task that control for feature integration and any possibility of 
contingency learning. CSEs were present in all three of the tasks.  
Kim and Cho (2014) used a different design that alleviates any possibility of feature 
integration and contingency learning. This task required participants to alternate 
between two flanker tasks in a trial by trial fashion. Experiment 1 of their study 
required responding with key presses by using four fingers of one hand (two fingers 
for each task), whereas experiment 2 of their study required participants to respond 
with their index and middle fingers of both hands (one hand for each task). Kim and 
Cho reported that a CSE was present only in their experiment 1. In short, the CSE 
was only present when the response mode was single-handed for both tasks, not 
dual-handed with one hand per task. They suggest that these results support the 
notion that the CSE is produced by top-down cognitive control resources coping 
with response conflict. However, it is entirely possible that both conflict monitoring 
and thus (conflict adaptation) as well as episodic memory processes can influence 
the CSE in different situations. Bugg (2014) suggested that conflict adaptation may 
be a last resort, and as such is a process that participants may only rely upon if 
environmental cues are not reliable.  
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5.1.7. The repetition expectancy account 
 
The repetition expectancy account of the CSE originally proposed by Gratton, Coles 
and Donchin (1992) does not concern objective probabilistic judgments, but relates to 
subjective expectancies. Gratton et al. reasoned that expectations of either congruent 
or incongruent stimuli repeating would facilitate adjustments in attentional focus. 
Incongruent trials would lead to a focused attentional state, whereas congruent trials 
would lead to a broadened attentional state (which they referred to as “parallel”). 
Thus, if two consecutive trials are of the same congruency (iI or cC) then the second 
trial in that sequence will be expected (in terms of congruency) and thus processed 
faster as the attentional state would be adjusted appropriately. The converse happens 
when the second trial in the sequence has the alternate congruency to the preceding 
trial (iC or cI), and the attentional state has been inappropriately adjusted, making 
RTs slower3.  
There are a few studies that have tried to isolate repetition expectancy based 
processing in conflict tasks. Duthoo and Notebaert (2012) used a Stroop task with a 
learning phase that had two conditions (manipulating the proportions of trial types to 
create either high congruency repetition expectancy or low congruency repetition 
expectancy). This was followed by a test phase. The idea here was if repetition 
expectancy has an effect it should transfer to the test phase where the proportions of 
trial types were kept equal, and be illustrated by an increased CSE in the high 
                                                          
3 It is noteworthy here that one cannot be sure that Gratton et al. use the term expectancy 
here in the sense that participants have an explicit expectancy of the up and coming trials 
congruency type. They may simply mean that there is a beneficial congruency matching 
effect that occurs on some sequential trials. In other words, if a congruent trial puts a 
participant in one cognitive state then it will be easier for them to respond quickly if they 
are required to respond to another congruent trial next (and thus are already in the “right” 
cognitive state). The same effect would occur for incongruent trials, except that they would 
be placed in an alternative cognitive state. These effects could/would happen without any 
need for any active (explicit) expectancy. This account could thus be interpreted as 
meaning that participants rely upon implicit attentional expectancies.  In other words, the 
word expectancy may be being somewhat misused in this account. 
205 
 
expectancy condition. This was not found to occur. However, Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem and Notebaert (2013) tested the repetition expectancy account more explicitly 
with a Stroop task by asking their participants if they expected an easy (congruent) 
or hard (incongruent) trial before they responded. Four experiments showed that 
participants exhibited a repetition bias, as they expected the congruency level of any 
trial to repeat above what would be predicted by chance. Moreover, a robust CSE 
was found only when participants had predicted a repetition of congruency type. 
Duthoo et al. suggested that expectancies might influence control in addition to 
conflict based adjustments, but only if the expectancies are being explicitly 
registered or manipulated.   
Correa, Rao and Nobre (2009) used EEG and showed that the N2 ERP deflection 
was reduced when it followed a cue that signalled increased conflict. The N2 is 
proposed to reflect conflict related brain activity, which is proposed to be generated 
in the ACC (Mathalon, Whitfield, & Ford, 2003).  Correa et al. suggested that the 
anticipation of conflict may speed up the detection of conflict and the subsequent 
resolution of this conflict. Aarts and Roelofs (2011) used a Stroop-like task with 
probabilistic cues and showed that anticipated conflict or anticipated lack of conflict 
facilitates sequential adjustments in a similar fashion to actually experienced conflict 
or lack of conflict in a previous trial. They also reported that this manipulation 
modulated ACC activity in a similar fashion to studies that used experienced conflict 
(e.g., Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004). Thus it seems as if the repetition expectancy 
account is the hardest to delineate from the conflict monitoring account.  
 
5.1.8. Plotting the CSE from the perspective of each of the three main theoretical 
accounts. 
 
The three main theoretical accounts of the CSE that feature in the literature are the 
conflict monitoring (conflict adaptation) perspective, the feature integration 
perspective, and the repetition expectancy perspective. An analysis of the CSE from 
each of these three perspectives would amount to the same thing statistically. 
However, the data are usually plotted slightly differently for the conflict 
monitoring/adaptation perspective, than for the feature integration perspective and 
the repetition expectancy perspective. In contrast, the data are usually plotted in the 
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same way for the feature integration perspective and the repetition expectancy 
perspective. In short, it is important to understand that the data in any congruency 
sequence effect paradigm can be plotted in several ways, and that the variables 
included in the required ANOVA can be labelled in several different ways. Figures 
5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 illustrate the three ways of plotting the data, the three ways of 
labelling the variables, and thus taken together these figures also illustrate the 
relationship between the three ways of analysing and interpreting the CSE.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: A hypothetical CSE plotted from the conflict monitoring/adaptation 
perspective, as advocated by conflict monitoring theory. Here the data is plotted as 
current trial type of congruency (solid lines vs. dotted lines) for different levels of 
previous trial type congruency on the x-axis. This plot is thus laid out in a way that 
specifically reinforces the suggestion that monitored conflict in a previous trial 
affects performance in any current trial.  
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Figure 5.2: A hypothetical CSE plotted from a feature integration perspective. 
Here the data is plotted as current trial type of congruency (solid vs. dotted lines) 
for different amounts of feature overlap with the previous trial plotted on the x-
axis. Thus, the previous trial has either complete feature overlap or partial feature 
overlap with the current trial. Thus, the feature integration account 
reconceptualises the current trial congruency versus previous trial congruency 
effect, as a current trial congruency by stimulus feature transition effect.  
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Figure 5.3: A hypothetical CSE plotted from a repetition expectancy perspective. 
Here the data is plotted as current trial type of congruency (solid lines vs. dotted 
lines) for repetition or alternation of congruency on the previous trial plotted on 
the x-axis. Although the proposed cognitive mechanisms differ, the plot for the 
repetition expectancy perspective is the same as for the feature integration 
perspective. Moreover, the plots for both of these two perspectives differ from the 
plot for the conflict monitoring/adaptation perspective.  
 
 
5.2. Purpose of experiment 4 
 
Here we intended to design a new, more ecologically valid, emotional face flanker 
paradigm that enables us to research goal conflict resolution by investigating the 
CSE. Moreover, we intended to control for contingency learning, negative priming, 
and as far as possible any feature integration effects. It seems that precisely 
delineating the effects of conflict monitoring and repetition expectancy upon the 
CSE is not very easy. However, we suggest that even though the data is plotted 
differently for these two accounts, and the theoretical cognitive mechanisms differ, 
they are actually still quite similar. The impact of any anxiety effect found upon the 
CSE would be similar regardless of which of these two perspectives one preferred. 
As discussed in chapter 2, in real life settings an (in)congruency repetition advantage 
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may manifest as the increased speed of detection of repeated conflicting (or non-
conflicting) facial emotions in the social environment. In contrast, an (in)congruency 
repetition disadvantage may manifest as a reduced speed of detection of repeated 
conflicting (or non-conflicting) facial emotions in the social environment. This 
would be true regardless of whether the CSE was driven by conflict adaptation, 
subjective expectancies (or even episodic memory). Thus we suggest that the CSE is 
still a viable method of researching how anxiety relates to conflict resolution. In 
short, here we wished to achieve three things. Firstly, we wished to design and test a 
new emotional CSE paradigm with an increased level of ecological validity. 
Secondly, we wished to use it to investigate whether a reliable anxiety related effect 
of emotional conflict resolution exists. Thirdly, we wished to determine whether 
fearful faces and happy faces differentially affect the magnitude of the CSE. 
Experiment 1 used a design with unequal proportions of congruent and incongruent 
trials, which theoretically could have enhanced the magnitude of the CSE. However, 
above we suggested that contingency learning was not the driving force behind the 
CSE in experiment 1 as RTs for iI trials were similar to RTs for cC trials. However, 
to be sure of this in the present study, we used equal proportions of congruent and 
incongruent trials. As discussed above, there is no evidence for negative priming in 
binary flanker tasks. However, to be sure this cannot affect the CSE we used a 
design with stimuli consisting of six persons’ identities included in each task. 
Moreover, we designed our sequences of stimuli such that the identity of the person 
depicting a target emotion was never the same identity as that of the flanker faces 
appearing in the previous trial, we suggest that negative priming should definitely 
not be possible. We can also account for possible feature integration effects because 
the identity of the person depicting a target emotion is never the same identity as that 
of the flanker faces in the previous trial. In addition, we can also account for 
differences in performance that may occur relative to whether the hand used by the 
participant to make a response repeats (i.e., the response repetition priming effect), 
or does not repeat, at the stage of data analysis.  
Thus, the purpose of this 4th experiment is to ascertain how trait anxiety relates to the 
CSE, but also to use a design that enables us to better understand the mechanism 
driving the CSE, and any anxiety effect upon the CSE. As stated above, we also 
wished to increase ecological validity relative to the task we designed for experiment 
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1. In experiment 1 the flanker stimuli were of the same identity to the target stimuli. 
This was the case as, when developing the original version of the task, we wished to 
remain as true to the conventional flanker task design as possible. In the real world 
faces on the periphery of any target face would be of a different person’s identity. In 
the present experiment we also included this alteration in our design. Thus, this 
alteration serves the dual purpose of controlling for the design and interpretation 
issues described above, and also increasing ecological validity. 
Specifically, we predicted that higher trait anxiety would be related to an increased 
CSE. More specifically, we predicted that higher trait anxiety would relate to an 
increased (in)congruency repetition advantage. We made this prediction based upon 
the results of experiment 1, and the results of Larson, Clawson, Clayson and 
Baldwin (2013). We also intended to conduct analyses designed to determine 
whether fearful faces and happy faces differentially affect the magnitude of the CSE. 
We make no specific predictions here as there is no literature available to base them 
on. We also intended to delineate trials with and without target and response 
repetition, in order to determine where the CSE occurs. As discussed above, the 
literature is inconsistent concerning this issue, so we cannot make a precise 
prediction here.  
As noted above, here we control for contingency learning, negative priming, and as 
far as possible any feature integration effects. However, as we are not attempting to 
delineate the effects of conflict adaptation and repetition expectancy here, we still 
plot the data, and analyse the CSE from the relatively atheoretical perspective that 
we adopted in experiment 1.  
 
5.3. Method 
 
5.3.1. Participants 
 
Participants with no reported history of neurological disorder (N = 87, 61 female) 
were recruited from Goldsmiths, University of London, and had a mean age of 24.3 
(SD = 6). 73 of these participants were right handed. 21 participants were 
psychology 1st year undergraduates recruited via a research participation scheme 
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who took part in return for course credit. The rest were paid £10 and recruited via 
advertisements placed around the campus, and were therefore students and staff from 
other departments. All participants gave informed written consent in accordance with 
standard ethical guidelines. This study was approved by the Goldsmiths Psychology 
Department ethics committee (approval received 24/10/2012).  
Based upon the 0.32 correlation between trait anxiety and the RT difference between 
responses to happy and fearful faces in experiment 1 of this thesis, 74 participants 
should allow 80% power for a two-tailed test at p=0.05, for a correlation of 0.32 in 
this experiment. We can also make a sample size and power prediction based upon 
the 0.4 correlation between anxiety and the CSE reported in the study by Larson et 
al. (2013), which also suggest that 46 participants would be sufficient. However, 
experiment 1 in this thesis showed a weaker 0.24 correlation between anxiety and the 
CSE. To obtain this size of correlation  133 participants would be required to allow 
80% power for a two-tailed test at p=0.05. However, we can make a one-tailed 
prediction here based upon experiment 1, so 103 participants would provide 80% 
power here. We therefore aimed for 100 participants approximately. Our final 
sample of 87 participants is slightly smaller than the required amount based on a 
0.24 correlation, but the availability of participants was somewhat reduced towards 
the end of our testing period. 87 participants gave us a power of 73% for a 0.24 
correlation.  
 
5.3.2. Psychometric measures. 
Trait anxiety was initially assessed with the STAI trait anxiety scale of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 1983; referred to as STAI-trait 
hereafter). We also used the previously proposed anxiety and depression subscales of 
the STAI, as described by Bieling, Antony & Swinson (1998). The STAI-anxiety 
subscale consists of STAI-trait items 22, 28, 29, 31, 37, 38, & 40. The STAI-
depression subscale consists of STAI-trait items 21, 23-27, 30, 32-36, & 39. 
 
5.3.3. Stimuli 
The emotional faces used were obtained from a standardised face stimuli set 
developed for research (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 2009). The individual face 
212 
 
pictures were 20mm high x 16 mm wide and were formed into grids of 9 faces, thus 
the overall grid dimensions were 60mm high and 48 mm wide (when presented using 
MATLAB version R2006a on a 15.5 inch laptop screen). The laptop was running 
Windows XP, and we used the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 for precision RT 
measurement. As with experiment 4, three face stimulus sets containing different 
people’s faces in each were used. Each of the three face sets included happy and 
fearful facial expressions (with versions of each expression included that had both 
open mouths and closed mouths) posed by six different models from the NimStim 
set. Thus, in each set, images of each of the six models were used, with both closed 
and open mouths (for both facial expressions). Figure 5.4 shows examples of the 
grids of emotional faces used to create the congruent and incongruent trials described 
below. 
 
Figure 5.4: Examples of the grids of emotional faces used to create the different 
trial types. Clockwise from top left; incongruent happy trial; incongruent happy 
trial; incongruent fear trial; congruent happy trial; congruent fear trial; 
congruent fear trial.  
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5.3.4. Procedure 
 
Participants were told that they would be required to complete a facial emotion 
recognition task. Participants were asked to sit as close to the screen as was 
comfortable for their eyes (typical viewing distance was approximately 70 cm). The 
task instructions were presented on the screen. To start each task the first screen 
instructed participants that they would have to judge the emotional expression 
showing on photos of faces. Participants were then shown examples of the various 
stimulus combinations they might see and reminded to concentrate on the central 
face and ignore any others. They were told to rest their index fingers over the 
responses keys (z and /) and to respond as fast as possible while maintaining high 
accuracy levels. They were verbally told that a high pitched tone following a 
response indicates a correct response, whereas a low pitched tone following a 
response indicates an incorrect response.  
 
The experimental stimuli were displayed until a response key was pressed. 
Unbeknown to the participants, at the beginning of each task, there were twelve 
congruent trials and twelve incongruent trials included as practice trials; these were 
discarded and not analysed. The main experimental stimuli that followed consisted 
of 120 incongruent trials and 120 congruent trials. The emotional stimuli also 
consisted of 120 happy face trials and 120 fearful face trials. Thus, there were 60 
happy incongruent trials and 60 happy congruent trials (and 60 fearful incongruent 
trials and 60 fearful congruent trials). Half of each of these sets of 60 stimuli types 
had open mouths whereas half had closed mouths. The modified flanker task was 
designed primarily to elicit RT effects as opposed to errors. The trial type sequence 
was created using a programme in Matlab that used its random number generator 
function to create a sequence with very specific requirements (see below). The 
sequence used was the same for all participants. We kept the sequence the same for 
all participants as this is an individual differences study, and we wanted as few 
uncontrolled variables as possible to vary across participants. We specified in the 
programme, which created the sequence, that at no point was a person’s identity 
from a previous trial (target or flanker) to be used in the following trial (target or 
flanker). This was to help control for feature integration and negative priming (as 
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discussed above). The task lasted for approximately ten minutes. The left/right finger 
response key mappings were also counterbalanced.  
 
5.3.5: Data analysis  
In our primary analysis, RTs will be analysed using ANCOVA with factors of trial 
type, emotion, previous trial type (i.e. (in)congruency repetition/alternation), and 
previous emotion (emotion repetition vs. emotion alternation), with standardised trait 
anxiety included as the covariate.  
The effect of trial type will allow us to test if the different types of peripheral 
distracting faces (congruent vs. incongruent) affect the discrimination of the central 
target faces. The effect of the covariate here will show if anxiety modulates 
(correlates with) the overall trial type effect. The effect of emotion will reveal 
whether RTs to central fearful faces differ from RTs to central happy faces, and the 
covariate interaction with this will test whether trait anxiety modulates (correlates 
with) this emotion effect. The effect of emotion upon the effect of trial type will 
allow us to test whether the size of the distraction (trial type) effects differ 
significantly when happy or fearful faces are the target emotion. The anxiety by 
emotion by trial type interaction will test whether trait anxiety modulates (correlates 
with) the emotion by trial type interaction effect. 
The CSE is the previous trial type effect, which we have referred to as the 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation effect. This effect is the RT difference between 
trials when the level of (in)congruency repeats relative to when it alternates. The 
effect of emotion upon the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect tests if the 
CSE differs between trials with happy central target faces vs. trials with fear targets. 
The critical covariate effect here is the covariate interaction with the (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect. This will reveal if anxiety modulates (correlates with) 
the size of the CSE. These effects therefore test our hypotheses that anxiety will 
relate to a difference in how conflict resolution is achieved (as indexed by the CSE).  
The effect of previous emotion tests the RT difference between trials when the target 
emotion (i.e., happy vs. fear) repeats relative to when it alternates. This emotion 
repetition vs. emotion alternation effect can also be described as whether the correct 
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response on the previous trial was repeated or not. Such effects are sometimes 
described in the literature as target and response repetition effects.  
The test of previous emotion (emotion repetition vs. emotion alternation) upon the 
effect of emotion tests whether the emotion RT difference differs significantly when 
the emotion repeats between the previous and current trial, and when it alternates. 
More critically, the test of previous emotion upon the effect of (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation tests whether the CSE differs significantly between trials on 
which the previous emotion is repeated on the current trial, compared with trials on 
which the previous emotion alternates to the other emotion on the current trial.  The 
anxiety by previous emotion by current emotion effect thus tests if trait anxiety 
modulates (correlates with) the size of the previous emotion by current emotion 
interaction.  
The further 3 and 4-way interactions test if either target emotion or trial type 
modulate other effects within this design. The covariate interactions with these 
complex higher order interactions test whether those effects are further modulated by 
trait anxiety.  
We also conducted follow-up tests where required and also some planned 
comparisons of the trial type versus (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction 
in each emotion condition, and each emotion repetition/alternation condition. In 
effect, we sorted the trial type and (in)congruency repetition/alternation comparisons 
by target emotion and by target and response repetition/alternation.  
We also planned to conduct further analyses concerning how the STAI subscales 
relates to relate to any RT effects that relate to trait anxiety as measured by the total 
scores of the STAI. For completeness, the main analyses were then repeated with the 
accuracy data.  
 
5.4. Results 
 
5.4.1. Psychometric measures 
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In this sample, participants’ total STAI scores (STAI-trait scores) ranged from 23 to 
69 (mean: 43, SD: 9).  
 
5.4.2. Reaction time analyses 
 
Including all participants the experiment contained 20880 responses in total. 19534 
of these were correct responses. Correct responses ranged from 1 msec to 6751 
msecs. RT outliers for correct responses were removed if RTs < 200 msecs and RTs 
> 1250 msecs. Of these 1530 were where RT > 1250msecs, and 2 were where RT < 
0.200 msecs. Thus, 1532 correct responses were removed. Thus, 7.84 % of correct 
responses were excluded.  
1532 / 19534 * 100 
 
We will denote 4 key types of goal conflict trial within this analysis thus: 
incongruent trials preceded by incongruent trials (iI); incongruent trials preceded by 
congruent trials (cI); congruent trials preceded by congruent trials (cC); and 
congruent trials preceded by incongruent trials (iC).We will also denote 4 key types 
of emotion trial within this analysis thus: fearful trials preceded by fearful trials (fF); 
fearful trials preceded by happy trials (hF); happy trials preceded by happy trials 
(hH); and happy trials preceded by fearful trials (fH). However, the nature of our 
analysis requires combining the goal conflict and emotion variables, as each of the 
goal conflict variable appears under each of the emotion variables. Thus, this creates 
16 variables 4 x 4 (sequential conflict trials x sequential emotion trials). 
Accordingly, the 16 trials types are denoted by both the goal conflict and emotion 
denotations. For example, fFiI would denote a trial where an incongruent fear trial 
follows and incongruent fear trial. Similarly, hFcI would denote a trial where an 
incongruent fear trial follows a congruent happy trial.  
The RT data were subjected to a 2 (current trial type; congruent versus incongruent) 
x 2 (emotion; fearful face versus happy face) x 2 (previous trial type; (in)congruency 
repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) x 2 (previous emotion type; emotional 
face repetition versus alternation) repeated-measures ANCOVA with the 
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standardised scores of the STAI-trait measure as the covariate. STAI-trait scores are 
referred to as trait anxiety in this analysis. Responses faster than 200 msecs and 
slower than 1250 msecs were not included. We also planned to conduct several 
further comparisons designed to examine the CSE in each of four specific cognitive 
situations; 1:  fearful faces with target/response repetition; 2: fearful faces without 
target/response repetition; 3: happy faces with target response repetition; 4: happy 
faces without target response repetition.  
The test of between-subjects effects was not significant (F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.448, 
η2=0.007), thus anxiety was unrelated to RTs averaged across the paradigm. The 
mean RTs for each trial type, 95% confidence intervals, and standard errors of the 
mean are shown in Table 5.2. Figure 5.5 shows the mean RTs for each of the 16 trial 
types. 
 
Table 5.2: Mean RTs, 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs), and standard errors 
(SE) for each of the 16 stimulus types. All values are in msecs. As described above, 
in the trial type denotations the first 2 letters describe the emotion presented on the 
previous trial (lower case) and the current trial (upper case). Then the next 2 
letters describe the congruency type again for the previous trial (lower case) and 
the current trial (upper case). 
 Fearful face trials  Happy face trials 
        
Trial type Mean 95% CI SE Trial type Mean 95% CI SE 
        
fFcC 
hFcC 
fFiC 
hFiC 
fFiI 
hFiI 
fFcI 
hFcI 
778 
809 
 
791 
 
773 
 
815 
 
798 
 
781 
 
781 
729-827 
757-861 
 
747-835 
 
731-815 
 
765-864 
 
754-841 
 
738-824 
 
738-823 
25 
26 
 
22 
 
21 
 
25 
 
22 
 
22 
 
21 
hHcC 
fHcC 
hHiC 
fHiC 
hHiI 
fHiI 
hHcI 
fHcI 
727 
775 
722 
766 
725 
769 
745 
 
792 
689-765 
732-819 
 
686-759 
 
726-807 
 
685-765 
 
727-810 
 
707-783 
 
747-836 
19 
22 
 
18 
 
20 
 
20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
22 
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Figure 5.5: Mean RTs for each of the 16 trial types separated by current trial 
congruency, previous trial congruency, emotion, and previous emotion.   
 
The test of within subjects effects showed that the main effect of trial type was not 
significant (F[1,85]=3.4, p=0.067, η2=0.039). Thus, averaged congruent trials (mean 
RT 769 msecs; 95% CI 729-809; SE 20) were not responded to significantly faster 
than averaged incongruent trials (mean RT 776 msecs; 95% CI 737-815; SE 20). The 
main effect of trial type did not significantly interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=1.6, 
p=0.206, η2=0.019). This interaction finding shows that there was no significant 
correlation between trait anxiety and the RT difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials. This effect relates to our key interest in whether trait anxiety 
relates to distraction.  
The main effect of emotional face type was highly significant (F[1,85]=41.5, 
p<0.001, η2=0.328), as averaged happy faces (mean RT 754 msecs: 95% CI 717-
792; SE 19) were responded to faster than averaged fearful faces (mean RT 791 
msecs; 95% CI 749-834; SE 21). However, the main effect of emotional face type 
did not significantly interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.4, p=0.544, η2=0.004). 
Therefore, trait anxiety was not significantly correlated with the RT difference 
between responses to happy faces and responses to fearful faces. This effect relates 
to our key interest in whether trait anxiety relates to emotional face discrimination. 
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The main effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation was not significant 
(F[1,85]=1.6, p=0.212, η2=0.018). This shows that the CSE was not significant when 
averaged across emotion types and across congruent and incongruent trials. In other 
words averaged (in)congruency repetition trials  (mean RT 774 msecs; 95% CI 733-
816; SE 21) were not responded to significantly faster than averaged (in)congruency 
alternation trials (mean RT 769 msecs; 95% CI 731-807; SE 19). Critically, this 
effect also did not significantly interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.4, p=0.536, 
η2=0.005). Thus, trait anxiety was uncorrelated with the RT difference between 
averaged (in)congruency repetition trials and averaged (in)congruency alternation 
trials. This effect relates to our key interest in whether trait anxiety relates to conflict 
resolution as measured by the CSE. 
The main effect of emotional face repetition/alternation was highly significant 
(F[1,85]=23.2, p<0.001, η2=0.214). This shows that averaged RTs to faces that 
followed a face depicting the same emotion  (mean RT 760 msecs; 95% CI 722-799; 
SE 19) were significantly faster than averaged RTs to faces that followed a face 
depicting the alternative emotion (mean RT 783 msecs; 95% CI 742-824; SE 21). 
This main effect of emotional face repetition/alternation did not interact with trait 
anxiety (F[1,85]=0.7, p=0.419, η2=0.008). Thus, anxiety was not correlated with the 
RT difference between emotional face repetition trials and emotional face alternation 
trials. 
The trial type x emotion interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.2, p=0.656, 
η2=0.002). This shows that the effect of trial type (i.e., the congruency effect) upon 
RTs did not significantly differ depending upon what the target emotional face was. 
However, the trial type x emotion x trait anxiety interaction was significant 
(F[1,85]=5.3, p=0.024, η2=0.059). This shows that trait anxiety was related to a 
difference in the effect of trial type (or congruency effect) between the two emotion 
conditions. The correlation value between trait anxiety and the RT difference 
between the fearful trial congruency effect and the happy trial congruency effect is -
0.23, p=0.029. This correlation is depicted in Figure 5.6. This effect relates to our 
key interest in whether trait anxiety relates to distraction, thus we return to this issue 
later. 
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Figure 5.6: The correlation between standardised trait anxiety and the RT 
difference between the congruency effect for trials with fearful target faces and 
the congruency effect for trials with happy target faces. The correlation value is -
0.23.  
 
The trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was not significant 
(F[1,85]=0.8, p=0.368, η2=0.010). This shows that there was no difference in the 
effect of (in)congruency repetition and alternation depending upon whether 
congruent or incongruent trials were involved. Moreover, the trial type x 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction did not further interact with anxiety 
(F[1,85]=0.3, p=0.581, η2=0.004).   
By contrast, the emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was 
robustly significant (F[1,85]=7.3, p=0.008, η2=0.079). This interaction suggests that 
the effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation may be present more strongly in 
one of the emotion conditions than the other. This effect is depicted by Figure 5.7. 
We return for further statistical analysis of this effect later.  
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Figure 5.7: The RT interaction between the effect of (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation and the effect of target emotional face type.  
 
The emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction did not significantly 
further interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=2.6, p=0.113, η2=0.029). Thus trait 
anxiety was not significantly correlated with any relative difference in the size of the 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation effect that may occur as a function of emotional 
target face type. This effect relates to our key interest in whether trait anxiety relates 
to conflict resolution and emotion. 
The trial type x emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was also 
robustly significant (F[1,85]=7.4, p=0.008, η2=0.081). Thus the effect of emotion on 
the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect varies significantly depending 
whether the trials are congruent or incongruent. This interaction is explained by 
Figures 5.8 and 5.9. 
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Figure 5.8: The RT interaction between the effect of congruency repetition and 
alternation, and the effect of emotional face type for the congruent trials. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: The interaction between the effect of congruency repetition and 
alternation, and the effect of emotional face type for the incongruent trials. 
 
We return for further statistical analysis of this effect later. However, trait anxiety 
was not related to this effect, as the trial type x emotion x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x anxiety interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.3, p=0.616, 
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η2=0.003). This effect relates to our key interest in whether trait anxiety relates to 
conflict resolution and emotion. 
The trial type x emotional face repetition/alternation interaction was not significant 
(F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.444, η2=0.007). This comparison shows that the effect of trial type 
upon RTs was not affected by whether the emotional face type depicted the same 
emotion as the previous trial, or depicted a different emotion to the previous trial. 
The trial type x emotional face repetition/alternation interaction did not further 
significantly interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.02, p=0.902, η2<0.001). This 
shows that trait anxiety was not related to any sequential effect of emotion upon the 
effect of trial type.  
The emotion x emotional face repetition/alternation interaction was robustly 
significant (F[1,85]=18.8, p<0.001, η2=0.181). This shows that the difference in RTs 
for responses when the emotional face type repeats relative to when the emotional 
face type alternates is greater in one of the two emotion conditions. Figure 5.10 
shows that an emotional face repetition advantage was present for the happy faces 
but not the fearful faces. We return for further statistical analysis of this effect later. 
The emotion x emotional face repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction was 
not significant (F[1,85]=0.1, p=0.725, η2=0.001). Thus this effect of emotion upon 
the emotional face repetition/alternation effect was not further modulated by trait 
anxiety. Moreover, the trial type x emotion x emotion repetition/alternation 
interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.435, η2=0.007), and this interaction 
did not further interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.02, p=0.895, η2<0.001). 
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Figure 5.10: Mean RTs for the happy target faces, and fearful target faces, as a 
function of the previous emotional face type. 
 
The (in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotional face repetition/alternation 
interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.8, p=0.383, η2=0.009). This shows that 
averaged across emotion type, and trial type, the CSE did not differ between 
responses to repeated emotional faces and alternated emotional faces. Thus, overall 
the CSE appeared to be unaffected by whether the emotion repeated or not. 
Moreover, this null effect did not further significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]=1.0, p=0.320, η2=0.012). This effect relates to our key interest in whether 
trait anxiety relates to conflict resolution and emotion. 
The trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotional face 
repetition/alternation interaction was significant (F[1,85]=5.4, p=0.022, η2=0.060). 
Given the large number of effects in this 4-way design we might treat this relatively 
weak effect with caution. It might be a Type I error. If it is real, then it suggests that 
there was an effect of emotional target and response repetition/alternation that is 
modulated by the effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation, but this effect 
differs between trial types. This is illustrated by Figures 5.11 and 5.12. We return for 
further statistical analyses of this effect later. However, this interaction did not 
further interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.3, p=0.577, η2=0.004). 
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Figure 5.11: The interaction between the (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
effect and the emotional target and response repetition/alternation effect for 
congruent trials. The reader is reminded here that the variables in this interaction 
are averaged across the two emotional face types.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: The interaction between the (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
effect and the emotional target and response repetition/alternation effect for 
incongruent trials. The reader is reminded here that the variables in this 
interaction are averaged across the two emotional face types.  
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The emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotional face 
repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.444, 
η2=0.007), nor was the emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotional 
face repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=0.3, p=0.586, 
η2=0.004). Similarly the trial type x emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
x emotion repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=2.3, 
p=0.130, η2=0.027), nor was the trial type x emotion x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x emotion repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction 
(F[1,85]=2.4, p=0.128, η2=0.027). 
 
5.4.3. Probing the RT interaction effects 
 
There were some significant interactions in the previous analysis that require further 
analyses. The trial type x emotion x trait anxiety interaction suggests that the effect 
of trial type (i.e., the congruency effect) is modulated by anxiety but the modulation 
is different across the two emotion conditions. To verify which condition this was 
we conducted two more ANCOVAS (including standardised trait anxiety as the 
covariate). Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.05/2. A one-way 
ANCOVA conducted upon trial type (congruent versus incongruent) in the fearful 
face condition showed that although the trial type effect was not significant 
(F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.442, η2=0.007), trait anxiety showed a trend towards interacting 
with the trial type effect (F[1,85]=4.8, p=0.031, η2=0.054). This interaction tests the 
correlation between trait anxiety and the RT difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials when fearful faces were the target emotion. The correlation value 
was r=0.23. Therefore those higher in anxiety showed a greater RT congruency 
effect relative to those lower in anxiety. A second one-way ANCOVA conducted 
upon trial type (congruent versus incongruent) in the happy face condition showed 
that the effect of trial type was not significant (F[1,85]=3.2, p=0.077, η2=0.036), and 
nor was the trial type versus trait anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=0.7, p=0.419, 
η2=0.008). Thus, anxiety was not correlated with the RT difference between 
congruent and incongruent trials when happy faces were the target emotion. The 
correlation value was r= -0.09. Figure 5.13 shows the two separate correlations 
between trait anxiety and the congruency effect for trials with target happy faces, and 
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the congruency effect for trials with target fearful faces. These two correlations 
relate to our key interest in whether trait anxiety relates to distraction. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: The two separate correlations between standardised trait anxiety and 
the congruency effect for trials with target happy faces, and the congruency effect 
for trials with target fearful faces. The correlation values are r= -0.09, and r=0.23, 
respectively.  
 
As the trend towards an anxiety interaction with the trial type congruency effect for 
fear trials could have been driven by high anxious participants responding slower on 
incongruent trials and/or faster on congruent trials we ran two more correlations to 
clarify this issue. Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.025/2. Trait 
anxiety was not significantly correlated with RTs to incongruent fear trials (r= -0.05, 
p=0.673), or with RTs to congruent trials (r= -0.11, p=0.298).  
Next, we focused upon the emotion versus previous emotion interaction. Figure 5.10 
depicted above suggests that the emotional response priming effect is present for 
happy faces but not fearful faces. In order to explore this statistically we conducted 
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two more one-way ANCOVAS (including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate) 
whilst also adopting an adjusted significance level of 0.05/2. The first one-way 
ANCOVA showed that there was no significant RT difference between fearful trials 
that followed a fearful trial and fearful trials that followed a happy trial (F[1,85]=0.2, 
p=0.879, η2<0.001). Moreover, trait anxiety did not significantly interact with this 
comparison (F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.801, η2=0.001).  Thus, trait anxiety was not correlated 
with any RT difference between these trials. The second one-way ANCOVA showed 
that there was a significant RT difference between happy trials that followed a happy 
trial and happy trials that followed a fearful trial (F[1,85]=44.4, p<0.001, η2=0.343). 
Once again, trait anxiety did not significantly interact with this comparison 
(F[1,85]=0.7, p=0.412, η2=0.008).  Thus, trait anxiety was not correlated with any 
RT difference between these trials.  
There were also two more complex interactions that were significant in our initial 
ANCOVA; first there is a trial type x emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
interaction, depicted above in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. Second, there is a trial type x 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotional face repetition/alternation 
interaction, depicted above in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. Rather than carry out individual 
follow-up analyses for these interactions we carried out our planned (and thus more 
meaningful) comparisons of the trial type versus (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction in each emotion condition, and emotion 
repetition/alternation condition. In effect, we sorted the trial type and (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation comparisons by target emotion and target and response 
repetition/alternation. Thus we conducted four ANCOVAS on the CSE (i.e., fear 
trials without target and response repetition; fear trials with target and response 
repetition; happy trials without target and response repetition; happy trials with 
target and response repetition). Here we adopt an adjusted significance level of 
0.05/4.  
The first analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the fearful face condition (when target emotion and response do not 
repeat), including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect was robustly significant 
(F[1,85]=9.2, p=0.003, η2=0.098). However, the (in)congruency 
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repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]=0.1, p=0.730, η2=0.001). Figure 5.14 shows that the CSE for fearful trials 
when the previous emotion was a happy face is in reverse to what is usually found. 
In short, (in)congruency alternation trials were responded to faster than 
(in)congruency repetition trials. The trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=1.4, p=0.234, η2=0.017), and nor was the 
trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction 
(F[1,85]=1.4, p=0.243, η2=0.016). The test of between-subjects effects showed that 
trait anxiety was uncorrelated with RTs averaged across these trial types 
(F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.459, η2=0.006).  
 
 
Figure 5.14: The significant reversed (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect 
in RTs for fearful trials without emotional target and response repetition. 
 
The second analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the fearful face condition (when target emotion and response do 
repeat), including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect shown in Figure 5.15 was 
not significant (F[1,85]=0.9, p=0.332, η2=0.011). The (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]=2.7, p=0.102, η2=0.031). The trial type x (in)congruency 
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repetition/alternation interaction was not significant at the adjusted significance level 
(F[1,85]=5.3, p=0.024, η2=0.058), and nor was the trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=0.9, p=0.338, η2=0.011). 
The test of between-subjects effects showed that trait anxiety was uncorrelated with 
RTs averaged across these trial types (F[1,85]=0.7, p=0.410, η2=0.008). 
 
 
Figure 5.15: The non-significant (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect in 
RTs for fearful trials with emotional target and response repetition. 
 
The third analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the happy face condition (when target emotion and response do not 
repeat), including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect shown in Figure 5.16 was 
not significant (F[1,85]=0.6, p=0.450, η2=0.007). The (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]=0.5, p=0.467, η2=0.006). The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction was not significant at the adjusted significance level 
(F[1,85]=4.4, p=0.038, η2=0.049), and nor was the trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=1.5, p=0.230, η2=0.017). 
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The test of between-subjects effects showed that trait anxiety was uncorrelated with 
RTs averaged across these trial types (F[1,85]=0.3, p=0.607, η2=0.003). 
 
Figure 5.16: The non-significant (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect in 
RTs for happy trials with no emotional target and response repetition. 
 
The fourth analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the happy face condition (when target emotion and response do 
repeat), including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect shown in Figure 5.17 was 
not significant (F[1,85]=0.8, p=0.386, η2=0.009). The (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]=0.1, p=0.733, η2=0.001). The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=2.8, p=0.098, 
η2=0.032), and nor was the trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x trait 
anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=0.1, p=0.911, η2<0.001). The test of between-subjects 
effects showed that trait anxiety was uncorrelated with RTs averaged across these 
trial types (F[1,85]=0.8, p=0.368, η2=0.010). 
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Figure 5.17: The non-significant (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect in 
RTs for happy trials with emotional target and response repetition. 
 
To follow, we followed up the reversed CSE interaction found for fearful trials when 
target and response did not repeat, in order to verify if both incongruent and 
congruent trials were implicated. Here we use two one-way ANCOVAs with 
standardised trait anxiety included as the covariate. Here we adopt a further adjusted 
significance level of 0.0125/2. The first ANCOVA compared hFiI trials with hFcI 
trials, and showed that hFcI trials were not responded to significantly faster than hFiI 
trials (F[1,85]=2.9, p=0.092, η2=0.033). Trait anxiety did not significantly interact 
with this RT difference (F[1,85]=1.4, p=0.238, η2=0.016). Thus, trait anxiety was not 
significantly correlated with the RT difference between these trials. The correlation 
value was r=0.13. The second ANCOVA compared hFcC trials with hFiC trials, and 
showed that hFiC trials were responded to faster than hFcC trials (F[1,85]=7.6, 
p=0.007, η2=0.082). This comparison was very near significant as the adjusted 
significance level of p=0.006. This means that the reversed CSE was found primarily 
in the congruent trials. Once again, trait anxiety did not significantly interact with 
this RT difference (F[1,85]=0.2, p=0.643, η2=0.003). Thus, trait anxiety was 
uncorrelated with the RT difference between these trials. The correlation value was 
r= -0.05. 
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5.4.4. Latent correlations: Controlling for general RT effects.  
 
As with experiment 1, we suspected that the correlations between trait anxiety and 
the specific RT effects in any single condition were likely to have been suppressed 
by general sources of RT variance shared across all conditions. Thus, we calculated a 
general RT factor. Exploratory factor analyses clearly revealed a strong general RT 
factor across all conditions. To estimate the general RT factor we used a maximum 
likelihood extraction of two factors using mean RTs from each participant for each 
of the 16 stimulus types. Factor 1 was clearly the general RT factor (all loadings > 
0.83), which accounted for 78% of the variance). Factor 2 was much smaller, and 
accounted for 6% of the variance. We used the general RT factor in a series of 
exploratory partial correlations to determine if trait anxiety shared any latent RT 
correlations with any specific effect. These correlations have not been adjusted for 
multiple testing and should therefore be treated with caution. When controlling for 
these general RT effects trait anxiety was still not significantly correlated with the 
happy face recognition advantage (r= -0.04, p=0.726), and not significantly 
correlated with the reversed CSE for fear trials (when target and response did not 
repeat; r= -0.06, p=0.556), nor was trait anxiety significantly correlated with the 
CSE when we combined fear trials with and without target and response repetition 
(r= -0.14, p=0.216). However, the correlation between trait anxiety and the 
congruency effect for fear trials remained stable (r= 0.22, p=0.039). When 
controlling for general RTs trait anxiety was correlated with RTs to congruent fear 
trials at a trend level (r= -0.21, p=0.052), but not with RTs to incongruent trials (r= 
0.05, p=0.624). Thus, the anxiety effect upon the congruency effect for fear trials 
appears to be driven by high anxious participants responding to congruent trials 
faster than low anxious participants. Finally, we also confirmed that when 
controlling for general RTs, trait anxiety was still not significantly correlated with 
the RT difference between hFiI trials and hFcI trials (r= 0.14, p=0.209), and also not 
significantly correlated with the RT difference between hFcC trials and hFiC trials 
(r= -0.03, p=0.799).  
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5.4.5. Exploratory RT correlations with the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression 
measures. 
 
STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression correlated positively and moderately (r=0.65, 
p<0.001). We wished to explore the relationship between these measures and some 
selected RT effects. Once again these analyses are exploratory in nature, are not 
adjusted for multiple testing, and as such should be treated with caution. We wished 
to verify whether the STAI-anxiety subscale related to any of the main emotional 
goal conflict effects of interest any more strongly than the total STAI-trait scores did. 
We also wished to verify whether STAI-depression related to any of these effects.  
STAI-anxiety correlated with the interference effect for fear trials (r= 0.21, p=0.057) 
at a trend level (the correlation value was r= 0.21, p=0.052, when controlling for the 
general RT factor), as did STAI-depression (r= 0.22, p=0.045; the correlation value 
was r= 0.20, p=0.067 when controlling for the general RT factor). However, partial 
correlation showed that when controlling for STAI-depression, STAI-anxiety was no 
longer correlated with the interference effect for fear trials (r= 0.087, p=0.423). 
When controlling for STAI-anxiety, STAI-depression was uncorrelated with the 
interference effect for fear trials (r= 0.11, p=0.306). Therefore we suggest that the 
STAI-trait correlation with the interference effect for fear trials was driven by the 
shared variance of STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression. This analysis relates to our 
key interest in whether trait anxiety relates to distraction. 
Similarly to the total scores of the STAI-trait (r= 0.04, p=0.730), STAI-anxiety was 
not significantly correlated with the reversed RT (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect for fear trials when target and response did not repeat (r= 
0.11, p=0.295). The correlation value was (r= 0.13, p=0.253), when controlling for 
the general RT factor. As one would expect, STAI-depression was also uncorrelated 
with the reversed RT (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect for fear trials when 
target and response did not repeat (r= -0.02, p=0.857). The correlation value was (r= 
0.01, p=0.901), when controlling for the general RT factor. 
Next, we wished to verify whether when controlling for general RTs STAI-anxiety 
and/or STAI-depression were specifically correlated with the RT difference score for 
hFiI trials and hFcI trials, and also the RT difference score for hFcC trials and hFiC 
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trials. When controlling for general RTs STAI-anxiety was correlated with the RT 
difference between hFiI trials and hFcI trials (r= 0.22, p=0.040), but not the RT 
difference between hFcC trials and hFiC trials (r= -0.02, p=0.873). Moreover, when 
controlling for both general RTs and STAI-depression, STAI-anxiety was correlated 
with the RT difference between hFiI trials and hFcI trials (r=0.24, p=0.026). This 
effect relates to our key interest in whether trait anxiety relates to conflict resolution 
and emotion as indexed by the emotional CSE.  
When controlling for general RTs STAI-depression was not correlated with the RT 
difference between hFiI trials and hFcI trials (r= 0.06, p=0.592), nor with the RT 
difference between hFcC trials and hFiC trials (r= -0.03, p=0.778). Moreover, when 
controlling for both general RTs and STAI-anxiety, STAI-depression was still not 
significantly correlated with the RT difference between hFiI trials and hFcI trials (r= 
-0.12, p=0.293).  
Finally, we determined that STAI-anxiety was not significantly correlated with RTs 
to hFiI trials (r= -0.07, p=0.536), or hFcI trials (r= -0.04, p=0.742). However, when 
controlling for general RTs STAI-anxiety was correlated with hFiI trials (r= 0.21, 
p=0.051), but not hFcI trials (r= -0.06, p=0.579). Moreover, the correlation between 
STAI-anxiety and the hFiI trials was similar when controlling for both general RTs 
and STAI-depression (r= 0.22, p=0.043). This effect relates to our key interest in 
whether trait anxiety relates to conflict resolution and emotion as indexed by the 
emotional CSE. 
 
5.4.6. Proportion correct analysis 
 
The proportion correct data were subjected to a 2 (current trial type; congruent 
versus incongruent) x 2 (emotion; fearful face versus happy face) x 2 (previous trial 
type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) x 2 (previous 
emotion type; emotional face repetition versus alternation) repeated-measures 
ANCOVA with the standardised scores of the STAI-trait measure as the covariate. 
STAI-trait scores are referred to as trait anxiety in this analysis. Once again 
responses faster than 200 msecs and slower than 1250 msecs were not included. 
Again, we also planned to conduct several further comparisons designed to examine 
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the CSE in each of four specific cognitive situations; 1:  fearful faces with 
target/response repetition; 2: fearful faces without target/response repetition; 3: 
happy faces with target response repetition; 4: happy faces without target response 
repetition. 
The test of between-subjects effects was not significant (F[1,85]=0.9, p=0.352, 
η2=0.010),thus anxiety was unrelated to proportion correct averaged across the 
paradigm. The mean proportion correct for each trial type, 95% confidence intervals, 
and standard errors of the mean are shown in Table 5.3. Figure 18 shows the mean 
proportion correct for each of the 16 trial types.  
 
Table 5.3: Mean proportion correct, 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs), and 
standard errors (SE) for each of the 16 stimulus types. As described above, in the 
trial type denotations the first 2 letters describe the emotion presented on the 
previous trial (lower case) and the current trial (upper case). Then the next 2 
letters describe the congruency type again for the previous trial (lower case) and 
the current trial (upper case). 
 Fearful face trials  Happy face trials 
        
Trial type Mean 95% CI SE Trial type Mean 95% CI SE 
        
fFcC 
hFcC 
fFiC 
hFiC 
fFiI 
hFiI 
fFcI 
hFcI 
0.95 
 
0.92 
 
0.92 
 
0.93 
 
0.92 
 
0.93 
 
0.94 
 
0.93 
0.93-0.96 
 
0.90-0.94 
 
0.90-0.94 
 
0.91-0.94 
 
0.90-0.94 
 
0.92-0.95 
 
0.92-0.96 
 
0.91-0.94 
0.008 
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Figure 5.18: Mean proportion correct for each of the 16 trial types separated by 
current trial congruency, previous trial congruency, emotion, and previous 
emotion.   
 
The test of within subjects effects showed that the main effect of trial type was not 
significant (F[1,85]=0.01, p=0.910, η2<0.001). Thus, averaged congruent trials 
(mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% CI 0.93-0.95; SE 0.005) were not responded to 
more accurately than averaged incongruent trials (mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% 
CI 0.93-0.94; SE 0.005). The main effect of trial type did not significantly interact 
with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=1.1, p=0.294, η2=0.013). This interaction shows that there 
was no significant correlation between trait anxiety and the accuracy difference 
between congruent and incongruent trials. 
The main effect of emotional face type was significant (F[1,85]=6.5, p=0.013, 
η2=0.071), as averaged happy faces (mean proportion correct = 0.94; 95% CI 0.93-
0.95; SE 0.005) were responded to significantly more accurately than averaged 
fearful faces (mean proportion correct = 0.93; 95% CI 0.92-0.94; SE 0.006). This 
effect is in alignment with the RT analysis which showed that happy faces were 
responded to faster than fearful faces. Moreover, in the proportion correct analysis 
the main effect of emotional face type did not significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]=3.3, p=0.075, η2=0.037), which is also in alignment with the RT analysis. 
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Therefore, trait anxiety was not correlated with the accuracy difference between 
responses to happy faces and responses to fearful faces. 
The main effect of (in)congruency repetition/alternation was not significant 
(F[1,85]=0.2, p=0.648, η2=0.002), as repetition trials (mean proportion correct 0.93; 
95% CI 0.92-0.94; SE 0.005) were not responded to significantly more accurately 
than alternation trials (mean proportion correct 0.94; 95% CI 0.93-0.995; SE 0.005). 
This shows that the CSE was not significant when averaged across all other features 
of the design. Critically, this effect also did not significantly interact with trait 
anxiety (F[1,85]=0.001, p=0.970, η2<0.001). Thus, trait anxiety was uncorrelated 
with any average accuracy difference between (in)congruency repetition trials and 
(in)congruency alternation trials.   
The main effect of emotional face repetition/alternation was significant 
(F[1,85]=6.5, p=0.013, η2=0.071). This shows that averaged proportion correct for 
faces that followed a face depicting the same emotion (mean proportion correct 0.94; 
95% CI 0.93-0.95; SE 0.005) were more accurate than averaged proportion correct 
for faces that followed a face depicting the alternative emotion (mean proportion 
correct 0.93; 95% CI 0.92-0.94; SE 0.005). This accuracy effect is in alignment with 
the RT analysis reported above which showed that emotion repetition trials were 
responded to significantly faster than emotion alternation trials. In the proportion 
correct analysis the main effect of emotional face repetition/alternation did not 
interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.2, p=0.667, η2=0.002). Thus, anxiety was not 
correlated with any accuracy difference between emotional face repetition trials and 
emotional face alternation trials. 
The trial type x emotion interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.002, p=0.964, 
η2<0.001). This shows that the effect of trial type upon accuracy did not significantly 
differ depending upon what he target emotional face was. The trial type x emotion x 
trait anxiety interaction was also not significant (F[1,85]=0.02, p=0.876, η2<0.001). 
This shows that trait anxiety was not related to any difference in the effect on 
accuracy of trial type between the two emotion conditions. This is in contrast to the 
RT analysis, which showed that trait anxiety was related to a difference in the effect 
of trial type between the two emotion conditions 
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The trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was not significant 
(F[1,85]=2.9, p=0.093, η2=0.033). This shows that there was no difference in the 
effect of (in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation depending upon 
which trial type was responded to. Moreover, the trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction did not further interact with anxiety (F[1,85]=1.3, 
p=0.252, η2=0.015).  
The emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was not significant 
(F[1,85]=0.4, p=0.524, η2=0.005). This shows that the effect of (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation did not differ significantly as a function of the emotion 
conditions. This null effect in accuracy is in contrast to the RT analysis which was 
robustly significant.  In the proportion correct analysis the emotion x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction did not significantly further interact with trait 
anxiety (F[1,85]=1.2, p=0.277, η2=0.014). Thus trait anxiety was not related to any 
difference in the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect that may occur relative 
to emotional target face type.  
The trial type x emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction was also 
not significant (F[1,85]=1.1, p=0.308, η2=0.012). Therefore the effect of trial type 
did not differ depending upon how emotional target face type affects the 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation effect. This null effect in accuracy is again in 
contrast to the RT analysis which was robustly significant.  In the proportion correct 
analysis, trait anxiety was not related to this effect, as the trial type x emotion x 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation x anxiety interaction was not significant 
(F[1,85]=0.4, p=0.529, η2=0.005). The trial type x emotional face 
repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=1.4, p=0.246, 
η2=0.016). This comparison shows that the effect of trial type upon accuracy was not 
affected by whether the emotional face type depicted the same emotion as the 
previous trial, or depicted a different emotion to the previous trial. The trial type x 
emotional face repetition/alternation interaction did not further significantly interact 
with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.5, p=0.462, η2=0.006). This shows that trait anxiety 
was not related to any sequential effect of emotion upon the effect of trial type.  
The emotion x emotional face repetition/alternation interaction was not significant 
(F[1,85]=3.1, p=0.083, η2=0.035). This shows that the difference in accuracy for 
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responses when the emotional face type repeats relative to when the emotional face 
type alternates is not significantly affected by which emotion type is involved. This 
is in contrast to the RT analysis, where this effect was robustly significant. In the 
proportion correct analysis the emotion x emotional face repetition/alternation x trait 
anxiety interaction was also not significant (F[1,85]=1.4, p=0.238, η2=0.016). Thus 
any possible effect of emotion upon the emotional face repetition/alternation effect 
was not modulated by trait anxiety. However, the trial type x emotion x emotion 
repetition/alternation interaction was highly significant (F[1,85]=9.4, p=0.003, 
η2=0.099). This effect is illustrate by Figures 5.19 and 5.20. We return for further 
statistical analyses of this effect later. This interaction did not further interact with 
trait anxiety (F[1,85]=1.3, p=0.258, η2=0.015). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19: The accuracy interaction between emotional expression type and 
previous emotional expression type for congruent trials. 
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Figure 5.20: The accuracy interaction between emotional expression type and 
previous emotional expression type for incongruent trials. 
 
The (in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotional face repetition/alternation 
interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.2, p=0.656, η2=0.002). Moreover, this null 
interaction effect did not further significantly interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=3.4, 
p=0.069, η2=0.038). The trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x 
emotional face repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=2.1, 
p=0.151, η2=0.024). This is in contrast to the RT analysis, where this effect was 
significant. This proportion correct interaction did not further interact with trait 
anxiety (F[1,85]=0.8, p=0.367, η2=0.010). The emotion x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x emotional face repetition/alternation interaction was not 
significant (F[1,85]=0.03, p=0.861, η2<0.001), nor was the emotion x 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotional face repetition/alternation x trait 
anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=0.7, p=0.412, η2=0.008). However, the trial type x 
emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotion repetition/alternation 
interaction was robustly significant (F[1,85]=8.7, p=0.004, η2=0.092). We return to 
this issue later (4-way interactions are hard to depict so there is no figure here). It is 
again noteworthy here that this effect was not significant in the RT analysis. In the 
proportion correct analysis the trial type x emotion x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x emotion repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction was 
not significant (F[1,85]=0.07, p=0.793, η2=0.001). 
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5.4.7. Probing the proportion correct interaction effects 
 
There were two interactions in the accuracy analysis that were significant in our 
initial ANCOVA: a trial type x emotion x emotion repetition/alternation interaction; 
and a trial type x emotion x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x emotion 
repetition/alternation interaction.  
Rather than carry out excessive individual follow-up analyses for these interactions 
we carried out the planned comparisons of the trial type versus (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction in each emotion condition, and emotion 
repetition/alternation condition. In effect, as with the RT analysis we sorted the trial 
type and (in)congruency repetition/alternation comparisons by target emotion and 
target and response repetition/alternation. Thus we conducted four ANCOVAS 
evaluating the CSE (i.e., separate CSE analyses for: fear trials without target and 
response repetition; fear trials with target and response repetition; happy trials 
without target and response repetition; happy trials with target and response 
repetition). Here we again adopt an adjusted significance level of 0.05/4.  
The first analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the fearful face condition when target emotion and response do not 
repeat, including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the CSE shown in Figure 5.21 (i.e. the (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
effect) was not significant (F[1,85]=0.05, p=0.817, η2=0.001). Moreover, the 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait 
anxiety (F[1,85]=0.9, p=0.355, η2=0.010). The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=1.2, p=0.284, 
η2=0.014), suggesting that there was not significant variation in the CSE size for 
congruent vs. incongruent trials. Finally, the trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.02, 
p=0.896, η2<0.001). However, it is noteworthy here that the test of between-subjects 
effects showed that trait anxiety was related to accuracy levels averaged across these 
four trial types, at a trend level (F[1,85]=4.5, p=0.037, η2=0.050). The correlation 
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value was r=0.22, thus anxiety was marginally related to increased accuracy for fear 
trials when emotional target and response did not repeat.  
 
Figure 5.21: The non-significant (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect 
present in the proportion correct for trials with fearful target faces, when the 
target and response did not repeat.  
 
The second analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the fearful face condition (when target emotion and response do 
repeat), including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the CSE shown in Figure 5.22 (i.e., the (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
effect) was not significant (F[1,85]=0.1, p=0.708, η2=0.002). The (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]<0.001, p=0.100, η2<0.001). The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction was robustly significant at the adjusted significance 
level (F[1,85]=9.8, p=0.002, η2=0.103). This means that the CSE was significantly 
different for congruent and incongruent trials. The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=1.7, 
p=0.200, η2=0.019). The test of between-subjects effects showed that trait anxiety 
was not related to accuracy levels averaged across these four trial types 
(F[1,85]=0.7, p=0.394, η2=0.009).   
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Figure 5.22: The non-significant (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect 
present in the proportion correct for trials with fearful target faces, when the 
target and response did repeat. 
 
The third analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the happy face condition (when target emotion and response do not 
repeat), including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the CSE shown in Figure 5.23 (i.e., the (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
effect) was not significant (F[1,85]=0.5, p=0.479, η2=0.006). The (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait anxiety 
(F[1,85]=0.8, p=0.380, η2=0.009). The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction was not significant at the adjusted significance level 
(F[1,85]=1.2, p=0.274, η2=0.014), and nor was the trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation x trait anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=0.03, p=0.874, η2<0.001). 
The main effect of trial type did not reach significance (F[1,85]=4.7, p=0.032, 
η2=0.053) and this effect did not interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=2.0, p=0.160, 
η2=0.023). The test of between-subjects effects showed that trait anxiety was not 
related to accuracy levels averaged across these four trial types (F[1,85]=0.07, 
p=0.782, η2=0.001).   
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Figure 5.23: The non-significant (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect 
present in the proportion correct for trials with happy target faces, when the target 
and response did not repeat. 
 
The fourth analysis focused upon a 2 (trial type; congruent versus incongruent) x 2 
(previous trial type; (in)congruency repetition versus (in)congruency alternation) 
ANCOVA in the happy face condition (when target emotion and response do 
repeat), including standardised trait anxiety as the covariate. The critical finding here 
was that the CSE shown in Figure 5.24 (i.e., the (in)congruency repetition/alternation 
effect) was not significant (F[1,85]=0.2, p=0.682, η2=0.002). Moreover, the 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation effect did not significantly interact with trait 
anxiety F[1,85]=3.8, p=0.054, η2=0.043). Trait anxiety shared a weak correlation 
(that was non-significant cf the adjusted critical p-level) with the accuracy difference 
between (in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation trials when happy 
faces repeated. The correlation value was r=0.21. The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction was not significant (F[1,85]=0.1, p=0.750, 
η2=0.001), and nor was the trial type x (in)congruency repetition/alternation x trait 
anxiety interaction (F[1,85]=0.5, p=0.471, η2=0.006). It is noteworthy here that the 
main effect of trial type approached significance against the adjusted significance 
level (F[1,85]=6.2, p=0.015, η2=0.068) as congruent trials (proportion correct = 
0.94) were responded to less accurately than incongruent trials (proportion correct = 
0.96), but this effect did not interact with trait anxiety (F[1,85]=0.4, p=0.523, 
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η2=0.005). The test of between-subjects effects showed that trait anxiety was not 
related to accuracy levels averaged across these four trial types (F[1,85]=0.03, 
p=0.859, η2<0.001).   
 
Figure 5.24: The non-significant (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect 
present in the proportion correct for trials with happy target faces, when the target 
and response did repeat. 
 
We further probed the two proportion correct interactions reported above. The 
adjusted p-level is 0.0125/2 for these follow-up tests. The trial type x (in)congruency 
repetition/alternation interaction in the fearful face condition when target emotion 
and response did repeat was driven by the CSE being more robustly present for 
congruent trials (F[1,85]=7.2, p=0.009, η2=0.078), than for incongruent trials 
(F[1,85]=4.2, p=0.044, η2=0.047). This is also illustrated in Table 5.3 which shows 
that fFcC trials were responded to more accurately than fFiC trials. In contrast, fFiI 
trials were responded to less accurately than fFcI trials. This shows that congruent 
trials where the congruency level repeats were responded to more accurate than 
when it alternates. In contrast, the opposite pattern is present for incongruent trials 
(although the effect would not approach significance after accounting for multiple 
testing). Neither comparison was significantly affected by trait anxiety (both Fs < 
1.0, both ps > 0.3).  
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As noted above, the (in)congruency repetition/alternation interaction with trait 
anxiety in the happy face condition when target emotion and response did repeat was 
driven by trait anxiety showing a trend towards a correlation with the accuracy 
difference between (in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation trials. 
We further probed this effect in an attempt to verify which trial type was driving the 
effect. However, trait anxiety was not significantly correlated with (in)congruency 
repetition trials (r= -0.11, p=0.304), or (in)congruency alternation trials (r= 0.12, 
p=0.281).  
 
5.5. Discussion 
 
We created a novel, and more ecologically-valid, emotional face flanker task that 
allowed for an analysis of emotion recognition, emotional distraction, and emotional 
conflict resolution. Thus, this task assesses the non-sequential and sequential effects 
of both emotional face processing and emotional goal conflict processing.  
Congruent trials where the emotional expression depicted by the target face was the 
same as the emotional expression depicted by the flanker faces were not responded 
to significantly faster or more accurately than incongruent trials where the target face 
and flanker faces depicted different emotions (when averaged across target emotion 
type, goal conflict sequence type, and emotion sequence type). There was no 
significant correlation between trait anxiety and any RT difference or accuracy 
difference between these congruent and incongruent trials. The finding that trait 
anxiety is unrelated to the congruency effects is in alignment with the results of 
experiment 1 and the results of the neutral arrow flanker task experiment carried out 
by Larson, Clawson, Clayson and Baldwin (2013).  
Overall happy faces, averaged across trial type, goal conflict sequence type, and 
emotion sequence type, were responded to faster and more accurately than fearful 
faces averaged across these trial types. This finding is in alignment with the findings 
of experiment 1. The finding of an overall processing advantage for happy facial 
expressions also supports the findings of several emotional facial expression 
recognition studies (Silvia, Allan, Beauchamp, Maschauer, & Workman., 2006; 
Cooper, Rowe, & penton-Voak, 2008; Hietanen & Astikainen, 2013; Leppanen & 
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Hietanen, 2004; Leppanen & Hietanen, 2003; Kirita & Endo, 1995; Feyereisen, 
Malet, & Martin, 1996; Werheid, Alpay, Jentzsch, & Sommer; 2005). In the present 
study trait anxiety did not appear to significantly affect either the RT difference or 
the accuracy difference between responses to happy faces and responses to fearful 
faces averaged across trial types. This finding is in contrast to experiment 1 where 
trait anxiety was related to the RT difference between happy and fearful face trials4.  
The effect of trial type upon RTs and accuracy did not significantly differ depending 
upon what the target emotional face was. However, trait anxiety was related to a RT 
difference, but not any accuracy difference, in the effect of trial type between the two 
emotion conditions (i.e., a RT congruency effect which is greater in one emotion 
condition than the other). In the fearful face condition those higher in anxiety 
showed a greater RT congruency effect relative to those lower in trait anxiety, 
although the effect was marginal. This effect of trait anxiety was not present in the 
happy face condition. Moreover, this effect of trait anxiety upon the fearful face 
congruency effect was not present in experiment 1. In the present experiment, when 
controlling for sources of general RT variance trait anxiety was negatively correlated 
with RTs to congruent fear trials at a trend level, but not with RTs to incongruent 
trials. Those high in trait anxiety responded to congruent fear trials faster than those 
low in anxiety. This effect of trait anxiety upon RTs to the congruent grids of fearful 
faces does still suggest that trait anxiety affects the speed of the detection of threat 
related stimuli, even when there is no distraction caused by the presence of different 
emotions in the display.  
The present experiment assessed both the sequential effects of emotion recognition, 
and the sequential effects of goal conflict resolution. There were some robust 
                                                          
4 NOTE: It is noteworthy that in the present experiment the effect of anxiety upon the 
accuracy difference between happy and fearful faces could be considered a weak trend (p = 
0.075). Moreover, when the analysis is carried out non-sequentially (i.e., a basic trial type x 
emotion analysis), the anxiety interaction with the emotion effect upon accuracy is actually 
significant (p = 0.045). The correlation value here was r = – 0.22, thus higher trait anxiety 
was marginally related to a reduced difference in accuracy between happy and fearful faces. 
This was driven by a non-significant anxiety related increase in accuracy for fear trials (r = 
0.18, p = 0.093), not happy trials (r = -0.02, p = 0.842).  
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sequential effects concerning the speed of emotion recognition. An emotional face 
repetition RT advantage was present for the happy faces but not the fearful faces. In 
contrast, an emotional face repetition accuracy advantage was present for both happy 
faces and fearful faces. These effects of emotional face repetition were not altered by 
participants’ levels of trait anxiety. The finding of a happy face repetition effect (or 
possible priming effect) in the RTs is somewhat in alignment with the findings of the 
studies conducted by Hietanen and Astikainen (2013) and Werheid, Alpay, Jentzsch 
and Sommer (2005). Hietanen and Astikainen found that happy faces were 
recognised more accurately when they followed positive picture primes as opposed 
to negative picture primes. However, in their study RTs for sad faces following 
negative picture primes only showed a trend towards being faster than RTs for sad 
faces following positive picture primes. Werheid et al. also found that happy faces 
were responded to faster when they were primed by a happy face, than when they 
were primed by an angry face. However, in their study RTs for angry facial 
expressions were not faster when they were primed by an angry face relative to when 
they were un-primed (by a previous happy face). However, in the present study we 
cannot be definitely sure that the repetition advantage for happy faces was due to an 
emotional priming effect.  It is possible that the effect was due to a basic featural 
processing advantage provided by the mouth region of the happy faces being more 
salient than the mouth region of the fearful faces, as the stimuli were quite small.  
The sequential effect of goal conflict resolution as measured by the CSE was not 
significant for both RTs and accuracy when averaged across emotion types and 
across trials where target and response repeat and where target and response 
alternate. Critically, trait anxiety was uncorrelated with any RT or accuracy 
difference between averaged (in)congruency repetition trials and averaged 
(in)congruency alternation trials. This finding is in contrast to the results found for 
the between-valence condition (happy faces versus fearful faces) of experiment 1. 
Moreover, in the present experiment there was no difference in the effect of 
(in)congruency repetition and (in)congruency alternation depending upon which trial 
type was responded to.  This finding is consistent with experiment 1.  
The critical finding in the present experiment was that the CSE for RTs (but not 
accuracy) appeared to be present only in trials where fearful faces were the target 
face, not where happy faces were the target face. When we probed this effect further 
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we found that the effect was even more specific. It was only reliably present in the 
fearful face condition when target emotion and response did not repeat (i.e., the 
(in)congruency repetition/alternation effect was robustly significant). It is 
noteworthy here that the CSE for fearful trials when target emotion and response did 
not repeat (i.e., the previous emotion was a happy face) was in reverse to what is 
usually found in conventional flanker tasks (e.g., Davelaar, 2013; Davelaar & 
Stevens, 2009; Gratton et al., 1992; Larson et al., 2013; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006), 
and was thus the opposite pattern to what was found in experiment 1.  
In summary, in the current experiment when fearful faces were the target face (and 
the previous trial contained a happy target face) congruent trials (where fearful 
flanker faces surround the target fearful face) were responded to faster if the 
previous trial was incongruent (where happy flanker faces surround the fearful target 
face) compared to when the previous trial was also congruent (where fearful flanker 
faces surround the target fearful face). Moreover, when fearful faces were the target 
face (and the previous trial contained a happy target face) incongruent trials (where 
happy flanker faces surround the fearful target face) were responded to faster if the 
previous trial was congruent (where fearful flanker faces surround the target fearful 
face) compared to when the previous trial was also incongruent (where happy flanker 
faces surround the fearful target face). In short, for fearful trials with no target and 
response repetition (in)congruency alternation trials were responded to faster than 
(in)congruency repetition trials. In contrast, in the fearful face condition when target 
and response did repeat, overall the (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect was 
not significant.5 Trait anxiety did not affect the CSE in either of these conditions. 
The CSE was not significant in either the happy face condition when target emotion 
and response did not repeat, nor in the happy face condition when target emotion and 
response did repeat. Trait anxiety was not related to the CSE in either of these two 
conditions. Thus, the lack of a trait anxiety interaction with the CSE is in contrast to 
the results of the between-valence condition of experiment 1 in (happy faces versus 
fearful faces), and in contrast to the results of Larson et al. (2013).  
                                                          
5 NOTE: We conducted an extra exploratory analysis (not reported in the main results) 
which verified that fFcI trials were responded to faster than fFiI trials, but the effect is not 
robust and does not withstand the necessary Bonferroni adjustment. 
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We followed up the reversed CSE interaction found for fearful trials when target and 
response did not repeat, in order to explore whether both incongruent and congruent 
trials were implicated. We found that the effect was mostly driven by the congruent 
trials. The analysis showed that incongruent trials that followed congruent trials were 
not responded to faster than incongruent trials that followed incongruent trials. Trait 
anxiety was uncorrelated with the RT difference between these trials. Moreover, 
congruent trials that followed incongruent trials were responded to faster than 
congruent trials that followed congruent trials. This comparison was much more 
robust (but just missed a very strict Bonferroni adjusted significance cut-off). Trait 
anxiety was uncorrelated with the RT difference between these trials.  
There was also an interesting effect in the accuracy data for the fearful face condition 
when target emotion and response were repeated. For congruent trials 
(in)congruency alternation trials were responded to more accurately than 
(in)congruency repetition trials. In contrast, the opposite pattern was present for 
incongruent trials as (in)congruency repetition trials were responded to more 
accurately than (in)congruency alternation trials. However, it is noteworthy that the 
effect on the incongruent trials did not withstand a strict Bonferroni adjustment. 
Neither of these CSEs were significantly affected by trait anxiety 
There were however two marginal effects of trait anxiety upon levels of accuracy. 
Trait anxiety was marginally related to an overall increased level of accuracy for fear 
trials when emotional target and response did not repeat (i.e., trials where trials 
requiring responding to a target fearful face were preceded by a trial requiring 
responding to a target happy face). In the happy face condition when target and 
response did repeat (i.e., trials where trials requiring responding to a target happy 
face were preceded by a trial requiring responding to a target happy face) the overall 
CSE related to trait anxiety at a trend level. Thus there was a weak effect of trait 
anxiety upon the accuracy of emotion processing.  
To summarise the anxiety effects thus far, trait anxiety was related to a marginally 
increased RT congruency effect when fearful faces were the target emotion. 
Exploratory analyses suggested that this effect was driven by high anxious 
participants responding to congruent fear trials faster than their low anxious 
counterparts. Trait anxiety was unrelated to the happy face recognition advantage, or 
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any of the CSEs found in the RTs. The only other effects of anxiety found in the 
analysis thus far were therefore the marginal accuracy effects described directly 
above. Accordingly, we also wished to verify whether the STAI-anxiety and/or 
STAI-depression subscale related to any of the main emotional goal conflict effects 
of interest any more strongly than the total STAI-trait scores did.  
Both STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression related to an increased congruency effect 
for fear trials at a trend level. However, partial correlation showed that when 
controlling for STAI-depression, STAI-anxiety was no longer correlated with the 
congruency effect for fear trials. Similarly when controlling for STAI-anxiety, STAI-
depression was uncorrelated with the congruency effect for fear trials. Therefore we 
suggest that the STAI-trait correlation with the congruency effect for fear trials was 
possibly driven by the shared variance of these anxiety and depression measures 
(assuming that the names for these STAI subscales are valid).  
Similarly to the total scores of the STAI-trait, STAI-anxiety was uncorrelated with 
the reversed RT (in)congruency repetition/alternation effect for fear trials when 
target and response did not repeat. However, when controlling for general RTs 
STAI-anxiety was positively correlated with the RT difference between hFiI trials 
and hFcI at a trend level, but not the RT difference between hFcC trials and hFiC 
trials. Moreover, when controlling for both general RTs and STAI-depression, STAI-
anxiety remained correlated with the RT effect. In contrast, STAI-depression was not 
correlated with either of these RT difference effects when controlling for general 
RTs or STAI-anxiety. Critically, we determined that when controlling for general 
RTs STAI-anxiety was positively correlated with RTs for hFiI trials at a trend level, 
but not RTs for hFcI trials. Moreover, the correlation between STAI-anxiety and the 
hFiI trials remained when controlling for both general RTs and STAI-depression. 
Thus, anxiety was weakly related to a slowing in responses to incongruent fearful 
trials (when target and response did not repeat). 
There were two important but unpredicted effects found in the present study that 
require some considerable explanation. Firstly the CSE for RTs was absent for happy 
trials but present for fear trials. Secondly, the CSE for RTs present for fear trials was 
in reverse to what is reliably reported in the literature. Even more specifically, the 
reversed CSE was only reliably present for fearful trials with no target and response 
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repetition. Therefore, in this subset of trials (in)congruency alternation trials were 
responded to faster than (in)congruency repetition trials. It is tempting to suggest that 
the happy face repetition / priming effect in some way overpowered the CSE for 
happy trials. However, this seems unlikely as although the CSE was absent for trials 
with target and response repetition, it was also absent for those without target and 
response repetition. Thus, it is entirely possible that the happy faces (or the detection 
of appetitive emotion) abolished the CSE. Moreover, it is entirely possible that the 
appetitive happy faces activated the same brain system (or emotional survival 
circuit) that would be active for reward processing.  
We are aware of three studies that investigated the CSE and how it is affected by 
reward processing. Two studies by van Steenbergen, Band and Hommel (2012; 
2009) used a neutral arrow flanker task to investigate the CSE. Participants received 
arbitrary feedback indicating monetary loss or gain in-between trials. Reward 
(monetary gain) reduced the CSE (that was manifested in the usual direction: 
(in)congruency repetition trials responded to faster than (in)congruency alternation 
trials), relative to monetary loss. However, Braem, Verguts, Roggeman and 
Notebaert (2012) used a colour naming flanker task and showed that reward (for 
25% of trials) increased the CSE relative to no reward trials. The studies by van 
Steenbergen et al. differed from the study by Braem et al. as they had a monetary 
loss condition whereas Braem et al. had a no reward condition. It seems as if the 
effects of reward may vary depending upon the context provided by situations of 
potential loss or no reward. Nevertheless, in the present study it is possible that the 
loss of any significant CSE in the happy face condition was in some way due to the 
happy faces activating reward based brain systems. However, this cannot explain the 
reversal of the CSE in the fearful face condition.  
The CSE was reliably present only for fear trials when target and response did not 
repeat. Thus, we cannot rule out the explanation that there was something specific 
about these fearful trial types that facilitated the CSE. Moreover, it is noteworthy 
that the CSE for incongruent trials when target and response did repeat was 
marginally present. Accordingly, the complete lack of a CSE for congruent trials 
when target and response did repeat could have also been lost due to target and 
response repetition. These selective RT effects for the fear trials are difficult to 
interpret. However, it does seem that the effect of processing the differing emotional 
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faces might have further affected cognitive control processes being carried out by a 
network of interconnected brain regions differently. The medial frontal cortex 
(MFC) and ACC are activated by stimuli that are emotionally negative, but they are 
also involved in anxiety (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011). Both the ACC and the mid-
cingulate cortex (MCC) may be implicated in both emotion and cognitive control 
(Shackman et al., 2011). It is possible that upon perception of the appetitive happy 
faces that the cognitive control functions of the ACC, MCC and/or MFC were 
interrupted by a dopaminergic reward signal, which resulted in an abolished CSE for 
happy face trials. Moreover, it is possible that for fearful face trials the threat-related 
aversive emotion affected ACC, MCC and/or MFC function differently, and this 
then reversed the CSE (with the effect being more robust when target and response 
repetition were not present). It is possible that the reversed CSE was due to the 
interaction of neural resources in the ACC, MCC, and MFC when processing the 
threat related target fearful faces, whilst simultaneously providing cognitive control 
(i.e., monitoring conflict, selective attention and/or response inhibition).  
It is also noteworthy that in the accuracy data for the fearful face condition when 
target emotion and response were repeated, congruent (in)congruency alternation 
trials (fFiC trials) were responded to more accurately than congruent (in)congruency 
repetition trials (fFcC trials), which shows a reversed CSE in accuracy was present 
for these trials. In contrast, the opposite pattern was present for incongruent trials as 
(in)congruency repetition trials (fFiI trials) were responded to more accurately than 
(in)congruency alternation trials (fFcI trials). These two findings suggest that 
attention to repeated target fearful faces was affected by the sequential effects of 
conflict. It seems possible that for congruent trials attention to the target fearful faces 
was more focused for trials that followed emotionally conflicting incongruent trials, 
relative to trials that followed no conflict congruent trials. Moreover, it also seems 
possible that for incongruent trials attention to the target fearful faces was more 
focused for trials that followed emotionally conflicting incongruent trials, relative to 
those that followed no conflict congruent trials. Thus, we suggest that these effects 
upon accuracy may also be due to some effects of emotion upon the activity of the 
ACC, MCC, and/or MFC when cognitive control is required. 
Neuroimaging evidence suggests that the ACC has bi-directional connections to the 
insula cortex, which is involved with subjective feelings and uncertainty (Singer, 
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Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). Anxiety is related to uncertainty and anticipation 
concerning possible future threat-related situations (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). It is 
possible that in the present study the ACC, MCC, and MFC did affect the cognitive 
control of emotion by high anxious participants slightly differently than low anxious 
participants. In the present study trait anxiety was weakly related to some 
performance differences when processing the fearful faces. Anxiety was weakly 
related to an overall increased level of accuracy for fear trials when emotional target 
and response did not repeat. Moreover, high anxious participants responded to 
congruent fear trials faster than their low anxious counterparts. It is also noteworthy 
that STAI-anxiety was positively but not robustly correlated with the RT difference 
between hFiI trials and hFcI trials. Thus there was some indication that anxiety 
related to the cognitive control of threat-related emotion. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, overall the CSEs found in the present experiment offer no support to 
any of the theoretical accounts of the CSE discussed earlier. Critically, none of the 
accounts predict a reversed CSE in RTs after accounting for target and response 
repetition. However, we changed the design of the task considerably in order to 
account for various possible confounds to any interpretation of the data, and also to 
increase ecological validity. We are not aware of any other study that has used a 
design such as ours. It is possible that the task design used a combination of 
variables that affected ACC, MCC, and/or MFC performance slightly differently 
than other published conflict paradigms do. We suggest that further anxiety and 
emotional CSE experiments may have to sacrifice a certain amount of ecological 
validity in order to detect any reliable anxiety effect. Our analysis using the total 
STAI scores did not reveal that anxiety related to any CSE effect in RTs, although 
there was a weak effect of anxiety in the accuracy data. However, critically there was 
an effect of anxiety, measured by the STAI-anxiety subscale, upon the reversed CSE 
present in RTs. STAI-anxiety was weakly related to a slowing in responses to 
repeated incongruent fearful trials (when target and response did not repeat). Thus, 
increased anxiety was related to slower responses to trials with a fearful target face 
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surrounded by happy faces, when they were preceded by a trial with a target happy 
face surrounded by fearful faces. Although this effect can be considered marginal at 
best, it does suggest that trait anxiety might be related to a difference in how 
emotional conflict resolution is achieved.  
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6. Experiment 5 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Bieling, Antony and Swinson (1998) suggested that the STAI (Spielberger et al., 
1983) may measure more than one underlying factor (as discussed in chapter 4). To 
briefly reiterate, Bieling et al. suggested that the STAI measures an umbrella factor 
of negative affect, but it also separately measures anxiety (referred to as STAI-
anxiety hereafter) and depression (referred to as STAI-depression hereafter). If the 
factorial structure of the STAI proposed by Bieling et al. is accurate it may have 
some important implications concerning how future research is interpreted. Indeed, it 
may also suggest that much published work on trait anxiety should be reanalysed, 
whilst accounting for the distinction made between the two proposed anxiety and 
depression subscales. Accordingly, in experiment 3 (chapter 4) and experiment 4 
(chapter 5) we have already conducted and reported some exploratory analyses 
designed to determine if the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression subscales offer any 
reliable level of discriminant validity. STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression were 
moderately correlated in experiments 3 and 4, but it is still not clear if they measure 
different constructs or not.  
Experiment 3 (chapter 4) showed that STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression related to 
emotional facial expression recognition differently from one and another. STAI-
anxiety was related to a reduced happy face recognition advantage present in RTs 
when discriminating happy faces from fearful faces. STAI-depression was not 
related to any emotional face discrimination effects. These results appear to lend 
some support to the discriminant validity of the STAI subscales proposed by Bieling 
et al. (1998). However, it is noteworthy in experiment 3 that when controlling for 
STAI-depression the correlation between STAI-anxiety and the reduced happy face 
recognition advantage was unreliable. Experiment 4 (chapter 5) showed that high 
STAI-anxiety was weakly related to a reduced reversed CSE present in the RTs, 
whereas STAI-depression was not. Thus, this tentatively suggests that STAI-anxiety 
but not STAI-depression may be related to variations in how emotional conflict 
resolution is achieved. Based upon these findings we reanalysed the data from 
experiments 1 and 2, but this time we used the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression 
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scales as the individual difference measures. These analyses are contained in 
appendix A and appendix B. These analyses showed that the key behavioural effects 
did not relate to either the proposed STAI-anxiety scale or STAI-depression scale 
more than the other. Thus, the behavioural effects may relate to both anxiety and 
depression, or an umbrella factor of negative affect. However, experiment 3 (chapter 
4) showed that psychometric measures such as the attentional control scale may be 
of utility when assessing the discriminant validity of the STAI subscales. Moreover, 
there are a number of published studies that use other psychometric constructs to 
tease apart measures of anxiety and depression in general. 
The reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST, Gray & McNaughton, 2000) constructs 
of behavioural inhibition system (BIS) sensitivity and behavioural activation system 
(BAS) sensitivity are often measured using the so-called BIS/BAS scales (Carver & 
White, 1994). Multiple past studies have shown that high BIS is related to both high 
anxiety and high depression, but BAS is not related to either anxiety or depression 
(Johnson, Turner, & Iwata, 2003; Jorm et al., 1999; Muris, Meesters, De Kanter, & 
Timmerman, 2005). In contrast, both anxiety and depression have been shown to 
relate to high BIS and low BAS (Coplan, Wilson, Frohlick, & Zelenski, 2006). In a 
further contrast, multiple past studies have also shown that high BIS is related to 
high anxiety and high depression, and also that high BAS is related to low 
depression but not low anxiety (e.g., Beevers & Meyer, 2002; Campbell-Sills, 
Liverent, & Brown, 2004; Hundt, Nelson-Gray, Kimbrel, Mitchell, & Kwapil, 2007; 
Kimbrel, Nelson-Gray, & Mitchell, 2007; Segarra et al., 2007). Accordingly one can 
suggest that generally studies indicate that increased BIS scale scores relate in some 
way to the comorbidity of depression and anxiety, whereas low BAS might relate to 
depression although this relationship is not always found. Takahashi, Roberts, 
Yamagata and Kijima (2015) investigated whether these inconsistencies concerning 
the reported relationships between both BIS and BAS, and anxiety and depression 
might be due to the shared variance of anxiety with depression.  
Takahashi et al. (2015) showed that higher state anxiety (controlling for depression) 
was related to higher BIS scale scores, whereas higher depression (controlling for 
state anxiety) was related to higher BIS scale scores and lower BAS. Thus, whereas 
BIS was related to both anxiety and depression, BAS was uniquely related to 
depression. Takahashi et al. suggest that BIS might be one of the constructs 
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underlying the comorbidity of anxiety and depression, whereas BAS uniquely 
predicts depression. They suggest that BAS may be a useful measure in 
differentiating between the internalising disorders of anxiety and depression. They 
continue by suggesting that low BAS activity reflects low reward seeking activity 
which may lead to increased depression.   
Takahashi et al. (2015) used a non-clinical sample, however, there are two clinical 
studies that are also particularly relevant here. Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow and Gotlib 
(2002) showed that clinically depressed patients reported lower BAS scores and 
higher BIS scores than normal controls. They also showed that for these patients 
lower BAS scores were related to increased levels of current depression, and a worse 
outcome after eight months. In a similar study, Mellick, Sharp and Alfano (2014) 
used a design with three groups; clinically depressed, high risk of clinical depression, 
and normal controls. Clinical levels of depression were related to higher BIS scores 
than normal controls but not the high risk group (the BIS scores of the high risk and 
normal controls were similar). No differences in BAS scores were found for the three 
groups.  
BIS and BAS are not the only constructs that can be used to tease apart anxiety and 
depression. As discussed in more detail in chapter 4, Olafsson et al. (2011) reported 
that attentional shifting significantly predicted depression (after controlling for 
anxiety). Moreover, Olafsson et al. also reported that attentional focusing 
significantly predicted anxiety (after controlling for depression). Whereas Olafsson 
et al. did not use the STAI subscales, there are two more studies that actually used 
the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression subscales to investigate this same issue. 
Judah, Grant, Mills and Lechner (2013) and Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg and Bradley 
(2013) also reported that attentional focusing predicts STAI-anxiety whereas 
attentional shifting predicts STAI-depression. Thus, different attentional mechanisms 
that can be measured by questionnaire may also help discriminate between the 
constructs of STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression. 
In summary, it seems likely that anxiety and depression will relate to some other 
psychometric personality constructs differently from one and another. It is important 
for clinicians to be able to tease apart the symptoms of anxiety and depression in 
patients. Anxiety and depression share a strong comorbidity and are highly 
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correlated (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). This comorbidity is related to 
serious and prolonged psychiatric problems (Aina & Susman, 2006). It seems likely 
that the constructs of BIS, BAS, attentional shifting, and attentional focusing might 
be useful in discriminating between anxiety and depression. More specifically, based 
upon the studies discussed above, increased BIS activity (or whatever is actually 
captured by BIS scale scores) might in some way contribute to the comorbidity of 
both anxiety and depression, but low BAS activity might specifically contribute to 
depression. Moreover, a reduced ability to shift ones attention may relate specifically 
to depression, whereas a reduced ability to focus ones attention may relate 
specifically to anxiety.  
There is however some controversy that concerns the construct validity of Carver 
and White’s (1994) BIS scale. This controversy has arisen from studies using factor 
analysis to assess the reliability of the measure. Cogswell, Alloy, van Dulmen and 
Fresco (2006) found that two items included in the BIS scale were problematic. 
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that Johnson, Turner and Iwata (2003) showed that 
these two items represented a separate factor from the other BIS items6. However, it 
is noteworthy that a later study by Heym, Ferguson and Lawrence (2008) has 
actually shown that three items from the original BIS scale form a separate factor 
from the four remaining items. Heym et al. refer to the three item factor as 
representing fear and the activity of the FFFS component of RST, whereas the four 
items represent anxiety and the BIS component of RST. This controversy was not 
addressed in any of the studies discussed above. Thus, this could have obscured the 
interpretation of how BIS scores relate to anxiety and depression.  
 
6.2. Purpose of experiment 
 
We intended to use the self-report measures of BIS, BAS and attentional control 
discussed above to further investigate the discriminant validity of the STAI-anxiety 
and STAI-depression subscales defined by Bieling et al. (1998). Here we also 
                                                          
6 It is noteworthy here that in their study concerning the relationships between BIS, BAS, 
anxiety, and depression, they still included the whole BIS scale when calculating their 
participants BIS scores.  
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confirm if the separate BIS-fear and BIS-anxiety subscales of the original BIS scale, 
as proposed by Heym et al. (2008), affect the reported relationship between BIS 
scores and STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression. As the regression analyses in 
experiment 3 (chapter 4) concerning the relationship between the STAI subscales 
and the attentional control subscales were carried out on one experimental sample of 
90 participants we intended to repeat the analyses but this time pooling the data from 
experiment 1 (chapter 2) and experiment 3 (chapter 4 ). This will provide a larger 
sample and more power to explore the depression and attentional shifting correlation. 
We also intended to use self-report measures of trait anger and interpersonal fear to 
help discriminate between the constructs of STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression.  
Based upon the literature discussed above we can make some predictions concerning 
how BIS relates to STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression. We can predict that high 
anxiety will relate to higher total BIS scores based upon the results of many 
published studies (Beevers & Meyer, 2002; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Coplan et 
al., 2006; Hundt et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2003; Jorm et al., 1999; Kimbrel, et al., 
2007; Muriseta et al., 2005; Segarra et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2015). We can also 
predict that high depression will relate to higher total BIS scores, based upon the 
results of many published studies (Beevers & Meyer, 2002; Campbell-Sills et al., 
2004; Coplan et al., 2006; Hundt et al., 2007; Kasch et al., 2002; Kimbrel et al., 
2007; Mellick et al., 2014; Segarra et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2015). We aim to 
confirm if the BIS correlations will remain stable after separating the items that load 
onto the BIS-fear scale from those that load onto the BIS-anxiety scale.  
We can also tentatively predict that low BAS might relate to higher depression but 
be unrelated to anxiety based upon several published studies (Beevers & Meyer, 
2002; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Hundt et al., 2007; Kimbrel et al., 2007; Segarra et 
al., 2007). However, the reason this prediction must be considered tentative is some 
other published studies have not found this relationship. To reiterate, BAS has 
sometimes been shown to be unrelated to either anxiety or depression (Johnson et al., 
2003; Jorm et al., 1999; Muris et al., 2005). Moreover, we are aware of one study 
that does not support our predictions, as both anxiety and depression were reportedly 
related to high BIS and low BAS (Coplan et al., 2006). Nevertheless, we intend to 
investigate whether the BAS scale offers any help in determining the discriminant 
validity of the two STAI subscales.  
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Based upon the studies by Judah et al. (2013), Olafsson et al. (2011), and Reinholdt-
Dunne et al. (2013) that used the attentional control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001, 
2002), we can predict that attentional shifting would predict STAI-depression (when 
controlling for attentional focusing). We can also predict that attentional focusing 
would predict STAI-anxiety (when controlling for attentional shifting) based upon 
these three studies. Although the STAI-anxiety and attentional focusing relationship 
was not significant in chapter 4, we assumed that this was due to the limited sample 
size, whereas in the present analysis we double the size of the sample.  
We also intended to run an exploratory correlational analysis using these measures to 
verify if some other psychometric relationships reported in the literature are present 
in the sample. For example, we can predict that that trait anger will be related to 
higher BAS scores as it is related to increased BAS activity (Carver & Harmon-
Jones, 2009), as anger is an approach related behaviour (Harmon-Jones, 2003). We 
can suggest that trait anger will also relate to increased anxiety based upon the 
studies by (Carre et al., 2012; van Honk et al., 2001). Moreover, here we can also 
confirm if high scores on the BIS-fear scale proposed by Heym et al. (2008) relate to 
high scores on the interpersonal fear subscale of the fear survey schedule (Wolpe & 
Lang, 1969). 
 
6.3. Method 
 
6.3.1 Participants  
 
Participants with no reported history of neurological condition (N = 171, 50 male) 
were recruited from Goldsmiths, University of London, and had a mean age of 23.6 
(SD = 7). 150 were right handed, 18 were left handed, and 2 claimed to be 
ambidextrous (with 1 response omission). These participants are those that featured 
in experiment 1 (N = 81) and experiment 3 (N = 90); therefore 76 took part in return 
for course credit whereas the rest were paid £10. All gave informed written consent 
in accordance with standard ethical guidelines as reported earlier.  
In the studies by Judah et al. (2013) and Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2013) the smaller 
hierarchical regression effect of interest is the effect in predicting STAI-anxiety from 
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the combination of the 2 predictors of attentional focussing and attentional shifting, 
after first controlling for STAI-depression (or STAI-depression after first controlling 
for STAI-anxiety). In these studies the average R² change for this step of the 
regressions was 0.07 across the 4 analyses. This corresponds to an effect size of 
f²=0.075. With such an effect size, g-power reveals that 80% power and 
alpha=0.05 requires 132 participants.  
 
In the Reinholdt-Dunne et al. study they give enough information to compute the 
partial r² for the independent effect of the separate shifting and focussing 
predictors, in each of their 2 regressions (predicting STAI-anxiety and predicting 
STAI-depression). The average of the 4 partial r² values from these 2 
regressions was 0.08, corresponding to an effect size f² of 0.087. For this size of 
effect, 80% power, and alpha=0.05 two tailed, g-power gives a required sample size 
of 93.  
 
The participants used in this chapter were aggregated across the samples from 
experiment 1 and experiment 3 which gave us a total sample size of 171. We were 
therefore confident that our sample wold be well -powered to detect effects of this 
magnitude. 
 
 
6.3.2. Self-report measures 
 
Trait anxiety was initially assessed with the trait anxiety subscale of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 1983). Trait anger was assessed using 
the trait anger 10 item subscale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 
(STAXI, Spielberger, 1988). Once again we also used the STAI subscales described 
by Bieling et al. (1998).  To reiterate, the STAI-anxiety subscale consists of STAI-
trait items 22, 28, 29, 31, 37, 38, & 40. The STAI-depression subscale consists of 
STAI-trait items 21, 23-27, 30, 32-36, & 39. Individual differences in the 
experiencing of interpersonal fear were assessed using the 23 item interpersonal fear 
subscale of the Fear Survey Schedule (Wolpe & Lang, 1969). Attentional control 
was assessed with the Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001, 2002). 
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Once again the attentional focusing and attentional shifting sub-scales of the 
attentional control scale (as used by Olafsson et al., 2011) were also used. To 
reiterate, in their analysis one item (question 9) did not load on either factor. Thus, 
the attentional focusing sub-scale consisted of 9 items (items 1-8 and item 12), and 
the attentional shifting sub-scale consisted of 10 items (items 10, 11, and 13-20). 
Behavioural inhibition sensitivity (BIS) and behavioural activation sensitivity (BAS) 
were measured by the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994). The BIS scale from 
Carver and Whites’ BIS/BAS scales was further divided into the BIS-fear scale 
(items 1, 17, and 20), and the BIS-anxiety scale (items 5, 9, 13, and 19) as proposed 
by Heym et al. (2008).   
 
6.3.3. Procedure 
 
All participants completed the questionnaires in the traditional pen and paper way as 
part of experiment 1 or experiment 3. The STAI-trait measure and the trait anger and 
interpersonal fear measures feature in chapter two whereas the STAI-trait and 
attentional control measures feature in chapters two and three. The BIS / BAS 
measures have not featured in this thesis thus far.  
 
Data analysis 
First we ran partial correlations between STAI-anxiety (controlling for STAI-
depression) and the BIS, BIS-anxiety, BIS-fear, BAS, interpersonal fear, trait anger 
attentional focasing, attentional shifting, and total attentional control self-report 
measures, and also the partial correlations between STAI-depression (controlling for 
STAI-anxiety) and the BIS, BIS-anxiety, BIS-fear, BAS, interpersonal fear, trait 
anger, attentional focasing, attentional shifting, and total attentional self-report 
measures. This tests our key interest in determining whether the STAI subscales 
have any discriminant validity. 
We then ran a further regression analysis to determine the differential relationships 
between both attentional focusing and attentional shifting and the STAI-anxiety and 
STAI-depression subscales. This analysis relates to our other key interest that was 
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based upon the analyses conducted by Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2013) and Judah et al. 
(2013), and will facilitate a direct comparison with their regression analyses.  
We carried out one more correlational analysis to illustrate how the total BIS scores, 
BIS-anxiety scores, BIS-fear scores, BAS scores, trait anger scores, interpersonal 
fear scores, and attentional focusing and shifting scores relate to one and another, 
and the proposed umbrella construct of general negative affect that the total scores of 
the STAI might measure.  
 
6.4. Results 
 
Table 6.1 shows the mean scores and standard deviations for each of the self-report 
measures. STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression were quite strongly correlated 
(r=0.69, p<0.001). Table 6.2 shows the partial correlations between STAI-anxiety 
(controlling for STAI-depression) and the self-report measures, and also the partial 
correlations between STAI-depression (controlling for STAI-anxiety) and the self-
report measures. Both STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression correlated positively with 
total BIS scale scores (although only the STAI-anxiety correlation withstood the 
strict Bonferroni correction). STAI-anxiety also correlated positively and robustly 
with BIS-anxiety. However, it is noteworthy here that although the correlation 
between STAI-depression and BIS-anxiety was also positive, it was not anywhere 
near significant. It is also noteworthy here that STAI-anxiety was not correlated with 
BIS-fear, whereas STAI-depression was, although the relationship was quite weak 
and non-significant. Interpersonal fear scores and trait anger scores both correlated 
positively with STAI-anxiety. Thus, the more anxious a person was, the more 
interpersonal fear and anger they experienced. In contrast, STAI-depression was 
uncorrelated with interpersonal fear scores and trait anger scores. STAI-depression 
was negatively correlated with BAS scores, but not significantly. STAI-depression 
was also significantly and negatively correlated with total attentional control scores, 
and attentional shifting scores, and also non-significantly and negatively with 
attentional focusing scores. In contrast, STAI-anxiety was not correlated with BAS 
scores or any of the three attentional control scores.  
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Table 6.1: The mean scores and standard deviations for the STAI-trait, BIS, BIS-
anxiety, BIS-fear, BAS, interpersonal fear, attentional control and trait anger self-
report measures. 
 
 
 Mean score Standard deviation 
STAI-trait 43 10 
BIS-total 21 3 
BIS-anxiety 12 2 
BIS-fear 9 2 
BAS 40 5 
Interpersonal fear 44 22 
Attentional control 50 9 
Trait anger 19 6 
ACS focusing 22 5 
ACS shifting 26 5 
STAI-anxiety 15 4 
STAI-depression 28 7 
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Table 6.2: The partial correlations between the STAI-anxiety (STAI-anx) and 
STAI-depression (STAI-dep) subscales (i.e., STAI-anxiety controlling for STAI-
depression and STAI-depression controlling for STAI-anxiety) and BIS, BIS-
anxiety, BIS-fear, BAS, interpersonal fear (I/P fear), total attentional control 
scores (ACS total), trait anger and the attentional control scale focusing (ACS 
focusing) and shifting (ACS shifting) subscales. 
 BIS 
total 
BIS 
anxiety 
BIS 
fear 
BAS I/P  
fear 
Trait  
anger 
ACS 
 total 
ACS 
focusing 
ACS  
shifting 
          
STAI-anx 
 
 
r= 0.22# 
p= 0.004 
r=0.26* 
p=0.001 
r=0.09 
p=0.247 
r= 0.11 
p= 0.176 
r= 0.26* 
p= 0.001 
r= 0.22# 
p= 0.004 
r= -0.02 
p= 0.806 
r= -0.10 
p= 0.197 
r= 0.06 
p= 0.422 
STAI-dep 
 
 
r= 0.21 
p= 0.007 
r=0.17 
p=0.033 
r=0.19 
p=0.015 
r= -0.19 
p= 0.013 
r= 0.06 
p= 0.466 
r= 0.01 
p= 0.978 
r= -0.31* 
p< 0.001 
r= -0.20 
p= 0.010 
r= -0.33* 
p< 0.001 
Note: Due to some response omissions N for these measures ranged from 168 to 171. 
Based upon the fact that 18 correlations are reported a Bonferroni correction would 
mean that correlations would be considered significant if the p-values are less than 
0.05/18 (two-tailed, thus p < 0.003, marked *), or 0.1/18 (one-tailed, thus p < 0.006, 
marked #). The correlations that remain significant after either the one or two tailed 
Bonferroni corrections are also displayed in bold font.  
 
The partial correlations in Table 6.2 concerned the relationship between the 
individual difference measures and each of the STAI subscales whist controlling for 
the other STAI subscale. This analysis did not allow for any comparison with the 
two attentional control subscales whilst controlling for the other attentional control 
subscale. Therefore, we also intended to determine whether STAI-anxiety and STAI-
depression share any unique relationships with attentional focusing (this time when 
controlling for attentional shifting) and attentional shifting (this time when 
controlling for attentional focusing). Table 6.3 contains our regression analyses 
showing the differential relationships between both attentional focusing and 
attentional shifting and the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression subscales. We 
present this data in the same way as other recently published papers to aid a direct 
comparison. Table 6.3 shows that attentional shifting independently predicted STAI-
depression and not STAI-anxiety. In contrast, attentional focusing did not 
independently predict STAI-depression, nor did it significantly independently predict 
STAI-anxiety, although it is noteworthy that the sign of the correlation was negative.   
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Table 6.3: Regression analyses using the attentional focusing and attentional 
shifting subscales of the attentional control scale to predict STAI-anxiety and 
STAI-depression (N = 168 due to some response omissions).  
 
 B SE B beta 
    
Dependant variable: STAI-anxiety    
    
Step 1 (R²= 0.46***)     
         STAI-depression 0.41 0.04 0.68*** 
    
Step 2 (R²= 0.47***)    
         STAI-depression 0.41 0.04 0.68*** 
         ACS-focusing -0.10 0.05 -0.12 
         ACS-shifting 0.09 0.06 0.11 
    
Dependant variable: STAI-depression    
    
Step 1 (R²= 0.46***)    
         STAI-anxiety 1.11 0.09 0.68*** 
    
Step 2 (R²= 0.52***)    
         STAI-anxiety 1.00 0.09 0.61*** 
         ACS-focusing -0.06 0.09 -0.04 
         ACS-shifting -0.33 0.09 -0.23*** 
Note: This table follows the same format as Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2013) and 
Judah et al. (2013) to facilitate a direct comparison with their regression analyses 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001).   
 
 
To clarify, as already shown by the beta values in the regression analyses presented 
in table 6.3, the partial correlation between shifting and depression when controlling 
for focusing and anxiety was r= -0.28, p< 0.001. These regression analyses also 
show that the equivalent partial correlation between focusing and depression when 
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controlling for shifting and anxiety was r= -0.05, p= 0.519. Moreover, the regression 
analyses in table 6.3 also show that the equivalent partial correlation between 
focusing and anxiety when controlling for shifting and depression was r= -0.14, p= 
0.067, whereas the equivalent partial correlation between shifting and anxiety when 
controlling for focusing and depression was r= 0.12, p= 0.119.  
Thus far our analyses were structured to tease apart the partial correlations between 
the subscales of the STAI and the other individual difference measures, and the 
subscales of the STAI and the subscales of the attentional control measure. However, 
we were also interested in how the total BIS scores, BIS-anxiety scores, BIS-fear 
scores, BAS scores, trait anger scores, interpersonal fear scores, and attentional 
focusing and shifting scores relate to one and another, and the proposed umbrella 
construct of general negative affect that the total scores of the STAI might measure. 
Thus we carried out a further correlational analysis to illustrate these relationships. 
Table 6.4 shows that STAI-trait was positively correlated with BIS-anxiety, BIS-
fear, interpersonal fear, and trait anger, but negatively correlated with attentional 
shifting and attentional focusing scores. STAI-trait was not significantly correlated 
with BAS scores, although it is noteworthy that the sign of the correlation was 
negative. BIS-anxiety scores were positively correlated with BIS-fear scores and 
interpersonal fear scores, but negatively correlated with attentional focusing and 
attentional shifting scores. BIS-anxiety was not significantly correlated with BAS, or 
trait anger. The only measure that significantly correlated with BAS was trait anger. 
As BAS scores increased, trait anger scores increased. Interpersonal fear scores were 
negatively correlated with attentional focusing scores (but not attentional shifting 
scores) and positively correlated with trait anger scores. Trait anger was also very 
weakly negatively but not significantly correlated with attentional focusing scores. 
BIS-fear was positively correlated with interpersonal fear, and weakly but not 
significantly correlated with attentional focusing.  
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Table 6.4: The bivariate correlations between STAI-trait (the total scores of the 
STAI), BIS-anxiety, and BIS-fear, as well as the BAS, interpersonal fear, 
attentional focusing, attentional shifting, and trait anger measures. 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1: STAI-trait  0.47* 0.34* -0.13 0.37* -0.36* -0.35*  0.27* 
2: BIS-anxiety  0.47* -0.08 0.58* -0.26* -0.22  0.11 
3: BIS-fear   -0.10 0.38* -0.17 -0.13  0.07 
4: BAS    0.003 -0.06  0.17  0.33* 
5: I/P fear     -0.23# -0.14  0.30* 
6: Focusing       0.50* -0.18 
7: Shifting       -0.11 
8: Trait anger        
Note: Due to some response omissions N for these measures ranged from 168 to 171. Based 
upon the fact that 28 correlations are reported a Bonferroni correction would mean that 
correlations would be considered significant if the p-values are less than 0.05/28 (two-
tailed, thus p < 0.002, marked *), or 0.1/18 (one-tailed, thus p < 0.004, marked #). It is 
noteworthy here that the correlation between BIS-anxiety and attentional shifting just missed 
the 2-tailed significance adjustment as p= 0.005. The correlations that remain significant 
after either the one or two tailed Bonferroni corrections are also displayed in bold font. 
 
6.5. Discussion 
 
Initially, we used partial correlation to explore the relationship between STAI-
anxiety (controlling for STAI-depression) and self-report measures of affective traits 
and attentional traits, and also the partial correlations between STAI-depression 
(controlling for STAI-anxiety) and these self-report measures. We also included in 
this analysis the BIS-anxiety and BIS-fear subscales of the original BIS scale, as 
proposed by Heym et al. (2008). STAI-anxiety (controlling for STAI-depression) 
correlated positively with total BIS scale scores. Thus, increased total BIS scale 
scores were related to increased anxiety. The finding that high anxiety relates to high 
total BIS scale scores is consistent with the results of many published studies 
(Beevers & Meyer, 2002; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Coplan et al., 2006; Hundt et 
al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2003; Jorm et al., 1999; Kimbrel, et al., 2007; Muriseta et 
al., 2005; Segarra et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2015). Critically, here we also show 
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that STAI-anxiety (controlling for STAI-depression) also correlated positively and 
robustly with BIS-anxiety (r = 0.26). It is also noteworthy here that STAI-anxiety 
(controlling for STAI-depression) was not correlated with BIS-fear (r = 0.09). These 
analyses with the BIS-anxiety and BIS-fear scales (as proposed by Heym et al., 
2008) suggest that it is specifically the anxiety component of the original BIS 
measure that relates to anxiety, not the fear component.  
Participants self-reported trait anger scores were positively related to their STAI-
anxiety scores (controlling for STAI-depression). This shows that the more trait 
anxious a person was, the greater amounts of trait anger they experienced. The 
finding that trait anxiety relates to increases in trait anger resonates with published 
studies that measured trait anxiety using the total scores of the STAI (e.g., Carre et 
al., 2012; van Honk et al., 2001). Moreover, (in contrast to the BIS-fear scale 
analysis) participants self-reported interpersonal fear scores were positively related 
to their STAI-anxiety scores (controlling for STAI-depression). This shows that the 
more anxious a person was, the greater amounts of interpersonal fear they 
experienced. 
STAI-depression (controlling for STAI-anxiety) was not correlated with either self-
reported interpersonal fear scores, or self-reported trait anger scores. However, in the 
present study STAI-depression (controlling for STAI-anxiety) was negatively 
correlated with BAS, but this would be considered a trend after controlling for 
multiple correlations.  This finding resonates with several published studies 
suggesting that high depression relates to low BAS activity (Beevers & Meyer, 2002; 
Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Hundt et al., 2007; Kasch et al., 2002; Kimbrel et al., 
2007; Segarra et al., 2007), but is inconsistent with others (Johnson et al., 2003; Jorm 
et al., 1999; Muris et al., 2005). In the present study BAS was not significantly 
related to anxiety which is also consistent with several published studies (Beevers & 
Meyer, 2002; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Hundt et al., 2007; Kimbrel et al., 2007; 
Segarra et al., 2007). In the present study STAI-depression (controlling for STAI-
anxiety) was positively correlated with total BIS scale scores. Although this 
correlation just missed the strict significance adjustment required after using multiple 
correlations, high depression did seem to relate to higher total BIS scale scores. This 
finding thus resonates with the results of many published studies (Beevers & Meyer, 
2002; Campbell-Sills et al., 2004; Coplan et al., 2006; Hundt et al., 2007; Kasch et 
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al., 2002; Kimbrel et al., 2007; Mellick et al., 2014; Segarra et al., 2007; Takahashi 
et al., 2015).  
The results of the present study therefore do tentatively support the notion that BAS 
specifically relates to depression. However, the findings obtained with the total BIS 
scale scores are less likely to be meaningful. Although the correlation between 
STAI-depression (controlling for STAI-anxiety) and BIS-anxiety was positive (r = 
0.17), it was not anywhere near as robust as the correlation between STAI-anxiety 
(controlling for STAI depression) and BIS-anxiety (r = 0.26). It is also noteworthy 
here STAI-depression (controlling for STAI-anxiety) was positively correlated with 
BIS-fear, although the relationship was not significant (r = 0.19). These analyses 
with the BIS-anxiety and BIS-fear scales proposed by Heym et al. (2008) suggest 
that it is both the anxiety and fear components of the original BIS measure that relate 
to depression. Thus, the overall BIS scale scores are not likely to represent the 
underlying factor that relates to the comorbidity of anxiety and depression, as both of 
the BIS-anxiety and BIS-fear scales relate to depression, but only the BIS-anxiety 
scale relates to anxiety. 
When controlling for STAI-anxiety, STAI-depression was also negatively correlated 
with total attentional control, attentional shifting, and unreliably with attentional 
focusing scores. Therefore, those with greater levels of depression reported less BAS 
activity and reduced attentional control. In contrast, when controlling for STAI-
depression, STAI-anxiety was not correlated with any of the three attentional control 
scores. This finding suggests that studies which report high trait anxiety is related to 
lower self-reported attentional control scores, and also report theoretical viewpoints 
that interpret this as meaning that anxiety relates to poor attentional control abilities, 
may be interpreting the data incorrectly (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). In short, these theories may be relying upon 
reported attentional control relationships with trait anxiety that are in fact dependent 
on the depression components present in the total STAI trait anxiety scores. 
Moreover, from this analysis we can suggest that the two STAI subscales might well 
have a reasonable level of discriminant validity.  
The partial correlations discussed thus far illustrated the relationship between the 
self-report affective trait and attentional trait measures, and each of the STAI 
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subscales, whist controlling for the other STAI subscale. Thus, the analyses 
discussed thus far were limited as they did not allow for any comparison with the 
two attentional control subscales whilst controlling for the other attentional control 
subscale. Therefore, we used regression models to determine whether STAI-anxiety 
and STAI-depression shared any unique relationships with attentional focusing 
(when controlling for attentional shifting) and attentional shifting (when controlling 
for attentional focusing). These regression models showed that attentional shifting 
independently predicted STAI-depression but it did not predict STAI-anxiety. In 
contrast, attentional focusing did not independently predict STAI-depression, nor did 
it significantly predict STAI-anxiety. However, it is noteworthy here that the 
direction of this relationship between attentional focusing and STAI-anxiety was 
negative.  In summary, the only reliable effect we found here was that increases in 
depression relate to a poorer ability to intentionally shift one’s attentional focus 
towards desired stimuli, whilst avoiding any unintentional focussing on any other 
stimuli. Thus, the two STAI subscales did seem to offer some discriminant validity. 
These findings also confirm what we originally reported in experiment 3 (chapter 4) 
where we used the same analysis on that specific experimental sample (which was a 
subset of the sample analysed in this chapter).  
The results of the present study are somewhat in alignment with those reported by 
Olafsson et al. (2011), who showed that attentional shifting significantly predicted 
depression (after controlling for anxiety). However, in contrast to the present study, 
Olafsson et al. also reported that attentional focusing significantly predicted anxiety 
(after controlling for depression). However, as stated earlier, Olafsson et al. did not 
use the actual STAI subscales. Two studies that actually used the STAI subscales 
also reported that attentional focusing relates to anxiety in addition to attentional 
shifting relating to depression (Judah, Grant, Mills & lechner, 2013; Reinholdt-
Dunne, Mogg & Bradley, 2013). However, it is noteworthy that Judah et al. also 
reported that depression measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; 
Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) correlated negatively with focusing but not shifting. 
This finding was inconsistent with their analysis using the STAI subscales.  
Moreover, the BDI-II correlated positively and at identical magnitudes with both the 
STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression scales, which adds some controversy to either 
the discriminant validity of the STAI-anxiety subscale and/or the discriminant 
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validity of the BDI-11. Across these studies and the present study it does seem that 
STAI-depression negatively relates to attentional shifting, but that STAI-anxiety may 
relate unreliably and negatively to attentional focusing.  
The total scores of the STAI were proposed to measure an umbrella construct of 
negative affect by Bieling et al. (1998). Owing to the theoretical importance we also 
carried out bivariate correlations between the total STAI scores and BIS-anxiety, 
BIS-fear, BAS, interpersonal fear, trait anger and attentional shifting and attentional 
focusing scores. Higher STAI-trait scores (i.e., general negative affect) were 
unsurprisingly related to higher BIS-anxiety, BIS-fear, interpersonal fear, and trait 
anger scores, but lower attentional shifting and attentional focusing scores. Higher 
BIS-anxiety scores were related to higher BIS-fear scores and interpersonal fear 
scores, but lower total attentional focusing and attentional shifting scores. However, 
BIS-anxiety was not significantly related to BAS or trait anger. The only measure 
that was significantly related to BAS was trait anger. Higher BAS was related to 
increased trait anger. This finding is consistent with the notion that trait anger is 
mediated by the BAS (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), and that trait anger is a 
behaviour closely related to approach motivation (Harmon-Jones, 2003). Higher 
interpersonal fear scores were related to lower attentional focusing scores and higher 
trait anger scores. It is noteworthy here that higher interpersonal fear score were not 
related to lower attentional shifting scores. As one would expect, higher BIS-fear 
scores were related to higher interpersonal fear scores. This finding appears to 
provide some support to the validity of the BIS-fear scale proposed by Heym et al. 
(2008). However, this finding needs treating with caution as BIS-anxiety shared a 
larger correlation with interpersonal fear than BIS-fear did. It is also noteworthy that 
although the BIS-fear and interpersonal fear scales were positively correlated in the 
present study, they differentially predicted STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression. BIS-
fear weakly predicted depression but not anxiety. In contrast, interpersonal fear 
robustly predicted anxiety but not depression.  
The findings of the present study do not lend much support to the theory that the 
total scores on the BIS scale represent a factor for the comorbidity of anxiety and 
depression. However, BAS was uniquely related to depression (albeit non-
significantly due to controlling for the amount of correlations we carried out). The 
BAS scale might still prove to be a useful measure to delineate the internalising 
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disorders of anxiety and depression. RST (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) suggests that 
the BAS is a reward based motivational system that is associated with the 
neurotransmitter dopamine. Impoverished BAS activity may thus relate to reduced 
reward seeking and/or reward processing, which may lead to depression. Indeed, 
research suggests that the pathophysiology of depression is related to a dysfunctional 
mesocorticolimbic dopamine system, which is involved in reward processing. 
However, it is currently unclear what the precise nature of the dysfunction is 
(Martin-Soelch, 2009). Moreover, depressed patients show abnormal behaviour in 
response to punishment and reward. These tendencies relate to aberrant frontostriatal 
brain function that is subserved by the monoamine systems (Eshel & Roiser, 2010). 
However, it is noteworthy that, from an RST perspective, punishment responses are 
controlled by the BIS, which are argued to be based upon cholinergic 
neurotransmission (Gray, 1989). From this perspective it is the BIS that inhibits the 
dopamine based BAS. Thus, one can see how neural activity in the BIS might still 
indirectly contribute to depression, even if this relationship is not evident 
psychometrically, when using the so called BIS/BAS scales. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we administered BIS, BAS, trait anger, interpersonal fear, attentional 
shifting, and attentional focusing measures to investigate the discriminant validity of 
the proposed STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression measures. Overall we found some 
evidence of discriminant validity between the scales, as they differentially predicted 
several other measures. This is generally in contrast to our findings with behavioural 
measures of emotion and cognitive control. We suggest that these behavioural 
measures may have actually measured the reactivity of specific cognitive emotional 
systems that relate to both anxiety and depression, or some shared components of 
anxiety and depression. These shared components of anxiety and depression may 
represent the umbrella factor of negative affect that is suggested to be measured by 
the total scores of the STAI.  
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Chapter 7 
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7. General discussion 
 
7.1 Discussion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether trait anxiety relates to any 
variability in the activity of three interrelated cognitive processes. We wished to 
determine whether trait anxiety relates to enhanced conflict resolution, enhanced 
cognitive interference as experienced as distraction, and the enhanced processing of 
threat-relevant visual stimuli. We also wished to determine whether the threat-related 
attentional bias interacts with the conflict resolution and/or distraction processes. A 
further rationale for this work was based upon the idea that, if trait anxiety relates to 
a threat-related modification to any stimuli processing functions, it may reflect an 
anxiety-related increase in the reactivity of the survival circuits proposed by LeDoux 
(2012). We also wished to determine how trait anxiety relates to individual 
differences in trait anger, interpersonal fear, and attentional control abilities. 
Moreover, we wished to conduct some exploratory analyses to determine whether 
the other three personality variants are also related to the aforementioned conflict 
resolution, cognitive interference/distraction and threat processing functions.  
We designed a series of RT experiments in order to answer several specific 
questions. Firstly, we wished to ascertain how anxiety is related to the recognition of 
happy, fearful, and angry faces. Secondly, we wished to ascertain how anxiety 
relates to distraction by the other emotional faces when identifying these emotions. 
Thirdly, we wished to ascertain whether anxiety relates to differences in how conflict 
resolution is achieved in situations of goal conflict when identifying the emotional 
faces. Fourthly, we wished to determine how anxiety relates to trait anger, 
interpersonal fear, and attentional control. And fifthly, we wanted to develop and test 
a novel emotional conflict resolution paradigm that is practical for other researchers 
to use in future research.  
In experiment 1 we designed a novel emotional face flanker paradigm that assessed 
the three processes discussed above (i.e., emotional face recognition, emotional 
distraction, and emotional conflict resolution). This task included predominantly 
congruent trials, thus the conflict caused by incongruent trials was infrequent. This 
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task also included single face trials as a simple test of emotion recognition. Two 
emotional conflict conditions were included: a between-valence condition (happy 
faces versus fearful faces), and a within-valence condition (angry faces versus fearful 
faces). Experiment 1 showed that trait anxiety was selectively related to a RT bias 
for fearful faces, but it was dependent upon the context provided by the other task 
relevant faces. The bias was only present when happy faces were the alternative face, 
not when angry faces were the alternative face. Trait anxiety was not related to 
distraction caused by the flankers, even though the predicted effects were detected in 
the whole sample. However, trait anxiety was related to the sequential effects of 
emotional conflict processing. This was evidenced by an enhanced congruency 
sequence effect (CSE), but only in the between-valence condition. Based upon these 
initial findings we devised three more experiments.  
Experiment 2 differed considerably from experiment 1 as we used an emotional 
word-face Stroop task. The proportions of congruent and incongruent trials were 
kept the same as in experiment 1. The only other differences in design were that the 
single face trials were replaced with neutral word trials, and there was only a 
between-valence condition (not a within-valence condition). Thus, experiment 2 also 
assessed emotional face recognition, emotional distraction, and emotional conflict 
resolution. In experiment 2 the emotional word-face Stroop task resulted in an 
anxiety-related speed-accuracy trade-off. This resulted in an anxiety-related 
reduction in accuracy for incongruent trials. However, anxiety seemed to be mainly 
related to increased interference by positive emotional words as opposed to increased 
interference by threat-related words. Anxiety was unrelated to the CSE in this 
experiment. Thus, anxiety did not appear to relate to conflict resolution in this 
experiment (taking the CSE as an index of conflict resolution).  
Experiment 3 used an emotional expression recognition task, and therefore assessed 
only emotion recognition, but not distraction or conflict resolution. This task was 
inspired by the emotional face recognition effects found in experiment 1. However, 
this task allowed a more detailed analysis of between-valence emotional expression 
recognition, as we varied the salience of the mouth region on the expressions. 
Moreover, in this task two between-valence conditions were included: happy versus 
fear and happy versus anger. Social anxiety was robustly related to faster responses 
to threat-related faces, and slower responses to happy faces. However, further 
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planned comparisons showed that this effect was only detectable when the facial 
expressions display less salient mouth regions. Trait anxiety measured by the total 
scores of the STAI was not related to these effects. However, further analyses 
showed that trait anxiety as measured by the proposed anxiety subscale (Bieling, 
Antony, & Swinson, 1998) of the STAI was related specifically to the discrimination 
of fearful faces from happy faces. In contrast, social anxiety was related to the 
discrimination of both fearful and angry faces from happy faces.  
Experiment 4 built upon the CSE component of experiment 1. However, whereas the 
flanker task used in experiment 1 adhered as closely as possible to traditional flanker 
tasks, the task in experiment 4 was quite different. In experiment 4 the person 
identities of the flanker faces were always different to the person identities of the 
target faces. Moreover, this task differed from experiment 1 as the proportions of 
congruent and incongruent trials were kept equal. Nevertheless, this task also 
assessed all three cognitive processes: emotion recognition, emotional distraction, 
and emotional conflict resolution. In experiment 4 the pattern of the CSEs found in 
the RTs was unexpected, as it was only present only in trials where fearful faces 
were the target face (not where happy faces were the target face). Moreover, this 
effect was only reliably present in the fearful face condition when target emotion and 
response did not repeat, and was also in reverse to what is usually found in 
conventional flanker tasks. This offered no support to any of the theoretical accounts 
of the CSE as none of the accounts predict the reversed CSE in RTs (after 
accounting for target and response repetition). However, we changed the design of 
the task considerably from experiment 1. Our analysis using the total STAI scores 
did not reveal that anxiety related to any CSE in RTs, although there was a weak 
effect of anxiety in the accuracy data. However, critically there was an effect of 
anxiety, measured by the STAI-anxiety subscale: increased anxiety seemed to be 
related to an increased RT difference between hFiI trials and hFcI trials (after 
controlling for general RT variance). This effect was driven by increased anxiety 
being related to slower RTs for hFiI trials (i.e., fearful target faces surrounded by 
happy distractor faces when they were preceded by a trial consisting of happy target 
faces surrounded by fearful distractor faces). Although this effect was marginal, it 
does suggest that trait anxiety might be related to a difference in how emotional 
conflict resolution is achieved.  
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Experiment 5 examined the discriminant validity of the STAI subscales proposed by 
Bieling, Antony and Swinson (1998). We administered BIS-anxiety, BIS-fear, BAS, 
trait anger, interpersonal fear, attentional shifting and attentional focusing measures 
to investigate the discriminant validity of the proposed STAI-anxiety and STAI-
depression measures. We found that these scales had a degree of discriminant 
validity. This was generally in contrast to our findings with the behavioural measures 
of emotion and cognitive control. We suggest that the behavioural measures may 
have actually measured the reactivity of specific cognitive emotional systems that 
relate to both anxiety and depression, or some shared cognitive and/or neural 
components of both anxiety and depression that might relate to the emotional 
survival circuits proposed by LeDoux (2012). These shared cognitive and/or neural 
components of anxiety and depression might also represent the umbrella factor of 
negative affect that was suggested to be measured by the total scores of the STAI by 
Bieling et al. (1998).  
We now turn to a more detailed summary of the key findings in this series of 
experiments, and to a summary of how trait anxiety relates to emotional conflict 
resolution, emotional cognitive interference/distraction, and the processing of 
emotional faces. To sum up the emotional face recognition effects, experiment 1, 3, 
and 4 showed that happy faces were responded to faster than negatively valenced 
faces. These results are consistent with the findings of several published emotional 
facial expression recognition studies (Silvia, Allan, Beauchamp, Maschauer, & 
Workman., 2006; Cooper, Rowe, & penton-Voak, 2008; Hietanen & Astikainen, 
2013; Leppanen & Hietanen, 2004; Leppanen, Tenhunen, & Hietanen, 2003; Kirita 
& Endo, 1995; Feyereisen, Malet, & Martin, 1996; Werheid, Alpay, Jentzsch, & 
Sommer; 2005).  
The key findings in experiment 1 and 3 showed that sub-clinical levels of anxiety 
robustly relate to a threat-related face recognition advantage. More specifically, in 
experiment 1 trait anxiety (as measured by the total scores of the STAI) related to a 
reduced happy face recognition advantage when discriminating happy faces from 
fearful faces. In experiment 3 increased trait anxiety (as measured by the scores of 
the STAI-anxiety subscale) related to a reduced happy face recognition advantage 
when discriminating happy faces from fearful faces. However, increased STAI-
anxiety scores did not relate to this effect when discriminating happy faces from 
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angry faces. In addition, these effects were not present for the total scores of the 
STAI. Moreover, in experiment 3 increased social anxiety related to a reduced happy 
face recognition advantage when discriminating the happy faces from both fearful 
faces and angry faces.  
The effect of trait anxiety (as measured by either the total scores of the STAI, or the 
STAI-anxiety subscale) upon the happy face recognition RT advantage was not 
present in experiment 4. However it is noteworthy that in experiment 4 (after 
controlling for general RT variance) those with higher total STAI scores responded 
to congruent fearful face trials faster than those with lower total STAI scores. Thus 
trait anxiety did seem to affect the speed of the detection of threat related stimuli 
when no emotional distractors were present, although the effect was marginal. 
Moreover, higher total STAI scores were marginally related to a reduced difference 
in response accuracy between happy and fearful faces. This was driven by a non-
significant anxiety related increase in accuracy for fear trials. Although social 
anxiety was not part of the main emotional goal conflict analysis in experiment 4 
(chapter 5), we wished to confirm whether social anxiety related to the main effect of 
emotional face recognition. Thus, we also carried out one more exploratory analysis. 
We confirmed that in spite of trait anxiety not affecting the happy face recognition 
RT advantage in experiment 4, social anxiety was still implicated. This analysis is 
contained in appendix C, and shows that increased social anxiety was related to a 
decreased happy face recognition RT advantage. However, the effect was marginal, 
and as such the effect in this flanker experiment was much weaker than in the single 
face recognition experiment (experiment 3).   
We can summarise the emotional distraction effects upon trait anxiety as being very 
specific. Experiments 1 and 4 suggest that trait anxiety is not related to distraction 
caused by peripheral emotional faces. However, experiment 2 showed that trait 
anxiety was related to distraction caused by positive emotional words. One could 
suggest that trait anxiety may be affected by verbal distraction more than visual face 
distraction, however the effects were only present for positive words. We offered a 
detailed if speculative explanation of this effect in experiment 2 (chapter 3) and will 
not repeat it here. Suffice to say that the effect was very specific and probably driven 
by subtle differences in how attention is affected by emotion. We do not consider 
this effect to result from a general distraction effect in high trait anxiety. We suggest 
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this as if it were a general anxious distraction effect, we would have expected the 
effect to be less specific (i.e., show up in some way in the flanker experiments).  
We can also summarise the emotional conflict resolution effects upon trait anxiety as 
being very specific. Experiment 1 showed that trait anxiety measured by the total 
scores of the STAI was related to the sequential effects of conflict resolution when 
fearful faces and happy faces were the stimuli. Experiment 4 showed that the STAI-
anxiety subscale (but not the total scores of the STAI) marginally predicted a very 
specific CSE concerning the hFiI trials.  Therefore, the effects of trait anxiety across 
the two flanker experiments were not very reliable. Moreover, experiment 2 
suggested that trait anxiety was not related to the sequential effects of conflict 
resolution, however the Stroop task was a very different paradigm than the flanker 
tasks used in experiments 1 and 4. It is also noteworthy that in experiment 1 it 
seemed to be the shared variance of trait anxiety and trait anger that accounted for 
the trait effects upon the CSE, and thus emotional conflict resolution.  
The effects of both trait anxiety and social anxiety upon emotional face recognition 
found in the series of studies presented in this thesis support the perspectives on 
anxiety offered by Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg and van 
Ijzendoorn (2007), Beck and Clark (1997), Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), Mogg 
and Bradley (1998), Ohman (1996), Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews 
(1988). These perspectives suggest that anxiety is related to a bias in attention for 
threat-related stimuli. We suggest the findings of this thesis and the above theories 
on anxiety and the threat-related attentional bias can be accommodated within the 
survival circuit theory of emotion and brain function proposed by LeDoux (2012). 
We can suggest that any survival circuit that pertains to threat-monitoring may be 
more reactive in high anxiety. However, this only seems to be the case when the 
threat-related faces are the target stimulus, not when they are the distracting 
stimulus. We say this as we did not find that performance in high anxiety individuals 
was specifically affected by any flanker faces.  
We can also suggest that the effects of anxiety upon emotional conflict resolution (as 
evidenced by anxiety effects upon the CSEs), might also have represented some 
increased reactivity of an emotional survival circuit in the brain. However, these 
effects appear to be more subtle, and harder to detect, than the emotional face 
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recognition effects. It is also noteworthy that the differential effects of anxiety upon 
conflict resolution are somewhat in alignment with the RST proposition that anxiety 
is sub-served by a defensive conflict resolution system (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). 
However, more work is needed before this relationship can be clearly understood. 
It is noteworthy here that there is some controversy concerning how to make 
hypotheses from the RST perspective of Gray and McNaughton (2000). Corr (2004) 
suggested that the ‘separable subsystems hypothesis’ in RST research proposes that 
those high in BAS activity should be more responsive to reward when compared to 
those low in BAS activity. This hypothesis also suggests that those high in BIS 
activity should be more responsive to punishment (or conflict) than those low in BIS 
activity. This perspective suggests that reactions to reward ought to be the same at all 
levels of BIS activity, whereas reactions to punishment (or conflict) ought to be the 
same at all levels of BAS activity. Reward is simply defined as stimuli that activate 
the BAS7. In this thesis it would be the happy faces. From the perspective of the 
‘separable subsystems hypothesis’ punishment is defined as stimuli that activate the 
FFFS (or BIS).  
Corr (2004) proposed that an alternative hypothesis referred to as the ‘joint 
subsystems hypothesis’ can offer better predictions, as the data found in RST 
research is not really accommodated by the ‘separable subsystems hypothesis.’ From 
this perspective there are two effects (antagonistic and facilitatory) elicited by each 
reinforcement sensitivity. BIS activity facilitates reactions to aversive stimuli but 
reduces reactions to appetitive stimuli. BAS activity facilitates reactions to appetitive 
stimuli, but reduces reactions to aversive stimuli. Thus the two reinforcement 
systems can be said to be interdependent. However, Corr suggested that this need not 
always be the case. In experimental settings where strong aversive and appetitive 
stimuli are present this interdependence may not occur. In addition, Corr suggested 
that if high BAS and BIS participants are tested, or if there are only aversive OR 
appetitive stimuli used, this interdependence may also not occur. Corr also suggested 
                                                          
7 NOTE: However, it is possible that non-reward stimuli such as the angry faces could have 
also activated the BAS as anger is an approach motivation, and might facilitate an approach 
response.  
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that the interdependence may not occur if there is no requirement for quick 
behavioural or attentional shifting between stimuli that are aversive and appetitive. 
In experiment 1 of this thesis (after controlling for general RT effects) trait anxiety 
(as measured by the total STAI scores) was related to faster RTs for fearful faces, but 
was unrelated to RTs for happy faces. In addition, in experiment 3 (after controlling 
for general RT effects) trait anxiety (as measured by the STAI-anxiety subscale 
scores) was also related to faster RTs for fearful faces, but was unrelated to RTs for 
happy faces. Thus, if the BIS sub-serves trait anxiety then this supports the notion 
that those high in BIS activity (high trait anxious individuals) were more reactive to 
threat/punishment than those low in BIS activity. Moreover, these data also suggest 
that reactions to reward (i.e., the happy faces) were the same at all levels of BIS 
activity. Thus, these findings actually support the separable subsystems hypothesis. 
In contrast, in experiment 3, social anxiety was related to faster RTs to threat-related 
faces, but slower RTs for happy faces. Thus, if social anxiety is sub-served by BIS 
activity, then the BIS facilitated socially anxious participants’ reactions to aversive 
stimuli but reduced socially anxious participants’ reactions to appetitive stimuli. 
Thus, these findings actually support the joint subsystems hypothesis. This 
inconsistency is intriguing, as it tentatively suggests that the BIS may react in a 
slightly different way in high trait anxiety than it does in high social anxiety 
(assuming that the BIS subserves both trait anxiety and social anxiety).  
A different theoretical perspective on anxiety offers an explanation of the lack of a 
general anxiety related effect of cognitive interference / distraction (particularly in 
our flanker tasks). ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) suggests that anxiety relates to an 
increased influence of a stimulus driven attentional system, coupled with a decrease 
in the influence of a goal directed attentional system. However, this perspective also 
suggests that the negative effect of the stimulus driven systems dominance can be 
overcome with the use of compensatory strategies (i.e., enhanced effort or the 
increased use of processing resources). Eysenck and Derakshan (2011) clarified this 
issue. They suggested that if a task is not very demanding (or there is not a clear goal 
to the task) those high in anxiety have a low level of motivation, and thus recruit the 
minimal amount of attentional control resources. In contrast, Eysenck and Derakshan 
suggested that if a task is demanding (and there is a clear goal to the task) those high 
in anxiety have a high level of motivation. In this situation they thus recruit 
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extensive attentional control resources, in order to reduce the dominance of the 
stimulus driven attentional system. This would thus result in the use of compensatory 
strategies such as effortful processing in order to achieve the goals of the task in 
hand. In our flanker experiments the goal of the task was very clear. The perspective 
of Eysenck and Derakshan suggests that if our high anxious participants’ motivation 
was high, then they may have adopted a processing strategy that enabled them to 
override the effects of the flankers during the incongruent trials. From the 
perspective of Eysenck and Derakshan this would explain why in our flanker studies 
trait anxiety was not related to any cognitive interference / distraction effects.  
This ACT based explanation of our results that show that anxiety is unaffected by 
incongruent flankers is flawed. In important real life situations, where trait anxiety 
and/or clinical anxiety causes problems, the situations would be demanding and 
would also have a clear goal. ACT does not explain why high anxious patients 
cannot engage their compensatory tactics in everyday life. We suggest that the ACT 
notion that anxious patients have this processing bias which makes them do worse 
cognitively under certain conditions is a weak theory. We suggest this as we find that 
there is no effect of anxiety in the high distraction conditions in our flanker 
experiments where the anxiety effect would be expected. The ACT suggestion that 
compensatory mechanisms can prevent the occurrence of this expected anxiety effect 
makes their theory almost unfalsifiable.  
Experimental neurocognitive research has shown that trait anxiety is related to the 
impaired reactivity of cognitive mechanisms that are mediated by the prefrontal 
cortex, when goal conflict resolution and the inhibition of distractor processing is 
required. These effects have been found when neutral distractors are used (Bishop, 
2009), and when threat-related distractors are used (Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 
2007). Bishop (2009) proposed that these findings may explain why clinical anxiety 
patients suffer daily problems with concentration. More specifically, Bishop (2009) 
used a response conflict task (with neutral digit stimuli) that manipulated conditions 
of high demand upon attention and low demand upon attention (high vs. low 
perceptual load). Relative to those with low trait anxiety, those high in trait anxiety 
showed a reduced difference (incongruent – congruent) in neural activity in the left 
DLPFC, under low perceptual load, and an increased difference (incongruent – 
congruent) in neural activity in the left DLPFC under high perceptual load. Relative 
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to those with low trait anxiety, those high in trait anxiety also showed slower RTs to 
target stimuli under conditions of both high and low perceptual load. Moreover, in a 
median split analysis, those high in anxiety were slower to respond to incongruent 
trials than congruent trials (under low perceptual load), whereas those low in anxiety 
were not. Neither group showed this effect under high perceptual load.  
Bishop (2007) used a letter search paradigm with conditions of both high and low 
perceptual load. Stimuli were overlaid upon neutral or fearful distractor faces. High 
trait anxiety relative to low trait anxiety was related to reduced lateral PFC, dorsal 
ACC, and rostral ACC activity to fearful face distractors under low but not high 
perceptual load. High trait anxiety was related to reduced accuracy in the high 
perceptual load condition relative to low trait anxiety. The design of these two 
studies differed from the designs used in our studies.  It is noteworthy that in 
addition to the anxiety related differences in brain activity, these studies revealed 
some behavioural effects that may relate to a general anxiety related increase in 
distraction. However, it is also noteworthy here that both of these studies used 17-18 
participants in each and as such the behavioural data should be interpreted with 
caution. 
Theoretical accounts of how perceptual load modulates distractor processing suggest 
that perception of distractors can be inhibited when perceptual load is high (i.e., if 
many task relevant distractors are present), but not when perceptual load is low (i.e., 
just one task relevant distractor is present). From this perspective, when perceptual 
load is low, spare processing resources attend to the distractor (Lavie, 1995). It is not 
easy to quantify the exact level of perceptual load in our flanker experiments as 
although there were eight flanker faces present, there were always only two emotions 
present in incongruent trials. However, it is interesting to note that Lavie, Ro and 
Russell (2003) showed that interference from emotionally neutral distractor faces 
was unaffected by perceptual load in an emotionally neutral name search task. Lavie 
et al. suggest that in contrast to other irrelevant stimuli, it might be adaptive to 
process irrelevant faces as they may still convey important social cues. Thus, we 
suggest that in our flanker studies the level of perceptual load would not have 
affected the magnitude of distractor interference. However, it is also worth briefly 
considering that in our emotional word-face Stroop task that trait anxiety was 
selectively affected by the happy word distractors during incongruent trials. In 
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contrast, in our emotional face flanker tasks trait anxiety was not affected by the 
happy face flankers during incongruent trials. It seems possible that perceptual load 
was lower in the Stroop task than in the flanker tasks, however we cannot be sure. It 
would be beneficial if future studies on trait anxiety, goal conflict resolution, and 
distractor processing use a design that manipulates different levels of perceptual 
load.  
 
7.2. Limitations 
 
7.2.1. Limitation 1 
 
There is a limitation to the research presented in this thesis as female participants 
outnumbered male participants. A lot of research with UK psychology student 
samples has this bias, as females outnumber males on UK psychology degrees by 
three or four to one. However, we are not overly concerned with this issue here for 
five reasons. Our first two reasons concern emotional face processing. Firstly, 
Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina and Traue (2010) have shown that there is no 
gender difference in recognition accuracy for full blown emotional expressions 
(although a female recognition advantage exists for subtle emotional expressions). 
Secondly, Wager, Phan, Liberzon and Taylor (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 65 
neuroimaging studies and reported that when averaging across the whole brain there 
was no significant gender difference in the likelihood of brain responses to emotion 
(although some regions were more reliably active in women, whereas others were 
more reliably active in men).  
Our third and fourth reasons concern distraction, goal conflict, and thus cognitive 
control. Our third reason for not being overly concerned with the gender imbalance 
in our samples is specific to Stroop tasks.  MacLeod (1991) reviewed Stroop studies 
spanning half a century and reported that research has not found any reliable gender 
difference in Stroop task performance. Our fourth reason is specific to flanker tasks. 
Clayson, Clawson and Larson (2011) used an emotionally neutral flanker task which 
showed that although females responded slower and were less accurate than males, 
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there were no gender differences present in the CSE data. In addition, Fischer, 
Danielmeier, Villringer, Klein and Ullsperger (2016) also used an emotionally 
neutral flanker task to examine gender effects. In this study gender did not affect 
accuracy which is in contrast to the study by Clayson et al. (2011). Fischer et al. 
reported that females only displayed a very small increase in the RT congruency 
effect compared to males (mean = 5 msecs). However, males responded faster than 
females did, which is consistent with the study by Clayson et al. (2011). Schulte 
Holthausen, Regenbogen, Turetsky, Schneider and Habel (2016) used an emotional 
face flanker type task which showed that females responded faster than males. This 
is inconsistent with the studies by Clayson et al. (2011) and Fischer et al. (2016). 
There was no effect of gender upon emotion recognition accuracy. They do not 
report an analysis of gender upon their non-significant congruency effect, thus one 
assumes there was no effect of gender present here. In summary, we can suggest that 
gender differences in flanker tasks are not very reliable, and as such we are not 
overly concerned with this issue here.  
Our fifth reason concerns gender differences in anxiety. We are aware that Feingold 
(1994) conducted a large meta-analytic study examining the literature on gender 
differences in personality. This study showed that females score higher than males 
on anxiety measures in general, but there were no gender differences reported 
specifically for social anxiety. However, here we are interested in the relationship 
between anxiety and behavioural measures (and other personality constructs) as 
opposed to how our actual sample mean anxiety scores generalize to the population 
mean anxiety scores. Considering the inconsistent gender effects described above, 
we find it unlikely that there would be any robust gender differences in how anxiety 
interacts with the behavioural effects (or other personality constructs) we are 
interested in. Thus, we suggest that the gender imbalance in our sample is probably 
of minimal consequence here.  
 
7.2.2. Limitation 2 
 
Another limitation is the fact that the personality trait measures we used are labelled 
a measure of one specific construct, and yet they are factorially complex. For 
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example, the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983). the BIS scale (Carver & White, 1994), 
and the attentional control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001, 2002) have this 
limitation as they both claim to measure unitary constructs, but may actually consist 
of constituent constructs (i.e., anxiety and depression in the STAI, anxiety and fear 
in the BIS scale, and attentional focusing and attentional shifting in the attentional 
control scale). This thesis has gradually addressed this issue throughout the 
behavioural chapters, and chapter 6 addresses this issue psychometrically and 
discusses it in more detail.  
Bieling, Antony and Swinson (1998) suggested that the STAI (Spielberger et al., 
1983) may measure an umbrella factor of negative affect. Thus, it is hard to 
psychometrically distinguish between anxiety and depression, and in our series of 
experiments it is possible that the behavioural effects that related to anxiety were 
mediated by a general negative affect system. Nettle (2004) suggests that a 
moderately reactive negative affect system would facilitate a person to work hard for 
desirable outcomes whilst avoiding negative outcomes. Nettle suggests that this 
could increase fitness. As discussed above, both anxiety and depression fall under 
this umbrella term. From an evolutionary perspective anxiety is considered a 
specialised state that has been designed by natural selection and has evolved to help 
an individual cope with threat and/or aid escape from threat. (Marks & Nesse, 1994).  
Thus, anxiety can increase inclusive reproductive success (i.e., Darwinian fitness). 
Depression may also increase fitness in two ways. Firstly it may increase a person’s 
focus upon difficult life problems, by avoiding them using energy on everyday social 
activity. Moreover, depression may also signal to others that help is required (Nettle, 
2004). Another evolutionary perspective on depression suggests that depressed states 
evolved to reduce risk in social situations where a person perceives their social value 
to be low or where they may become a burden. From this perspective low social 
value and social burden could lead to a person being excluded from future social 
contexts that are critical to fitness. Thus avoiding being in any situation where future 
exclusion might arise, could well be adaptive (Allen & Badcock, 2003). Thus, it is 
easy to see how and why both anxiety and depression related to some of our 
behavioural measures of emotional face processing, and emotional conflict 
resolution. It is also easy to see why higher depression was related to lower BAS 
scores, and thus reduced reward seeking. In short, we suggest that our experiments 
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might have tapped into the activity of emotional survival circuits in the brain that 
sub-serve both anxiety and depression.  
Considering that the STAI might measure general negative affect we reanalysed the 
key social anxiety and RT correlation from experiment 3 (chapter 4), with a view to 
determining if this correlation remained stable after controlling for the total STAI 
scores. When controlling for the total STAI scores the correlation between social 
anxiety and the RT difference for threat-related and happy faces remained negative. 
The correlation value was r = -0.26, and the correlation was still significant 
(p=0.018). Thus, if the STAI was ever proven to measure general negative affect, 
one could interpret these results as meaning that social anxiety relates to emotional 
face processing independently to the effects of general negative affect.  
 
7.2.3. Limitation 3  
 
A further limitation concerns the behavioural tasks we used. We designed RT 
paradigms that are more ecologically valid than most we observed in the literature. 
However, the tasks are still likely not to be capturing large emotional effects as they 
are still quite artificial. Thus, the threat-related stimuli used in our tasks may actually 
elicit slightly different responses compared to environmental and/or social threats 
that occur in the real world. It is entirely possible that strong trait anxiety effects 
can’t be observed very easily when using the artificial type of threat stimulation that 
we used in our experiments.  
 
7.2.4. Limitation 4 
 
The fourth limitation that requires mentioning relates to cognitive task design and 
interpretation in general. Cognitive tasks are designed to measure one process but 
can easily be argued to be addressing other processes instead (or as well). The long 
debate about the mechanisms in implicated in Stroop tasks or in the CSE are cases 
that we have reviewed and discussed earlier. The CSE might not reflect conflict 
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resolution processes (as discussed in detail in chapter 5). If it does then the 
relationship between trait anxiety and the CSE, which was inconsistent across the 
experiments in this thesis, might be evidence of the link between conflict resolution 
and anxiety. However, it is important resist the temptation to argue that the CSE 
measures conflict resolution in the task that shows a link to anxiety (i.e., experiment 
1) and doesn’t measure conflict resolution when the relationship with trait anxiety is 
missing (i.e., experiment 2; and somewhat in experiment 4). This argument would be 
circular as it lacks any independent evidence for the dependence of the CSE on 
conflict resolution. Moreover, we cannot be sure that the CSE task used in 
experiment 4 would have activated the same cognitive control mechanisms as in 
experiment 1, or in conventional flanker tasks. We say this as the trial type 
congruency effect present in the RTs was unexpectedly very weak, and not 
statistically significant. It is entirely possible that experiment 4 activated a different 
cognitive control mechanism than that which was active in experiment 1. In short, it 
is possible that if a conflict monitoring / conflict adaptation system in the brain was 
responsible for producing the CSE in experiment 1, that this neural system did not 
receive enough conflict to be activated in experiment 4.  
 
7.2.5. Limitation 5 
 
This series of experiments were based upon both cognitive and biological theories of 
anxiety. However, these experiments were all behavioural and/or psychometric, thus 
here we cannot determine how other factors that influence human behaviour may 
have affected our results. In short, this series of experiments did not take into 
account how genes, biological structures, chemical imbalances, and/or individual 
participants’ life experiences may have affected task performance, or the relationship 
between anxiety and task performance.  However, in this thesis we have suggested 
conducting some further studies using electrophysiological methods such as EEG. 
Further studies concerning anxiety, emotion and cognition should also consider 
using a range of biological methods, along with a means of assessing participants’ 
individual life experiences (e.g., stressful life events).  
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7.2.6. Limitation 6 
The studies in this thesis examined the effects of emotional valence upon face 
processing. However, there is another emotional dimension referred to as emotional 
arousal. Emotional arousal can also affect the processing of stimuli, as arousal levels 
can affect how the amygdala modulates the cortical representation of stimuli (e.g., 
Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). The studies in this thesis were limited to interpreting the 
data from a valence-based perspective that was predicated upon theories of face 
perception and information processing. However, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that arousal levels of the different emotional expressions depicted in our stimuli also 
affected the results.  
We briefly touched on this issue in experiment 3, as we manipulated the salience of 
the mouth regions of the faces (and suggested that open mouthed expressions 
represent a more intense and therefore probably a more arousing version of an 
emotion relative to closed mouthed expressions). However, future studies should 
obtain arousal ratings for the emotional faces used as stimuli, and determine if/how 
arousal levels of the stimuli used affect emotional face processing and cognitive 
control.  
Lundqvist, Juth and Ohman (2014) showed that higher emotional arousal ratings for 
emotional facial stimuli related to higher emotional intensity ratings. However, 
emotional intensity ratings predicted emotional face recognition scores (as indexed 
by RTs) better than emotional arousal ratings did. Lundqvist et al. suggest that both 
emotional arousal and emotional intensity ratings are both a type of intensity 
measure. They further suggest that the two types of ratings just differ in terms of the 
perspective taken when providing the ratings. They propose that when providing 
emotional intensity ratings participants adopt an objective perspective and rate the 
intensity of the stimulus. In contrast, they propose that when providing emotional 
arousal ratings participants adopt a subjective perspective and rate the intensity of 
their own reaction to the stimulus. Accordingly, future studies using emotional faces 
should obtain both emotional arousal and emotional intensity ratings for each of the 
faces used, with a view to determining if arousal and intensity differentially affect 
emotional face recognition.  
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7.3. Conclusion 
 
We wished to determine whether anxiety relates to enhanced conflict resolution, 
enhanced cognitive interference which is experienced as distraction, and the 
enhanced processing of threat-relevant visual stimuli (in this case emotional faces). 
We found good evidence that anxiety relates to the enhanced processing of threat-
related faces. Trait anxiety was related to the more rapid processing of specifically 
fearful faces, whereas social anxiety was related to the more rapid processing of both 
fearful and angry faces. We found no evidence that anxiety was related to cognitive 
interference/distraction caused by peripheral emotional faces (threat-related or 
otherwise). However, we found a very specific distracting effect of happy words that 
was related to anxiety. However, we suggest that this was not due to a general 
distraction effect, but was due to an interaction between an anxiety-related speed 
accuracy trade-off, and micro differences in how emotional stimuli are processed. 
We found that anxiety was related to conflict resolution as evidenced by the CSEs. 
However, we suggest that this area needs further work before the relationship can be 
properly understood. We also found some evidence supporting the idea that a widely 
used measure of trait anxiety (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) may measure an 
umbrella construct of negative affect, and that the scale has two sub-factors of 
anxiety and depression. From this perspective it seems that some (if not most) of the 
behavioural effects present in our experiments may relate to the umbrella construct 
of general negative affect, or to both anxiety and depression. We have suggested 
throughout this thesis that the anxiety related behavioural effects may represent the 
activity of the emotional survival circuits in the brain theorised by LeDoux (2012). 
We cannot rule out the possibility that an umbrella factor of general negative affect 
also reflects the activity of these survival circuits. Further work is required to 
determine if, how, and why both anxiety and depression relate to the altered 
functioning of these survival circuits.  
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Appendix A 
 
Reanalysing experiment 1 using the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression scales.  
 
 
Here we investigated the relationship between the two STAI subscales and the key 
RT effects reported in experiment 1. The analyses are exploratory, but to aid 
interpretation of the data we adopt a significance level of 0.05/2. STAI-anxiety (N = 
80) significantly correlated with the happy face recognition advantage (r= -0.29, p= 
0.008), as did STAI-depression (N = 78; r= -0.28, p= 0.014).  However, the 
depression correlation was noticeably less robust. The sign of the correlations shows 
that as STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression increased, the happy face recognition 
advantage decreased.  
We then repeated the analyses using partial correlations to ascertain whether these 
effects related to the umbrella factor of negative effect that is measured by the total 
STAI scores, or just one of the subscales. When controlling for STAI-depression, 
STAI-anxiety was no longer significantly related to the happy face recognition 
advantage (r= -0.19, p= 0.106). Similarly, When controlling for STAI-anxiety, 
STAI-depression was no longer significantly related to the happy face recognition 
advantage (r= -0.07, p= 0.552).  
We also reanalysed the sequential effects in the RTs, whist adopting an adjusted 
significance level of 0.05/2. STAI-anxiety (N = 80) significantly correlated with the 
CSE (i.e., the (in)congruency repetition advantage) in RTs during the between-
valence condition (r= 0.26, p= 0.020), but STAI-depression (N = 78) only showed a 
trend towards this correlation (r= 0.20, p= 0.086). The sign of the correlations shows 
that as STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression increased, the (in)congruency repetition 
advantage increased.  
We then conducted partial correlations to ascertain whether these effects related to 
the umbrella factor of negative effect that is measured by the total STAI scores, or 
just one of the subscales. When controlling for STAI-depression, STAI-anxiety was 
no longer significantly related to the (in)congruency repetition advantage (r= 0.18, 
334 
 
p= 0.109). Similarly, when controlling for STAI-anxiety, STAI-depression was not 
related to the (in)congruency repetition advantage at all (r= 0.01, p= 0.946). 
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Appendix B 
 
Reanalysing experiment 2 using the STAI-anxiety and STAI-depression scales.  
 
 
Here we investigated the relationship between the two STAI subscales and the key 
RT and accuracy effects reported in experiment 2. These analyses are exploratory, 
but to aid interpretation of the data we adopt a significance level of 0.05/2. STAI-
anxiety did not significantly correlate with overall RTs when judged against this 
adjusted p-value, but was a trend (r= -0.24, p= 0.041), but STAI-depression did (r= -
0.30, p= 0.011). The sign of the correlations shows that as STAI-anxiety and STAI-
depression increased, mean RTs decreased. STAI-anxiety did not significantly 
correlate with overall proportion correct (r= -0.19, p= 0.113), and nor did STAI-
depression, although this was a borderline trend (r= -0.26, p= 0.027). STAI-anxiety 
did not significantly correlate with the proportion correct for incongruent fear trials 
(r= -0.19, p= 0.098), but STAI-depression did (r= -0.29, p= 0.011).  
We then repeated the analyses using partial correlations to ascertain whether these 
effects related to the umbrella factor of negative effect that is measured by the total 
STAI scores, or just one of the subscales. When controlling for STAI-depression, 
STAI-anxiety did not correlate with overall RTs (r= -0.04, p= 0.713), overall 
accuracy (r= -0.01, p= 0.946), or accuracy for incongruent fearful trials (r= -0.02, p= 
0.873). Similarly, when controlling for STAI-anxiety, STAI-depression did not 
correlate with overall RTs (r= -0.19, p= 0.113), overall accuracy (r= -0.18, p= 
0.125), or accuracy for incongruent fearful trials, although this was a trend (r= -0.23, 
p= 0.054). Clearly, the specific relationship with STAI-depression is numerically 
quite a lot larger than the near-zero specific relationship with STAI-anxiety. 
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Appendix C 
 
Reanalysing the basic emotional face recognition RT effect in experiment 4 
using the social anxiety scale.  
 
We wished to confirm whether social anxiety related to the main effect of emotion 
found in experiment 4. Social anxiety was negatively correlated with the happy face 
RT advantage at a trend level (r= -0.19, p=0.088). Thus, as social anxiety increased, 
the RT advantage for happy faces relative to fearful faces decreased. However, it is 
noteworthy that when controlling for the general RT factor this correlation was 
strengthened slightly (r= -0.21, p=0.056).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
